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THE

WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH
UNDER THE EDITORSHIP
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I. Our object is the study of being as such.
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3. We must study also the primary axioms, and especially the law of contradiction.
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Δ.

Philosophical Lexicon.
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2. 'Cause.'
3. 'Element.'
4. 'Nature.'
5. 'Necessary.'
6. 'One.' 'Many.'
7. 'Being.'
8. 'Substance.'
9. 'The same.' 'Other.' 'Different.' 'Like.' 'Unlike.'
10. 'Opposite.' 'Contrary.' 'Other in species.' 'The same in species.'
11. 'Prior.' 'Posterior.'
12. 'Potency.' 'Capable.' 'Incapacity.' 'Possible.' 'Impossible.'
13. 'Quantum.'
14. 'Quality.'
15. 'Relative.'
16. 'Complete.'
17. 'Limit.'
18. 'That in virtue of which.' 'In virtue of itself.'
19. 'Disposition.'
20. 'Having' or 'habit' (ἐχθέω).
21. 'Affection.'
22. 'Privation.'
23. 'Have' or 'hold' (ἐχεῖν). 'Be in.'
24. 'From.'
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25. 'Part.'
26. 'Whole.' 'Total.' 'All.'
27. 'Mutilated.'
28. 'Race' or 'genus' (γένος). 'Other in genus.'
29. 'False.'
30. 'Accident.'

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15. No individual can be defined, whether sensible or, like the Ideas, intelligible.

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CH.
1. The parts of sensible things are only potencies. Unity and being are not the substance of things.

17. Substance is the cause or form which puts matter into a determinate state; it is that in a thing which is distinct from its material elements.

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Λ.
1. Substance the primary subject of inquiry. Three kinds of substance—perishable sensible, eternal sensible, and unmovable (non-sensible).
2. Change implies not only form and privation but matter.
3. Neither matter nor form comes into being. Whatever comes into being comes from a substance of the same kind. If form ever exists apart from the concrete individual, it is in the case of natural objects.
4. Different things have elements numerically different but the same in kind; they all have form, privation, and matter. They also have a proximate and an ultimate moving cause.
5. Again actuality and potency are principles common to all things, though they apply differently in different cases. The principles of all things are only analogous, not identical.
Since movement must be eternal, there must be an eternal mover, and one whose essence is actuality (actuality being prior to potency). To account for the uniform change in the universe, there must be one principle which acts always alike, and one whose action varies.

The eternal mover originates motion by being the primary object of desire (as it is of thought); being thoroughly actual, it cannot change or move; it is a living being, perfect, separate from sensible things, and without parts.

Besides the first mover there must be as many unmoved movers as there are simple motions involved in the motions of the planets. The number is probably either 55 or 47. As there is but one prime mover, there must be but one heaven.

The divine thought must be concerned with the most divine object, which is itself. Thought and the object of thought are never different when the object is immaterial.

How the good is present in the universe both as the order of the parts and (more primarily) as their ruler. Difficulties which attend the views of other philosophers.

We pass to immaterial substance. Two kinds of immaterial substances have been believed in, mathematical objects and Ideas. We shall discuss first the former, then the latter, then the view that numbers and Ideas are the substance of sensible things.

Mathematical objects cannot exist as distinct substances either in or apart from sensible things.

They can be separated only in thought. Mathematics is not entirely divorced from consideration of the beautiful, as is sometimes alleged.

Arguments which led to the belief in Ideas. Some prove too little, others too much.

Even if there were Ideas, they would not explain the changes in the sensible world.

Various ways in which numbers may be conceived as the substance of things.

(a) If all units are associable, this gives only mathematical, not ideal number. (b) If all units are inassociable, this gives neither mathematical nor ideal number. (c) If only the units in the same number are associable, this leads to equal difficulties; units must have no difference of kind.

The views of Platonists who disagree with Plato, and those of the Pythagoreans, lead to equal difficulties. Further objections to ideal numbers: (a) How are the units derived from the indefinite
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dyad? (b) Is the series of numbers infinite or finite; and if finite, what is its limit? (c) What sort of principle is the One?

