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PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
OF JAPAN

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*Fullo Martin
Kendal regards
W. Johnston S.D.*

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gives a vivid picture of a practical philosopher. On the other hand the fact, that HEGEL was eager to complete his work "Phenomenology of Mind" on the eve of the battle of Jena, 1806, may reveal some aspects of his character of a theoretical philosopher, even though it might not be an anecdote to be told here for the contrast against FICHTE. For HEGEL's eagerness to complete the work was, in reality, caused by the contract with his publisher. He was hard-up at that time. I am not going to discuss here the contents of their philosophies and their attitudes, but only pointed out the difference between the characters of their philosophies. On the other hand, what is the character of contemporary philosophy? On the whole, it seems to me that it has a character of the present. This tendency can be traced to the existence-philosophy of KIERKEGAARD, HEIDEGGER and others, and is especially noticeable in the philosophy of our own country nowadays. From the attitude of attaching importance to the present, it naturally follows, in a concrete way, that the historical actuality is considered a central problem. For KIERKEGAARD, whose criticism against HEGEL was made on the grounds of human existence, the infinite and eternal God was thought transcendent over the human being as finite and temporal existence, and the present was understood as a juncture of eternity and time. The moment of actuality was not yet conceived directly as self-determination of the eternal now. HEIDEGGER searched for the fundamental definition of finite human existence in his so-called time character, but the congruity of eternity and time, infinite and finite, could no longer be explained in HEIDEGGER who is called KIERKEGAARD without God. Again, both of them, on the one hand, might think much of the present, and yet, on the other hand, they maintain the priority of the future. Whereas, as if reserving it, the philosophers of our country, although admitting the importance of the future in a certain sense, determine their attitude almost entirely centering around the present. Therefore, it is not, I think, too much to say that the philosophy of historical actuality which holds the present as the central figure is maintained in the purest form in our country. This phenomenon, on the one side, may be naturally construed as the result of the fact that the tense situation of the world at present has dragged the interest of the people down from the contemplation of transcendent existence to historical practice in the actual world. This consideration, however, is worldwide and is not circumscribed especially by the limits of our country. For the fact that the historical view centering around the present is strongly emphasized in our country, another reason must be investigated than the present necessities. It is simply because our philosophical tradition, fostered by the thoughts of Buddhism,

especially Zen, etc., is based on the immanent view of absolutism which is expressed by such catchwords as "the relative is the absolute," "phenomenon is reality." Here we can say that the collaboration of these philosophical reasons and current necessities determines the philosophical view of history predominant in our country at present.

In accordance with the inclination of philosophical interests toward actuality a tendency, that philosophy itself becomes actual, is developed. Although it is a question whether the philosophy which has actuality as its object should be actual in itself, it would be also a natural tendency that a philosophy concerning actuality becomes a philosophy based on actuality and then the latter again develops into what is thought: actuality is philosophy and philosophy is actuality. The difference between the ways of understanding what is actuality is inevitable with the change of the times. It is, therefore, natural that the philosophy of actuality has been taking on political color in these days when politics have the central meaning and that only a philosophy full of political color is thought to have actuality. The appearance of our philosophical thinking at present, concentrating chiefly on the theory of state-existence, has been not a little caused by the reason mentioned above. This tendency involves some risk of narrowing our field of vision, making it one-sided, but it tells necessarily the needs of the times for philosophy.

There must be some questions in determining the character of HEGEL's philosophy as solely that of the past. As is generally known, he says in the preface of the same "Philosophy of Right": "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational" and he, quoting an ironical passage "*Ἰδοὺ Ῥόδου, ἰδοὺ καὶ τὸ πηδῆμα*; Hic Rhodus, hic saltus" (Here is Rhodes, leap thou here) from Aesop's fable, states that every individual is after all "a child of his times" and cannot overleap his own age, just as he is unable to leap over Rhodes, and that the philosophy grasps the times in the end with conceptions. He, too, turned the passage above into a parody: "Here is the rose, dance thou here"¹ and said, "To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us to the actual, the reconciliation which philosophy affords to those in whom there has once arisen an inner

1 Besides "to leap" another meaning of *πηδῆμα* is "to dance." I am not sure in which meaning HEGEL himself interpreted that word of Aesop's passage, since I know some in HEGEL's times who translated it in the meaning of "to dance." Or he might have both meanings in mind. By the way "rose" is *ῥόδον* and Rhodes is said to mean "Island of Rose."

which we may meet in the distant future. We come into the world bearing death with us. Our life encounters death in its each step, and is incessantly inserting one foot into the domain of death. Ever on the verge of an abyss, it may come in an instant to nothing. Our being has come into being from the first with non-being. It pulsates above a void, every moment passing into nothingness, every moment regaining itself. That is to say, our existence is a transient existence. This nothingness is such that it renders meaningless the meaning of life. Therefore, that we ourselves become a question to ourselves and ask the purpose of our existence, indicates that nothingness has emerged from the ground of our being and that we have been driven, therefrom, to question our own being. The emergence of this nothingness is no other than the deepening of the awareness of our own being—which ordinarily does not reach such a depth. Ordinarily, we unceasingly move forward, having an eye toward something or other. We are always engaged with things within or outside of ourselves, and that engagement itself obstructs the kind of awareness of which we have just spoken. It blocks the possibility of that horizon opening up in which we are able, nothingness having manifested itself to us, to make our own being a question. This blockage occurs even in engaging in learning, the arts, and other cultural matters. But when the aforementioned horizon has opened up, there appears to us from the bottom of the engagements of the ever moving-forward life something lingering and standing still. From the bottom of those engagements which are normally meaningful, appears meaninglessness. Then the sense of nothingness, "all is the same," expressed by DOSTOIEVSKY and NIETZSCHE, causes the feet of one's ever forward moving life to step back, and causes one, as is said in Zen, to "reflect one's light upon what is underfoot". In our ordinary forward-moving life, that which lies beneath our very feet trails behind as we advance and never comes to be seen. In that situation, to retreat one step is to shed light upon the "underfoot". Again as expressed in Zen, this is "to step back and come to oneself". It is the about-face of our life. The opening up of the horizon of nothingness out of the ground of our life is the occasion of the radical about-face in our life itself. This turn-about is no other than the transformation from the self-centered (or man-centered) attitude which asks concerning all things, what is their use to us (or to man), to that of asking, for what purpose do we ourselves exist. When we stand on the point of just this transformation, for the first time, the question "What is religion?" really becomes a question to us.

II

Since religion has several aspects, we can approach it from various angles. Ordinarily it is defined as the relation of man to the Absolute, such as God. But even such a definition is already perhaps too narrow. For this reason, some scholars make use of, for example, the concept of the "Holy". But, further, if we consider this man-Absolute-relationship more concretely and in detail, there are again many possible approaches. For instance, it may be said to be man's abandoning his self-will and living according to the will of God, or to be the seeing or knowing of God, or to be the Divine manifesting itself to or in us. It may be considered as an immediate awareness of the absolute dependence of our existence upon God; it may also be thought of as becoming one with God. Or again, it is also possible to take the view that it is in religion that man for the first time becomes a true man, in his finding his own "original face". Further, it is possible to consider, as SCHLEIERMACHER proposed in his "*Addresses on Religion*," "the direct intuition of the Universe" (that is, to have a sense of the infinite in the finite) to be the essence of religion. And, of course, each of the above-mentioned views is itself open to various criticisms. But foregoing at this time any further discussion of these interpretations, I should like to consider the problem from a somewhat different perspective—in a word, from the perspective of the awareness of Reality, or, more strictly, the *real* awareness of Reality.

In this consideration, the *real* awareness of Reality means that at the same time as we become aware of Reality, in this very awareness of ours, Reality itself comes to its own realization. Or conversely, it is only when Reality comes to its own realization in us that we truly experience Reality. In this connection it is interesting to note that in English the term "realize" has both meanings, to "realize" in the sense of "actualize" and to "realize" in the sense of "understand". But I wonder whether in its sense of "understand" it includes as a necessary component the meaning of Reality coming to its own realization in us. As being here used, the term "realization" denotes real experience, not theoretical knowledge, as in the case of a philosophical cognition: a "bodily" understanding, so to speak, ("body" here means everybody as a whole man with his spirit, soul...and body.) This real experience, this "bodily" realization, gives to our being (*esse*) its essential (in *essentia*) determination. This real awareness of Reality is our real being itself and constitutes the true reality of our existence. And this is because that awareness actualizes itself as one with the self-realization of Reality itself. In this

We usually consider things in the "external" world to be real; but when we do so, it is doubtful whether we are truly in contact with the reality of things. The fact is that, ordinarily, even while considering things to be real, we are not in real contact with the things themselves. It is extremely rare for us to "fix our sight" upon things in such a way as to "forget ourselves" in them, or to see things, becoming ourselves the things we see. In them to be directly aware of "God's own world", or the "Universe" as the Infinite, is even more rare. We usually look at things, looking away from ourselves; that is, we are looking out toward things out of the citadel, as it were, of the self, or, it may be said, out of the cave of the self. PLATO once likened us in our ordinary relation to things to people chained inside a cave, looking at the shadows coming and going on the wall of the cave, and taking these shadows as reality. To look away from one's self is always to see things merely as objects, that is, as "external" things outside of the "internal" self. This is to confront things on the field of fundamental separation between things and the self. The field of separation or opposition between internal and external, subject and object, is the field which is called "consciousness". Ordinarily standing on this field, we relate to things through ideas and representations, and accordingly, no matter if we speak of the reality of things, the things do not come to reveal their *real* reality. On the field of consciousness, it is impossible to come into contact with things as they really are, that is, to become intimate with things at their own home, where they are in and by themselves. The field of consciousness is the field in which our self always occupies the centre.

We think, again, that our own self as well as our "inner" emotions, desires and thoughts are real. But even in this case, there is the same doubt as to whether we are really in contact with ourselves, whether our emotions, desires and the like are really revealing themselves as they truly are within us, or whether those feelings are present to us, such as they are in themselves at their own home-ground, so to speak. On the field of consciousness, in which we are separated from things and stand confronting things, we are, correspondingly, ever separated from ourselves and do not really come in contact with ourselves. On the other hand, just in our being really in contact with things within the things themselves, is our being really in contact with ourselves. Of course, ordinarily, when we confront the "external", we fancy at the same time that we as "internal" are in real contact with ourselves and are in our own home-ground. And this "we as internal" is what is commonly called self-consciousness. However, the self which is the "internal" as regards

the "external" and is self-centered in its relation to the "external", is a self that is estranged from things and shut up within itself—a self which is always standing before itself (*gegenständlich*). In this, the self always puts itself before itself and regards itself as a "thing" called "self", separated from other things. This is the self of self-consciousness. There intervenes the representation, in which the self presents itself in the form of "thing." This self is not really at home with itself. In self-consciousness, the self is not really in contact with itself. This is also true of our being internally "conscious" of our emotion, desires and the like. To sum up, things and the self, feelings and desires, all are real, but it cannot be said that they are present in their true reality in the field of consciousness, where they are always present only in the form of representation and are, nevertheless, usually taken as real. As long as the field of separation between "internal" and "external" is not broken through, among the things which are taken as real, discrepancies and contradictions will always prevail, as stated previously. One of the contradictions manifests itself, for example, in the philosophical opposition between materialism and idealism, but, before it makes its appearance on the level of thought, it is already hidden in the daily mode of our thinking and being. The field which lies at the ground of our daily life, is that of the basic separation between the self and things, that is, the field of consciousness, and within it Reality cannot present itself really. Reality appears only in broken fragments and in the form of tortured self-contradiction.

The form of self-contradiction of Reality prevails strongly over us, especially since the emergence in modern times of the "ego" as the self-relying subject. The thought of DESCARTES, the father of modern philosophy, exemplifies this situation. As is commonly known, DESCARTES established a dualism between *res cogitans*, which has as its essence consciousness, and *res extensa*, which has as its essence extension. In that dualism, on the one hand, the ego came to be established as that reality which cannot be doubted in any way, occupying the central position *vis à vis* all other things. In his "cogito ergo sum" is expressed the ego in its self-centered assertion of its own reality. On the other hand, however, the things in the natural world came to appear as things which have no living, intrinsic connection with ego, as lifeless, so to speak, as the cold world of death. Even our own body, not to speak of animals, were regarded as mechanisms. DESCARTES equated extension with matter; and the fact that he considered it to be the "essence" of things, meant that the natural world came to be a dead world and a mechanistic world-view came to be established. By that, it is true, the world-image of modern natural science

came into being, and the way of mastering nature through the scientific techniques was able to be opened. However, it is also true that the world simply became as stuff for man as a self-centred ego; and that ego with great power of controlling nature became surrounded by a cold, dead world. Each ego became like a solitary island floating on a sea of dead matter and could not help to be shut up within itself. Life vanished from nature and natural things. It has ceased to be the living bond flowing through the basis of man and all other things.

In the pre-scientific world-view, the concept of life as such a living bond was central. In that world-view, life was taken not only as something which was in each individual as individual life, but as a real and substantial bond between parents and children, brothers and sisters, and, further, between all men. It was thought that, just as the individual leaves of a tree, for example, live through the same life, although they grow and are scattered separately, each individual human being, too, was considered to come to life from the same life. No, not only human beings, but all living beings belonged to a larger "Tree of life". And what is called "soul" (*psyche*) was no other than this life itself manifested in a certain "form". Life manifested as man took the form of human psyche; the life of plants and animals took the form of plant or animal psyche. It was thought that plants and animals also had their own souls. And on the basis of the life which bound individual beings together at their foundation, a sympathetic relation was thought to exist between one man's soul and another man's soul. Such sympathy means, so to speak, a direct contact, before and more direct than consciousness; it is the field of the most immediate encounter between man and man in the impulsive and instinctive which lies hidden at the base of emotions, desires and thoughts. More than that, it was thought to obtain not only between man and man, but between all living beings. The nexus of life manifested itself to those people as a field of "psychic" sympathy between individual beings. Of course, this view apparently has been almost completely wiped out by the modern mechanistic view of nature. But should we merely disregard it as an old pre-scientific view of nature?

On a summer night, a mosquito comes flying in. It begins its attack singing in high spirits, as if it were cheering because it had caught sight of its prey. But the moment when it is seized and squashed in the palm of the hand, it lets out a loud sound of distress. It appears to us as no other than a cry of distress. It is a cry which is capable of making us feel that, although it differs respectively from the cry of a howling dog or a screaming man, it

not so obvious that I should think of "I think" from the same position of "I think". This is not the only way of indicating the evident fact "I think". It is merely one way of looking at that fact, one philosophical position. Moreover, it is the revelation of a particular way of being—the self-centered way of being—of the ego itself. Thus, to think of "I think; therefore I am", from "I think; therefore I am"—that is, to view self-consciousness and its self-evidence as it is reflected on the plane of the same self-consciousness—is most natural for such an "ego". We may say that what is called the "ego" consists of the procedure that the self-consciousness endlessly reflects only itself. And therefore, the self-evidence of self-consciousness—the very fact that the self is evident to itself—prevents us from viewing its evident truth from any point beyond that fact itself. Indeed, actually, as we said before, the self-evidence of "I think" cannot be derived from the plane of anything that is other than the thinking subject, such as life, matter, or God. But the fact that the ego is conceived of in this way, that self-consciousness is endlessly reflected in self-consciousness, and "I think" is thought from the standpoint of "I think" itself, means that the ego is the mode of being of the self shut up within itself. We may also say the self attaching to itself. This is the reason why the various fundamental problems that originate in the basic nature of the mode of self-being as "ego" rise up in ourselves. These "problems" are the various ethical, philosophical, and religious doubts, anxieties and quests that are tied up with the basic nature of the ego; for example, the problems of radical evil and original sin, the problem of loneliness and the loss of self in society, the problem of the possibility of cognition, the demand for the salvation and deliverance of the soul. Such problems are bound to the mode of being of the ego, which is the self self-centredly grasping itself. And through the various problems just listed, the very mode of being of the ego turns at last into a problem for the ego itself. "I think; therefore I am" is the most directly evident truth, but as a result of its being regarded from the self-same position of "I think", contrary to what one would expect, this truth has become problematical, and, on a more fundamental level, has become a doubt. Its own foundation becomes incomprehensible to the ego; and its self-evidence even becomes a self-deception and falsehood for itself. The necessity of such a process is implied from the first in the very establishment of the ego itself.

We must therefore think of the self-consciousness of "I think; therefore I am" in its subjectivity, from a more fundamental level than self-consciousness without, however, eliminating its very subjectivity. Although I used

here the word "think", I do not mean to think objectively, as we do in our ordinary thinking. To think of the ego more basically means that the ego itself opens up subjectively a more basic level of existence within itself. In this sense, it is not different from the ego's becoming more fundamental by itself, that is, a more basic self-awareness. To think of "I think" more fundamentally is in this sense "existential" thinking; and this "real" thinking, itself, must be the more basic being of the self. The Cartesian *cogito* can realize its own core of truth (along with its untruth as *ego cogito*) only when the field of consciousness is broken-through to a field of a still more fundamental self. If this is not done, the self of that self-consciousness even turns out to be a falsehood or a delusion to the self itself. This is a fact which has been uncovered and brought to its acuteness from older times in the history of philosophy, and especially of religion. Religion is therefore an existential exposure of the problematical which is contained in the usual mode of self-being. In this lies the unique import which religion, and religion alone, has. In this sense, religion may also be called the path of the great and fundamental "I think", in order to search into and elucidate the "I am".

