



*Side groups from the Lateran Mosaic,
showing on one side Peter & Constantine deriving their authority direct from Christ
& on the other side Leo & Charlemagne deriving theirs from Peter.*

A
TRANSLATION
OF THE
LATIN
WORKS
of DANTE
ALIGHIERI

MCMXXXIV • PUBLISHED BY • J. M. DENT
& SONS • LD. ALDINE HOUSE • LONDON • W.C.



LATIN
WORKS
OF
DANTE
ALIGHIERI






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THE
LATIN WORKS
OF
DANTE

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
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*Side groups from the Lateran Mosaic.
 The figures on the left, Christ & St. Peter, claiming their authority direct from Christ.
 On the other side, St. Peter & St. Paul, claiming theirs from Peter.*

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 OF THE
 LATIN
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ALIGHIERI OF DANTE WORKS OF THE TRANSLATION A B B

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The subject defined

But because the business of every science is not to prove but to explain its subject, in order that men may know what that is [20] with which the science is concerned, we say (to come quickly to the point) that what we call the vernacular speech is that to which children are accustomed by those who are about them when they first begin to distinguish words; or to put it more shortly, we say that the vernacular speech is that which we acquire without any rule, by imitating our nurses. There further springs from this another secondary speech, which the Romans called grammar. And this [30] secondary speech the Greeks also have, as well as others, but not all. Few, however, acquire the use of this speech, because we can only be guided and instructed in it by the expenditure of much time, and by assiduous study. Of these two kinds of speech also, the vernacular is the nobler, as well because it was the first employed by the human race, as because the whole world makes use of it, though it has been divided into forms differing in pronunciation and vocabulary. It is also the nobler as being natural to us, whereas the other is [40] rather of an artificial kind; and it is of this our nobler speech that we intend to treat.

The original chapter headings, which are not by the hand of Dante and are inadequate and sometimes incorrect, have been replaced by summaries of the contents prefixed to each chapter. When in the notes appended to each chapter citations of passages from the *Divina Commedia* and the *Convivio* are followed by the letter *n.*, it is to be understood that the notes to those passages in the 'Temple Classics' edition are referred to.

* * The numbers inserted in the text in square brackets, used for reference in the notes and elsewhere, are those of the lines in Dr Moore's Oxford Dante. The original Latin text followed is that of Rajna's smaller edition (Florence, Successori Le Monnier, 1897). On the title, date, and history of this work, see Appendix I. p. 116.

2. Compare *Paradiso*, II. 7; *De Monarchia*, I. 1: 18, 19.

8. Compare *Convivio*, I. 11: 18 ff.; IV. 8: 1-6.

10. Compare *Paradiso*, VIII. 94, 136.

11. The Word is here equivalent to the Wisdom of God, as in *Paradiso*, XIX. 44. Compare *Convivio*, II. 6: 66.

12. Lit., 'To the speech of the vulgar peoples,' i.e. the different varieties of the vernacular in Italy. See below, I. 19.

17. *Sed quia unamquamque doctrinam oportet non probare sed suum aperire subiectum.* See *Convivio*, II. 14: 14 ff.; and compare *Paradiso*, XXIV. 70-78. The vernacular was not one of the recognised sciences (*Convivio*, II. 14: 55 ff.), hence Dante here speaks of the learning relating thereto as *doctrina*, not *scientia*.

28. By grammar Dante here means a literary language of conventional origin, artificial construction, and permanent character; with special reference to Latin. See below, I. 9: 101n. In *Convivio*, I. 11: 95 ff., he talks of 'the Grammar of the Greeks,' meaning their literary language, and alludes also to the literary language of Provence.