9. Discussion of the principles of geometrical objects. Criticism of the generation of numbers from unity and plurality, and of spatial magnitudes from similar principles. The criticism of ideal numbers summed up. The upholders of Ideas make them at once universal and individual.

10. Are the first principles of substances individual or universal?

N.

1. The principles cannot be contraries. The Platonists in making them contraries treated one of the contraries as matter. Various forms of this theory. The nature of unity and plurality expounded.

2. Eternal substances cannot be compounded out of elements. The object of the Platonists is to explain the presence of plurality in the world, but in this they do not succeed. What justifies the belief in the separate existence of numbers?

3. Difficulties in the various theories of number. The Pythagoreans ascribe generation to numbers, which are eternal.

4. The relation between the first principles and the good.

5. How is number supposed to be derived from its elements? How is it the cause of substances?

6. The causal agency ascribed to numbers is purely fanciful.
There are several senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words; for in one sense the 'being' meant is 'what a thing is' or a 'this', and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things that are predicated as these are. While 'being' has all these senses, obviously that which 'is' primarily is the 'what', which indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say of what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or bad, not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is, we do not say 'white' or 'hot' or 'three cubits long', but 'a man' or 'a god'. And all other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some other determination of it. And so one might even raise the question whether the words 'to walk', 'to be healthy', 'to sit' imply that each of these things is existent, and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them (i.e. the substance or individual), which is implied in such a predicate; for we never use the word 'good' or 'sitting' without implying this. Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the others also is. Therefore that which is primarily, i.e. not in a qualified sense but without qualification, must be substance.

Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first; yet substance is first in every sense—(1) in definition, (2) in order of knowledge, (3) in time. For (3) of the other categories none can exist independently, but only

1 Cf. A. 7.
35 substance. And (1) in definition also this is first; for in the definition of each term the definition of its substance must be present. And (2) we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g. what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or its place; since we know each of these predicates also, only when we know what the quantity or the quality is.

And indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance? For it is this that some 1 assert to be one, others more than one, and that some 2 assert to be limited in number, others 3 unlimited. And so we also must consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense.

Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and so we say that not only animals and plants and their parts are substances, but also natural bodies such as fire and water and earth and everything of the sort, and all things that are either parts of these or composed of these (either of parts or of the whole bodies), e.g. the physical universe and its parts, stars and moon and sun. But whether these alone are substances, or there are also others, or only some of these, or others as well, or none of these but only some other things, are substances, must be considered. Some 4 think the limits of body, i.e. surface, line, point, and unit, are substances, and more so than body or the solid.

Further, some do not think there is anything substantial besides sensible things, but others think there are eternal substances which are more in number and more real; e.g. Plato posited two kinds of substance—the Forms and the objects of mathematics—as well as a third kind, viz. the substance of sensible bodies. And Speusippus made still more kinds of substance, beginning with the One, and assuming principles for each kind of substance, one for

1 The schools of Miletus and Elea.
2 The Pythagoreans and Empedocles.
3 Anaxagoras and the Atomists.
4 The Pythagoreans.
numbers, another for spatial magnitudes, and then another for the soul; and by going on in this way he multiplies the kinds of substance. And some say Forms and numbers have the same nature, and the other things come after them—lines and planes—until we come to the substance of the material universe and to sensible bodies.

Regarding these matters, then, we must inquire which of the common statements are right and which are not right, and what substances there are, and whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances, and how sensible substances exist, and whether there is a substance capable of separate existence (and if so why and how) or no such substance, apart from sensible substances; and we must first sketch the nature of substance.

The word 'substance' is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are thought to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum. Now the substratum is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else. And so we must first determine the nature of this; for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance. And in one sense matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another, shape, and in a third, the compound of these. (By the matter I mean, for instance, the bronze, by the shape the pattern of its form, and by the compound of these the statue, the concrete whole.) Therefore if the form is prior to the matter and more real, it will be prior also to the compound of both, for the same reason.