In order to explain more concretely what I have stated above, I shall attempt to compare the so-called methodical doubt which Descartes adopted in order to reach his "I think; therefore I am", with doubt which appears in the world of religion. In the courtyard of religion there comes ever and ever to appearance some deep doubt. For example, there is the sort of problem mentioned at the beginning of this article which concerns the life and death of oneself and the transitoriness and impermanence of the things of the world. In the agony of losing a loved one forever there lies a basic doubt concerning the very existence of oneself and other things. Such a doubt takes various forms and is expressed in various ways. For example, Zen speaks of "the self-presence of the great doubt". The word "great" in the great doubt is probably derived from the very content of this doubt; that is, because the very condition of basic uncertainty about human existence in the world, the existence of the self and of others, and the suffering arising from it, is the most fundamental, important problem. It is because "birth and death is a great matter". But on the other hand, it may be said that the word also refers to the consciousness of our manner of existence and our own behavior vis à vis this "great matter". This is the most important point.

As I said previously, we realize within ourselves death and nothingness as constituting the basis of our life or existence. And they are realized as real (no simply subjective) entities, hidden at the bottom of every thing that

exists,—at the foundation of the world itself. They are not simply viewed or contemplated. But the self realizes its own being from the nothingness at the foundation of its existence, that is, from the ultimate limit of self-existence. So far, the realization of the nothingness is nothing other than the realization of the self itself. That is, it does not mean to look at nothingness objectively or to have a representation of it; it is, so to speak, for the self itself to become nothingness completely. And this is a self-awareness of the self from the border-line of self-being itself. This self-awareness is not self-consciousness, but rather a breaking through the field of consciousness and self-consciousness. Consciousness is the field of the engagement between the existence of the self and the existence of other things. That is, it is the field of “being” (*esse*) only, where the nothingness at the foundation of “being” always remains covered. At this level, the self in its subjectivity is still self-consciously represented as a being called the self. It undergoes a kind of objectivization and is grasped as an objective “being”. But when the self breaks-through the field of “being” only, that is, the field of consciousness, and reaches the nothingness lying at the base, it is able for the first time to attain a subjectivity that can not be objectified in any way. This is a self-awareness more basic than self-consciousness. To stand subjectively on nothingness (where, in truth, there is no plane to stand on) is for the self to become more fundamentally itself. When this occurs, the self’s own being is “transformed into nothingness”, along with the being of everything else. Although we say “transformed into nothingness”, it does not mean, of course, that we are reduced to nothing and that we “are” no more. We mean that nothingness appears at the foundation of whatever at all “is”, that the field of consciousness, the field of the separation of “internal” and “external”, is “existentially” passed through, and the void (*nihil*) at the foundation of “internal” and “external” opens up. The opening of this void is a basic awareness of subjectivity. Such a realization of nothingness is not simply a conscious, “subjective” phenomenon; it is rather the real manifestation of what is actually concealed at the foundation of the self and everything in the world. On the field of consciousness, it is hidden and cannot really emerge. When, however, this “nihil” is realized, what are considered external reality and internal reality become unreal, so to speak. (They are not annihilated, but are rather “transformed into nothingness”.) That is, the self and all things in their *esse* are turned into a single question-mark and become a single problem. This is an awareness which is still more basically subjective than is the self-evidence of the self-grasping self-consciousness, which is “internal”, simply shut up inside

the self. And this awareness can emerge in no other way than as "existence". It lies on the yonder side of that which the grasp of psychology can reach; or rather, immediately on "this" side of it.

When we thus break-through the level of self-consciousness to the level of *nihil*, when we pass through the field of "being" only,—in a word, when the existence of the self and the existence of all things are turned into a single question-mark on the yonder side (or rather "this" side) of the distinction between "internal" and "external", we might say, as before, that "we" doubt. But this is basically different from the usual doubt where we doubt about something, about a certain objective matter. It is different from doubt as consciousness. Here, the *nihil* which is really concealed at the foundation of oneself and all things comes to be really present to ourselves, and our very *esse*, together with the *esse* of all things, becomes a single doubt. We must say that there where there is no longer a distinction between the doubter and the doubted, where this distinction is transcended, we ourselves become a great "Doubt" itself. We say "great", because that Doubt does not concern only the isolated self of self-consciousness, but concerns this self together with the existence of everything else, and hence is not a consciousness, but a real Doubt presenting itself to the self from the foundation of oneself and all things. This Doubt appears as reality from the one foundation of oneself and the world. When it appears, it appears as an inevitability, and we, with our consciousness and our arbitrary will, cannot know what to do with it. Through this manifestation of the "Doubt" in our self, our self really becomes the Doubt itself. It becomes itself the realization of the great Doubt, which is in itself a reality. This is what is meant by "the self-presence of the great Doubt". And in such a way, the uncertainty at the foundation of oneself and all things is really experienced and "bodily" realized by oneself. This may be called "dubito" (I doubt), but not in the meaning of *ego dubito*; that is, it is not the "I" (as ego)—doubting. In Buddhist terminology, it is doubt as a "*samadhi*" (concentration). Of course, there may be few occasions when this condition appears in a pure and thorough form. But in all cases, when the self's doubt about some matter begins to reflect itself back upon the doubting self,—for example, when we are seized with anguish and agony because we begin to feel doubts about our thoughts and way of life, which up till now we have believed to be right, or if the sincerity of someone we love becomes questionable,—the self's doubt of a certain thing becomes a doubt in which oneself and that thing become fundamentally synthesized in one and the same "doubt", and our existence is turned into the real realization of that doubt in the self. To the

extent that the doubt becomes "existentially" serious at all and is real to oneself, it always comes to mean to that degree, "the self-presence of the great Doubt". I think that the basic difference between religion and philosophy, and the unique significance of the religious way of living, appears only when we persistently push forward upon the path where the doubt comes to manifest itself really in oneself and is realized as reality in oneself. Such a *real* doubt may come forth at any time in philosophical doubt also, but philosophy usually then turns back to the domain of theoretical reflection and seeks there the explanation and solution of the problem.

When DESCARTES thought it possible to doubt in general of all things and especially of material objects, and to suppose that they may be illusions like images in our dreams or may be an artifice employed by some malignant demon in order to deceive us, etc., and thus reached "cogito ergo sum", considering this cogito in doubting alone to be unchallengeable, this doubt had, from the start, the character of a methodological doubt. It was basically different from the self-presence of the great Doubt. It was not the sort of doubt of which we can say that both oneself and all things are gathered and turned into a single doubt from their foundation. This Doubt comes to present itself in oneself as a basic reality of the self and things together, and the self itself becomes the realization of that reality. By this means it perceives (or realizes) at a stroke the fundamental uncertainty of oneself and all things. DESCARTES' cogito, however, has not passed through the tempering fire in which the self itself is changed, together with all things, into a single great Doubt. "I think" was thought of simply on the field of "I think". For this very reason, the reality of such an ego, once established, cannot be exempt from the possibility of becoming, just as it stands, non-reality. But when it has passed through the tempering flame, when it has broken through the nothingness (*nihil*) presenting itself in its own foundation, then, for the first time, the reality of "I think" or "I am", together with the reality of all things, can truly emerge, or, its reality can be "bodily" experienced and realized. If we can say that DESCARTES' philosophy best expresses the mode of existence of modern man, then we can also say that it conceals the fundamentally problematical which is contained in the very mode of existence of the modern ego.

Further, seen from the preceding line of thought, it will be a mistake to regard the self-presence of the great Doubt as a kind of psychological state which may occur in the process of religious practice, as many religious people themselves even regard it. Of course, what is called here the self-presence of the great Doubt implies that we should concentrate thoroughly on our doubt,

or that we must be single-minded in our doubt and must, so to speak, become ourselves the doubt itself, (*samadhi*). This is not, however, a doubt on the level of consciousness, where "we" doubt something. It is a doubt where the level of consciousness has been erased. It is true that such *real* doubt, driven home "existentially", has its own psychological counterpart. When we speak of a grief, in which "the self and the world vanish", or of a joy, in which one "doesn't know how his hands are dancing and his feet stepping", it is similarly a sort of "single-mindedness", or, "becoming ourselves the grief (or joy) itself,"—*samadhi*. But it must not be taken as a psychological condition alone. Although we say "single-minded" and "concentration", this is not mere psychology. The "mind" in the expression "single-minded" is not the mind in any psychological sense; it is reality in the sense spoken of above. Although we refer to passing beyond the field of consciousness, this does not mean subconsciousness. Subconsciousness is still joined to the field of consciousness. A monk called TEIJŌZA once asked RINZAI, the Zen master, what is the quintessence of Buddhism, and RINZAI gave him a slap and pushed him away. TEIJŌZA, brought suddenly into "concentration", stood motionless, forgetting himself, so that a monk nearby reminded him to bow down. He is said to have attained "the great enlightenment" at the instant when he began to bow. His standing still does not indicate a simply psychological state; it was the previously described "bodily" realization of a great reality (here, the Doubt) which completely possessed his mind and body; it was the self-presence of the great Doubt. This sort of thorough emergence is probably a result of one's happening upon a "great opportunity" after having engaged in great deal of religious practice. But, as I have said before, not to speak of such an eminent case as this, every doubt which is truly real has the same characteristic in it. No matter whether there are differences of depth or strength, it is essentially—that is, in its "existential" characteristic—the same doubt.

I quote here at random out of innumerable Zen-words urging the great Doubt a popular sermon from the 18th century; "The method to be practised is as follows: you must doubt concerning the subject in you which hears all voices. All voices are heard just now because there certainly is in you a subject that hears. Although you hear voices with ears, the holes of the ears are not the subject that hears. If they were, dead men also would hear voices.... You must doubt deeply again and again, asking yourself what could be the subject of hearing. Don't mind the various illusive thoughts and ideas that may occur to you. Only doubt more and more deeply, with all the gathered might of your entire self, without aiming at or expecting anything

beforehand, without even intending to be enlightened, but also without intending not to intend to be enlightened; and being within your breast like a child.... But, however you go on doubting, you will find it impossible to know the subject that hears. Then you must still more deeply explore just there, where it is not to be known. Doubt deeply in a state of single-mindedness, looking neither before nor after, right nor left, becoming wholly like a dead man and becoming unaware even of your own person being there. When this method is practised more and more deeply, you will come to a state of being totally absent-minded and vacant. Even then, you must raise up the great doubt, "what is the subject that hears?" and must doubt further, being all the time wholly like a dead man. And after that, when you are aware no more of your being wholly like a dead man, are no more conscious of your procedure of "great doubting" and become, yourself, through and through a great doubt-mass, there will come all of a sudden a moment when you come out into a transcendence called the Great Enlightenment, as if you woke up from a great dream, or as if you, being completely dead, suddenly revived." (TAKUSUI, "Sermons"). That the method of doubting here described is wholly and qualitatively different from that of a DESCARTES, is doubtless.

This sort of doubt is no other than a form in which the nothingness (*nihilum*) or death presents itself to us from the foundation of our very being and thus comes to be directly perceived,—perceived as reality. There, nothingness or death is made "spiritual" through its making us "spiritual" by its own realization (in the sense of actualization). This is the same as our own realization (both in the sense of understanding as well as of actualization) of it. This is just what is called in Zen Buddhism the "Great Death". The great Doubt appears from the bottom of our existence only when we press our doubt, "what am I?" or "why do I exist?" to the extreme where our doubt itself encounters a dead end. Then, the great Doubt emerges from the depth of our own existence, from the terminal boundary of our act of consciousness: "I doubt". It emerges then, however, as something which breaks down the whole field of *cogitatio*, together with its centre, the "I". It is the place where our self comes to its own termination and at the same time reaches its own "extinction," or becomes "nothingness." We might liken this to the shell and seeds coming apart when a bean ripens. (In that case, the shell is the small ego and the seeds are the "great" Doubt, the greatness of which means, however, infinity, because that Doubt involves the whole world within its span.) At that moment, the self is at the same time the nothingness of the self; and with this nothingness the field is opened up in which an about-

face from the great Doubt can take place. The great Doubt emerges always as something that opens up the field of nothingness, which gives place to the turn-about of the Doubt itself. (For this very reason, too, it is the "great" Doubt). And, as such, it is also called the great Death. For example, the sayings: "Once [when occurs] the great Death, then the Universe becomes new", and "Under the great Death, there is the great Enlightenment", refer to that turn-about. As in the case of Doubt, this Enlightenment is an enlightenment we attain, but at the same time it must be the "falling off" of our mode of existence in which the "I" is the agent. It comes to present itself as Reality from the foundation of the self-together-with-all-things. This Reality is the true reality of the self and of all things; that is, it is precisely their being present *as they are*—each in suchness. And this Reality, which emerges from the foundation of the great Doubt—which it turns over, is nothing else than our "original face", our true and original Self. "The Universe becomes new" is, as such, the emergence of our "original face", or, our encounter with our own "original face". That is, it is the realization (in both senses—actualization and understanding) of the true reality of our self together with all things. This Enlightenment is the "Great Wisdom" (so called in Buddhism), the wisdom which is no other than one aspect of our religious "existence" itself. But as I shall touch upon the subject of this wisdom again later [not in this essay], I shall not go into it any further here.

IV

Along with death and nothingness, evil and sin are also fundamental problems for man. It must be as reality in the sense set forth above that they must become problems. Ordinarily, evil and sin are made problems on the field of consciousness. In regard to ourselves, not to mention other people, we speak of the evil "we" have committed. This manner of thinking makes our "self" the root and trunk from which spring the leaves and branches of evil. The self and evil are divided into two, like this, because we are on the field of consciousness and we are thinking of our self and of the evil only in representations. Sin or evil comes to present itself in its true reality only on a field which transcends the field of the conscious self. KANT was considering evil on such a field when he thought of "radical evil" as something which has its roots in the basic ground of the subject himself (to use his words, "the ultimate subjective ground of all maxims"), as an "intelligibele Tat (act)" of the subject himself, which in principle precedes all his temporal

actions and experiences. We usually associate evil and sin with events in the world of temporal experience, *a posteriori* events; but as long as we stop at this stage, only the branches and leaves of evil are visible and the root is hidden. The fundamental awareness of evil occurs when, on the occasion of particular evils within time, their origin is traced down to the foundation of the very existence of the self. When KANT said that "radical evil" precedes all temporal experiences as something with its roots in the ground of the subject, he did not mean that it simply precedes in time every temporal experience, in the way that we speak of the time before we were born. It means that radical evil comes to be realized directly beneath the present, which, while being in the very middle of time, breaks-through time; that is, it comes to be realized on the supra-temporal ground of the subject himself. It is, so to speak, in an "instant", which KIRKEGAARD calls "the atom of eternity within time", that we become aware of radical evil as reality in the very bottom of our existence. And further, just because evil comes to be manifested at the very bottom of the subject himself, it is more than an evil committed "by him". It is something real that presents itself in its own "suchness" at the ground of our own *being* itself. "We" cannot, therefore, grasp it; or, it cannot be grasped on the field where we speak of "we" committing some evil. In this sense, it is "incomprehensible" for "us", for the ego; and that it is incomprehensible is that it presents itself really, and in its "suchness". Yet, radical evil is not something which has come to us from somewhere outside ourselves. As a reality revealed on the ground of the *subject*, it belongs to no other than the subject itself. The ground of the subject itself is the place where radical evil originates; and so, in the awareness of that evil, the subject is aware of itself, in its own ground, as the *real* realization of that evil—of that evil as reality. This is the reason why KANT found it necessary to think of radical evil as an "intelligibele *Tat*". Thus, we can truly subjectively—that is, really and in suchness—be aware of radical evil here, having passed through the field of consciousness in which, as we usually say, "we" have committed an evil. Here, for the first time, our evil can be "bodily" experienced and truly realized. While this is most basically the evil of our self itself, or the evil of which our self is fundamentally the realization, it is not simply and only the "self's" evil. It is not evil which is immanent in the self-consciously isolated "ego" alone. As KANT has already thought concerning radical evil, and KIRKEGAARD, concerning original sin, this evil or sin belongs to the nature of all mankind as well as to each individual. This evil, which lurks in the ground where the self and all other things (or all

living things, or at least all mankind) are united as one, comes to realize itself as a great reality in the subjective ground of the self. Our evil is real, only because it is such a realization. It is also for this reason that Buddhism speaks of "*karma* from before the time infinite" and of *avidya* (basic blindness), and Christianity, too, of original sin. In these concepts is contained a *real* apperception of sin and evil. It is said in Christianity that man's sinful existence is a result of Adam's sin of disobeying God, which is interpreted as we ourselves committing a sin in Adam. More subjectively or "existentially", it means that both the sinfulness of the self and the sinfulness of all mankind come to realize themselves as basically a single reality; and that, as such, it is experienced and realized in our self. It is, so to speak, to "bodily" realize the evil of all men in (and with) the evil of the self, and similarly, to realize the evil of the self in (and with) the evil of all men. *Karma* and *avidya* in Buddhism also should be considered reality in the same sense.

It is only in religion that evil and sin can be clearly realized as reality in this way. Crime and evil are problems in the social sciences of law and economics and in the various cultural sciences; but there, for the most part, they become problems merely as objective events. It is only in the domain of ethics, that they become subjective problems. In ethics they become the concern of each individual subject and become the matter of his own responsibility. Thus alone is opened for us the horizon of our own "personal" existence and self-awareness.