34. For Dante's own experience, see *Convivio*, II. 13: 22 ff.

41. There is a contradiction, more apparent than real, between this passage and *Convivio*, I. 5: 45-106, where Latin is proved superior to the vernacular (a) on the ground of nobility, because of its being unchangeable [as to this see below, note on I. 9: 101]; (b) because of its greater efficiency as a vehicle of thought, (c) because of the greater beauty due to its artificial character. To understand the relation between these two passages it must be borne in mind that in *Convivio*, I. 5 the comparison is between Latin as a literary language in the fixed and perfected state in which Dante supposed it to be, and the vernacular

Temporal monarchy strive to expound anew felicity, which Aristotle has already expounded; who should undertake again the apology of old age, which Cicero has pleaded? Naught at all, but rather would such wearisome superfluity provoke disgust.

And inasmuch as amongst other unexplored and important truths the knowledge of the temporal monarchy is most important and least explored, and (for [30] that it stands in no direct relation to gain) has been attempted by none; therefore am I minded to extract it from its recesses; on the one hand that I may keep vigil for the good of the world, and on the other that I may be the first to win for my glory the palm of so great a prize. A hard task in truth do I attempt, and beyond my strength, trusting not so much in my proper power as in the light of that giver who giveth to all liberally and upbraideth not.

2. *The Higher Nature* — *Natura superior* = God. Compare *Purgatorio*, XVI. 79, where God is referred to as *miglior natura*.

CHAPTER II

[All political theory and action is to be judged by its bearing upon the ultimate goal of human civilisation as a whole.]

Typical treatment **FIRST**, therefore, we have to consider what the temporal monarchy means; in type to wit, and after intention. The temporal monarchy, then, which is called empire is 'a unique principedom

extending over all persons in time,' or, 'in and over those things which are measured by time'; **The first principle** and there rise three main inquiries concerning the same: for in the first place we may inquire and examine whether [10] it is needful for the well-being of the world; in the second, whether the Roman people rightfully assumed to itself the function of monarchy; and in the third, whether the authority of the monarchy depends immediately upon God, or upon some other minister or vicar of God.

Three inquiries concerning the Empire

But inasmuch as every truth which is not a first principle is demonstrated by reference to one that is, it behoves us in every inquiry to be clear as to the first principle [20] to which we are to return by analysis, in order to establish the certainty of all such propositions as may afterwards be laid down. And inasmuch as the present treatise is an inquiry, it would seem that before all else we must investigate the first principle in the strength of which what follows is to be established.

Be it known, then, that there are some things, in no degree subject to our power, about which we can think, but which we cannot do; such are [30] mathematics, physics, and divinity; but there are some which are subject to our power, and which we can not only think about, but can also do; and in the case of these the doing is not undertaken for the sake of thinking, but the latter for the former, since in such cases the doing is the goal.

Since, then, the present matter is concerned with polity, nay, is the very fount and first principle of right politics, and since all that

105 ff. The tradition that the office of emperor of Rome was elective was still living. In theory the Roman people were the electors; but whether the German princes, technically called 'electors,' or any older and more popular body should be, or should at any time have been, regarded as the electing college, the only true elector was God. It was the function of his earthly agents to learn and to proclaim his will.

APPENDIX

Boccaccio, in his *Life of Dante*, after giving some account of the *Comedy*, and of why it was written in the vernacular, continues, 'In like manner this excellent author, on the coming of the Emperor Henry VII., made a book in Latin prose, called *Monarchia*, which is divided into three books after the three points which he therein determines. In the first he proves, by logical disputation, that for the well-being of the world the empire is a necessity; and this is the first point. In the second he shows, by historical arguments, that Rome attained to the imperial title by right, which is the second point. In the third, he proves, by theological arguments, that the authority of the empire proceeds direct from God, and not through the mediation of any vicar of his, as it seems the clergy would have it; and this is the third point. This book was condemned several years after the author's death by messer Beltrando, cardinal of Poggetto,¹ and papal legate in the parts of Lombardy, pope John XXII. being in the chair. And the reason was because Lewis, duke of Bavaria,

¹ So Boccaccio, but the title is incorrect. Bertrand du Poiet (who was a Frenchman) was created Cardinal with the title *di S. Marcello* in 1316 (Ricci). He was afterwards Cardinal Bishop of Ostia.

