

# THE KASHF AL-MAHJÚB

THE OLDEST PERSIAN TREATISE ON  
SUFISM

BY

‘ALÍ B. ‘UTHMÁN AL-JULLÁBÍ AL-HUJWÍRÍ

TRANSLATED FROM THE TEXT OF THE LAHORE EDITION,  
COMPARED WITH MSS. IN THE INDIA OFFICE AND  
BRITISH MUSEUM.

NEW EDITION

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


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
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
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




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himself with other folk, but employs his skill in order to maintain his own health. One of the moderns has said: ✓ *Al-faqr 'adam' bilá wujud'*, "Poverty is not-being without existence." To interpret this saying is impossible, because what is non-existent does not admit of being explained. On the surface it would seem that, according to this dictum, poverty is nothing, but such is not the case; the explanations and consensus of the Saints of God are not founded on a principle that is essentially non-existent. The meaning here is not "the not-being of the essence", but "the not-being of that which contaminates the essence"; and all human attributes are a source of contamination: when that is removed, the result is annihilation of the attributes (*faná-yi şifat*), which deprives the sufferer of the instrument whereby he attains, or fails to attain, his object; but his not-going to the essence (*'adam-i rawish ba-'ayn*) seems to him annihilation of the essence and casts him into perdition.

I have met with some scholastic philosophers who, failing to understand the drift of this saying, laughed at it and declared it to be nonsense; and also with certain pretenders (to Şúfism) who made nonsense of it and were firmly convinced of its truth, although they had no grasp of the fundamental principle. Both parties are in the wrong: one ignorantly denies the truth, and the other makes ignorance a state (of perfection). Now the expressions "not-being" (*'adam*) and "annihilation" (*faná*), as they are used by Şúfís, denote the disappearance of a blameworthy instrument (*dlat-i madhmúm*) and disapproved attribute in the course of seeking a praiseworthy attribute; they do not signify the search for non-reality (*'adam-i ma'nt*) by means of an instrument which exists.

Dervishhood in all its meanings is a metaphorical poverty, and amidst all its subordinate aspects there is a transcendent principle. The Divine mysteries come and go over the dervish, so that his affairs are acquired by himself, his actions attributed to himself, and his ideas attached to himself. But when his affairs are freed from the bonds of acquisition (*kasb*), his actions

in proportion as God honoured him; and did not attach their hearts to anyone (except God); and did not open their eyes to gaze upon mankind, inasmuch as "he that beholdeth mankind waneth, but he that returneth unto God reigneth" (*man naẓara ila 'l-khalq halak wa-man raja'a ila 'l-ḥaqq malak*). And Abú Bakr showed that his heart was empty of this deceitful world, for he gave away all his wealth and his clients (*marwáti*), and clad himself in a woollen garment (*gilim*), and came to the Apostle, who asked him what he had left for his family. Abú Bakr replied: "Only God and His Apostle." All this is characteristic of the sincere Şúfi.]

I said that *ṣafá* (purity) is the opposite of *kadar* (impurity), and *kadar* is one of the qualities of Man. The true Şúfi is he that leaves impurity behind. Thus, human nature (*bashariyyat*) prevailed in the women of Egypt as they gazed, enraptured, on the wondrous beauty of Yúsuf (Joseph), on whom be peace! But afterwards the preponderance was reversed, until at last they beheld him with their human nature annihilated (*ba-faná-yi bashariyyat*) and cried: "This is no human being" (Kor. xii, 31). They made him their object and gave expression to their own state. Hence the Shaykhs of this Path—God have mercy on them!—have said: *Laysa 'l-ṣafá min ṣifat al-bashar li'anna 'l-bashar madar wa'l-madar lá yakhlú min al-kadar*, "Purity is not one of the qualities of Man, for Man is clay, and clay involves impurity, and Man cannot escape from impurity." Therefore purity bears no likeness to acts (*af'dl*), nor can the human nature be destroyed by means of effort. The quality of purity is unrelated to acts and states, and its name is unconnected with names and nicknames—*purity is characteristic of the lovers* (of God), *who are suns without cloud*—because purity is the attribute of those who love, and the lover is he that is dead (*fání*) in his own attributes, and living (*báqí*) in the attributes of his Beloved, and their "states" resemble the clear sun in the opinion of mystics (*arbáb-i ḥál*). The beloved

of God, Muḥammad the Chosen One, was asked concerning the state of Hāritha. He answered: *'Abd nawwara 'llāh galbahu bi 'l-īmān*, "He is a man whose heart is illumined by the light of faith, so that his face shines like the moon from the effect thereof, and he is formed by the Divine light." An eminent Sūfī says: *Ḍiyā al-shams wa'l-qamar idha 'shtarakā namūdḥaj' min safā al-ḥubb wa 'l-tawḥīd idha 'shtabakā*, "The combination of the light of the sun and moon, when they are in conjunction, is like the purity of Love and Unification, when these are mingled together." Assuredly, the light of the sun and moon is worthless beside the light of the Love and Unification of God Almighty, and they should not be compared; but in this world there is no light more conspicuous than those two luminaries. The eye cannot see the light of the sun and moon with complete demonstration. During the sway of the sun and moon it sees the sky, whereas the heart (*dīl*) sees the empyrean (*'arsh*) by the light of knowledge and unification and love, and while still in this world explores the world to come. All the Shaykhs of this Path are agreed that when a man has escaped from the captivity of "stations" (*maqāmāt*), and gets rid of the impurity of "states" (*aḥwāl*), and is liberated from the abode of change and decay, and becomes endowed with all praiseworthy qualities, he is disjoined from all qualities. That is to say, he is not held in bondage by any praiseworthy quality of his own, nor does he regard it, nor is he made self-conceited thereby. His state is hidden from the perception of intelligences, and his time is exempt from the influence of thoughts. His presence (*ḥudūr*) with God has no end and his existence has no cause. And when he arrives at this degree, he becomes annihilated (*fānī*) in this world and in the next, and is made divine (*rabbānī*) in the disappearance of humanity; and gold and earth are the same in his eyes, and the ordinances which others find hard to keep become easy to him.