We have now outlined the nature of substance, showing that it is that which is not predicated of a stratum, but of which all else is predicated. But we must not merely state the matter thus; for this is not enough. The statement itself is obscure, and further, on this view, matter becomes substance. For if this is not substance, it baffles us to say what else is. When all else is stripped off evidently nothing but matter remains. For while the rest are affections, products,

1 The school of Xenocrates.
and potencies of bodies, length, breadth, and depth are quantities and not substances (for a quantity is not a sub-
stance), but the substance is rather that to which these
belong primarily. But when length and breadth and depth
are taken away we see nothing left unless there is something
that is bounded by these; so that to those who consider
the question thus matter alone must seem to be substance.

By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular
thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of
the categories by which being is determined. For there is
something of which each of these is predicated, whose
being is different from that of each of the predicates (for
the predicates other than substance are predicated of sub-
stance, while substance is predicated of matter). Therefore
the ultimate substratum is of itself neither a particular thing
nor of a particular quantity nor otherwise positively charac-
terized; nor yet is it the negations of these, for negations
also will belong to it only by accident.

If we adopt this point of view, then, it follows that matter
is substance. But this is impossible; for both separability
and 'thisness' are thought to belong chiefly to substance.
And so form and the compound of form and matter would
be thought to be substance, rather than matter. The sub-
stance compounded of both, i.e. of matter and shape, may
be dismissed; for it is posterior and its nature is obvious.
And matter also is in a sense manifest. But we must
inquire into the third kind of substance; for this is the most
perplexing.

Some of the sensible substances are generally admitted
to be substances, so that we must look first among these.

For it is an advantage to advance to that which is more
knowable. For learning proceeds for all in this way—
through that which is less knowable by nature to that
which is more knowable; and just as in conduct our task is
to start from what is good for each and make what is with-
out qualification good good for each, so it is our task to
start from what is more knowable to oneself and make
what is knowable by nature knowable to oneself. Now
what is knowable and primary for particular sets of people
is often knowable to a very small extent, and has little or nothing of reality. But yet one must start from that which is barely knowable but knowable to oneself, and try to know what is knowable without qualification, passing, as has been said, by way of those very things which one does know.

4 Since at the start we distinguished the various marks by which we determine substance, and one of these was thought to be the essence, we must investigate this. And first let us make some linguistic remarks about it. The essence of each thing is what it is said to be *propter se.*

For being you is not being musical, since you are not by your very nature musical. What, then, you are by your very nature is your essence.

Nor yet is the whole of this the essence of a thing; not that which is *propter se* as white is to a surface, because being a surface is not *identical* with being white. But again the combination of both—'being a white surface'—is not the essence of surface, because 'surface' itself is added. The formula, therefore, in which the term itself is not present but its meaning is expressed, this is the formula of the essence of each thing. Therefore if to be a white surface is to be a smooth surface, to be white and to be smooth are one and the same.

But since there are also compounds answering to the other categories (for there is a substratum for each category, e. g. for quality, quantity, time, place, and motion), we must inquire whether there is a formula of the essence of each of them, i. e. whether to these compounds also there belongs an essence, e. g. to 'white man.' Let the compound be

1 1028b 33-6.
2 It seems convenient here to translate thus the phrase translated in Α. 18 as 'in virtue of itself'.
3 Cf. De Sensu 442b 11 (on Democritus, whose doctrine this is).
4 i. e. this identification does not give the essence of 'surface' (for 'surface' is repeated) but it gives the essence of 'white', since this is not repeated but replaced by an equivalent.
5 i. e. compounds of substance with the other categories.
6 Λευκός ἄνθρωπος means a pale as opposed to a dark man, not a white man as opposed to a negro (cf. H. 1044b 25, I. 1058b 34, K. 1068b 17). But as Aristotle has already in this chapter used Λευκός in the general significance of 'white', I have thought it best to preserve this translation here and in chs. 5 and 6.
denoted by 'cloak'. What is the essence of cloak? But, it may be said, this also is not a \textit{propter se} expression. We reply that there are just two ways in which a predicate may fail to be true of a subject \textit{propter se}, and one of these results from the addition, and the other from the omission, of a determinant. \emph{One} kind of predicate is not \textit{propter se} because the term that is being defined is combined with another determinant, e.g. if in defining the essence of white one were to state the formula of white \textit{man}; the \emph{other} because in the subject another determinant is combined with that which is expressed in the formula, e.g. if 'cloak' meant 'white man', and one were to define cloak as white; white man is white indeed, but its essence is not to be white.