When this kind of subjective self-awareness is not taken into consideration and men accordingly try to dissolve morality and ethics into the elements of the social and cultural domains, we see that the formulation of the so-called "environment theory" about crime and evil comes to be established. According to that theory, a man's committing a crime is entirely due to the conditions of his environments. "It is because society is bad". Surprisingly, this one-sided view keeps men from a personal awakening and makes social life all the worse. Hence the unique significance of ethics, and the necessity for moral education. But even though we consider ethics important for this reason, in ethics crime and evil are still treated only on the level of "ego", as actions which "we" have committed. Indeed, there are actually many instances in which they suffice to be treated only in this way. But in so far as they are treated in this way, sin and evil still remain unrevealed in their true reality, and we cannot yet reach to the *real* experience of our own sin and evil. This is possible in religion alone. Herein lies the reason too, that KANT, who in his moral philosophy thought of evil simply as immanent in man, i. e., as the sub-

mission of will to an inclination which has its source in self-love, could not help to take into consideration "radical evil" when he came to his philosophy of religion. Here is to be found the basic difference between ethics and religion, paralleling the difference, noted previously in connection with doubting, between philosophy and religion.

There was a famous controversy between KARL BARTH and EMIL BRUNNER prompted by the question of original sin. In opposition to BARTH's idea that the "image of God" in man is completely corrupted by original sin, BRUNNER (who similarly recognized its complete corruption) thinks that reason, as the mere "form" of God's image, remains as an "Anknüpfungspunkt" (point of contact) for God's grace. But, when we take sin as a great reality—"great" in the sense above discussed—which manifests itself at the very foundation of the self-being and which transcends the field of the conscious self, it is impossible to separate the "form" from the "contents" in the existence of the self, in which the self and humanity as one in being the manifestation of the Sin. The self- (and human) being as a whole must be assumed as corrupted. However, if the complete corruption were the last word we could say about the actual condition of "imago Dei", the question how it occurs at all that men seek for and recognize God, become conscious of sin and hear the addressing of God, remains unanswerable. It was not without reason that BRUNNER tried to think of a "point of contact". But, on the other hand, if we set any limit whatever to the complete corruption, it falls short of the full truth in regard to our sinfulness. The place of "contact" must, I think, be sought somehow in the complete corruption itself; and it is probably to be found in the very awareness of the fact of complete corruption. That awareness means to realize that we ourselves are completely powerless to effect our salvation, to realize our own "spiritual" death—or our own nothingness (*nihil*)—in sin. This realization is at the same time the self-realization and our becoming aware of nothingness or death, as we explained above. When the self becomes the realization of sin as a great reality and thus has a real experience of sin, the result is a despair in which no possibility is opened to extricate one's self from sin. The awareness of the self's being nothing and powerless must in itself be, paradoxically speaking, the open field (the field of nothingness, so to speak) which alone makes it possible to receive the salvation and love from yonder, from God. The fact that there is no hope to cut open one's way with one's own power and that there is no sphere of possibility open before one's self, means that the self is completely possessed by sin, is united with sin and becomes an organ of sin. Yet we can say that when we come in this way to be

aware of sin, our self becomes—or rather our self as the nothingness of the self becomes—a “place to receive,” like the “space” (χώρα) of PLATO exposed in his “*Timaeus*”. Since this “place” is the place where the hope of the self was exhausted and the self became nothing, it can be said that this place itself is opened from beyond, by the love of God, but even then it is opened as the place to receive,—as the receptacle of,—that very love. It is not merely a “point of contact”. BRUNNER’S Anknüpfungspunkt is posited in human reason, and is, as such, immanent in the self, but the field of nothingness of which I am speaking now is the field in which the self is nothing, is the self of non-self, as it were, and has become the realization of sin as a great reality. And as it is nothing in itself, it is the place where we can receive God’s love really and as it is.

This field of nothingness is not something innate in human beings as reason is. It cannot be called either corrupted or uncorrupted. It is just nothingness, the nothingness that appears in the deepest self-awareness at the boundary of man’s being. If we call this, too, a kind of “form” (of being man), then we must say that it is not “form” as distinct from “contents”, but the formal aspect of the united whole of contents and form, the totality of which is said to be corrupted; the formless form of the whole, as it were. God’s love is said to be revealed in Christ and Christ “emptied himself, taking the form of a servant” (ἐκένωσας). The “nothingness” that comes forth in the realization of sin in man may be thought of as something which stands in correlation to this “emptiness” in divine Love.

The reception of God’s love is called faith. Faith, while always our own faith, is fundamentally different from the usual sense in which “we” put faith (or believe) in something. The latter is an act of our self and is immanent in the self. It is an “intentional” act towards some object, from “within” the self. This is the same also in the case of believing in one-self. In all cases, belief remains immanent in the field of consciousness and self-consciousness. But in religion, belief is established at a point where this field has been passed through and the framework of “ego” has been broken. Just as sin comes to be realized within the self as a reality emerging from the foundation of all human existence—or of all living things (*sattva*)—together with the self itself, the belief that means a turn-about from this sin, that is, salvation, must become a great reality in the same way. We can find the concept of faith in this sense in Christianity as well as in Buddhism. In the former, faith is considered as a grace we receive through God’s love, and the latter speaks of “two sorts of profound faith,” of which one, the faith of man who seeks sal-

vation, consists in the above mentioned real awareness of man's own sinfulness, and the other, the faith of "dharma", means that faith in salvation is a grace emanating from the Buddha Amida's saving "Power of the Original Vow" (that is, His saving Will). In Christianity, faith in Christ means to personally realize and confirm God's saving love in oneself and means at the same time God's realization and confirmation of His own Love in man. It is a single Realization. And it is considered as the operation of the Holy Spirit which works to establish between man and God a *real* relationship—as a "bodily" experienced realization, which is faith. It means that "those who come to the master shall be one spirit with him." When the Buddha Amida's Name, which is the testimony to the completion of that Buddha's compassionate Vow to save all living beings and which, moreover, reveals the substantial identity of the Buddha and "profane" beings,—when that Name, I say, is kept in mind and is recited on the lips of "living beings", we can see there that the realization of the Buddha's "Great Compassion" and the faith and confirmation by human beings are really unified and become a single Realization. Hence it could also be said, "Without a practicing devotee who in faith opens up his mind to the Name, the Buddha Amida's Vow to save all and forsake none would not be fulfilled. Without the Buddha's Vow to save all and forsake none, how would the desire of a practicing devotee for rebirth in Pure Land be fulfilled? This is the reason why it is said, 'Isn't the Vow the Name, and the Name the Vow? Isn't the Vow the practicing devotee, and the practicing devotee the Vow?'" (SHINRAN, "*Shūjishō*").

This sort of faith occurs, in all cases, as something in which the self truly becomes the self itself. The fundamental awareness and realization of sin or evil, the area of nothingness which is opened up in that awareness, and the faith in which the work of salvation is received,—these signify, each in its own way, the place where the self becomes itself as an absolutely unique and unsubstitutable being. It is the most "private" place in the self, the place of the "solitary man" as KIRKEGAARD called him. Not only that no other person can substitute for it, but also even the usually so-called self, that is, the self as "ego", cannot do so. The ego is the subjectivity of the individual, but it has still the character that it can be universally applied to any person whomsoever, namely as such a mode of being as "ego". This characteristic appears already in DESCARTES' "I think; therefore I am." But in faith the self becomes really the self—the solitary self, becomes truly the self itself, and at the same time, it is not the self's own self. This is the status of faith in its reality. We see the same status expressed in the words of PAUL: Christ

"threw Himself away for my sake", and in the words of SHINRAN: "pondering over Amida Buddha's Vow which prompted His five *aeons* long contemplation, I find that it was for the sake of SHINRAN alone that the Vow was made."

This Realization always occurs at once as the *absolute* negation and absolute affirmation of the "solitary" self. Salvation is called the love of God, and it is essentially different from human love. For example, JESUS said, "Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword." This sword is—if it is permitted here to use the terms of Zen—at once "a sword that kills man" and "a sword that gives him life". It is a sword that negates the ego-centered self or the self of original sin from the foundation of its being. It cuts through the "nihil" (or spiritual "death") contained in sin. But, for this very reason, it is also a sword that makes man inherit eternal life. Here, the love is a sword. "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall save it." Faith as a realization and direct experience of God's love necessarily develops into "loving one's neighbour", but that love of one's neighbour also is, in the sense we have just established, to acquire the same kind of sword. It can be said that the word "theopneustos" (inspired by God) in the Bible (2 *Timothy*, 3; 16) does not mean that the Holy Spirit is inspired "into us", but rather that our "being" itself becomes God-breathed by God's own breathing. Here is the reality of faith and "rebirth" in faith. Our Eastern ancestors expressed the same idea by the saying, "The water comes and the channel is made." That is, the water does not flow into a ready-made water-way called "us", but it comes freely flowing and with its flow makes its own water-way, that is, the new us. This rebirth, this reality of the new creation, is no other than an emergence of the "absolute negation-affirmation". This is perhaps a necessary characteristic as well in the neighbourly love of the man who has been newly born, being breathed out of the "Breath of God" (the Holy Spirit)—namely, that love is at the same time sword, and sword is at the same time love. In the world of men, faith and love ought to exist as such things. And such things, for the first time, they can be a testimony of the Love of God,—of God who says, "Those whom I love, I reprove and chasten" (*Rev.*, 3; 19).

It is said in Buddhism, "If one prays to be born into Buddha's Land, then he will attain rebirth in it and reside in un-retrogressive confirmation." The moment when one pure act of faith springs up, that faith is established as that which will never regress and we reside in it as in the situation of "right confirmation." Such an occurrence is possible because this faith is not merely an act of consciousness of the self, but is an *actual* realization within

the self of the reality spoken of above. "Our situation is un-retrogressively ensured" because we enter, in an instant, into certainty of rebirth in Buddha's Land, and because in that instant—in that "atom of eternity in time"—the *possibility* of the rebirth is determined to *necessity* by the power of Buddha's Original Vow. In the phrase, "directly attaining rebirth into the Pure Land", the word "directly" means also "instantly", it means the instant of turn-about when the chain of illusive *karma* from before time infinite is absolutely negated and we realize (and experience) in ourselves the confirmation and testimony of rebirth into the Pure Land. We spoke previously about the instant which should be called "the atom of eternity" in time. It was the instant when original evil comes to present itself to one's self-awareness in the foundation of subjectivity. We said also that the nothingness of the self is realized in the self-awareness of that evil, and that this self-awareness in nothingness becomes the place of the turn-about. When we speak of directly attaining rebirth into the Pure Land, this, too, must be an instant of such a transformation. As in the saying, "our receiving in faith the Original Vow is our dying in the first instant, and our directly attaining the rebirth is our directly being alive in the second instant", the instant of transformation from death to rebirth is the instant when absolute negation and absolute affirmation are one. This is the instant of the pure act of resigning oneself to Buddha, which appears in the pure act of faith. For this reason, "when we bow our heads and worship the Buddha, we are in the realm of this world, and when we have raised our heads, enter the realm of Amida" (ZENDO, "*Hanshūsan*").

Thus far, we have called various things real. Objects and events and mental processes are real. But we said that their reality can be revealed in its original reality only on the level where the field of consciousness has been passed through. We have not yet touched upon what this level ultimately is. We have simply said that where the field of consciousness is passed through, nothingness is realized, and that this nothingness is also real, although here things and mental processes become unreal. Next, we have referred to the problem of doubt and to that of evil and sin, as the instances of nothingness appearing in a "spiritual" self-awareness at the foundation of the self-conscious "ego," (that is, at the foundation of what is usually thought of as subjectivity); and we have also touched upon the question of enlightenment and faith as a turn-about from doubt and from evil and sin. And we considered that even though all these matters (such as doubt and enlightenment, sin and faith) belong to ourselves and are ours, they are primarily in themselves real, and

become *really* ours only when we ourselves become the realization of them,—or, as we can also say, only when they come to present themselves to us in their real suchness, are we able to be aware of ourselves in them. In this sense, it may be said that the above mentioned turn-about or conversion, or the absolute negation-affirmation, is an event of Reality itself, which rises up within Reality. Of course, when we speak thus, we do not think of Reality as something merely “objective”. If it were, this would all become an occurrence on the field of consciousness, that is, on the field of separation between the subjective and the objective. Rather, in the case of doubt and enlightenment as well as in that of sin and faith, where our whole being is thrown into their reality in such a way that we ourselves become the realization of the reality, there occurs a turn-about of Reality itself, we ourselves becoming as a hinge within Reality itself; that is, we *really* turn-about. Then, in connection with the problem of belief, we touched on God and *Tathagata* (Buddha).

With this, the question of what is true reality acquires a new dimension. But before that, I should like to touch upon the subject of modern atheism.

V

In the previous section I mentioned God, but today it has become a question to begin with whether there is a God or not. Not that atheism did not exist in olden times, but atheism today has a special characteristic which makes it different from what it was previously. Atheism today has been raised to the rank of a substitute for religions with their Deities; it tries to provide an ultimate basis for human existence and to point out the ultimate *telos* of human life. Atheism comes forth with the assertion that it alone is the proper standpoint today which is truly adequate to a modern man. We can find such a characteristic as this in Marxism and in atheistic existentialism, of which SARTRE's existentialism in the form of humanism is an example.

SARTRE says in his “*L'Existentialisme est un humanisme*”, “Existentialism is nothing else than an attempt to draw all the consequences of a coherent atheistic position”. “God does not exist, and we have to face all the consequences of this”. Already in the last century, many thinkers thought that God had become a useless, out-of-date hypothesis, and that they could set up from humanism a better system of values which might provide norms *a priori* for society, morality, culture and so on. This was simply an optimistic humanism, one of the most prominent expressions of which we find in FEUERBACH's philosophy of “Anthropology.” But the existentialistic humanism of

our time is a humanism which "thinks it very distressing that God does not exist". SARTRE quotes from DOSTOIEVSKY; "If God didn't exist, everything would be permitted", and says that this is the very starting point of existentialism. He thinks that the foundation of human existence is nothingness. The fact that man cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself, is, for him, the basis of existentialism. The reason that existentialism is established on the basis of atheism is that nothing is found at the foundation of our being itself and that we come, pre-reflectively, to an awareness of this "nothing," as the foundation of our self-being and the basis of our subjectivity. Existentialism is subjectivism in the sense that man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity. Atheism, that is, the assertion that man cannot have anything to depend upon either within or outside himself, appears, in the form of existentialism, as a deepening of man's subjectivity.

But from that position, SARTRE enters into a relation with the Cartesian ego. According to him, in the position of this ego we have the absolute truth of evident consciousness, and outside of this, there is no truth which we might take as a starting point. In the case of DESCARTES, although he arrived at the ego of *cogito ergo sum* and started from it, this ego was after all something which could not help again to postulate beyond itself God and His veracity. For SARTRE, the ego is subjectivity set up on "nothing". The existence of the self as a "*res cogitans*" is apperceived on the basis of nothingness. While it is based in the same way on the apperception of the ego, the ground of the existence of this ego has changed from God to nothingness, from theism to atheism. We can perceive in this change the distance which modern man has covered since he began to follow his own way of independent subjectivity. The fact that there is nothing to depend upon either within or outside, signifies for SARTRE the very freedom of human existence. Human existence, as an existence based on nothingness and thrown from nothingness into an actual situation, cannot be other than free. Man is "condemned" to be free. With this freedom, each individual chooses in his actual situations his own mode of existence; he chooses himself. In all his actions, he throws himself before himself as "a series of undertakings" and in that way chooses himself. His existence consists in "*projet*". Existence means that a human being, thrown into his factual situation, is at the same time ceaselessly going out of his own "being" and is suspended in nothingness. This constitutes freedom. Thus alone it is possible for him to act. SARTRE says that the reason that he calls his existentialism a humanism is that a man who chooses and creates himself at the same time creates an image of man such as he believes he ought to be.

In choosing himself "he is at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind." If he chooses and decides, for example, to marry and to have children, in his decision he not only chooses himself, but also indicates how humanity as a whole ought to be; he has established an "image of man." The act of choice always implies responsibility to oneself and to the whole of mankind as well. Therefore, existentialism is a humanism, he says. According to the Christian tradition, man is created in the "image of God", which image constitutes his essence and precedes ontologically his existence. But in SARTRE's atheism, which sees "nothing" at the foundation of the self, it is a natural consequence that the concept of God's image is discarded and an image of man, in which his existence is thought to precede his essence, is established.

Such a standpoint reveals a conclusion naturally drawn by modern man who set out from the self-consciousness of the Cartesian ego. It can be said that herein the "problematical" which was hidden from the start in that ego has become manifest in a clear-cut form. As I have said previously, even though *cogito ergo sum* is the most directly real fact, the evidence of that fact cannot authenticate modern man's ego being derived from it, as it would seem at first glance. A most subtle and easily misleading problem is lurking herein. The status of "ego" consists in "I think" being thought from the standpoint of "I think". I consists in a duplication of "I think". Here subjectivity appears taking the form of a self shut up within itself, which means that the self is bound by itself in such a way that cannot extricate itself from itself. There is a characteristic in the very existence of this self, which may be called "clinging to oneself" or "being bound by one's own hands with one's own rope". There is a demand concealed within the depth of such a self for liberation from itself. This liberation—namely, the true emergence of the reality of "I think" and "I am"—is first possible on the level where the above mentioned duplication of "I think" has been broken and the field of consciousness and self-consciousness passed through. Subjectivity also can be revealed for the first time as original subjectivity at the point where the framework of the Cartesian ego has burst.