[Here follows the story of Hāritha, who declared that he had true faith in God. The Prophet asked: "What is the

## SECTION.

Dhu 'l-Nún, the Egyptian, says: *Al-Şúfi idhá naţaqa bána nuţquhu 'an al-ḥaqá'iq wa-in sakata naţaqat 'anhu 'l-jawáriḥ bi-qaţ' al-'ald'iq*, "The Şúfi is he whose language, when he speaks, is the reality of his state, i.e. he says nothing which he is not, and when he is silent his conduct explains his state, and his state proclaims that he has cut all worldly ties;" i.e. all that he says is based on a sound principle and all that he does is pure detachment from the world (*tajríd*); when he speaks his speech is entirely the Truth, and when he is silent his actions are wholly "poverty" (*faqr*). Junayd says: *Al-taşawwuf na't<sup>m</sup> uqlma 'l-'abd flhi qlla na't<sup>m</sup> li-'l-'abd am li-'l-ḥaqq faqála na't al-ḥaqq ḥaqíqat<sup>m</sup> wa-na't al-'abd rasm<sup>m</sup>*, "Şúfism is an attribute wherein is Man's subsistence." They said: "Is it an attribute of God or of mankind?" He replied: "Its essence is an attribute of God and its formal system is an attribute of mankind;" i.e. its essence involves the annihilation of human qualities, which is brought about by the everlastingness of the Divine qualities, and this is an attribute of God; whereas its formal system involves on the part of Man the continuance of self-mortification (*mujáhadat*), and this continuance of self-mortification is an attribute of Man. Or the words may be taken in another sense, namely, that in real Unification (*tawḥíd*) there are, correctly speaking, no human attributes at all, because human attributes are not constant but are only formal (*rasm*), having no permanence, for God is the agent. Therefore they are really the attributes of God. Thus (to explain what is meant), God commands His servants to fast, and when they keep the fast He gives them the name of "faster" (*şá'im*), and nominally this "fasting" (*şawm*) belongs to Man, but really it belongs to God. Accordingly God told His Apostle and said: *Al-şawm lí wa-ana ajz' bihi*, "Fasting is mine," because all His acts are His possessions, and when men ascribe things to themselves, the attribution is formal and metaphorical, not real. And Abu 'l-Ḥasan Núrí says: *Al-taşawwuf tarku kulli ḥazz<sup>m</sup>*

*li-l-nafs*, "Šúfism is the renunciation of all selfish pleasures." This renunciation is of two kinds: formal and essential. For example, if one renounces a pleasure, and finds pleasure in the renunciation, this is formal renunciation; but if the pleasure renounces him, then the pleasure is annihilated, and this case falls under the head of true contemplation (*musháhadat*). Therefore renunciation of pleasure is the act of Man, but annihilation of pleasure is the act of God. The act of Man is formal and metaphorical, while the act of God is real. This saying (of Núrí) elucidates the saying of Junayd which has been quoted above. And Abu 'l-Ḥasan Núrí also says: *Al-Šúfiyyat humu 'l-ladhina šafat arwáḥukum fa-šarú fi 'l-šaff al-awwal bayna yadayi 'l-ḥaqq*, "The Šúfís are they whose spirits have been freed from the pollution of humanity, purified from carnal taint, and released from concupiscence, so that they have found rest with God in the first rank and the highest degree, and have fled from all save Him." And he also says: *Al-Šúfi alladhí lá yamlik wa-lá yumlak*, "The Šúfi is he that has nothing in his possession nor is himself possessed by anything." This denotes the essence of annihilation (*faná*), since one whose qualities are annihilated neither possesses nor is possessed, inasmuch as the term "possession" can properly be applied only to existent things. The meaning is, that the Šúfi does not make his own any good of this world or any glory of the next world, for he is not even in the possession and control of himself: he refrains from desiring authority over others, in order that others may not desire submission from him. This saying refers to a mystery of the Šúfís which they call "complete annihilation" (*faná-yi kullí*). If God will, we shall mention in this work, for your information, the points wherein they have fallen into error.

Ibn al-Jallá<sup>1</sup> says: *Al-tašawwuf ḥaqíqat<sup>um</sup> lá rasm lahu*, "Šúfism is an essence without form," because the form belongs

<sup>1</sup> So J. The Lahore edition has Ibn al-Jalálí, I. Ibn al-Jullábí. See Chapter X, No. 34.

person who took it off: "Why do you take it off?" Moreover, at the present day there is at Ghazna—may God protect it!—an old man with the sobriquet Mu'ayyad, who has no choice or discrimination with respect to his clothes; and he is sound in that degree.

Now, as to their garments being mostly blue (*kabūd*), one of the reasons is that they have made wandering (*siyāhat*) and travelling the foundation of their Path; and on journeys a white garment does not retain its original appearance, and is not easily washed, and besides, everyone covets it. Another cause is this, that a blue dress is the badge of the bereaved and afflicted, and the apparel of mourners; and this world is the abode of trouble, the pavilion of affliction, the den of sorrow, the house of parting, the cradle of tribulation: the (Ṣúfi) disciples, seeing that their heart's desire is not to be gained in this world, have clad themselves in blue and have sat down to mourn union (with God). Others behold in the practice (of devotion) only imperfection, in the heart only evil, in life only loss of time: therefore they wear blue; for loss (*fawt*) is worse than death (*mawt*). One wears blue for the death of a dear friend, another for the loss of a cherished hope.