But is being-a-cloak an essence at all? Probably not. For the essence is precisely what something \textit{is}; but when an attribute is asserted of a subject other than itself, the complex is not precisely what some 'this' \textit{is}, e.g. white man is not precisely what some 'this' \textit{is}, since thisness belongs only to substances.\footnote{The point is that \textit{λευκός} is one thing, \textit{ἀνθρώπος} another, while \textit{ζυγόν} and \textit{δίπου} are not distinct things but \textit{δίπου} is only a form of \textit{ζυγόν}. Thus \textit{ἀνθρώπος λευκός} is not an individual type and cannot be defined, while \textit{ζυγόν δίπου} is an individual type and can be defined.} Therefore there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition. But we have a definition not where we have a word and a formula identical in meaning (for in that case all formulae or sets of words would be definitions; for there will be some name for any set of words whatever, so that even the \textit{Iliad} will be a definition\footnote{Sc. of the word 'Iliad'.}), but where there is a formula of something primary; and primary things are those which do not imply the predication of one element in them of another element. Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an \textit{essence}—only species will have it, for these are thought to imply not merely that the subject participates in the attribute and has it as an affection,\footnote{Cf. 1037\textsuperscript{b} 14-21 for the interpretation of this.} or has it by accident; but for everything else as well, if it has a name, there will be a \textit{formula of its meaning}—viz. that this
attribute belongs to this subject; or instead of a simple formula we shall be able to give a more accurate one; but there will be no definition nor essence.

Or has 'definition', like 'what a thing is', several meanings? 'What a thing is' in one sense means substance and the 'this', in another one or other of the predicates, quantity, quality, and the like. For as 'is' belongs to all things, not however in the same sense, but to one sort of thing primarily and to others in a secondary way, so too 'what a thing is' belongs in the simple sense to substance, but in a limited sense to the other categories. For even of a quality we might ask what it is, so that quality also is a 'what a thing is', not in the simple sense, however, but just as, in the case of that which is not, some say, emphasizing the linguistic form, that that which is not is—not is simply, but is non-existent; so too with quality.

We must no doubt inquire how we should express ourselves on each point, but certainly not more than how the facts actually stand. And so now also, since it is evident what language we use, essence will belong, just as 'what a thing is' does, primarily and in the simple sense to substance, and in a secondary way to the other categories also, not essence in the simple sense, but the essence of a quality or of a quantity. For it must be either by an equivocation that we say these are, or by adding to and taking from the meaning of 'are' (in the way in which that which is not known may be said to be known),—the truth being that we use the word neither ambiguously nor in the same sense, but just as we apply the word 'medical' by virtue of a reference to one and the same thing, not meaning one and the same thing, nor yet speaking ambiguously; for a patient and an operation and an instrument are called medical neither by an ambiguity nor with a single meaning, but with reference to a common end. But it does not matter at all in which of the two ways one likes to describe the facts; this is evident, that definition and essence in the primary and simple sense belong to substances. Still they belong to other things as well, only not in the primary

1 Cf. Pl. Soph. 237, 256 ff. 2 i.e. it is known to be unknown.
sense. For if we suppose this it does not follow that there is a definition of every word which means the same as any formula; it must mean the same as a particular kind of formula; and this condition is satisfied if it is a formula of something which is one, not by continuity like the Iliad or the things that are one by being bound together, but in one of the main senses of 'one', which answer to the senses of 'is'; now 'that which is' in one sense denotes a 'this', in another a quantity, in another a quality. And so there can be a formula or definition even of white man, but not in the sense in which there is a definition either of white or of a substance.