SARTRE says that his theory "is the only theory which gives man dignity, the only one which does not reduce him to an object." We can well appreciate his purpose, but as I said before, so long as we do not open up a horizon which transcends wholly the field of the self-conscious ego, there always remains in us some residuum of our inveterate habit of representing our own self as an object, no matter how we think of subjectivity. Moreover, although his theory appears to ensure the dignity of man as it is expressed in his free-

dom and independence, I think the real dignity of man can be established only in the "reborn man"—or the "new man"—that emerges in us, when we die to our self and resuscitate to our self, cutting through the "nothing" in doing so. SARTRE also says that existence of man consists of "*projet*", that is, of its continuously transcending itself and going out of itself. He recognizes, therefore, an "ecstatic" transcendence. This transcendence is not transcendence in the sense that God is transcendent. It means that there is "nothing" at the foundation of the self-being. To go continuously out of oneself in choosing one's own existence is to make this nothingness a spring-board, so to speak. But so long as he places subjectivity in the position of the Cartesian ego, this is not even the "death" spoken of by HEIDEGGER. The being of this ego is not "being unto death". Neither is it the previously mentioned "great Death" which was said to be the field of "nothing" opened in the great Doubt; because the great Doubt is no other than the bankruptcy of the Cartesian ego. Still more, it is not Buddhistic "*sunyata*" ("nothingness or emptiness.") Nothingness in Buddhism is "non-self", while SARTRE's nothingness is, in spite of its transcendence, still thought of as immanent in the ego, a sort of transcendence glued to the ego, as it were. Although he considers it the foundation of the subject, it is still considered like a wall projected in the base of the ego, or like a spring-board on which the ego is standing. His nothingness is turned into a basic factor that shuts the ego up within itself. Here, the ego has a partition of nothingness at its bottom, and becomes a vast and desolate cave, so to speak. It reminds us of what men of Zen used to call "livelihood in the Black Mountain" or "living in the Demon's Cavern"—that is, to live inside the cave of the self-conscious ego with its "subjective" nothingness opened at its base. So far as this "nothingness" is still set up as something called nothingness at the base of our existence, it does not yet go beyond "the perversely-grasped *Sunyata* (Emptiness)" which is rebuked by Buddhism. Our existence, here, is an existence "attached to Emptiness"; and its subjectivity, although deepened basically, is still "demonic". The self which sets up this "nothingness" is, just in doing so, bound and captured by that nothingness. While this existence on "nothing" seems to pass through a denial of "self-attachment" it is, in turn, a self-attachment in higher potency and in subtler concealment. This nothingness appears, of course, as negativity, as negation of "being" in general; but so long as it presents itself as an *object* of consciousness, and so also in the form of representation—or, (what means the same), so long as it is an object of a basic attachment,—it still retains a certain character of being. The "nihil" usually spoken of is something like this. It cannot truly be the

"absolute negation" of the self and all things, because it hides behind it a self that has a representation (idea) of it and in that way is basically attached to it, and through this, it becomes itself a kind of "being". Also it can not truly be the "absolute affirmation" of the self and all things, because it is not the field on which all things are present in reality as they are. The "nothingness" so-called here is merely the void, the "nihil", that turns everything into non-reality. This is that which in Buddhism came to be called the the *sunyata* (emptiness) of "the nihilating view-point". Buddhism stresses rather the Absolute *Sunyata* that negates even such nihilating *sunyata*. In this Absolute *Sunyata*, there can be transcended, for the first time, both the field of consciousness where our self and all things are viewed as positive reality (internal or external), and the nothingness which is seen at their foundation; that is, both the simply negative attitude in all sorts of nihilism ("the nihilating view" in Buddhistic terms) and the simply positive attitude in all sorts of positivism and naive realism ("the view of constancy") are transcended. Both the self which is the attacher and the "things" that are attached to are nihilated and made "empty". All are truly "empty". But that all things are nihilated and empty means here that all things are just present in their original reality. This is True Suchness. And it is also non-attachment. To see, like SARTRE, that there is "nothing" at the ground of one's existence means that there is no ground for the self. But here, the nothingness of "there is no ground" is still standing before the self like a wall and turns into a kind of ground—that is, turns into there *being* a ground. Only Absolute Emptiness is the truly groundless (*Ungrund*). Here all things, a flower and a stone, nebulas and galactic systems,—even life and death—present themselves as bottomlessly real, as bottomlessly *such as they are*. True freedom lies in the "bottomless" such as this; while, on the contrary, SARTRE's "freedom" is still bondage, because the "nothing" on which it is established is such a kind of nothingness as still has a shadowy projection of the "ego" wedged into like a stake, the self being bound to it. (This is what is meant by "attachment"). What he has grasped *can* be called freedom, but more fundamentally, it is rather bondage.

SARTRE says "There is no reality except in actions", and, "At heart, what existentialism shows is the connection between the absolute character of free involvement, by virtue of which every man realizes himself in realizing a type of mankind, an involvement always comprehensible in any age whatsoever and by any person whomsoever, and the relativity of the cultural ensemble which may result from such a choice; it must be stressed that the relativity of

Cartesianism and the absolute character of Cartesian involvement go together." I think the meaning of this will be understood from what I said previously about his thought. The question is, from what plane are the actions spoken of here to be done, and from what plane is the realization of oneself and "a type of mankind" to be realized. In order that an action truly be reality, it must not be done from such sort of nothingness as SARTRE speaks of. When he says, "Each of us performs an absolute act in breathing, eating, sleeping, or behaving in any way whatever. There is no difference between being free and being absolute," it sounds as if they were the words of a follower of Zen, but the fact that such actions as dressing and eating are "absolute actions" cannot really be affirmed and confirmed from his standpoint. Neither is the realization of a "type of mankind" possible on the level of humanism which he speaks of, but it must mean the realization of a "new man," which accrues from the absolute negation of "man". An action is able to become truly "absolute" only as arising from the plane which is opened up when we break-through the cave of the ego, and through the wall of the "nothingness" at the base of the ego, too;—that is, only when it is an action that comes to realize itself from the yonder side (or rather from this side) of the field of consciousness and self-consciousness, the field of "ego", and when it ceases to be "my" or "your" action, although it is also the same I or you who then acts.

It is natural that SARTRE's existentialism, which rests on a Cartesian subjective ego, should give rise to a criticism of materialism, which is its antipode. In SARTRE's book which we mentioned, there is a discussion with a certain Marxist in the supplement, and there it is asserted, from the standpoint of materialism, that the first reality is the natural reality, of which the human reality is only a function, and that natural conditions are the prime reality. From such a point of view, it is not possible to explain the subjectivity of our self, and the criticism itself does not seem to have been raised with sufficient understanding in regard to man's "existence" which SARTRE asserts. But it cannot be denied also that the reason that such a criticism has appeared lies in SARTRE himself. So long as we do not transcend the field of the fundamental separation between subject and object, there arises of necessity an opposition between the standpoint of viewing the object from the side of subject taken as basic, and that of considering the subject from the side of object which is taken as the basis. And in either case, as I said previously, we do not truly and *really* reach the reality of the self or the reality of things.

VI

The position of atheistic existentialism such as SARTRE's is not yet the ultimate standpoint; or rather, the domain of religion comes into being just where such a position is broken-through. But, nevertheless, it is not without reason that a position such as SARTRE's has appeared. This reason is the same reason that the mode of human existence of so-called modern man could not help but emerge. It is, fundamentally, a problem contained in Christianity. Now, Christianity has been recognizing disobedience to God or original sin in egoistic existence as constituting the basic mode of being of every actual man. It has opened, as the contrary to that existence, the way to a new man, who rather than following his own will denies it and does God's will, who is dead to self and alive in God. There, too, is to be sought the true freedom. This freedom is thought to be found only with submission to the will of God. Here, man's free subjectivity is under God's absolute power and is established only together with subordination to that power. But meanwhile in the modern world, man has begun to realize his own subjective independence as something which cannot be restricted by any authority whatsoever; not though it were God's authority. Principles in the domains of the sciences, arts, politics, ethics, and all other such areas have become independent from their religious groundings, and the universal "secularization" of human life has been more and more developed. The alienation of the actualities of human life from religion thus constitutes the fundamental problem in the history of modern man. Consequently, there appeared various forms of atheism, and at last, in present times, atheism has come to be postulated at the very foundation of man's subjective existence itself, and in this way, the atheistic standpoint itself has come to be subjectivized. This may be called an atural consequence in the modern "Geistesgeschichte." This position maintains that only a subjectivized atheism, namely, the atheism of a man who sees "nothing" (either outside or within) on which to depend, and accepts as his own the void of which he is aware at the foundation of his existence, can establish truly the actual existence and freedom of man. But, as I said before, man simply runs up, in this standpoint, against a wall inside his self, and his freedom is a freedom that is at the same time deepest bondage. We cannot stop at this standpoint. We must descend further into our own existence to the plane where this barrier has been broken-through. Our religious search obliges us to this step. But, to repeat, the Christian faith in its traditional form has shown that it implies an alienation from the awaked subjectivity of modern man. Do not these two mutually

exclusive positions—namely, man's freedom pushed to its ontological conclusion in subjective nothingness and in subjectivized atheism on the one hand, and the religious freedom manifested in the Christian tradition on the other hand,—to-day require to attain by some means a new and higher synthesis which is to be attained only through self-negation and the mutual negation of these two positions? Modern atheism should not be regarded by Christianity merely as something to be eliminated. Nor is Christianity able to eliminate it. It should rather receive modern atheism as a mediation to the possibility of its own new development. Be that as it may, what problem in Christianity caused the existence of modern man to advance in a direction away from the Christianity? I should like to consider this question from the point of the Christian view of God, and especially, the transcendence and personal character of God.

Christianity speaks of the "creation out of nothing." God created everything that exists out of nothing, and as all things have the "nothing" at the foundation of their existence, they are absolutely distinct from the Creator. This idea is an expression of the absolute transcendence of God. The idea of creation out of nothing, which permits consideration of God's absolute transcendence, is a more advanced conception of God than, for example, the Greek idea that the Demiurgos made all things by giving various forms to the material which already existed. But this caused, on the other hand, the ontological relationship between God and the created things unavoidably to become a perpetual problem in Christianity. God alone is the absolute Being, and so far, all things are basically nothing. But so long as we must also say all things "are", what shall we consider to be the relationship between their being and God's absolute Being? In order to solve such a difficult problem, people adopted such concepts as the Platonic idea of "participation" or the Aristotelian idea of "analogia entis," for example. This problem cannot be called solved even at present.

The most important point about this problem is that it must be an "existential" question in the "existence" of each religious man. There is, for example, God's omnipresence. AUGUSTINE says in his *"Confessions"*, that all things in heaven and on earth are proclaiming that they were created by God. These words can be taken simply as an expression of metaphysical or theological thought about God's omnipresence. But if all things are *really* speaking thus to us and we listen *really* to what they are saying, then this would turn into the question of our "existence"—but in what sense? That all things are saying loudly that they were made by God means that they are saying

that they themselves are not God. So far, we cannot encounter God anywhere in the world. Instead, we encounter everywhere in the world, at the foundation of everything that is, the *nihilum*” as it is expressed in the phrase, “creation out of nothing.” This nothingness is an iron wall that absolutely partitions all things off from God. Accordingly, to encounter this nothingness must be, so to speak, to encounter God as an iron wall. It means an encounter upon the absolute negativity in God, the absolute negativity manifested in the fact that God is *not* what was created, and what was created can *not* be God. At the same time, the fact that all things exist as they are in actuality, means, seen from the standpoint of a believer, that he encounters in them God’s power of creation, which gives them existence and preserves them, in spite of nothingness. The words of AUGUSTINE signify the encounter with God in such a double meaning. It means that in our very inability to encounter God, no matter where we turn in the world, we encounter Him, no matter where we turn. If God’s omnipresence should be considered in such a paradoxical way, what becomes of the existence of each individual as being in such a world? In short, it means that we are everywhere forced to a decision—even when we face a grain of sand, a worm, or an atom. It means that everyone stands there directly facing the iron wall of God. Those who have entered the faith, when they encounter the iron wall, will pass through it. But even people who do not return to God, whatever they look at, wherever they turn (even within themselves), cannot escape this iron wall, namely, God in His absolute negativity. God’s omnipresence must be something like this. People of old said that if God so desired it, the whole world would return in a instant to nothing and vanish. God is omnipresent as the absolute “No”, as well as the absolute “Yes” to the created existence. Therefore, when anyone, no matter who, encounters God’s omnipresence “existentially”, it should be primarily as if he himself had been thrown into the midst of a desert of death, where he can neither remain nor escape. God’s omnipresence, when it is met-with on the existential standpoint, means that God is always present everywhere as a paradox for our existence itself. It must come to present itself to us, first of all, as something that deprives us of all places, where we can stand as self-existence, where we can live and exhale our own breath. Our existence is spoken of as a sinful existence of rebellion against God, but the “ontological” relationship between this being of ours and God’s Being should be thought of, on the existential standpoint, as we have just described it. The omnipresence of an absolutely transcendent God must be thought of as something that is pressing close upon our own existence and which permits us neither to advance

nor to retreat, forcing us to a decision; as something that is thoroughly interlocked with every behaviour of our daily life. I think that we can glimpse such a situation in MOSES and the prophets, or PAUL, FRANCIS of Assisi, and LUTHER, for example. But in Christianity, God's transcendence is considered as if He were standing aloof from every created beings and from the world, "above the heavens" or "above the clouds". Isn't it rather rare for His transcendence to be borne truly existentially by Christians as a problem relevant to their own existence? Isn't it rather unusual that the omnipresence of an absolutely transcendent God is accepted as a presence directly confronting oneself? However, as said previously, the fact that all created things are proclaiming that they were created by God, means that no matter where we turn, God is not there, and again,—what is the same—that everywhere we turn, we directly confront God. That is, the very God, before whom all created things are nothing, is present through all created things. Christians must be able to hear and see even in a single stone or a blade of grass God's consuming flame, His roaring thunder and pillar of lightening experienced by MOSES and others. There should be the same "fear and trembling".

It is usually considered that God's absolute transcendence is met in a personal relationship with God, through the consciousness of sin, and with fear and trembling. That it is to be encountered in the world of creation seems seldom to be taken into consideration. The idea of perceiving God in all things of the world is usually rejected as "pantheism"; and "theism", based on a personal relationship, is considered correct. But in the idea of God's omnipresence is contained the possibility of encountering God everywhere in the world. This is not the so-called pantheism. For this does not mean that Universe is God, or that God is the immanent Life of the world itself, but it means that an absolutely transcendent God is, as such, absolutely immanent. That a certain thing was created from nothing means that this "nothing" is "immanent" in the very being of that thing,—more "immanent" than the being of that thing is "immanent" in that being itself. This is the meaning of what we just called "absolutely immanent". This is immanence in the form of absolute negativity, for the being of what was created is grounded upon *nothing* and, seen fundamentally, is nothing. It is, at the same time, immanence in the form of absolute positivity; for the nothingness of what was created is the ground of *being*. This is God's omnipresence in all that was created from nothing. And so, the omnipresence can be said to contain for man the moment of the turn-about from absolute negativity to absolute positivity, from being absolutely negated to being absolutely affirmed. To entrust one's self to this

moment, to ride on it, as it were, in order to die to self and live in God, constitutes faith. The appearance of Christ, too, can be considered to be the corporeal manifestation of what was just called the moment of turn-about for man, which is contained in God Himself. The Gospel, which proclaims that the Kingdom of God is at hand, urges men to the decision to die and revive. The fact that the Gospel of God's Kingdom has an eschatological meaning signifies, from the existential standpoint, that the moment of man's turn-about which is contained in God's omnipresence comes to present itself with such an urgency as to press an immediate decision upon man—to press upon him with “either eternal death or eternal life”. This is the meaning of my previous statement that the love of Christ is a sword—a “sword that kills man” and a “sword that gives him life” at the same time. In this sense, there is latent in the Gospel the meaning that man, no matter where he is and no matter what he does, each time comes in contact with a sword that cuts through him. Only thus considered, so-called eschatology can be made truly a problem of man's existence and he who dies and attains life by this sword of *agape* can be made God-breathed, an expiration from the Holy Spirit.

Now, even when we encounter His transcendence and omnipresence in such an existential way as just described, that encounter can be termed a personal relationship between God and man. But it must be in a very different sense from what is usually meant by “personal.” If we speak in the usual sense in which the relationship between God and the “soul”, or the “spiritual” relationship and so forth, are called “personal,” the above relationship must be said to have rather an impersonal character. But it is not impersonal simply in the usual sense of being the opposite of the personal. For example, when pantheism thinks of the Universal Life, or the productive power of Nature, they are impersonal in the usual sense. But when we meet with God's omnipresence existentially as the absolute negativity to the being of all created things, when it presents itself as an iron wall that prevents us from all further movement, forwards or backwards, it is not impersonal in the usual sense of the word. Rather, here appears a totally different point of view with regard to “personal” and also with regard to “impersonal”. This should be considered, so to speak, as an im-“personally” personal relationship, or as a “personally” impersonal relationship. *Persona* in its original meaning is probably close to what we are speaking of now. In Christianity, what is called the Holy Spirit possesses such characteristics. At the same time that it is thought of as one *persona* in the Trinity of “personal” God, it is no other than God's Love itself, the breath of God; a sort of impersonal person or

personal impersonal, as it were. But if such a point of view be once introduced, not only the Holy Spirit, but also God Himself with this Spirit, and man himself in his "spiritual" relationship with God, can be seen in the same light. And in the eyes of those who are God-breathed, who are born anew in that breath in eternal life, who have been given faith through the living bond with God, that is, through the living *religio*—in their eyes, I say, all created things would come to be seen as God-breathed. In Christianity, too, it may become possible to proclaim, "Once the Great Death, then the Universe becomes new." PAUL says: "I know and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus that nothing is unclean in itself; but it is unclean for anyone who thinks it unclean." In his faith is implied a kind of intuitive knowledge—a "faith-knowledge", Buddhists would say—that all things are pure in themselves. In a word, God is not only personal in the usual sense, and the relationship between God and man is not only a personal relationship. God must be encountered as really being omnipresent in the world in such a way as exposed above: as being absolutely immanent—with His absolute transcendence, which means here absolute negativity—in all things. This must be an impersonally personal (or personally impersonal) encounter, in which God's reality itself is realized as impersonally personal (or personally impersonal). God's reality must be taken up in the mode of its being as is revealed on the level where there is neither "internal" nor "external", and the existence of a man who meets with it must also be considered on the same level, not as just "internally" personal existence.