A dervish was asked why he wore blue. He replied: "The Apostle left three things: poverty, knowledge, and the sword. The sword was taken by potentates, who misused it; knowledge was chosen by savants, who were satisfied with merely teaching it; poverty was chosen by dervishes, who made it a means of enriching themselves. I wear blue as a sign of mourning for the calamity of these three classes of men." Once Murta'ish was walking in one of the quarters of Baghdád. Being thirsty, he went to a door and asked for a drink of water. The daughter of the householder brought him some water in a jug. Murta'ish was smitten with her beauty and would not leave the spot until the master of the house came to him. "O sir," cried Murta'ish, "she gave me a drink of water and robbed me of my heart." The householder replied: "She is my daughter, and I give her to you in marriage." So Murta'ish went into

the house, and the wedding was immediately solemnized. The bride's father, who was a wealthy man, sent Murta'ish to the bath, where they took off his patched frock (*muragga'a*) and clothed him in a night-dress. At nightfall he rose to say his prayers and engage in solitary devotion. Suddenly he called out, "Bring my patched frock." They asked, "What ails you?" He answered, "I heard a voice within, whispering: 'On account of one disobedient look We have removed thy *muragga'a*, the garb of piety, from thy body; if thou lookest again We shall remove the raiment of intimacy from thy heart.'" Only two kinds of men are fitted to wear the *muragga'a*: (1) those who are cut off from the world, and (2) those who feel a longing for the Lord (*mushtáqán-i mawlá*).

(X) The Şúfí Shaykhs observe the following rule. When a novice joins them, with the purpose of renouncing the world, they subject him to spiritual discipline for the space of three years. If he fulfil the requirements of this discipline, well and good; otherwise, they declare that he cannot be admitted to the Path (*Taríqat*). The first year is devoted to service of the people, the second year to service of God, and the third year to watching over his own heart. He can serve the people only when he places himself in the rank of servants and all other people in the rank of masters, i.e. he must regard all, without any discrimination, as being better than himself, and must consider it his duty to serve all alike; not in such a way as to deem himself superior to those whom he serves, for this is manifest perdition and evident fraud, and is one of the infectious cankers of the age (*az áfát-i zamána andar zamána yakt ínast*). And he can serve God Almighty only when he cuts off all his selfish interests relating either to this world or to the next, and worships God absolutely for His sake alone, inasmuch as whoever worships God for any thing's sake worships himself and not God. And he can watch over his heart only when his thoughts are collected and cares are dismissed from his heart, so that in the presence of intimacy (with God) he preserves his heart from the assaults



of heedlessness. When these three qualifications are possessed by the novice, he may wear the *muraqqa'a* as a true mystic, not merely as an imitator of others.

Now as to the person who invests the novice with the *muraqqa'a*, he must be a man of rectitude (*mustaqim al-hál*) who has traversed all the hills and dales of the Path, and tasted the rapture of "states" and perceived the nature of actions, and experienced the severity of the Divine majesty and the clemency of the Divine beauty. Furthermore, he must examine the state of his disciples and judge what point they will ultimately reach: whether they will retire (*ráji'an*), or stand still (*wáqifán*), or attain (*bálighán*). If he knows that some day they will abandon this Path, he must forbid them to enter upon it; if they will come to a stand, he must enjoin them to practise devotion; and if they will reach the goal, he must give them spiritual nourishment. The *Şúfi* Shaykhs are physicians of men's souls. When the physician is ignorant of the patient's malady he kills him by his art, because he does not know how to treat him and does not recognize the symptoms of danger, and prescribes food and drink unsuitable to his disease. The Apostle said: "The shaykh in his tribe is like the prophet in his nation." Accordingly, as the prophets showed insight in their call to the people, and kept everyone in his due degree, so the Shaykh likewise should show insight in his call, and should give to everyone his proper spiritual food, in order that the object of his call may be secured.

The adept, then, who has attained the perfection of saintship takes the right course when he invests the novice with the *muraqqa'a* after a period of three years during which he has educated him in the necessary discipline. In respect of the qualifications which it demands, the *muraqqa'a* is comparable to a winding-sheet (*kafan*): the wearer must resign all his hopes of the pleasures of life, and purge his heart of all sensual delights, and devote his life entirely to the service of God and completely renounce selfish desires. Then the Director (*Pir*) ennobles him by clothing him in that robe of honour, while he

on his part fulfils the obligations which it involves, and strives with all his might to perform them, and deems it unlawful to satisfy his own wishes.

Many allegories (*ishārāt*) have been uttered concerning the *muraqqa'a*. Shaykh Abú Ma'mar of Iṣfahán has written a book on the subject, and the generality of aspirants to Ṣúfism display much extravagance (*ghuluww*) in this matter. My aim, however, in the present work is not to relate sayings, but to elucidate the difficulties of Ṣúfism. The best allegory concerning the *muraqqa'a* is this, that its collar (*qabba*) is patience, its two sleeves fear and hope, its two gussets (*tiriz*) contraction and dilation, its belt self-abnegation, its hem (*kursí*)<sup>1</sup> soundness in faith, its fringe (*faráwtz*) sincerity. Better still is the following: "Its collar is annihilation of intercourse (with men), its two sleeves are observance (*hiḥz*) and continence (*iṣmat*), its two gussets are poverty and purity, its belt is persistence in contemplation, its hem (*kursí*) is tranquillity in (God's) presence, and its fringe is settlement in the abode of union." When you have made a *muraqqa'a* like this for your spiritual self it behoves you to make one for your exterior also. I have composed a separate book on this subject, entitled "The Mysteries of Patched Frocks and Means of Livelihood" (*Asrár al-khiraq wa'l-ma'únát*), of which the novice should get a copy.