It is a difficult question, if one denies that a formula with an added determinant is a definition, whether any of the terms that are not simple but coupled will be definable. For we must explain them by adding a determinant. E.g. there is the nose, and concavity, and snubness, which is compounded out of the two by the presence of the one in the other, and it is not by accident that the nose has the attribute either of concavity or of snubness, but in virtue of its nature; nor do they attach to it as whiteness does to Callias, or to man (because Callias, who happens to be a man, is white), but as 'male' attaches to animal and 'equal' to quantity, and as all so-called 'attributes propter se' attach to their subjects. And such attributes are those in which is involved either the formula or the name of the subject of the particular attribute, and which cannot be explained without this; e.g. white can be explained apart from man, but not female apart from animal. Therefore there is either no essence and definition of any of these things, or if there is, it is in another sense, as we have said.

But there is also a second difficulty about them. For if snub nose and concave nose are the same thing, snub and concave will be the same thing; but if snub and concave are not the same (because it is impossible to speak of snub-

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1 Cf. 1029b 30.
2 In the sense of kaō aîrō explained in An. Post. i. 73a 37-b3.
3 a 17-b13.
ness apart from the thing of which it is an attribute proper se, for snubness is concavity-in-a-nose), either it is impossible to say 'snub nose' or the same thing will have been said twice, concave-nose nose; for snub nose will be concave-nose nose. And so it is absurd that such things should have an essence; if they have, there will be an infinite regress; for in snub-nose nose yet another 'nose' will be involved.

Clearly, then, only substance is definable. For if the other categories also are definable, it must be by addition of a determinant, e.g. the qualitative is defined thus, and so is the odd, for it cannot be defined apart from number; nor can female be defined apart from animal. (When I say 'by addition' I mean the expressions in which it turns out that we are saying the same thing twice, as in these instances.) And if this is true, coupled terms also, like 'odd number', will not be definable (but this escapes our notice because our formulae are not accurate). But if these also are definable, either it is in some other way or, as we said, definition and essence must be said to have more than one sense. Therefore in one sense nothing will have a definition and nothing will have an essence, except substances, but in another sense other things will have them. Clearly, then, definition is the formula of the essence, and essence belongs to substances either alone or chiefly and primarily and in the unqualified sense.

6 We must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or different. This is of some use for the inquiry concerning substance; for each thing is thought to be not different from its substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing.

Now in the case of accidental unities the two would be generally thought to be different, e.g. white man would be thought to be different from the essence of white man. For if they are the same, the essence of man and that of white man are also the same; for a man and a white man are the same thing, as people say, so that the essence of

1 1030 a17-b13.
white man and that of man would be also the same. But perhaps it does not follow that the essence of accidental unities should be the same as that of the simple terms. For the extreme terms are not in the same way identical with the middle term. But perhaps this might be thought to follow, that the extreme terms, the accidents, should turn out to be the same, e.g. the essence of white and that of musical; but this is not actually thought to be the case.¹

But in the case of so-called self-subsistent things, is a thing necessarily the same as its essence? E.g. if there are some substances which have no other substances nor entities prior to them—substances such as some assert the Ideas to be?—If the essence of good is to be different from good-itself, and the essence of animal from animal-itself, and the essence of being from being-itself, there will, firstly, be other substances and entities and Ideas besides those which are asserted, and, secondly, these others will be prior substances, if essence is substance. And if the posterior substances and the prior are severed from each other, (a) there will be no knowledge of the former,² and (β) the latter ³ will have no being. (By ‘severed’ I mean, if the good-itself has not the essence of good, and the latter has not the property of being good.) For (a) there is know-

¹ The argument used in ll. 21-4 is:

If essence of white man = white man,
then since white man = man,
and man = essence of man,
∴ essence of white man = essence of man.
This is absurd, and Aristotle infers that essence of white man does not = white man.

He next (ll. 24-5) hints that this reductio ad absurdum fails because, while white man is (on the hypothesis under discussion) absolutely identical with the essence of white man, as well as man with the essence of man, white man is identical with man only per accidens. But, he urges (ll. 25-8), it might at least seem to follow from the identification of an accidental unity with its essence that the accidental extremes, essence of white and essence of musical, are identical:

Musical man = essence of musical man.
Man = musical man.
White man = man.
Essence of white man = white man.
∴ essence of white man = essence of musical man.
∴ essence of white = essence of musical.
Which is absurd.