VII

We have above discussed the problem concerning the transcendence of God and the ontological relationship between God and created things, and referred to the concept of omnipresence, explaining how it should be taken from existential standpoint. The same problem is connected also with the concept of omnipotence. What is to be said about this concept is fundamentally the same as what was said above, but I shall touch upon it briefly.

I once asked a certain Christian as a joke, "You consider God omnipotent. Well, can He sneeze?" The man who was being questioned thought awhile and replied that since God does not have involuntary muscles, probably he doesn't sneeze. This was a joke, but there is a basic problem in it. If there would be something, no matter what, which God could not do, God were neither omnipotent nor the absolute being. But if God is a God who sneezes

newspaper, chatting with someone, or at any other time. And, moreover, it must be something which is met with as that which can destroy both body and soul, which makes man fear and tremble, which forces a decision. Without this urgency, even though we may talk about God's omnipotence, it is simply an idea and so God, too, becomes just a concept. God's omnipotence must be taken as infinitely near to our self. This "near to our self" means: within every behavior in our daily lives and, moreover, with fear and trembling. Thus, for the first time, we can really receive it as reality. And when God's omnipotence is really received, the faith that turns us from fear is also really established. "But even the hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear not, therefore; you are of more value than many sparrows. So everyone who acknowledges me before men, I also acknowledge before my Father who is in heaven; but whosoever denies me before men, I also will deny before my Father in heaven....Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth. I have not come to bring peace, but a sword." We said before, that faith consists in our dying to self and living in God, which means that we entrust ourselves to the moment of turn-about (which is contained in God himself in His relationship to man) from absolute negation to absolute affirmation. It is perhaps unnecessary to repeat the point again here. Briefly, it means that the motif of turning-about is realized in oneself, that oneself becomes its realization and by this means gets a "bodily" experience of it.

There are no doubt many "intelligent" people who say, it is absurd that they ought to encounter God's omnipotence when they are listening to the radio. But, if so, then they ought instead to meet with the "nothingness" of themselves. If they say that they nowhere meet with nothingness, that such an encounter is not their business, that they are busy and have no leisure to take up with nothingness, that they are not such good-for-"nothing" persons, or that their intellect does not acknowledge such a thing as nothingness,—if they want to say something like this, then they are meeting with nothingness just in their not meeting with it. Just within the fact that they do not meet nothingness, nothingness is presenting itself. No matter what they do, no matter how busy or how "intellectual" they are, rather, precisely to the extent that they are busy and "intellectual", they cannot go a single step away from nothingness. Even when their consciousness or their intellect doesn't encounter it, their being itself is in encounter with it. Nothingness is evidenced in their busy or intellectual existence itself. To meet with the "nothingness" of themselves would be rather the first step away from it. Their not meeting with it only means that they are more deeply within it. Such is the nature

of nothingness.

As stated above, the incongruence between the world-order decreed through God's omnipotence and the evil in human beings has long been a perplexing problem. But basically this problem is not different from the problem contained in the case of the sneezing or in our listening to the radio. God does not sneeze; but God made some of His creatures so that they sneeze. In the sneezing of those creatures God's omnipotence is present—present primarily as the absolute negativity; in other words, as that nothing on the ground of which creatures are just creatures. Similarly, God created man so that he has freedom to do evil. Even man's evil acts are within God's omnipotence. God's omnipotence is present in the very fact that man has the power to do evil and actually does evil; and it is present there also primarily as the absolute negativity, the "anger" of God. The reason is that man's ability to commit evil comes from the nothingness at the foundation of his existence, that is, because he is a being created from nothing. And when (as we discussed above) he himself becomes the 'place of nothingness' in his self-awareness of "radical evil" and the turn-about to the faith takes place, then his salvation is assured, although he cannot cast off his evil and remains a sinner. Here the divine omnipotence is revealed to him as the absolute affirmation that pardons his sin, remaining at the same time the absolute negation that condemns it. This absolute negation-affirmation of the sinner is the pardoning of sin in the man of faith, is the "love" of God. Thus, it can be said that the evil is absolutely within God's omnipotence, and that, nevertheless, there is absolutely no evil in God.

In the problem of evil and sin, the relationship of God and man takes a "personal" form in the ordinary sense. Christianity speaks of the punishment of man in the "first Adam", and his atonement through the "second Adam". Modern theologians, moreover, with their modern conception of "personality" even assert a radical distinction between evil and sin, the latter being possible, as they say, only in the "personal" relationship to God. But on the foundation where this "personal" relationship is the absolute negation-affirmation, an evil act and an involuntary movement such as sneezing are the same. They are both due to man's createdness itself, that is, to the nothingness at the foundation of his being itself. And on this foundation, that personal relationship can be called an impersonally personal (or a personally impersonal) relationship, in the sense which was explained previously.

When we consider the concept of "personality" (in God as well as in man) by the above means on an at once broader and deeper ground than was done in the past, that is, on the plane where the opposites of "personal" and

"impersonal" are transcended, we attain for the first time the horizon in which the problem of religion and science can really be taken up as problem. One of the reasons that I dared to attempt the above line of thought, is that I am seeking a level on which we can *really* come in contact with the problem of religion and science. Next, I would like enter upon this difficult problem, while expounding at the same time more fully on the concepts of "personal" and "impersonal".

Translated by Janice D. ROWE

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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ORIENTAL NOTHINGNESS

By

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Preface

What I should like to call Oriental Nothingness is, in my opinion, a Nothingness ("Nothing," "Non-Being," or "Not")² peculiar to the Orient. It is, especially in contrast to Western culture, the fundamental moment of "Oriental" culture. I also consider it to be the core of Buddhism, and, moreover, the essence of Zen. Further, it is the living experience of Self-realization which constitutes the concrete base of my own religion and philosophy. I have from time to time already written about it in my various works according to the respective themes of those works. But since these treatments are fragmentary and unintegrated, I should like here to single out the characteristics of this Nothingness and to present, through a negative as well as a positive delineation of those characteristics, an all-inclusive explanation.

The mode of explanation thus employed is analytical and conceptual. It seeks to differentiate clearly Oriental Nothingness from other possible kinds of nothingness in order that it not be confused with them. Oriental Nothingness thus conceptualized and discriminated from other kinds of nothingness is, of course, not the true, concrete, living Nothingness. That it can not avoid being simply a shadow of the true Nothingness must be said to be a fate which a conceptual explanation can not escape.

In spite of this, however, throughout the centuries conceptual discourses concerning Oriental Nothingness have never been lacking. This, in part, is due to the mere conceptual demands and scholarly interests of men. But it must also be said to be due in large measure to a religious impulse. This is the religious impulse to provide an unerring signpost or exemplification for the one who, seeking to awaken to Himself, is trying to get into exact accord

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² Although in Japanese this is a single term, mu (無), in order to make clear in English the various meanings and nuances contained within it, these several alternative translations are offered. (Tr.)

with Nothingness and to know it for himself very much as he would know for himself hotness and coldness. Descriptions of Nothingness by modern scholars usually result from an academic interest. The various patriarchs up to now, on the other hand, out of this impulse to help man come to his Self-realization, intentionally discriminated Nothingness, which is beyond discrimination, in the attempt to make a compass to sail the ocean of fog and to light a true beacon for the one seeking to awaken to Himself.

Consequently, although both patriarchs and scholars have engaged in this scholarly inquiry and conceptualization, we must recognize that there is between them a difference in their objective and in the nature of their concern. In so far, however, as Oriental Nothingness is being treated scholarly and conceptually, that it must be discriminated precisely goes without saying. For regardless of the extent to which it may derive from the impulse to help man come to his Self-realization, if the treatment or presentation while taking a conceptual form lacks conceptual preciseness, it will fail even in its primary objective.

I. A Negative Delineation

What can that which I wish to call Oriental Nothingness be said not to be? Although one and the same term, "nothingness" ("nothing," "non-being," or "not")³, the meanings in which this term is generally used are several. It is never used in any one sense alone. Accordingly, in order clearly to distinguish and explain what I am calling Oriental Nothingness, let us inquire whether its meaning is or is not to be found within the meanings for which the term "nothingness" is ordinarily employed. To do this, I should like to examine the meanings expressed by the term "nothingness" ("nothing," "non-being," or "not"), roughly dividing them into five.

The first is non-being or nothingness as the negation of being. This is non-being or nothingness in the sense that something—whether something material or something spiritual—which has being is negated, as, for example, in saying, "There is no desk," or, "There is no pleasure." That is, it is the non-being or nothingness of "There is not." This includes both the negation of some individual being, for example, "There is not this desk," or, "There is not this pleasure," and the negation of all being, as, for example, "There isn't anything," or "There is nothing at all."

The second is "not" or nothingness as a predicative negation, or, as a negative predicate. This is the "not" or nothingness of a negative predicate

³ See Translator's note bottom of p. 65.

way, a peculiarly or uniquely Oriental nothingness. When, however, Oriental Nothingness is expressed by such phrases as "The three worlds are without 'things,'" "All is *śūnya*," or "not a single thing," one possibly may misunderstand Oriental Nothingness to mean that the whole of being is not.

Such expressions as "The three worlds are without things" and "not a single thing" taken literally do in fact mean that "the whole of being is not." To take Oriental Nothingness in this sense when expressed by such phrases is, therefore, not without reason. The expressions "The three worlds are without things" and "not a single thing," however, actually aver that "there is not one single thing—whatever it may be—which can be said to exist" in and for Oriental Nothingness-in-Itself or in-Its-Self-Inner-Realization. If, therefore, because of such expressions, Oriental Nothingness is understood simply as "There is nothing," this will not do. Through the centuries, falling into such a distorted understanding was strictly admonished by calling such an understanding "a literal-negative understanding," an "annihilating-nothingness view," or a "rigid-nothingness view."

In the second chapter, entitled "*Prajñā*," of his "*Platform Sūtra*" (六祖法宝壇經) (*Taishō Daizōkyō*, vol. 48, p. 350, a) the Sixth Patriarch, Hui-neng (7th century), declares: "The Mind in its dimensions is broad and great, like empty-space.⁴ It has no sides or limits; it is neither square nor round, neither large nor small. It is neither blue, yellow, red, nor white; it has neither upper nor lower; it is neither long nor short. It knows neither anger nor pleasure, neither right nor wrong, neither good nor evil. It is without beginning and without end. But good friends, do not, hearing me speak of emptiness, become attached to emptiness."

In Huang-po's "*Yüan-ling Record*" (宛陵錄) (*Taishō Daizōkyō*, vol. 48, p. 386b) also, it is written: "The Mind-Ground is like empty-space; it has neither form nor shape, it is without direction or location. But it is not nothing exclusively."

Again, Oriental Nothing is not nothing in the second sense of a negative predication. Probably no one would consider the "not" or negation in "A desk is not a chair" to be Oriental Nothing. If, however, one should say "Is not this, is not that," or "Isn't any-thing whatsoever," some might possibly wonder, is not such a "not" or nothingness Oriental Nothingness. But the predication "is not any-thing whatsoever" can be attached to any subject—as, "This desk isn't any-thing whatsoever," or "That chair isn't any-thing

⁴ In the analogy of "empty-space" used by these ancients, space is, of course, still understood as absolute and empty. (Tr.)

whatsoever." Since, however, in the case of "this desk" and "that chair," these are things which are already in and of themselves delimited, although we may predicate "is not any-thing whatsoever" of them just the same, this predication doesn't go any further than merely asserting that "It isn't any-thing whatsoever outside of itself; it is just what it is." This is not going beyond all predication absolutely. To be specifically delimited already necessitates having a predicate.

In the case, however, of "God is not any-thing whatsoever," this does not simply mean that "God is not any thing outside of God; God is God." This rather has the meaning that "God is beyond all predicates." That is, "God is not any-thing whatsoever" is not merely a negative expression of the tautological law of identity, as is the statement "This desk isn't anything whatsoever [outside of itself.]" It must rather be taken to mean that "God is beyond all delimitation." Even in Christianity when it is said that "God isn't any-thing whatsoever," "God is not any-thing within the totality of all that is," that is, God is nothing, it is meant in this sense.

Thus, with a finite, relative thing like a desk, since it is already delimited, the judgment "This desk isn't any-thing whatsoever" is not at all different from the judgment "This desk is this desk." As a judgment it has little value, amounting to no more than a mere tautology. But the judgment "God is not anything whatsoever" as a judgment about God's transcending delimitation, must be said to be, among all possible judgments, the judgment of highest value.

Such a statement as found in "The Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith" (大乘起信論) (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 32, p. 576, a, b), "The Self-Nature of True Tathatā is not 'with form,' is not 'without form,' is not 'not with form,' is not 'not without form,' is not 'both with and without form,' is not 'one and the same form,' is not different forms, is not 'not one and the same form,' is not 'not different forms,' is not both 'one and the same' and different forms," means that "The Self-Nature of True Tathatā is finally and ultimately not any-thing whatsoever, that is, it is nothing."

This nothing is no other than the nothing meant in Christianity when God is referred to as beyond all predication, that is, as "nothing." The instances in Buddhism in which the term "nothing" is used in this sense, as the predication of Buddha-nature, True Tathatā, or Nirvāṇa, are extremely numerous. Such a nothing, however, is no more than the nothing of merely negative predication, meaning "is not any-thing within all that is." This is not Oriental Nothing.

Oriental Nothing is Itself also beyond delimitation and beyond predication.

It can, therefore, be said that "Oriental Nothing is not any-thing within all that is," that is, that "Oriental Nothing is nothing." But Oriental Nothing is not identical with this nothing of mere predicative negation or negative predication. If it were identical, there would be no reason especially to call it Oriental.

Oriental Non-Being or Nothingness, further, is not non-being or nothingness in the third sense, that is, in the sense of an abstract concept. Non-being or nothingness as an abstract concept is not non-being or nothingness as the negation of being, as in "There is not some (particular) thing," or "There is not any thing (at all)." Nor is it "not" or nothing as a negative predication, as in "It is not some (particular) thing" or "It is not any thing (at all)." Rather, it is non-being or nothingness as a universal, just as "being" as an abstract concept is not "There is something," or "It is something," but is "being" as a universal.

Non-being or nothingness in the technical phrase "being and non-being," or in the proposition "Being is not non-being, non-being is not being," is not the non-being or nothingness of "There is not some (particular) thing," or of "It is not some (particular) thing." It is rather non-being or nothingness as a universal, and should be called non-being or nothingness as an abstract concept. Such a non-being is of necessity relative to being. If it is being, it is not non-being; if it is non-being, it is not being. There can not obtain both being and non-being at the same time.

Together with "being," such a "non-being" or "nothing" is an indispensable logical category for the cognition or judgment of things. It may be said also that the being or non-being of a concrete thing is determined by these a priori forms or categories.

For Parmenides, "being" is that which fills up space, and "non-being" is empty space. For Hegel, the unity of "being and non-being" is "becoming." With both Parmenides and Hegel this non-being is non-being as an abstract concept. Oriental Non-Being or Nothingness is not, as is non-being as an abstract concept, merely non-being.

Oriental Nothingness or Non-Being is neither non-being as an a priori form, nor is it non-being which is defined in terms of an a priori form. Oriental Non-Being does not belong to the non-being of "being and non-being." It is rather Non-Being which goes beyond "being and non-being." It is in this sense that it is said that True Tathatā belongs neither to being nor to non-being.

In the twenty-first chapter of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra (涅槃經) it is said: „Buddha-nature is not being and is not non-being." In the second volume of

the Sata Śāstra (百論) (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 30, p. 181, c) it is stated: "Because being and non-being are both [originally and fundamentally] Non-Being, in My True Form the various presentations and representations proclaim that being and non-being are both [in their Source] Emptiness (Sunyatā). Why? Because if, in My True Form, there is neither being nor non-being, being and non-being [in their Source] are therefore both Non-Being." Such statements, as well as the term "True Non-Being," found in the Chao-lun (肇論), have no other intention than to try to express the Non-Being which transcends being and non-being.

Oriental Nothingness is also not imagined or conjectured nothingness. We can imagine that the desk which is really here at present does not exist. If I give free rein intensively to my imaginative power, I can imagine that the desk which is actually present before my eyes here and now does not exist to the extent of my no longer being able to see it. It sometimes happens that when thinking intently that something is, what actually is not can be seen as if it were, and when thinking intently that something is not, what actually is can appear not to be. Thinking intently in this way, it can appear as if all things are not, that there is neither desk nor chair, neither floor nor house, neither earth nor heavens, neither body nor mind. For one intently thinking in this way there obtains one sort of the experience that "Everything is śūnya."

In the samādhi attained when contemplating on Buddha by thinking of the major marks of the Buddha-figure and meditating upon them wholeheartedly, even while keeping the eyes open one comes to see the Buddha right before one's eyes. Similarly, the experience of "Everything is śūnya" just mentioned is, so to speak, a contemplated "Everything is śūnya." Corresponding to the contemplating or concentrating upon Buddha, it may also be possible to speak of contemplating or concentrating upon nothingness. Oriental Nothingness, however, is not such a contemplated nothingness. If it were, Oriental Nothingness would be no more than merely one subjective state of contemplation.