If the novice, having donned the *muraqqa'a*, should be forced to tear it under compulsion of the temporal authority, this is permissible and excusable; but should he tear it of free will and deliberately, then according to the law of the sect he is not allowed to wear a *muraqqa'a* in future, and if he do so, he stands on the same footing as those in our time who are content to wear *muraqqa'as* for outward show, with no spiritual meaning. As regards the rending of garments the true doctrine is this, that when Ṣúfís pass from one stage to another they immediately change their dress in thankfulness for having gained a higher

<sup>1</sup> This conjectural translation of *kursí* was suggested to me by Colonel Ranking. The dictionaries give no explanation of the word as it is used here.

stage; but whereas every other garment is the dress of a single stage, the *muraqqa'a* is a dress which comprises all the stages of the Path of poverty and purity, and therefore to discard it is equivalent to renouncing the whole Path. I have made a slight allusion to this question, although this is not the proper place for it, in order to settle the particular point at issue; but, please God, I will give a detailed explanation of the principle in the chapter on rending (*kharq*), and in the revelation of the mystery of "audition" (*samá'*). Furthermore, it has been said that one who invests a novice with the *muraqqa'a* should possess such sovereign mystical powers that any stranger on whom he looks kindly should become a friend, and any sinner whom he clothes in this garment should become a saint.

Once I was travelling with my Shaykh in Ádharbáyaján, and we saw two or three persons wearing *muraqqa'as*, who were standing beside a wheat-barn and holding up their skirts in the hope that the farmer would throw them some wheat. On seeing this the Shaykh exclaimed: "*Those are they who have purchased error at the price of true guidance, but their traffic has not been profitable*" (Kor. ii, 15). I asked him how they had fallen into this calamity and disgrace. He said: "Their spiritual directors were greedy to gather disciples, and they themselves are greedy to collect worldly goods." It is related of Junayd that he saw at the Báb al-Ṭáq<sup>1</sup> a beautiful Christian youth and said: "O Lord, pardon him for my sake, for Thou hast created him exceeding fair." After a while the youth came to Junayd and made profession of Islam and was enrolled among the saints. Abú 'Alí Siyáh was asked: "Who is permitted to invest novices with the *muraqqa'a*?" He replied: "That one who oversees the whole kingdom of God, so that nothing happens in the world without his knowledge."

<sup>1</sup> A gate in the eastern quarter of Baghdád.

## CHAPTER V.

### ON THE DIFFERENT OPINIONS HELD CONCERNING POVERTY AND PURITY.

The Doctors of the Mystic Path are not agreed as to the respective merits of Poverty (*faqr*) and Purity (*safwat*). Some hold that Poverty is more perfect than Purity. Poverty, they say, is complete annihilation in which every thought ceases to exist, and Purity is one of the "stations" (*maqámát*) of Poverty: when annihilation is gained, all "stations" vanish into nothing. This is ultimately the same question as that touching Poverty and Wealth, which has already been discussed. Those who set Purity above Poverty say that Poverty is an existent thing (*shay ast mawjúd*) and is capable of being named, whereas Purity is the being pure (*safá*) from all existing things: *safá* is the essence of annihilation (*faná*), and Poverty is the essence of subsistence (*baqá*): therefore Poverty is one of the names of "stations", but Purity is one of the names of perfection. This matter has been disputed at great length in the present age, and both parties have resorted to far-fetched and amazing verbal subtleties; but it will be allowed on all sides that Poverty and Purity are not mere words and nothing else. The disputants have made up a doctrine out of words and have neglected to apprehend meanings: they have abandoned discussion of the Truth. Negation of arbitrary will they call negation of essence, and affirmation of desire they regard as affirmation of essence. The Mystic Path is far removed from such idle fictions. In short, the Saints of God attain to a place where place no longer exists, where all degrees and "stations" disappear, and where outward expressions fall off from the underlying realities, so that neither "spiritual delight" (*shurb*) is left, nor "taste" (*dhawq*), nor "sobriety" (*shaww*), nor "effacement"

(*mahw*). These controversialists, however, seek a forced name with which to cloak ideas that do not admit of being named or of being used as attributes ; and everyone applies to them whatever name he thinks most estimable. Now, in dealing with the ideas themselves, the question of superiority does not arise, but when names are given to them, one will necessarily be preferred to another. Accordingly, to some people the name of Poverty seemed to be superior and of greater worth because it is connected with renunciation and humility, while others preferred Purity, and held it the more honourable because it comes nearer to the notion of discarding all that contaminates and annihilating all that has a taint of the world. They adopted these two names as symbols of an inexpressible idea, in order that they might converse with each other on that subject and make their own state fully known ; and there is no difference of opinion in this sect (the Şúfis), although some use the term "Poverty" and others the term "Purity" to express the same idea. With the verbalists (*ahl-i 'ibárat*), on the contrary, who are ignorant of the true meaning of these ideas, the whole question is an affair of words. To conclude, whoever has made that idea his own and fixed his heart upon it, heeds not whether they call him "Poor" (*faqír*) or "Pure" (*Şúfí*), since both these appellations are forced names for an idea that cannot be brought under any name.

This controversy dates from the time of Abu 'l-Ĥasan Sumnún. He, on occasions when he was in a state of revelation (*kashf*) akin to subsistence (*baqá*), used to set Poverty above Purity ; and on being asked by spiritualists (*arbab-i ma'dní*) why he did so, he replied : " Inasmuch as I naturally delight in annihilation and abasement, and no less in subsistence and exaltation, I prefer Purity to Poverty when I am in a state akin to annihilation, and Poverty to Purity when I am in a state akin to subsistence ; for Poverty is the name of subsistence and Purity that of annihilation. In the latter state I annihilate from myself the sight (consciousness) of subsistence, and in the former state I annihilate from myself the sight of annihilation,

so that my nature becomes dead both to annihilation and to subsistence." Now this, regarded as an explanation (*'ibárat*), is an excellent saying, but neither annihilation nor subsistence can be annihilated: every subsistent thing that suffers annihilation is annihilated from itself, and every annihilated thing that becomes subsistent is subsistent from itself. Annihilation is a term of which it is impossible to speak hyperbolically. If a person says that annihilation is annihilated, he can only be expressing hyperbolically the non-existence of any vestige of the idea of annihilation; but so long as any vestige of existence remains, annihilation has not yet come to pass; and when it has been attained, the "annihilation" thereof is nothing but self-conceit flattered by meaningless phrases. In the vanity and rashness of youth I composed a discourse of this kind, entitled the "Book of Annihilation and Subsistence" (*Kitáb-i Faná ú Baqá*), but in the present work I will set forth the whole matter with caution, please God the Almighty and Glorious.