Arguments
of the
three books

the *Comedy* in the way indicated by the opening of the twenty-fifth canto of the *Paradiso* and by the correspondence with Del Virgilio (see below, pp. 371-385) could also be speaking of himself as one that had as yet made no contribution to the public weal, in payment for all he had received (*De Monarchia*, I. 1). And further, the later years of Dante's life seem to furnish no special occasion for the production of what after all seems to announce itself as an 'occasional' writing, in spite of its breadth of treatment and weight of argument. And finally, the general tone of the work and the impression it produces are as far removed as possible from that of a philosophical postscript to the documents of Dante's actual controversies. If we compare it, from this point of view, with the echoes of his political hopes, (the rumblings of the volcano, still glowing but no longer in eruption), which we find in the later cantos of the *Purgatorio* and in the *Paradiso* (*Purgatorio*, XX. 10-15; XXXIII. 40-45. *Paradiso*, XXX. 133-148 etc.), we shall hardly be inclined to regard them as all belonging to the same emotional stratum of Dante's life.¹ Nor would it be easy to understand the absence of any direct reference to Henry's reign if the work were contemporary with the *Paradiso*.

My conclusion, then (though given merely provisionally and with full consciousness of the difficulties that surround it), is, that the *De Monarchia* was written about the year 1309, and that in it we

¹ As to ecclesiastical affairs, the contrasted tone (though it may be felt) is not nearly so marked. Compare, for instance, *De Monarchia*, II. 12: 18 sqq. with *Paradiso*, XXII. 82-84.

first find in its full maturity the general conception of the nature of man, of government, and of human destiny, which was afterwards transformed, without being transformed, into the framework of the 'Sacred Poem.' Thus, even in the midst of his highest hopes, Dante was already preparing that 'other path' by which, when all earthly hopes sickened, he was to reach the goal of inward peace and inward liberty which he had sought with such deep devotion.

NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR

I have pleasure in acknowledging my obligations to E. J. Church's English translation of the *Monarchia* (first published in 1870), and to the author's German translation of *Opera* (Hamburg, 1872). In checking the numerous references to Aristotle and others, I have naturally found my starting-point in the invaluable labours of W. H. W.

Disparity itself I became your most devoted [20] servant
no bar to and friend.
friendship

2. Nor do I think I am laying myself open to a charge of presumption (as some perhaps might urge) by arrogating to myself the name of friend, since unequals no less than equals are united in the sacrament of friendship. For should one care to examine those friendships from which delight and advantage have sprung, right often will he discover on inspection that such have united pre-eminent persons to their inferiors. And if attention be turned to the true friendship [30] which exists for its own sake, will it not abundantly appear that the friends of illustrious and supreme princes have for the most part been men obscure in fortune but shining in integrity? Why not? Since even the friendship of God and man is in no sort hindered by disparity. But if any one thinks my assertions too bold, let him hearken to the Holy Spirit declaring that certain men share his own friendship, for in *Wisdom* we read, concerning Wisdom [40], 'For she is an infinite treasure to men, and they that use it are made partakers of the friendship of God.' But the artlessness of the vulgar herd judges without discrimination, and even as it supposes the sun to be a foot across, so is it deceived by vain credulity as to character. But it is not fitting for us, to whom it has been granted to know the best that is in us, to follow the footprints of the herd; nay, rather are we bounden to oppose its [50] wanderings; for we who have vigour of intellect and reason, being endowed with a certain divine liberty, are held to no precedents.

And no wonder, for such are not directed by the laws but rather the laws by them. It is clear, then, that what I said above, namely, that I am your most devoted servant and your friend, is in no sort presumptuous.