Oriental Nothingness is not anything like a subjective, contemplative state. Seen from the perspective of Oriental Nothingness, just as the contemplated Buddha is not the True Buddha, so the contemplated "Everything is śūnya" is not the True Śūnya. Oriental Nothingness is not the passive contemplated state, but is rather the active contemplating Mind. It is not, however, simply active contemplation. It is rather Subject-Nothingness, in which active and passive are one, and in which the duality of mind and object is left behind.

In Huang-po's "The Pivotal Point of Mind-to-Mind Transmission," (伝心法要) (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 381, a) there is the statement: "Ordinary people cling to objects, seekers after truth cling to the mind. But not clinging to—or being confined by—mind or object is the True-Dharma." This statement, as well as Lin-chi's saying "'the very listening to the dharma'—itself" and, in reply to a monk's question, "How can one see into the True Nature," Ta-chu's declaring that "Seeing is Itself the True Nature" must all be said to have a reason.

Whether speaking of "mind" or of "seeing," if they are externalized or objectified, they are no longer the true "Mind" or the true "Seeing." It must be said, as was said by the lay follower P'ang: "I only ask you to void that which is, but to take care not to reify or be captured by that voidness."

Oriental Nothingness is not, again, nothingness in the fifth sense of unconsciousness. Deep sleep, fainting, and death can not be said to be exactly the same states. However, these states are the same in so far as there is in each of them nothing of which we are conscious. That is, for us at such times there is nothing. Everything has completely disappeared. In each of these states, not alone the things of the natural world but even one's body and one's mind are not present. Such a world may probably also be called a world of nothingness.

Since, however, our consciousness is not functioning, such a nothingness is no more than our not being conscious of anything—not even of the nothingness. In this regard this is different from conjectured or imagined nothingness as in the fourth sense. With imagined nothingness, the imaginative function of consciousness is at work, and so there is a consciousness of nothingness, the object of that imagination. But with unconscious nothingness, since the function of consciousness is completely non-operative, nothingness does not become an object of consciousness. Oriental Nothingness, however, is not this kind of nothingness.

Oriental Nothingness is "perfectly lucid and clear," is "thoroughly clear ever-present awareness," that is, is that of which we are most clearly aware. Although we say "are clearly aware," this is not an awareness in which nothingness is external or objective, different from the one who is aware. This is rather an awareness in which subject and object are one. That is, Oriental Nothingness is that awareness of Oneself in which the subject and object of awareness are one and not two.

In this sense, in its being aware of Itself by Itself, it must be said that Oriental Nothingness knows Itself. Oriental Nothingness is not the same as

our—when we are unconscious—not being conscious of anything. If it were the same nothingness as obtains when we are unconscious, then we should be able to come to Oriental Nothingness through sleep, fainting, or death. Whether we speak of Oriental Nothingness as “No-Mind,” “No-Consciousness,” the “Great Death Itself,” or “Nirvāṇa,” it is not the unconsciousness of sleep, fainting, or ordinary death.

But even further, “No-Mind” or “No-Consciousness” is penetratingly clear to a degree which is absolutely impossible in any other state. It does not permit the slightest obscurity or turbidity. It has the absolute clarity of a polished mirror or an autumn moon. Whatever other condition one may speak of, there is no condition in which one is so clearly aware as in that of “No-Mind” or “No-Consciousness,” and there is no time when life is so alive and so ready to burst as in the “Great Death Itself.” Although Po-ch’ang Huai-lai said “Do not remember anything at all,” and Huang-po said “subject and object are both forgotten,” this is not a blank loss of consciousness. On the contrary. This is rather Supreme Awareness in which there is not the slightest unawareness or unclarity.

Again, although Huai-lai said, “The Mind, like trees and rocks, harbors no discrimination,” and Huang-po said, “Inner and outer, body and mind, all cast away together,” and Dōgen said, “to stop the working of the mind and its consciousness,” these statements do not mean to become something without consciousness, like a tree or a rock. Nor do they mean to dissolve consciousness, get rid of the body and psyche, and die.

Bodhidharma, similarly, counseled the Second Patriarch, Hui-k’o, saying, “Outwardly bring an end to all contingencies, inwardly the mind is to be without disturbance. With the mind being like a wall, one can then enter into the Bodhi-Way.” But this, too, is not saying to become unconscious. As Hui-k’o truly understood and actually realized, this was instructing him to become the “No-Mind” of “thoroughly clear ever-present awareness.”

When the term *ekstasis* from Western mysticism is translated into Japanese by such an expression as “to be bereft of one’s senses,” it is sometimes understood in the sense of the divine inspiration or the divine possession of a spiritual medium who proclaims, in a state of unconsciousness, God’s word. The *ekstasis* or *unio-mystica* of Oriental Nothingness, however, is neither “divine possession” nor “a state of bewitchment.” Rather, it must always be the Nothingness-Samādhi of “thoroughly clear ever-present awareness,” in which subject and object are not two. The samādhi of Oriental Nothingness is Formless-Samādhi, True-Śūnya-Samādhi, True-Tathatā-Samādhi, Sovereign-

Samādhi, One-Form-Samādhi, One-Act-Samādhi.

In the above discussion, I have particularly taken up five meanings of the term nothingness which are especially liable to be misunderstood as and confused with the meaning of Oriental Nothingness. At any rate, I have re-surveyed the fact that these meanings of "nothingness" ("nothing," "non-being," or "not") differ from the meaning of Oriental Nothingness. But to the extent that these other five meanings of nothingness can be easily confused with the meaning of Oriental Nothingness, they must contain certain similarities to Oriental Nothingness. Indeed, once Oriental Nothingness has truly come "to be known in itself in its coldness and hotness," these other meanings may then become suitable verbal media through which to express it.

It is for this reason that in spite of the fact that it is different from the first meaning of nothingness as the negation of being, Oriental Nothingness has, from long past, been fondly expressed by such phrases as "not a single thing" and "There is nothing at all." It is for this same reason that in spite of the fact that it is different from the second sense of "not" or nothing as a negative predication, it has been fondly expressed by such phrases as "neither this nor that," "not anything whatsoever," and "going beyond the four logical propositions [is, is not, is and is not, neither is nor is not] and the hundred negations." Again, in spite of the fact that it is different from the third sense of nothingness as an abstract concept, it has been fondly expressed as "Nothingness," "Śūnya," "'it is not' ness," and "'does not' ness." Once more, in spite of the fact that it is different from the fourth sense of conjectured nothingness, it has fondly been said, "Intensely concentrating upon nothingness, enter into nothingness-samādhi," or "Contemplate upon nothingness." And, finally, it is for the same reason that in spite of the fact that it is different from the fifth sense of unconscious nothingness, it has been fondly expressed by such phrases as "No-Consciousness," "No-Mind," "Not-Conscious," "like trees and rocks," the "Great Death Itself," and "Nirvāṇa." If we do not employ nothingness in these above meanings as media, the term Oriental Nothingness itself can not be established, and one, in trying to express Oriental Nothingness conceptually, would certainly encounter many inconveniences and constrictions.

Since, however, Oriental Nothingness should be thoroughly and completely "known in itself in its coldness and hotness," Huang-po taught in his "The Pivotal Point of Mind-to-Mind Transmission" (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 382, c): "This Bodhi-Way is original truth; in its origin it has no name. It is only because people of the world do not understand, are unawakened, and

are in a state of clinging-attachment that the various Buddhas appear, and, fearing that you people will not understand, provisionally set up names for the Bodhi-Way in order to teach and explain it. But do not stick to the names and thereby produce misunderstanding." If one, therefore, simply clings to the conceptual expression and tries to understand Oriental Nothingness, or if one begins and ends with searching within the words, even though one struggle through the three infinite kalpas, one will never be able to grasp it.

To say that Oriental Nothingness must be "known in its coldness and hotness," and to say that there isn't anything, in so far as it is actually experienced, which is not "known in its coldness and hotness," are quite different in their import. With Oriental Nothingness, its being "known in itself in its coldness and hotness" is of its very nature an essential necessity. With ordinary things, however, since they are particular, de-limited things, they can be taken hold of and conceptualized. So, too, their being "known in themselves in their coldness and hotness"—that is, in experience—can also, in its essential nature as an experience, be grasped and conceptualized. But since Oriental Nothingness, not being anything, is, also, not de-limited, its "Experience" in its essential nature goes beyond being grasped and goes beyond conceptualization. In this sense it must be said to be a "being known in itself in its coldness and hotness" which completely transcends expression.

Thus, for example, in saying that water or fire is "known in itself in its coldness and hotness" and in saying that Zen is "known in itself in its coldness and hotness," while the expressions are the same, the meanings are essentially different. As for "being known in itself in its coldness and hotness," in the case of water or fire this is not different in essence from the matter of their conceptualization. With Zen, however, the "being known in itself in its coldness and hotness" goes completely beyond conceptualization. It is only in the case of Zen that the expression "being known in itself in its coldness and hotness" for the first time becomes really apt, and, further, only in such a case does its difference from the matter of conceptualization for the first time become clear. "Being known in itself in its coldness and hotness" can genuinely be said only as regards that which can not be conceptualized. The expressions found in the Lankāvatāra Sūtra, "not even one word spoken," and in "The Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith," "True Tathatā apart from words," also were uttered in regard to that which truly goes beyond conceptual discrimination.

II. A Positive Delineation

A. The "Not a Single Thing" Nature of Oriental Nothingness

Why is it that, as I have just indicated, in spite of the fact that Oriental Nothingness is not simply the same as nothingness as the negation of being, from times past it has so often been expressed in terms of nothingness as the negation of being—to such an extent as to be thought almost to be the same? This is because Oriental Nothingness does have a characteristic which is best able to be expressed by nothingness in this sense. The "not a single thing" nature of Oriental Nothingness now being considered here refers to this characteristic. The "not a single thing" nature of Oriental Nothingness means that as regards that which is generally said "to be," there is in and for Oriental Nothingness not one single such thing.

Although saying there is not even one single thing, this does not mean simply that "Individual things severally are not (this is not and that is not)," or that "Everything jointly is not (there is nothing at all)." It rather means that it is in and for Oriental Nothingness that there is nothing whatsoever. Oriental Nothingness is not an objective world outside of me like an empty space in which there is not one single thing. Oriental Nothingness is the Nothingness-state of Myself, that is, it is no other than Myself being Nothingness. There being nothing whatsoever in and for Oriental Nothingness must mean, in other words, that there is nothing whatsoever in Myself.

When I say there is nothing whatsoever in Myself, this might be taken to mean that there is something on the outside of myself. But my saying here that there is nothing whatsoever in Myself, does not mean that there is nothing whatsoever in some internal world standing in contradistinction to what is usually called the external world. In saying that there is nothing whatsoever in Myself, this "Myself" goes beyond internal and external. There is nothing whatsoever in Myself, consequently, rather than meaning that there is nothing whatsoever in some "internal" which stands in contradistinction to "external," means that there is nothing whatever wherever. And, again, this nothing whatever wherever is I, Myself. I, Myself, am this nothing whatever wherever.

Nothing whatever wherever being Myself and Myself being nothing whatever wherever is Oriental Nothing. Nothing whatever wherever which is not Myself is no more than merely empty space. The myself which is not nothing whatever wherever is no more than merely a mental or physical something which "is". Neither can be called Oriental Nothing.

Ordinarily, within—and for—oneself there obtain the various contents of the “internal” and “external” worlds, such that it can never be said about oneself that there is not even one single thing. If not externally seeing colors or hearing sounds, then we are internally lamenting, rejoicing, or thinking about something. It may be said that there is almost no time when one is not entertaining some internal or external object. The ordinary “I,” therefore, is an “I” which is always connected with an object. This is the reason that consciousness is said to be of the nature of noema-noesis. Such an “I” is an “I” which can not but be limited by color when seeing color, by sound when hearing sound, by evil when thinking of evil, and by good when thinking of good. It is an “I” which is always limited and captured by the “internal” and “external” realms, that is, by objects. In external appearance, this “being captured” and the state of samādhi may appear to be similar. But while they may seem to be similar, they are not, for in the case of a genuine samādhi state, the base is different.

[What is referred to in Zen as] the so-called “spirit dependent upon grass or attached to trees” is no other than the “I” which has internal and external objects, and which, because of those objects, is changing and impermanent, going through the process of birth and death. Because, in having a physical body and having a mind, I am captured by them, I think that with the death of the body, I die, and that with the extinction of the mind, I am extinguished. The “I” which is captured by wealth or fame and becomes the same thing as the wealth or fame, the “I” which is captured by the Buddha and becomes the same thing as the Buddha, the “I” which is captured by nothingness, if we speak of nothingness, and becomes the same thing as nothingness, and the “I” which is captured by “nothing whatever wherever,” if we speak of that, and becomes the same thing as that, are all no other than “I”s which are shackled and “spirits which are dependent upon grass or attached to trees.” But, on the contrary, the “I” which does not have an object, the “I” which does not have a single thing, is the “I” which is no longer dependent upon or attached to anything. It is the “I” which is not of the nature of noema-noesis.

When we say there is nothing whatsoever in Myself, some may question, is there not therein still the consciousness of “there is nothing whatsoever,” which, in that case, is the noema, and, further, as regards this noema is there not then also a noesis. “There is nothing whatsoever in Myself,” however, is not an objectifying consciousness which makes “there is nothing whatsoever” into an object. If it is, it is not what I am calling the true “there is not a

single thing." The true "there is not a single thing" is I, Myself, and not my objective world. ||| X

That which has become an object to me is already a being, and, further, is a some-thing which has captured me. Even though one says "there is not a single thing," if objectified, in fact it is not that "there is not a single thing." When objectified, "there is not a single thing" finally becomes itself one thing, albeit called "there is not a single thing." If I am truly not a single thing, I am not delimited or captured by any-thing; I am absolutely free and unbounded. And, furthermore, since this "I" is beyond internal and external, it is One-Alone—or "Only-One."

The numerical "one" is a unit, and although we say one, since there are many such units, we can not say one is "only one." "Only one" must be Myself as "not a single thing," that is, "Myself" beyond internal and external. Hui-neng, the Sixth Patriarch, said (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 350, a): "The Mind-dimension is broad and great, like empty-space. It is without boundaries." He further said (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 356, c): "Your True Nature is like empty-space. Realizing that there is not one single thing to be seen is called Right-Seeing." Again, in the "Poem on the Realization of the Way" (證道歌) (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 396, c) and in "The Pivotal Point of Mind-to-Mind Transmission" (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 383, c) it is said: "In clearly Seeing, there is not one single thing—neither man nor Buddha." These expressions all refer to this "I" of not a single thing. The Sixth Patriarch's "One-Direct-Mind" is also no other than this "I."

One-Direct-Mind does not mean a moral, honest mind, but must be taken to mean a Straight-forward-Mind which is not captured by any-thing. The mind when captured swerves to the right and swerves to the left and can not be straight-forward. A mind which is captured by color, by sound, by falsehood, by evil, or even by truth or by goodness can hardly be called a direct-straight-forward mind. The Mind of "not a single thing" alone is a mind which is not captured. If it is this Mind which in its Nature is "not a single thing," there is no way for it even to attract dust.

The Mind which is "the not being caught up in the thinking of good and evil" is the Direct-Mind. Further, since it is One-Alone and not many, it is called One-Direct-Mind. Also, it is such a Mind of the nature of "not a single thing" which for the first time can be, as Lin-chi has said, a free mind which, entering into color, is not deluded by color, entering into sound, is not deluded by sound, and entering into the good, is not deluded by the good. It is only with this Free-Mind of "not a single thing" as a base that there

can truly occur "the non-obtaining of any obstacle between any thing and any other thing," the "samādhi of permeating each and every dust-particle," and the "samādhi of free-unattached-play."

Such samādhi as last mentioned have a completely different base from the state of being captured by some thing and, thus captivated by it, blindly entering into it. In contrast to a state of being captured, only such samādhi as above mentioned can genuinely be called samādhi. But while these samādhi are genuine samādhi, they are not simply of the nature of "not a single thing," but are rather the operation of "not a single thing" in and among "thing." Consequently, since they involve some particular form-content of color or sound or goodness, they are individualized samādhi, phenomenal samādhi.

The Mind of "not a single thing" in Itself, however, being thoroughly without internal or external and without limitation or boundary, is One-Alone, going completely beyond any subject and any object. It is not, therefore, an individual or phenomenal samādhi, but is rather "One-Alone-Samādhi," "One-Form-Samādhi," "One-Act-Samādhi," and is truly Sovereign-Samādhi. It is only because they are based on this Sovereign-Samādhi that the "various vassal-samādhi" are for the first time possible.

Indeed, it is exactly according to whether or not it's base is this Sovereign-Samādhi that being captured by a thing and attaching to it can be differentiated from an authentic "thing-samādhi." It is for this reason "The Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith" declares that it is based on "One-Act-Samādhi," that is, "True-Tathatā-Samādhi," that the "innumerable-samādhi" arise.

It is with this very same meaning that the Sixth Patriarch has said (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 361, a, b): "If you wish to realize the source of all wisdom, you must reach One-Form-Samādhi, One-Act-Samādhi. If in all places you do not give rise to form, and if, as regards all forms that are, you do not give rise to either love or hate, and if, further, there is no accepting or rejecting, if you do not think of profit, coming to be, passing away, and such things, if you are peaceful, tranquil, unimpeded, and unconcerned, this is called One-Form-Samādhi. If, in all places, whether in walking, resting, sitting, or lying, you are the pure One-Direct-Mind, then you do not move from the place of the Bodhi-Way and you truly bring into being the Pure Land. This is called One-Act-Samādhi."