This is the distinction between Purity and Poverty in the spiritual sense. It is otherwise when Purity and Poverty are considered in their practical aspect, namely, the denuding one's self of worldly things (*tajríd*) and the casting away of all one's possessions. Here the real point is the difference between Poverty (*faqr*) and Lowliness (*maskanat*). Some Shaykhs assert that the Poor (*faqír*) are superior to the Lowly (*miskín*), because God has said, "*the poor who are straitened in the way of Allah, unable to go to and fro on the earth*" (Kor. ii, 274): the Lowly possess means of livelihood, which the Poor renounce: therefore Poverty is honour and Lowliness abasement, for, according to the rule of the Mystic Path, he who possesses the means of livelihood is base, as the Apostle said: "Woe befall those who worship the *dínár* and the *dirhem*, woe befall those who worship garments with a nap!" He who renounces the means of livelihood is honoured, inasmuch as he depends on God, while he who has means depends on them. Others, again, declare the Lowly to be superior, because the Apostle

said: "Let me live lowly, and let me die lowly, and raise me from the dead among the lowly!" whereas, speaking of Poverty, he said, "Poverty is near to being unbelief." On this account the Poor are dependent on a means, but the Lowly are independent. In the domain of Sacred Law, some divines hold that the Poor are those who have a sufficiency (*sāhib bulgha*), and the Lowly those who are free from worldly cares (*mujarrad*); but other divines hold the converse of this view. Hence the name "Şúfí" is given to the Lowly by followers of the Path (*ahl-i maqámát*) who adopt the former opinion: they prefer Purity (*safwat*) to Poverty. Those Şúfís who accept the latter view prefer Poverty to Purity, for a similar reason.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### CONCERNING THE DOCTRINES HELD BY THE DIFFERENT SECTS OF ŞÚFÍS.

I have already stated, in the notice of Abu 'l-Ḥasan Núrî, that the Şúfís are divided into twelve sects, of which two are reprobated and ten are approved. Every one of these ten sects has an excellent system and doctrine as regards both purgation (*mujáhadat*) and contemplation (*musháhadat*). Although they differ from each other in their devotional practices and ascetic disciplines, they agree in the fundamentals and derivatives of the religious law and Unification. Abú Yazíd said: "The disagreement of divines is a mercy except as regards the detachment (*tajríd*)<sup>1</sup> of Unification"; and there is a famous tradition to the same effect. The real essence of Şúfism lies amidst the traditions (*akhbár*) of the Shaykhs, and is divided only metaphorically and formally. Therefore I will briefly divide their sayings in explanation of Şúfism and unfold the main principle on which the doctrine of each one of them is based, in order that the student may readily understand this matter.

#### 1. THE MUḤÁSIBÍS.

They are the followers of Abú 'Abdalláh Ḥárith b. Asad al-Muḥásibí, who by consent of all his contemporaries was a man of approved spiritual influence and mortified passions (*maqbul al-nafas ú maqtul al-nafs*), versed in theology, jurisprudence, and mysticism. He discoursed on detachment from the world and Unification, while his outward and inward dealings (with God) were beyond reproach. The peculiarity of his doctrine is this, that he does not reckon satisfaction


<sup>1</sup> i.e. the detachment of all phenomenal attributes from the Unity of God.





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# MEMORANDUM



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(*riḍā*) among the "stations" (*maqámát*), but includes it in the "states" (*ahwál*). He was the first to hold this view, which was adopted by the people of Khurásán. The people of 'Iráq, on the contrary, asserted that satisfaction is one of the "stations", and that it is the extreme of trust in God (*tawakkul*). The controversy between them has gone on to the present day.<sup>1</sup>

*Discourse on the true nature of Satisfaction and the explanation of this doctrine.*

In the first place I will establish the true nature of satisfaction and set forth its various kinds; then, secondly, I will explain the real meaning of "station" (*maqám*) and "state" (*ḥál*) and the difference between them.

Satisfaction is of two kinds: (*a*) the satisfaction of God with Man, and (*b*) the satisfaction of Man with God. Divine satisfaction really consists in God's willing that Man should be recompensed (for his good works) and in His bestowing grace (*karámat*) upon him. Human satisfaction really consists in Man's performing the command of God and submitting to His decree. Accordingly, the satisfaction of God precedes that of Man, for until Man is divinely aided he does not submit to God's decree and does not perform His command, because Man's satisfaction is connected with God's satisfaction and subsists thereby. In short, human satisfaction is equanimity (*istiwá-yi dil*) towards Fate, whether it withholds or bestows, and spiritual steadfastness (*istiqámat*) in regarding events, whether they be the manifestation of Divine Beauty (*jamál*) or of Divine Majesty (*jalál*), so that it is all one to a man whether he is consumed in the fire of wrath or illuminated by the light of mercy, because both wrath and mercy are evidences of God, and whatever proceeds from God is good in His eyes. The Commander of the Faithful, Ḥusayn b. 'Alí, was asked about the saying of Abú Dharr Ghifári: "I love poverty better than riches, and sickness better than health."

<sup>1</sup> According to Qushayrī (105, 21 ff.) the 'Iráqis held the doctrine which is here ascribed to the Khurásánis, and *vice versa*.