3. Cherishing your friendship, then, as my dearest treasure, I desire to [60] preserve it with loving forethought and considered care; and therefore, since in the teaching of ethics we are instructed that friendship is equalised and preserved by what is proportionate, it is in my vows to keep the path of proportion in my return for bounty received. Wherefore I have often and eagerly scrutinised such small gifts as I have, and have set them side by side, and then conned them over again, considering which would be the more worthy and the more acceptable to you. And I have found [70] nothing more suited to your pre-eminence than the sublime cantica of the *Comedy* which is adorned with the title of *Paradise*; which cantica, under cover of the present epistle, as though dedicated under its own special heading, I inscribe, I offer, and conclusively commend to you.

4. Neither will my glowing affection permit me to pass over in absolute silence the thought that in this dedication there may seem to be greater [80] measure of honour and fame conferred on the patron than on the gift. And what wonder? since in its very inscription I appeared to those who looked closely, to have already uttered a presage of the destined increase of the glory to your name, and this of set purpose. But now, zeal for your glory, for which I thirst, making little of my own, urges me

Dedication of the
Paradiso

He offers the
Paradiso
to
Can Grande.

Subject, Christ; if [150] the moral sense, the conversion of the soul from the grief and misery of sin to the state of grace is presented to us; if the anagogical, the departure of the holy soul from the slavery of this corruption to the liberty of eternal glory is presented to us. And although these mystic senses have each their special denominations, they may all in general be called allegorical, since they differ from the literal and historical; for *allegory* is derived from *alleon*, in Greek [160], which means the same as the Latin *alienum* or *diversum*.

8. When we understand this we see clearly that the *subject* round which the alternative senses play must be twofold. And we must therefore consider the subject of this work as literally understood, and then its subject as allegorically intended. The subject of the whole work, then, taken in the literal sense only, is 'the state of souls after death' [170], without qualification, for the whole progress of the work hinges on it and about it. Whereas if the work be taken allegorically the subject is 'man, as by good or ill deserts, in the exercise of the freedom of his choice, he becomes liable to rewarding or punishing justice.'

9. Now the *form* is twofold, the form of the treatise and the form of the treatment. The form of the treatise is threefold, according to its threefold division. The first division is that by which the whole work [180] is divided into three cantiche; the second that whereby each cantica is divided into cantos; the third, that whereby each canto is divided into lines. The form or method of treatment is poetic,

fictive, descriptive, digressive, transumptive; and likewise proceeding by definition, division, proof, refutation, and setting forth of examples.

10. The *title of the work* is, 'Here beginneth the *Comedy* of Dante Aligheri, a Florentine by birth, not by [190] character.' To understand which, be it known that *comedy* is derived from *comus*, 'a village,' and *oda*, which is, 'song'; whence comedy is, as it were, 'rustic song.' So comedy is a certain kind of poetic narration differing from all others. It differs, then, from tragedy in its content, in that tragedy begins admirably and tranquilly, whereas its end or exit is foul and terrible; and it derives its name from *tragus* [200], which is a 'goat' and *oda*, as though to say 'goat-song,' that is fetid like a goat, as appears from Seneca in his tragedies; whereas comedy introduces some harsh complication, but brings its matter to a prosperous end, as appears from Terence, in his comedies. And hence certain writers, on introducing themselves, have made it their practice to give the salutation: 'I wish you a tragic beginning and a comic end.' They likewise differ [210] in their mode of speech, tragedy being exalted and sublime, comedy lax and humble, as Horace has it in his *Poetica*, where he gives comedians leave sometimes to speak like tragedians and conversely:—

*'Interdum tamen et vocem comædia tollit,
Iratusque Chremes tumido delitigat ore;
Et tragicus plerumque dolet sermone pedestri.'*¹

¹ 'Sometimes Comedy herself raises her voice, and

Creation
derived
from God

note of the excellence and perfection of the first part of the prologue, let us proceed to the letter.