Ma-tsu (8th century) also has said, "Here, in Myself, I do not have even one single thing." This "I" is the "I" of "in all places not having anything." "Not having even one single thing," as is said even in the "Records

Mirroring the Original Source" (宗鏡錄) "vol. 6, (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 448, c) is not the same as "great voidness, emptiness, total extinction, and un-knowing." It is one's Self "not having even one single thing."

Even in Takuan's "Night Talks at Tōkai's" (東海夜話) it is stated: "The Confucians misunderstand Emptiness and slander it. When speaking of Emptiness, they think it to mean there is simply nothing whatever and speak from this misunderstanding. ...Rather, nothing being left in the Mind is called Emptiness. Again, the mind is an actor which performs every role. ...The Mind being left with no role is called Emptiness. ...Not being restricted by any one role is called Emptiness." What is here called "Emptiness" is no other than the Mind of the nature of "not a single thing."

B. The "Like Empty-Space"⁵ Nature of Oriental Nothingness

Oriental Nothingness, as just indicated, possesses a characteristic such as has, from the past, been expressed by the phrase "not a single thing." But it further possesses a characteristic such as has been expressed by the term "empty-space." This characteristic I shall call its "like empty-space" nature. Why then is Oriental Nothingness expressed by this term? In order to make this clear, let us first consider the meanings which are embraced by the term "empty-space."

Yung-ming in his "Records Mirroring the Original Source" vol. 6, (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 446, c) quoting from the Commenting on the Mahāyāna Śāstra (釈摩訶衍論) chapter 3, says that "empty-space" has ten meanings. The first is the meaning of no-obstruction. This means that in and among the various things of form empty-space knows no obstruction. The second is the meaning of omnipresence. This means that there is no point not reached by empty-space. The third is the meaning of impartiality. This means that empty-space is impartial, showing no instance of choosing. The fourth is the meaning of broad and great. This means that empty-space is broad and great, having no limits. The fifth is the meaning of formless. This means that empty-space is formless, going beyond rūpa-forms. The sixth is the meaning of purity. This means that empty-space is pure, having no afflictions. The seventh is the meaning of stability. This means that empty-space is stable, that is, without coming to be or passing away. The eighth is the meaning of voiding-being. This means that the being of empty-space is void, having no dimensions. The ninth is the meaning of voiding-voidness.

⁵ See footnote p. 68.

This means that empty-space is not attached to its voidness. The tenth is the meaning of without obtaining. This means that empty-space can not cling neither clings itself nor can be clung to.

If we deliberate and analyze in further detail, there are probably many other meanings to the term "empty-space." In general, however, it may be said to have these ten implications or meanings. And since Oriental Nothingness possesses characteristics similar to these meanings, it has, from the past, often come to be spoken of as "like empty-space."

In the "Night-Sitting Gāthā" (夜坐偈) contained in the "Treatise on the Awakening to—and of—the Buddha-Nature" (悟性論) it is said (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 373, a): "[Midnight,] the Mind is pure like empty-space. It permeates the ten directions. There is no place it does not penetrate. Mountains, rivers, and stone walls do not obstruct it. Worlds as numerous as the sands of the river Ganges are contained in it." This gatha expresses the fact that Mind, that is, Oriental Nothingness, possesses characteristics corresponding to the first, second, and sixth meanings of empty-space, un-obstructedness, all-pervasiveness, and purity.

In the "Discourse on the Direct-Lineage of the Dharma" (血脈論) (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 376, a) it is written: "This Mind is without form, without cause and effect, without sinew or bone. It is like empty-space. It can not be taken hold of." This expresses the fact that the Mind or Oriental Nothingness possesses characteristics corresponding to the fifth and tenth meanings of empty-space, formlessness and unattainability.

In "The Pivotal Point of Mind-to-Mind Transmission" (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 379, c) it is affirmed: "This Mind from the beginningless past never is born, never passes away. ...It is like empty-space, which is without spatial or temporal limitations and can not be measured." This treatise also states that "Tathatā in Itself, innerly, is like trees and rocks. It is without commotion; it does not vascillate. ...Outerly, it is like empty-space. It does not shut off; it does not obstruct." In the Lankāvatāra Sūtra it is declared, "There is no Mind-dimension of Mind." These statements express the fact that the Mind possesses characteristics corresponding to the first, fourth, seventh, and eighth meanings of empty-space, unobstructedness, unlimitedness, stability, and the voiding of being.

In the Sixth Patriarch's Platform Sūtra we find, "The Mind is like empty-space, but does not have the dimension even of empty-space." And, again, "The Mind is like empty-space, but does not stick to a fixed-emptiness perspective." In "Verses on the Faith-Mind" (信心銘) it is asserted: "Not even

the one is held on to." These statements express the fact that Mind possesses the characteristic corresponding to the ninth meaning of empty-space, the voiding of voidness, that is, the emptying even of emptiness.

Such expressions concerning Mind as "taking the form of whoever comes, a barbarian or a Chinese" and "the state of simply detesting discrimination" express the fact that Mind possesses the characteristic corresponding to the third meaning of empty-space, impartiality.

The term empty-space, besides these ten meanings, probably also includes the meanings of "One-Alone" and "without inner or outer." "One-Alone" means that empty-space is only one and not two. "Without inner or outer" means that empty-space has no outer, it is only "inner." But if it is "only inner," it can not even be said to be "inner." "Only inner" really means to transcend outer and inner. To speak of Oriental Nothingness as "Only this One-Mind," "One-Direct-Mind," "without two-ness," or "the One-Form of the Dharma-World" is to liken it to the "One-Alone" nature of empty-space. To speak of Oriental Nothingness as "one perfectly round light having neither inner nor outer," "the Dharma-World of True Tathatā, without either self or other," "For this Mind there is neither inside, outside, nor middle, in fact, there is neither place nor direction," is to liken it to the "without inner or outer" nature of empty-space.

Thus, Oriental Nothingness, in its characteristics, closely resembles empty-space. When we find such a statement by Huang-po in his "Yüan-ling Record" (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 387, a) as, "The sphere of empty-space exhausting the ten quarters is from the first one's own 'One-Mind in Itself.' However you may move or act, how can you in those movements or actions ever be separated from empty-space?" or, as in his "The Pivotal Point of Mind-to-Mind Transmission," (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 381, a), "The dharma-kāya is empty-space. Empty-space and the dharma-kāya do not have different forms," it might be thought that empty-space and the One-Mind are exactly the same thing. It need not be said, however, that the One-Mind, that is, Oriental Nothingness, is not the same thing as empty-space.

Oriental Nothingness and empty-space do have similar characteristics, and to this extent may seem to be the same thing. But, of course, Oriental Nothingness is not the same as empty-space, which has neither awareness nor life. Oriental Nothingness is the One who is "always clearly aware." Therefore it is called "Mind," "Self," or the "True Man."

In the "General Preface to the Collection of Various Expressions Concerning Zen Fundamentals" (禪源諸詮集都序) (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 404, c, p.

405, a) it is said, "True-Nature is not the same as empty-space, trees, and rocks. Therefore, it is called Awareness," and, again, "Awareness realized in Itself is called by name, Mind. The nature of Awareness beyond conceptual-differentiation is that it directly knows Itself in and through Itself. It is not like ordinary consciousness or knowing, which is a conditioned, object-dependent, intentional knowing. It is not, however, the same as a great hollow emptiness, vacuous and unknowing." This is no other than an expression of the fact that Mind is not the same as mere empty-space, vacuous and unaware.

Huang-po also in many places employs the mode of expression "Mind is like empty-space...." But it can never be said that he ever suggests Mind and empty-space to be one and the same thing. We do find him, as already noted, sometimes using such expressions as "The sphere of empty-space is from the first one's own 'One-Mind in Itself,'" and "the dharma-kāya is empty-space." When, however, we also observe that he clearly states that "What is meant by the figurative expression 'the dharma-kāya is empty-space; empty-space is the dharma-kāya' is to say that the Buddha's true dharma-kāya is like empty-space," or, again, that "Buddha-kāya is without intentionality. It does not fall into diversity. Provisionally, I use the analogy of empty-space," it is understood that empty-space, as regards the dharma-kāya, is simply a simile. It is also understood why this must be said to be different from pantheism, in which the spatial world itself is God.

Thus, Oriental Nothingness is not the same thing as empty-space. Since, however, Oriental Nothingness does possess characteristics such as may be likened to empty-space, I may now try to explain these "like empty-space" characteristics in terms of the previously noted ten meanings of empty-space. Oriental Nothingness in its nature of course goes beyond all forms and differentiations. This, therefore, is no more than an analogical consideration of Oriental Nothingness in terms of the various differentiations of the phenomenal world.

1. That Oriental Nothingness is without obstruction means that Oriental Nothingness, like empty-space, is not obstructed by any of the various internal and external phenomena. The freedom or emancipation quality of Oriental Nothingness derives from this. Oriental Nothingness is in everything, but is not obstructed by anything; it contains everything within it, but does not retain a trace of anything contained. In this it is like empty-space.

2. That Oriental Nothingness is omnipresent means that, like empty-space, Oriental Nothingness permeates all phenomena—regardless of whether they are distant or near, large or small, deep or shallow, coarse or fine, bright or

dark. Oriental Nothingness not only permeates all material things as does mere empty-space, but Oriental Nothingness permeates all mental phenomena as well, and is thus even more all-pervading than empty-space. It is precisely Oriental Nothingness which can be said to be that which is truly omnipresent.

3. That Oriental Nothingness is impartial means that, like empty-space, Oriental Nothingness "detests only discrimination." For it "all things being without fault," it accepts equally the pure and the defiled, it welcomes similarly the noble and the base, it treats in the same way good and evil, it sees alike the true and the false, it accommodates together the ordinary man and the saint, it neither takes hold of nor casts away.

4. That Oriental Nothingness is broad and great means that it is the whole, there not being anything "other" or "outside." Oriental Nothingness is not limited by anything "other," and, therefore, is without delimitation or termination. This not only means the spatial unlimitedness of empty-space, but also means temporal eternity. No! it is more than that. It should rather be said that, on the contrary, spatial unlimitedness as well as temporal eternity both derive from the "proto"-temporal and "proto"-spatial limitlessness of Oriental Nothingness. Buddha is spoken of as being broad and great without boundaries precisely because the True Buddha is no other than this Oriental Nothingness.

5. That Oriental Nothingness is formless means that Oriental Nothingness has neither spatial-material form nor temporal-mental form. This not having form is not meant in the usual sense in which things are considered to have form and mind not to have form. Seen from the Formlessness of Oriental Nothingness, even mind, which ordinarily is said not to have form, still has the form of mind. It is difficult, therefore, to say that the ordinary mind is really formless. Other than Oriental Nothingness, there isn't anything which can truly be spoken of as formless.

6. That Oriental Nothingness is pure means that, not being any-thing material or mental, Oriental Nothingness is completely beyond delimitation, and hence is not only in Itself not defiled, but can never become defiled by anything else. As for the things which are ordinarily called pure, since they are all delimited in some way, they can not be said to be of true, absolute purity. To be delimited already in itself means to be defiled.

That which is some-thing—even without being defiled by something else—is, by its very being some-thing, already in itself of contamination and defilement. Even such a thing called a Buddha—if it is some-thing—is of defilement. For this reason, even as regards those things which are ordinarily

called pure, there is not one which can genuinely be called pure. Oriental Nothingness, which is beyond all delimitation, is alone the truly pure, the truly undefiled. True purification is realized for the first time when I am neither a material some-thing nor a mental some-thing, when I am beyond all delimitation.

7. That Oriental Nothingness is stable means that since Oriental Nothingness is without beginning and without end, is un-born and un-dying, it is, therefore, without becoming or decaying. Since it is beyond left and right and beyond upper and lower, there is no way for it to waiver or to vascillate. That stability which stands in contrast to instability is no more than merely a temporary and provisional state, and can not really be called stability. True stability must be totalistic, beyond "other" or "outer." If it does not transcend time and space and contain them within itself, it is not truly stable. Only that which does transcend time and space can validly be called serenity or peace of mind. To the extent that I am body or mind in the usual sense, genuine stability does not realize itself within me.

8. That Oriental Nothingness is the voiding of being means that Oriental Nothingness can not be measured spatially or geometrically in terms of metric, dry, or liquid measurement, nor can it be evaluated according to the standard of truth or beauty. It is here that there is established the ultimate meaning of "completely going beyond discrimination and measurement."

9. That Oriental Nothingness is the voiding of voidness means that although Oriental Nothing is said to be Nothing, it is not the nothing of "something and nothing." Transcending being and non-being, it is neither some-thing nor nothing. Since it is Nothing as Non-Abiding-Subjectivity, which is completely beyond all delimitation, it neither abides in something nor does it abide in no-thing. If it is a nothing which sticks fast to nothingness, it is none other than a nothing which stands in oposition to something and is not Oriental Nothing. In this characteristic of Oriental Nothing lies the basis of the True Buddha's not abiding in—or clinging to—even Nirvāṇa. The Nirvāṇa which clings or abides is an extinction which stands in contrast to life and is not True Nirvāṇa.

10. That Oriental Nothingness is without that which is obtainable means that since Oriental Nothingness is of the nature of not a single thing, it neither has any "other" thing nor does it even have itself. It is completely without anything "obtained." It is here that there is established the meaning of the True Buddha's being without anything obtained, being unobtainable, being without greed, being of absolute poverty, and being without merit-accumulation.

C. The "Mind-in-Itself" Nature of Oriental Nothingness

As related above, since Oriental Nothingness possesses characteristics which closely resemble empty-space, it has frequently been explained through the use of the analogy of empty-space. But since empty-space, of course, is not Oriental Nothingness, Oriental Nothingness can not be fully exemplified by empty-space. The principal feature not exemplified by empty-space is the "Mind-in-Itself" nature of Oriental Nothingness. That is to say, Oriental Nothingness possesses a characteristic akin to that which we ordinarily call mind, which characteristic is not served by the simile of empty-space.

It is said that in addition to man higher beings among animals as well possess mind, and that the beginnings of mind are seen also among the lower forms of life. Empty-space, on the other hand, is not only completely without mind, but, moreover, does not have the slightest feature to be called life, which is possessed by even a micro-organism. In this regard, too, it can be said that empty-space is most inadequate as an analogy for Oriental Nothingness, and that, from the aspect of it possessing life, indeed a micro-organism would be more appropriate.

Oriental Nothingness is, thus, in no sense inanimate like empty-space. It is living. Not only is it living, it also possesses mind. Nor does it merely possess mind; it possesses self-consciousness. That is to say, it has all of the aspects and qualities of mind. Such phrases in Zen as "Right-Dharma-Eye-Treasure-Nirvāṇa-Wondrous-Mind," "directly pointing to the Mind of man, realizing Its Nature and attaining Buddhahood," "a transmission from Mind-to-Mind," "it is the straightfoward Mind which is the locus of Awakening," "Self-Mind is Buddha," "Mind-in-Itself is Buddha," "there is no Dharma outside of Mind," "Pure-Mind," "Unattainable Mind," "Mind-Dharma," "Mind-Nature," "Mind-Source," "Mind-Ground," and "Mind-Itself" all express this "Mind-in-Itself" nature of Oriental Nothingness.

Not only in Zen, but in Buddhism in general, while likening the True Buddha to empty-space, that it is said, nevertheless, that Buddha is "Mind-Itself" or "Awareness-Itself" attests to the fact that Buddha is mind-like.

Although Oriental Nothingness is said to be mind-like, it can not be said to be exactly the same as what we ordinarily call mind. Mind, in saying that Oriental Nothingness is mind, is Mind which is, again, to be likened to empty-space as described in the previous section. For this Mind is Mind possessing all of the characteristics of empty-space: un-obstructedness, omnipresence, impartiality, broadness and greatness, formlessness, purity, stability, the voiding of

being, the voiding of voidness, unattainability, "one-alone"-ness, having neither internal nor external, and so on. Since what we ordinarily call mind does not possess these characteristics of empty-space, in order to clearly distinguish the two, it has, from ancient times, been said that this "Mind is like empty-space."

When it is also said that the True Buddha, like trees and rocks, is "without mind," "without thought," "free from thought," "not caught up in the thinking of good and evil," "'not-thinking'-itself" or "the stopping of the functioning of mind, thought, and consciousness," and when it is said that true knowing is "being free from knowing," true awareness is un-awareness, or that True Nature is ungenerated and unperishing, without birth and death, these statements do not mean that what they are referring to are all merely, like trees and rocks, without mind, self-consciousness, or life. They rather mean that the ordinary mind, self-awareness, and life which we have are not the true mind, true self-awareness, and true life, and that the true mind, true self-awareness, and true life must possess the characteristics of empty-space.

The True Buddha is not without mind, but possesses Mind which is "without mind and without thought," is not without self-awareness, but possesses Awareness which is "without awareness"—an egoless ego, is not without life, but possesses Life which is ungenerated and unperishing.