Husayn replied: "God have mercy on Abú Dharr! but I say that whoever surveys the excellent choice made by God for him does not desire anything except what God has chosen for him." When a man sees God's choice and abandons his own choice, he is delivered from all sorrow. This, however, does not hold good in absence from God (*ghaybat*); it requires presence with God (*hudûr*), because "satisfaction expels sorrows and cures heedlessness", and purges the heart of thoughts relating to other than God and frees it from the bonds of tribulation; for it is characteristic of satisfaction to deliver (*rahântidan*).

From the standpoint of ethics, satisfaction is the acquiescence of one who knows that giving and withholding are in God's knowledge, and firmly believes that God sees him in all circumstances. There are four classes of quietists: (1) those who are satisfied with God's gift (*'atâ*), which is gnosis (*ma'rifat*); (2) those who are satisfied with happiness (*nu'mâ*), which is this world; (3) those who are satisfied with affliction (*balâ*), which consists of diverse probations; and (4) those who are satisfied with being chosen (*istifâ*), which is love (*mahabbat*). He who looks away from the Giver to the gift accepts it with his soul, and when he has so accepted it trouble and grief vanish from his heart. He who looks away from the gift to the Giver loses the gift and treads the path of satisfaction by his own effort. Now effort is painful and grievous, and gnosis is only realized when its true nature is divinely revealed; and inasmuch as gnosis, when sought by effort, is a shackle and a veil, such gnosis is non-cognition (*nakirat*). Again, he who is satisfied with this world, without God, is involved in destruction and perdition, because the whole world is not worth so much that a friend of God should set his heart on it or that any care for it should enter his mind. Happiness is happiness only when it leads to the Giver of happiness; otherwise, it is an affliction. Again, he who is satisfied with the affliction that God sends is satisfied because in the affliction he sees the Author thereof and can endure its pain by contemplating Him who sent it; nay, he

does not account it painful, such is his joy in contemplating his Beloved. Finally, those who are satisfied with being chosen by God are His lovers, whose existence is an illusion alike in His anger and His satisfaction; whose hearts dwell in the presence of Purity and in the garden of Intimacy; who have no thought of created things and have escaped from the bonds of "stations" and "states" and have devoted themselves to the love of God. Their satisfaction involves no loss, for satisfaction with God is a manifest kingdom.

## SECTION.

It is related in the Traditions that Moses said: "O God, show me an action with which, if I did it, Thou wouldst be satisfied." God answered: "Thou canst not do that, O Moses!" Then Moses fell prostrate, worshipping God and supplicating Him, and God made a revelation to him, saying: "O son of 'Imrán, My satisfaction with thee consists in thy being satisfied with My decree," i.e. when a man is satisfied with God's decrees it is a sign that God is satisfied with him.

Bishr Ĥáff asked Fuḍayl b. 'Iyād whether renunciation (*zuhd*) or satisfaction was better. Fuḍayl replied: "Satisfaction, because he who is satisfied does not desire any higher stage," i.e. there is above renunciation a stage which the renouncer desires, but there is no stage above satisfaction that the satisfied man should wish for it. Hence the shrine is superior to the gate. This story shows the correctness of MuĤásib's doctrine, that satisfaction belongs to the class of "states" and Divine gifts, not to the stages that are acquired (by effort). It is possible, however, that the satisfied man should have a desire. The Apostle used to say in his prayers: "O God, I ask of Thee satisfaction after the going forth of Thy ordinance (*al-riḍá ba'd al-qadá*)," i.e. "keep me in such a condition that when the ordinance comes to me from Thee, Destiny may find me satisfied with its coming" Here it is affirmed that satisfaction properly is posterior to the advent of Destiny, because, if it preceded, it would only be a resolution to be satisfied, which is not the same thing as actual

satisfaction. Abu 'l-'Abbás b. 'Aṭá says: "Satisfaction is this, that the heart should consider the eternal choice of God on behalf of His creature," i.e. whatever befalls him, he should recognize it as the eternal will of God and His past decree, and should not be distressed, but should accept it cheerfully. Hárith Muḥásibí, the author of the doctrine, says: "Satisfaction is the quiescence (*sukún*) of the heart under the events which flow from the Divine decrees." This is sound doctrine, because the quiescence and tranquillity of the heart are not qualities acquired by Man, but are Divine gifts. And as an argument for the view that satisfaction is a "state", not a "station", they cite the story of 'Utba al-Ghulám, who one night did not sleep, but kept saying: "If Thou chastise me I love Thee, and if Thou have mercy on me I love Thee," i.e. "the pain of Thy chastisement and the pleasure of Thy bounty affect the body alone, whereas the agitation of love resides in the heart, which is not injured thereby". This corroborates the view of Muḥásibí. Satisfaction is the result of love, inasmuch as the lover is satisfied with what is done by the Beloved. Abú 'Uthmán Ḥirí says: "During the last forty years God has never put me in any state that I disliked, or transferred me to another state that I resented." This indicates continual satisfaction and perfect love. The story of the dervish who fell into the Tigris is well known. Seeing that he could not swim, a man on the bank cried out to him: "Shall I tell some one to bring you ashore?" The dervish said, "No." "Then do you wish to be drowned?" "No." "What, then, do you wish?" The dervish replied: "That which God wishes. What have I to do with wishing?"

The Ṣúfí Shaykhs have uttered many sayings on satisfaction, which differ in phraseology but agree in the two principles that have been mentioned.

*The distinction between a "State" (ḥál) and a "Station" (maqám).*

You must know that both these terms are in common use among Ṣúfís, and it is necessary that the student should be

acquainted with them. I must discuss this matter here, although it does not belong to the present chapter.

"Station" (*maqám*) denotes anyone's "standing" in the Way of God, and his fulfilment of the obligations appertaining to that "station" and his keeping it until he comprehends its perfection so far as lies in a man's power. It is not permissible that he should quit his "station" without fulfilling the obligations thereof. Thus, the first "station" is repentance (*tawbat*), then comes conversion (*indbat*), then renunciation (*zuhd*), then trust in God (*tawakkul*), and so on: it is not permissible that anyone should pretend to conversion without repentance, or to renunciation without conversion, or to trust in God without renunciation.