20. He says, then, that the 'glory of the first mover' [350], who is God, 'reglows in all parts of the universe,' yet so as to be in 'some part more' and in 'another less.' Now that it reglows everywhere reason and authority declare. Reason thus: Everything that is has its being either from itself or from another. But it is obvious that to have being from itself is competent only to one, to wit the first or initial being, which is God. And since to have being does not imply [360] self-necessity of being, and self-necessity of being is competent to one only, to wit the first or initial Being, which is the Cause of all; therefore all things that are, save that one itself, have their being from another. If, then, we take any one of the individual phenomena of the universe it must evidently have its existence from something; and that from which it has it has [its existence] either from itself or from something else; if from itself then it is the prime existence; if from something else, then that again must have its existence from itself or from something else. And so we should [370] go on to infinity along a line of effective causes, as is proved in the second *Metaphysicorum*; and since this is impossible we must at last come to the prime existence, which is God, and thus mediately or immediately everything which is has its being from him; for it is by what the second cause received from the first cause that it has influence upon that which it causes, after the fashion of a body that receives and reflects a

ray. Wherefore the first cause is cause in a higher degree; and [380] this is what the book *De Causis* says, to wit, that 'every primary cause is more influential on that which it causes, than a universal secondary cause.' So much as to being.

21. But as to essence I prove it thus: Every essence, except the primary, is caused; otherwise there would be more than one existence of self-necessity, which is impossible. What is caused is either of nature or of intelligence; and what is of nature is [390] consequentially caused by intellect, since nature is the work of intelligence. Everything, therefore, which is caused, is caused by some intellect, mediately or immediately. Since, then, virtue follows the essence whose virtue it is, if the essence be intellectual the whole virtue is of one [intelligence] which causes it; and thus, like as before we had to come to a first cause of being itself, so now of essence and of virtue [400]. Wherefore it is clear that every essence and virtue proceeds from the primal one, and the lower intelligences receive it as from a radiating source, and throw the rays of their superior upon their inferior, after the fashion of mirrors. Which Dionysius, speaking of the celestial hierarchy, seems to handle clearly enough, and therefore it is said in the book *De Causis* that 'every intelligence is full of forms.' It is clear, then, how reason declares the divine [410] light, that is, the divine excellence, wisdom, and virtue, to reglow everywhere.

22. And authority does the same as science; for the Holy Spirit says by Jeremiah, 'Do I

in 'Then,' I replied, 'my joy shall be to bind
guerdon 'My brow with laurel and with ivy;—leave [50]
for the 'Of Mopsus asked.'
Paradiso 'Of Mopsus? Why of him?'

The other said.

And I myself replied:

'Hast thou not marked the scorn wherewith he
greets
'The speech of Comedy which women's chat
'Stales on the lip, which the Castalian sisters
Blush to receive?' And, Mopsus, here I
read
Thy verses once again.

He shrugged, and said,

'How to our side shall Mopsus, then, be won?'

'A ewe is mine!' I said, 'to thee well known,
'Choicest of all the rest, who scarce supports,
'So doth she teem with milk, her udders' weight
'(Herbage fresh cropt she chews beneath a rock

[60]

'Immense) associate with no flock, nor known
'To any fold. Of her own will she comes,
'And never driven, to the milking-pail.
'Her do I purpose with deft hand to milk.
'From her ten measures will I fill to send
'To Mopsus. And do thou give heed, the
while,
'To the wanton goats; and learn thy teeth to
fix
'In stubborn crusts.'

Such words beneath the oak

Did I and Melibœus sing; what time
Our humble cot prepared our oaten meal.

10. The Latin (like the translation) is ambiguous.

But it seems to be the young shepherd, not the goats, who has to face the hardships of meagre fare. Compare the closing lines of the poem.

33. Daphne, daughter of Peneus, changed to a laurel.

37. Del Virgilio was the only professor of literature in Bologna, and even he had a hard fight with poverty, while the professors of law grew rich.