The mind which we ordinarily have is a mind which has obstructions, places where it does not reach, differentiation, limitation, form, defilement, arising and decaying, dimension, attachments, acquisitions, an interior and exterior, and is uncollected. One generally has such a mind as subject, and therefore is an ordinary being and not Buddha. When one composes this mind and returns to the Original-True-Mind, which is like empty-space, then for the first time one is oneself Buddha. "Zen sitting" in which mind and body have "fallen off" is no other than a state of the realization of such a "Mind like empty-space." The mind referred to in the Sukhāvati-vyūha Sūtra (無量壽經) as quoted in the "Record of Masters and Disciples of the Lankā" (校刊唐写本楞伽師資記全 p. 20), "The Mind is the Buddha; it is Mind which becomes Buddha. You must know that Buddha is no other than Mind. Outside of Mind there is no other Buddha," is precisely this "Mind like empty-space." In speaking of the "Mind-in-Itself" nature of Oriental Nothingness, my intention is to indicate that Oriental Nothingness as mind is this "Mind like empty-space."

D. The "Self" Nature of Oriental Nothingness

Oriental Nothingness can be said to be Mind in the sense described in the previous section. Even though we say mind, however, it is not such a mind as can be viewed objectively outside of ourselves. It must be inside ourselves as the subject of ourselves. That is, it must be such that that Mind is Myself and that I am that Mind. This Mind is not the mind which is seen, but is, on the contrary, the Mind which sees. Speaking in terms of "seeing," this Mind is the "active seeing" and not the passive "being seen." When we say "active seeing," this of course does not mean physical, visual "seeing." It must rather be taken to mean "active" in the sense of being the subject of all functions, "active" from the standpoint of which all functions are themselves passive or "seen," that is, "active" as the all-integrating subject of all functions.

If I speak in this way, however, it may be thought that by such a mind is only meant the "active" aspect of "active and passive." But when I say here that this Mind is "active," I mean that this Mind does not obtain as object, but obtains as subject. It does not mean that such a Mind is simply the aspect of "the active" in separation from "the passive." In this Mind there is no duality of active and passive. Since, however, that which is the non-duality of active and passive (or subject and object) is so frequently taken as something objective, by here saying it is subjective is meant no more than to say that it is not something objective.

As indicated before, the Mind of which I am speaking is not merely that which is ordinarily called mind, but is the Mind which is itself Buddha. But when I say Buddha, this, again, is frequently taken as transcendent and objective. Buddha is often considered to be, in relation to us humans, "other" and objective. If Buddha were something perceived as an object by our senses, then its being "other" and objective would go without saying. But even a Buddha which becomes an object of feeling, faith, volition, or reason must also be said to be something other and objective. In such a case, we are not Buddha; we rather stand in contrast to Buddha. The "I" which thus stands in contrast to Buddha can not be said to be a Self or Subject. Nor can that to which I stand in contrast be said to be a Self or Subject.

The instances in religion as well as in metaphysics in which either God or Buddha is thought of as "other" and objective are numerous. That this is so in Christianity need not be mentioned. But even in Buddhism, in many cases Buddha is considered as something objective. Needless to say, in religion,

since God (or, in Buddhism, Buddha) is often seen as controlling us in some sense, and since we, in turn, obey and rely upon Him, God (or Buddha) is not merely something "other" and objective. Even though "other," God and Buddha can also be said to be subjects.

When it is said in Christianity, "it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me," or in the Jodo Shin Sect of Buddhism, "abandoning my own devices and leaving everything to Amitābha," Christ and Amitābha can be said to be "other," and at the same time to be subjects who give true life to us. Buddha as the Mind of which I am speaking, however, is not such a subject which is "other," but is a subject in which the something "other" is completely Oneself. This Subject is not the naïve self-subject of modern anthropocentrism. It is rather a Subject such that what is for naïve subject something "other" is for this Subject, Self.

Buddha as Mind is not something which I simply absolutely obey, rely on, and belong to. In such a case in which I simply obey Buddha, Buddha, while a subject which controls me, would be, nevertheless, internally or externally transcendent to me. The Buddha of which I am speaking, however, is not a subject in the sense of transcending and controlling me, but is a subject in the sense that Buddha is I, Myself. While the transcending, controlling Buddha is to be called an objective-subject, it can not be spoken of as being a pure subject. In contrast to this, the Buddha which is I, Myself, is to be called a subjective-subject, and is a pure, absolute subject.

It is for this reason that although in Zen it is said that Buddha can not be known by man and that man should die the Great Death, Zen especially emphasizes the "Self" nature of Buddha, saying that Buddha is Self, is Self-Mind, is Self-Nature, and the like.

When coming upon such an expression as is found in the chapter on "Life and Death" in Dōgen's "Right-Dharma-Eye-Treasury" (正法眼藏生死の巻), "Simply letting go, forgetting our body and mind and throwing oneself into the Buddha's house, being conducted from the side of Buddha and behaving accordingly, then, not exerting any force, not expending the mind, we leave behind life and death and become Buddha," if one understands this Buddha to be "other power" as conceived in Jodo Shin Buddhism and fancies it to be an objective-subject, this must be said to be a superficial understanding which does not penetrate into Dōgen's true meaning.

Zen possesses its distinctive characteristic and its pre-eminent strongpoint in taking Buddha as a radically subjective-subject, that is, as an absolute subject. In the history of Buddhism, the main factor accounting for the

intended to express the fact that however one may speak of a Tathāgata of perfect features possessing the thirty two major and eighty minor marks of distinction, such a Buddha is still objective, is something outside the mind, and is not the True Buddha.

The fact, then, that the True Buddha is not simply the naïve self, is not "other," and is not even an objective-subject, but is the subjective-subject, that is, the absolute subject, expresses the "Self" nature of Oriental Nothingness.

E. The "Freedom" Nature of Oriental Nothingness

Oriental Nothingness as the subjective-subject is, further, the completely free subject. We say free, but there are various kinds of freedom. What, then, is the nature of the freedom of Oriental Nothingness?

It is often said in Zen, if you wish to go, go; if you wish to sit, sit; when hunger comes, take food; when drowsiness comes, sleep. This expression, if taken literally, seems to mean to indulge in whatever the heart desires. An animal or an infant tries to do whatever it wants to do, and tries to eat whatever it wants to eat. It dislikes intensely whatever checks it in its inclinations. This is because animals and infants also desire freedom. As they mature, however, even children come gradually to cease to covet this sort of "freedom of indulgence." On the contrary, they rather come to try to check such freedom. They check themselves and refrain from doing things that they should not do, even though they want to do them, and come to do dutifully what should be done even though they do not want to do it. They wish to come to the point where they do freely what should be done and freely refrain from doing what should not be done.

The mature adult, rather than craving the kind of indulgent-freedom the young child seeks, aspires to the kind of freedom which, on the contrary, criticizes and controls such indulgent-freedom. It is in the longing for this mature, critical freedom that there lies the distinction between the human adult on the one hand and animals or young children on the other.

Because adult human beings can criticize and control the kind of freedom animals and young children desire, it is said that adult human beings, in difference to animals and young children, are rational. The freedom children desire is sensuous freedom; the freedom adults desire is rational freedom. What Kant termed the freedom of the will is no other than this rational freedom. Kant calls the final culmination of this rational freedom "holy." What Confucius spoke of as acting in accordance with the mind's desires and

yet not transgressing the norms is also rational freedom. It is precisely this rational freedom which is genuine human freedom. So it is that the aspiration to such rational freedom is characteristically human. The object of human morality lies in attaining this freedom. But is religious freedom the same as such a rational freedom or not?

Religious freedom, it must rather be said, is to be found in the negation or transcendence even of human reason. Indeed, Christianity goes so far as to say that the fact that man came to possess human reason was the cause of his being bannished from Paradise. In Buddhism, also, human reason as discriminating intellect is considered to be the source of delusion. Reason, being discrimination, is never free from dualistic polarities. There can not be any reason which is free from the discrimination of right and wrong, good and evil, profane and sacred, ordinary beings and Buddhas, being and non-being, and so on.

Religion, however, has as its basic objective the transcendence of, or the liberation from, such discriminations. If right is taken throughout—to the very last—as right, wrong as wrong, good as good, evil as evil, and sin as sin, then no basis could be found for sin being forgiven and for an evil man being saved just as he is, as in Christianity and in Jodo Shin Buddhism. As for a sinful man being saved, this can not occur on any other standpoint than the transcendence of good and evil.

Zen not only speaks of not being caught up in the thinking of good and evil, but furthermore does not even set up the distinction between profane and sacred, between ordinary beings and Buddhas. As for anything which is “not-dharma,” Zen would, of course, transcend it. But Zen would indeed transcend “dharma” itself.

In Christianity and even in Buddhism—as in Jodo Shin Buddhism—while good and evil are transcended, God and man, or Buddha and ordinary beings, are sharply distinguished to the very end. God and Buddha are, as regards man and ordinary beings, completely transcendent and objective.

For Zen, however, the placing of Buddha transcendentally and objectively outside of ordinary beings is a rope which still constrains freedom. Zen would indeed transcend any discrimination, even the so-called “Buddha-clinging-view” and “dharma-clinging-view.” Lin-chi’s saying, encountering Buddha (in Oneself), killing Buddha (in Oneself), encountering the Patriarch (in Oneself), killing the Patriarch (in Oneself), and the declaration in “The Blue Rock Collection” (碧巖集), “Do not stay where Buddha is. If one stays there, horns will grow on the head. Quickly pass through where there is No-Buddha. If

one does not quickly pass through, the grass will grow ten feet deep," are intended to express just this transcendence. Thus is realized the truly free state which is neither bound nor obstructed by either man or Buddha. It is this freedom which is the "freedom" nature of Oriental Nothingness.

True liberation in Buddhism is to be thoroughly—Oneself—this freedom. In this, true liberation in Buddhism differs from the state of salvation of religions like Christianity. Even such a Buddhist sect as the Jodo Shin Sect which, in the external aspect of its state of salvation, resembles Christianity, is different from Christianity to the extent that as a Buddhist sect it, too, must have its ultimate base in the freedom nature of Oriental Nothingness. I should like to call this freedom nature of Oriental Nothingness subjectively-subjective freedom, that is, absolutely subjective freedom.

In Zen, this freedom is attained through seeing into one's True Nature. The very "seeing into one's True Nature" itself is the free subject. The Sixth Patriarch, Hui-neng, has said (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 358, c): "The person who sees into his True Nature is free when he stands as well as when he does not stand. He is free both in going and in coming. There is nothing which retards him, nothing which hinders him. Responding to the situation, he acts accordingly; responding to the words, he answers accordingly. He expresses himself taking on all forms, but he is never removed from his Self-Nature. That is, he attains the 'Free-Wondrous-Play-Samādhi.' This is called seeing into one's True Nature." Such an account is no other than an explanation of the "freedom" nature of "seeing into one's True Nature."

"Seeing into one's True Nature" is of the nature of freedom because, as Hui-neng says (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 48, p. 353, b), "when the True-Tathatā-Self-Nature give to rise consciousness, although the six sense organs function in terms of seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing, they are not defiled by the ten thousand objects. Thus the True Nature is always free," and, further, because "seeing into one's True Nature, not being any-thing, is every-thing, and being every-thing, is not any-thing." It is in this sense that the true meaning of "absolute negation is in itself absolute affirmation; absolute affirmation is in itself absolute negation" is to be understood.

"Not to abide anywhere, and yet to activate that Mind," is not merely "not abiding anywhere," but is "not abiding anywhere" and yet activating that Mind. Nor is it merely "to activate that Mind"; but rather while activating that Mind, yet "not abiding anywhere."

Lin-chi's description of the "non-dependent Man of Tao" which appears in the Lin-chi Record (臨濟錄) (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 47, p. 500, a), "Entering

the world of form, not suffering from form-delusion; entering the world of sound, not suffering from sound-delusion; entering the world of smell, not suffering from smell-delusion; entering the world of taste, not suffering from taste-delusion; entering the world of touch, not suffering from touch-delusion; entering the world of cognition, not suffering from cognition-delusion. Thus realizing the six worlds of form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and cognition to be all Empty-Forms, nothing can constrict this non-dependent Man of Tao," is no other than an exposition of the "absolutely free subject."

Further, as Lin-chi has also said (Taishō Daizōkyō, vol. 47, p. 498, a), "The Buddha-Dharma is not in any special functioning. It is, simply, the ordinary and uneventful—discharging feces, passing water, wearing clothes, taking food, and, when drowsiness comes, sleeping." This, like the previously noted expressions, "If you wish to go, go; if you wish to sit, sit" and "when hunger comes, taking food; when drowsiness comes, sleeping," when used in Zen does not mean merely an indulgent freedom, but means the freedom of being completely unconditioned and non-dependent.

F. The Creative Nature of Oriental Nothingness

Being creative must be taken to be one of the main characteristics of man, because man, as it is said, in making tools is different from the other animals. That human culture from the beginning of history is the result of man's creative power need hardly be mentioned. This creative power has developed together with the evolution of man, and where it will stop we do not know. The progress of science during the last century is probably sufficient to prove how great man's creative power is.

Man's creative power is as great as all this, but, upon second thought, it may also be considered to be really quite negligible. Man can extract fibre from a plant, spin it into yarn, produce cloth, and make clothes, but he can not create the plant itself. Far from that, man still has not succeeded in creating even a micro-organism of one single cell. How much more so must it be said when it comes to the creation of man himself, or to the creation of heaven and earth, that man is completely powerless.

Thus, although we say that man creates things, there is not a single thing that he can create except that its original-stuff already be given. Within anything that man creates there is always included that which he can never create. In this sense, the creative power of man—in whatever it creates—can never be said to be primary or absolute.

In Christianity, the creative power of God, however, signifies absolute creative power. It is said, in Christianity, that God created out of nothing (*ex nihilo*) heaven and earth, plants, man, and all things. Before God created, there wasn't anything. It is precisely this creating out of nothing which can be called true creativity. In the God of Christianity we can find the perfect idea of creativity.

Scotus Eriugena divided nature into four classifications: that which creates but is not created; that which creates and is created; that which does not create but is created; that which neither creates nor is created. Man is that which creates and is created. God is that which creates but is not created. Although that which creates and is created is also a creator, to the extent that it was itself already created, it is not completely creator. Only in and as that which creates but is not created can creativity be said to be primary and absolute.

From this point of view, that which creates but is not created is a complete creator. But such a being is not one which can be actually confirmed by us in fact. Such a being, consequently, is either an idealization or an ideation of that human creativity which can actually be attested to by us, or else is no more than a being which simply has been hypothesized or is believed in. If it is just an idealization or ideation, it is no more than merely the perfect idea of creativity, and does not possess actual creative power. Again, if it is simply an object of faith, its actuality is not assured. The idea of such a creator can be entertained, but it is not something which itself possesses creative power and creates.

In Buddhism there is the expression, "All is created by Alone-Mind." This, however, is not merely an idealization or a matter of faith, but is an actual certification by the "Alone-Mind." Kant says that the actual world we daily experience is not, as we commonly think, something which exists completely external to and independent of our mind, but is something which our mind has created. If what is ordinarily called the external world is replaced by the term "all things," then all things are the creation of our mind. That is, all things are created by alone-mind.

What Kant speaks of as the "mind which creates all things," however, is so-called "consciousness-in-general" (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*). For Kant mind forms according to the formal categories of "consciousness-in-general" the impressions which it has received from what he calls the "thing-in-itself." Such a mind is like a mirror which in turn reflects according to the form—or forms—of reflection that which comes to be reflected in it from the

outside. In as much as that which is reflected by the mirror is something transformed by the form—or forms—of reflection it is not separate from the mirror. If, however, there were only the mirror and nothing coming to it reflected from the outside, there could be no reflected image. The image, thus, can not be said to be produced from within the mirror.

In Buddhism, on the contrary, that which is reflected in the mirror is not something which comes from outside the mirror, but is something which is produced from within the mirror. It is produced from within the mirror, is expressed by being reflected in the mirror, passes away in the mirror, and, passing away, does not leave any trace in the mirror. The Mind in the Buddhist expression "all is created by Alone-Mind" is like this mirror. That which is reflected is never something which comes from outside of that which reflects. In this sense, this Mind must be said to be different from anything like Kant's "consciousness-in-general."

Since, however, a mirror which produces from within that which is reflected, is not an actual possibility, this Mind is not fully served by the analogy of a mirror. The frequent use in Buddhism of the analogy of water and waves, is in order to try to illustrate more adequately the creative nature of this Mind which is not fully taken care of in the analogy of the mirror.

Waves are not something which come from outside the water and are reflected in the water. Waves are produced by the water but are never separated from the water. When they cease to be waves, they return to the water—their original source. Returning to the water, they do not leave the slightest trace in the water. Speaking from the side of the waves, they arise from the water and return to the water. Speaking from the side of the water, the waves are the movement of the water. While the water in the wave is one with the wave and not two, the water does not come into being and disappear, increase or decrease, according to the coming into being and disappearing of the wave. Although the water as wave comes into being and disappears, the water as water does not come into being and disappear. Thus, even when changing into a thousand or ten thousand waves, the water as water is itself constant and unchanging. The Mind of "all is created by Alone-Mind" is like this water. The assertions of the Sixth Patriarch, Hui-neng, "Self-Nature, in its origin constant and without commotion, produces the ten thousand things" and "All things are never separated from Self-Nature," and the statement in the Vimalakīrti-Nirdeśa Sūtra, "From the Non-Abiding origin is produced all things," express just this creative feature of Mind.

Oriental Nothingness is this Mind which is to be likened to the water as

subject. The creative nature of Oriental Nothingness is to be illustrated by the relation between the water and the wave, in which the water is forever and in every way the subject. If one were to make a subject of the wave which is produced and disappears, this would be the ordinary self of man. It is in such an ordinary subject's reverting back from wave to water—that is, returning to its source—and re-emerging as the True-Subject or True-Self that the characteristics of Oriental Nothingness must be sought and are to be found.

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