² The Ideas or things-themselves.
³ The essences.
ledge of each thing only when we know its essence. And (β) the case is the same for other things as for the good; so that if the essence of good is not good, neither is the essence of reality real, nor the essence of unity one. And all essences alike exist or none of them does; so that if the essence of reality is not real, neither is any of the others. Again, that to which the essence of good does not belong is not good.—The good, then, must be one with the essence of good, and the beautiful with the essence of beauty, and so with all things which do not depend on something else but are self-subsistent and primary. For it is enough if they are this, even if they are not Forms; or rather, perhaps, even if they are Forms. (At the same time it is clear that if there are Ideas such as some people say there are, it will not be substratum that is substance; for these must be substances, but not predicable of a substratum; for if they were they would exist only by being participated in.)

Each thing itself, then, and its essence are one and the same in no merely accidental way, as is evident both from the preceding arguments and because to know each thing, at least, is just to know its essence, so that even by the exhibition of instances it becomes clear that both must be one.

(But of an accidental term, e.g. 'the musical' or 'the white', since it has two meanings, it is not true to say that it itself is identical with its essence; for both that to which the accidental quality belongs, and the accidental quality, are white, so that in a sense the accident and its essence are the same, and in a sense they are not; for the essence of white is not the same as the man or the white man, but it is the same as the attribute white.)

The absurdity of the separation would appear also if one were to assign a name to each of the essences; for there would be yet another essence besides the original one, e.g. to the essence of horse there will belong a second essence.

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1 i.e. the Idea of good (I. 5).
2 i.e. as immanent in particulars.
3 Sc. who is white.
4 Sc. and so ad infinitum. As an infinite process is absurd, why take the first step that commits you to it—why say that the essence of horse is separate from the horse?
METAPHYSICA

Yet why should not some things be their essences from the start, since essence is substance? But indeed not only are a thing and its essence one, but the formula of them is also the same, as is clear even from what has been said; for it is not by accident that the essence of one, and the one, are one. Further, if they are to be different, the process will go on to infinity; for we shall have (1) the essence of one, and (2) the one, so that to terms of the former kind the same argument will be applicable.1

Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence. The sophistical objections to this position, and the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing, are obviously answered by the same solution; for there is no difference either in the standpoint from which the question would be asked, or in that from which one could answer it successfully. We have explained, then, in what sense each thing is the same as its essence and in what sense it is not.

Of things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, some spontaneously. Now everything that comes to be comes to be by the agency of something and from something and comes to be something. And the something which I say it comes to be may be found in any category; it may come to be either a 'this' or of some size or of some quality or somewhere.

Now natural comings to be are the comings to be of those things which come to be by nature; and that out of which they come to be is what we call matter; and that by which they come to be is something which exists naturally; and the something which they come to be is a man or a plant or one of the things of this kind, which we say are substances if anything is—all things produced either by nature or by art have matter; for each of them is capable both of being and of not being, and this capacity is the matter in each—and, in general, both that from which they are produced is nature, and the type according to which they are produced

1 i.e. if the essence of one is different from the one, the essence of the essence of one is different from the essence of one.
is nature (for that which is produced, e.g. a plant or an animal, has a nature), and so is that by which they are produced—the so-called 'formal' nature, which is specifically the same (though this is in another individual); for man begets man.

Thus, then, are natural products produced; all other productions are called 'makings'. And all makings proceed either from art or from a faculty or from thought. Some of them happen also spontaneously or by luck just as natural products sometimes do; for there also the same things sometimes are produced without seed as well as from seed. Concerning these cases, then, we must inquire later, but from art proceed the things of which the form is in the soul of the artist. (By form I mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance.) For even contraries have in a sense the same form; for the substance of a privation is the opposite substance, e.g. health is the substance of disease (for disease is the absence of health); and health is the formula in the soul or the knowledge of it. The healthy subject is produced as the result of the following train of thought:—since this is health, if the subject is to be healthy this must first be present, e.g. a uniform state of body, and if this is to be present, there must be heat; and the physician goes on thinking thus until he reduces the matter to a final something which he himself can produce. Then the process from this point onward, i.e. the process towards health, is called a 'making'. Therefore it follows that in a sense health comes from health and house from house, that with matter from that without matter; for the medical art and the building art are the form of health and of the house, and when I speak of substance without matter I mean the essence.