49. *Nether realms*, i.e. purgatory as well as hell. Del Virgilio's political allusions date his letter early in 1319, and from this phrase of Dante's we learn that the two earlier cantiche, but not the third, were known at that date.

57-64. Some have supposed these lines to refer to ten Eclogues (the Virgilian number) contemplated by Dante; and others have made other suggestions. But surely the most obvious interpretation is the best. The allusion can only be to ten cantos of the *Paradiso*.

10 cantos of
the *Divina
Commedia*?

of truth and hatred of falsehood. And lest the spleen of the many who are wont to foist lies, in their absence, upon those they hate, should pervert, behind my back, what I had rightly uttered, it was my further pleasure, in this attestation prepared by my own fingers, to leave a record of my conclusion, and to design with my pen the form of this whole disputation.

14, 15. *Should pervert.* The text reads *transmutent*, a plural verb to the singular subject *livor*, a mistake which suggests careless transcription.

§ 2.

The question, then, turned on the position question and shape, or form, of two elements, *water*, to wit, and *earth*; and what I here mean by form is what the Philosopher puts down as the fourth kind of 'quality' in the *Predicaments*. And the discussion was limited to this inquiry (as the principle of the truth to be investigated). 'Whether water, in its own sphere, that is in its natural [10] circumference, was in any part higher than the earth which emerges from the waters, and which we commonly call the habitable quarter.' And it was argued on the affirmative, for many reasons; some of which reasons were so insignificant that I passed them by, but five I retained as having some apparent validity.

3-6. The first of Aristotle's predicaments is, in Latin phrase, the *quiddity* or 'whatness' of a thing; the fourth is its *quality* or 'what-likeness.' Of this Aristotle makes several divisions, enumerating for example inherent capacities (e.g., for laughter), and acquired accomplishments (e.g., skill in music). The fourth of

these kinds of quality, or 'what-likeness,' is 'form' in the sense of 'shape'; and the author explains that he does not use 'form' in the scholastic sense of 'constituent principle,' but merely as the equivalent to 'shape.'

7, 8. At the beginning of each book of the *De Monarchia*, Dante lays down the fundamental principle, conformity to which is to be the test of the arguments and conclusions of the book. Such a fundamental principle will be established for the present inquiry if we can answer, with regard to the relations of earth and water, the question here proposed.

§ 3.

The first argument ran thus: Two **Geometrical arguments** circumferences, which are not uniformly distant from each other, cannot have a common centre. The circumference of water and the circumference of earth are not uniformly distant. Therefore, etc. Then it went on: Since the centre of earth, as all admit, is the centre of the universe; and anything that has a position in the world other than it, is higher than it; we must conclude that [10] the circumference of water is higher than the circumference of earth, since the circumference corresponds to the centre all round. The major premise of the chief syllogism appeared to be manifest from the theories demonstrated in geometry, the minor by the evidence of the senses, because we see that in some places the circumference of earth is included in the circumference of water and in some places excluded.

12. It is assumed throughout that the radius of the sphere of water will at anyrate not be smaller than the radius of the sphere of earth.

This volume contains all the extant Latin works of Dante. The translation of the *De Vulgari Eloquentia* has been revised for this edition by A. G. Ferrers Howell, who first published it in 1890. The translations of the *De Monarchia* and of *Epistolæ V.-IX.* have been revised by Philip H. Wicksteed from provisional translations issued by him to students in 1896 and 1898; while the translations of the rest of the *Epistolæ* (including that to *Can Grande*), of the *Eclogues*, and of the *De Aqua et Terra*, have been made by him expressly for this edition.

Each translator takes the full responsibility for his own part of the work, including both text and notes, but each has to acknowledge corrections, suggestions, and contributions from the other, not specified in detail.

BEDFORD STREET, W.C.

November 1904.

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