"State" (*hál*), on the other hand, is something that descends from God into a man's heart, without his being able to repel it when it comes, or to attract it when it goes, by his own effort. Accordingly, while the term "station" denotes the way of the seeker, and his progress in the field of exertion, and his rank before God in proportion to his merit, the term "state" denotes the favour and grace which God bestows upon the heart of His servant, and which are not connected with any mortification on the latter's part. "Station" belongs to the category of acts, "state" to the category of gifts. Hence the man that has a "station" stands by his own self-mortification, whereas the man that has a "state" is dead to "self" and stands by a "state" which God creates in him.

Here the Shaykhs are at variance. Some hold that a "state" may be permanent, while others reject this view. Hárith MuĤásíbĪ maintained that a "state" may be permanent. He argued that love and longing and "contraction" (*qabul*) and "expansion" (*bast*) are "states": if they cannot be permanent, then the lover would not be a lover, and until a man's "state" becomes his attribute (*sifat*) the name of that "state" is not properly applied to him. It is for this reason that he holds satisfaction to be one of the "states", and the same view is indicated by the saying of Abú 'Uthmán: "During the last forty years God has never put me in a 'state' that I disliked."

Other Shaykhs deny that a "state" can be permanent. Junayd says: "'States' are like flashes of lightning: their permanence is merely a suggestion of the lower soul (*nafs*)."<sup>1</sup> Some have said, to the same effect: "'States' are like their name," i.e. they vanish almost as soon as they descend (*talállu*) on the heart. Whatever is permanent becomes an attribute, and attributes subsist in an object which must be more perfect than the attributes themselves; and this reduces the doctrine that "states" are permanent to an absurdity. I have set forth the distinction between "state" and "station" in order that you may know what is signified by these terms wherever they occur in the phraseology of the Şúfis or in the present work.

In conclusion, you must know that satisfaction is the end of the "stations" and the beginning of the "states": it is a place of which one side rests on acquisition and effort, and the other side on love and rapture: there is no "station" above it: at this point mortifications (*mujáhadát*) cease. Hence its beginning is in the class of things acquired by effort, its end in the class of things divinely bestowed. Therefore it may be called either a "station" or a "state".

This is the doctrine of Muḥásibí as regards the theory of Şúfism. In practice, however, he made no difference, except that he used to warn his pupils against expressions and acts which, though sound in principle, might be thought evil. For example, he had a "king-bird" (*sháhmurghí*), which used to utter a loud note. One day Abú Ḥamza of Baghdád, who was Ḥáarith's pupil and an ecstatic man, came to see him. The bird piped, and Abú Ḥamza gave a shriek. Ḥáarith rose up and seized a knife, crying, "Thou art an infidel," and would have killed him if the disciples had not separated them. Then he said to Abú Ḥamza: "Become a Moslem, O miscreant!" The disciples exclaimed: "O Shaykh, we all know him to be one of the elect saints and Unitarians: why does the Shaykh regard him with suspicion?" Ḥáarith replied: "I do not suspect him: his opinions are excellent, and I know that he is a profound Unitarian, but why should he do something

which resembles the actions of those who believe in incarnation (*hulúliyyán*) and has the appearance of being derived from their doctrine? If a senseless bird pipes after its fashion, capriciously, why should he behave as though its note were the voice of God? God is indivisible, and the Eternal does not become incarnate, or united with phenomena or commingled with them." When Abú Ĥamza perceived the Shaykh's insight, he said: "O Shaykh, although I am right in theory, nevertheless, since my action resembled the actions of heretics, I repent and withdraw."

May God keep my conduct above suspicion! But this is impossible when one associates with worldly formalists whose enmity is aroused by anyone who does not submit to their hypocrisy and sin.

## 2. THE QAŞŞÁRÍS.

They are the followers of Abú Şálih Ĥamdún b. Aĥmad b. 'Umára al-Qaşşár, a celebrated divine and eminent Şúfi. His doctrine was the manifestation and divulcation of "blame" (*malámat*). He used to say: "God's knowledge of thee is better than men's knowledge," i.e. thy dealings with God in private should be better than thy dealings with men in public, for thy preoccupation with men is the greatest veil between thee and God. I have given some account of al-Qaşşár in the chapter on "Blame". He relates the following story: "One day, while I was walking in the river-bed in the Ĥíra quarter of Níshápúr, I met Núĥ, a brigand famous for his generosity, who was the captain of all the brigands of Níshápúr. I said to him, 'O Núĥ, what is generosity?' He replied, 'My generosity or yours?' I said, 'Describe both.' He replied: 'I put off the coat (*qabá*) and wear a patched frock and practise the conduct appropriate to that garment, in order that I may become a Şúfi and refrain from sin because of the shame that I feel before God; but you put off the patched frock in order that you may not be deceived by men, and that men may not be deceived by thee: accordingly, my generosity



Hence the purpose of mortifying the lower soul is to destroy its attributes, not to annihilate its reality. Now I will discuss the true nature of passion and the renunciation of lusts.