Of the productions or processes one part is called thinking and the other making,—that which proceeds from the starting-point and the form is thinking, and that which proceeds from the final step of the thinking is making. And

1 Cf. E. 1025b 22.
2 For the theory of these cf. Phys. ii. 5, 6.
3 Cf. b 23-30, 1034a 9-21, b 4-7.
each of the other, intermediate, things is produced in the same way. I mean, for instance, if the subject is to be healthy his bodily state must be made uniform. What then does being made uniform imply? This or that. And this depends on his being made warm. What does this imply? Something else. And this something is present potentially; and what is present potentially is already in the physician's power.

The active principle then and the starting-point for the process of becoming healthy is, if it happens by art, the form in the soul, and if spontaneously, it is that, whatever it is, which starts the making, for the man who makes by art, as in healing the starting-point is perhaps the production of warmth (and this the physician produces by rubbing). Warmth in the body, then, is either a part of health or is followed (either directly or through several intermediate steps) by something similar which is a part of health; and this, viz. that which produces the part of health, is the limiting-point, and so too with a house (the stones are the limiting-point here) and in all other cases.

Therefore, as the saying goes, it is impossible that anything should be produced if there were nothing existing before. Obviously then some part of the result will pre-exist of necessity; for the matter is a part; for this is present in the process and it is this that becomes something. But is the matter an element even in the formula? We certainly describe in both ways what brazen circles are; we describe both the matter by saying it is brass, and the form by saying that it is such and such a figure; and figure is the proximate genus in which it is placed. The brazen circle, then, has its matter in its formula.

As for that out of which as matter they are produced, some things are said, when they have been produced, to be not that but 'thaten'; e.g. the statue is not gold but

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1 Sc. not the thinking, cf. ll. 15-17.
2 i.e. the minimum necessary basis.
3 From the proportion established, warmth : health :: stones : house, and from the next paragraph, it would appear that warmth is treated as the matter which when specialized in a particular way becomes health.
golden.¹ And a healthy man is not said to be that from which he has come. The reason is that though a thing comes both from its privation and from its substratum, which we call its matter (e.g. what becomes healthy is both a man and an invalid), it is said to come rather from its privation (e.g. it is from an invalid rather than from a man that a healthy subject is produced). And so the healthy subject is not said to be an invalid, but to be a man, and the man is said to be healthy. But as for the things whose privation is obscure and nameless, e.g. in brass the privation of a particular shape or in bricks and timber the privation of arrangement as a house, the thing is thought to be produced from these materials, as in the former case the healthy man is produced from an invalid. And so, as there also a thing is not said to be that from which it comes, here the statue is not said to be wood but is said by a verbal change to be wooden,² not brass but brazen, not gold but golden, and the house is said to be not bricks but bricken (though we should not say without qualification, if we looked at the matter carefully, even that a statue is produced from wood or a house from bricks, because coming to be implies change in that from which a thing comes to be, and not permanence). It is for this reason, then, that we use this way of speaking.

8 Since anything which is produced is produced by something (and this I call the starting-point of the production), and from something (and let this be taken to be not the privation but the matter; for the meaning we attach to this has already been explained), and since something is produced (and this is either a sphere or a circle or whatever else it may chance to be), just as we do not make the substratum (the brass), so we do not make the sphere, except incidentally, because the brazen sphere is a sphere and we make the former. For to make a ‘this’ is to make a ‘this’ out of the substratum in the full sense of the word.⁴ (I mean

¹ Aristotle uses the example of stone, but unfortunately we do not say ‘stonen’.
² Omitting ὕπον in l. 18.
³ Cf. 1032a 17.
⁴ i.e. including form as well as matter (cf. 1029a 3).