*Discourse on the true nature of Passion (hawá).*

You must know that, according to the opinion of some, passion is a term applied to the attributes of the lower soul, but, according to others, a term denoting the natural volition (*irádát-i ṭab'*) whereby the lower soul is controlled and directed, just as the spirit is controlled by the intelligence. Every spirit that is devoid of the faculty of intelligence is imperfect, and similarly every lower soul that is devoid of the faculty of passion is imperfect. Man is continually being called by intelligence and passion into contrary ways. If he obeys the call of intelligence he attains to faith, but if he obeys the call of passion he arrives at error and infidelity. Therefore passion is a veil and a false guide, and man is commanded to resist it. Passion is of two kinds: (1) desire of pleasure and lust, and (2) desire of worldly honour and authority. He who follows pleasure and lust haunts taverns, and mankind are safe from his mischief, but he who desires honour and authority lives in cells (*ṣawámi'*) and monasteries, and not only has lost the right way himself but also leads others into error. One whose every act depends on passion, and who finds satisfaction in following it, is far from God although he be with you in a mosque, but one who has renounced and abandoned it is near to God although he be in a church. Ibráhīm Khawwás relates this anecdote: "Once I heard that in Rúm there was a monk who had been seventy years in a monastery. I said to myself: 'Wonderful! Forty years is the term of monastic vows: what is the state of this man that he has remained there for seventy years?' I went to see him. When I approached, he opened a window and said to me: 'O Ibráhīm, I know why you have come. I have not stayed here for seventy years because of monastic vows, but I have a dog foul with passion, and I have taken my

abode in this monastery for the purpose of guarding the dog (*sagbání*), and preventing it from doing harm to others.' On hearing him say this I exclaimed: 'O Lord, Thou art able to bestow righteousness on a man even though he be involved in sheer error.' He said to me: 'O Ibráhím, how long will you seek men? Go and seek yourself, and when you have found yourself keep watch over yourself, for this passion clothes itself every day in three hundred and sixty diverse garments of godhead and leads men astray.'"

In short, the devil cannot enter a man's heart until he desires to commit a sin: but when a certain quantity of passion appears, the devil takes it and decks it out and displays it to the man's heart; and this is called diabolic suggestion (*waswás*). It begins from passion, and in reference to this fact God said to Iblís when he threatened to seduce all mankind: "*Verily, thou hast no power over My servants*" (Kor. xv, 42), for the devil in reality is a man's lower soul and passion. Hence the Apostle said: "There is no one whom his devil (i.e. his passion) has not subdued except 'Umar, for he has subdued his devil." Passion is mingled as an ingredient in the clay of Adam; whoever renounces it becomes a prince and whoever follows it becomes a captive. Junayd was asked: "What is union with God?" He replied: "To renounce passion," for of all the acts of devotion by which God's favour is sought none has greater value than resistance to passion, because it is easier for a man to destroy a mountain with his nails than to resist passion. I have read in the Anecdotes that Dhu 'l-Nún the Egyptian said: "I saw a man flying through the air, and asked him how he had attained to this degree. He answered: 'I set my feet on passion (*hawá*) in order that I might ascend into the air (*hawá*).'" It is related that Muḥammad b. Faḍl al-Balkhí said: "I marvel at one who goes with his passion into God's House and visits Him: why does not he trample on his passion that he may attain to Him?"

The most manifest attribute of the lower soul is lust (*shahwat*).

Lust is a thing that is dispersed in different parts of the human body, and is served by the senses. Man is bound to guard all his members from it, and he shall be questioned concerning the acts of each. The lust of the eye is sight, that of the ear is hearing, that of the nose is smell, that of the tongue is speech, that of the palate is taste, that of the body (*jasad*) is touch, and that of the mind is thought (*andîshîdan*). It behoves the seeker of God to spend his whole life, day and night, in ridding himself of these incitements to passion which show themselves through the senses, and to pray God to make him such that this desire will be removed from his inward nature, since whoever is afflicted with lust is veiled from all spiritual things. If anyone should repel it by his own exertions, his task would be long and painful. The right way is resignation (*taslîm*). It is related that Abú 'Alí Siyáh of Merv said: "I had gone to the bath and in accordance with the custom of the Prophet I was using a razor (*pubis tondendæ causâ*). I said to myself: 'O Abú 'Alí, amputate this member which is the source of all lusts and keeps thee afflicted with so much evil.' A voice in my heart whispered: 'O Abú 'Alí, wilt thou interfere in My kingdom? Are not all thy limbs equally at My disposal? If thou do this, I swear by My glory that I will put a hundredfold lust and passion in every hair in that place.'"

Although a man has no power over what is vicious in his constitution, he can get an attribute changed by Divine aid and by resigning himself to God's will and by divesting himself of his own power and strength. In reality, when he resigns himself, God protects him; and through God's protection he comes nearer to annihilating the evil than he does through self-mortification, since flies are more easily driven away with an umbrella (*mikanna*) than with a fly-whisk (*midhabba*). Unless Divine protection is predestined to a man, he cannot abstain from anything by his own exertion, and unless God exerts Himself towards a man, that man's exertion is of no use. All acts of exertion fall under two heads: their object is either to avert the predestination of God or to acquire something in spite

of predestination ; and both these objects are impossible. It is related that when Shiblî was ill, the physician advised him to be abstinent. "From what shall I abstain?" said he, "from that which God bestows upon me, or from that which He does not bestow? It is impossible to abstain from the former, and the latter is not in my hands." I will discuss this question carefully on another occasion.

### 7. THE HAKÍMÍS.

They are the followers of Abú 'Abdalláh Muḥammad b. 'Alî al-Hakím al-Tirmidhî, who was one of the religious leaders of his time and the author of many works on every branch of exoteric and esoteric science. His doctrine was based on saintship (*wiláyat*), and he used to explain the true nature of saintship and the degrees of the saints and the observance of the proper arrangement of their ranks.

As the first step towards understanding his doctrine, you must know that God has saints (*awliyá*), whom He has chosen out of mankind, and whose thoughts He has withdrawn from worldly ties and delivered from sensual temptations ; and He has stationed each of them in a particular degree, and has opened unto them the door of these mysteries. Much might be said on this topic, but I must briefly set forth several points of capital importance.

#### *Discourse on the Affirmation of Saintship (wiláyat).*

You must know that the principle and foundation of Şúfism and knowledge of God rests on saintship, the reality of which is unanimously affirmed by all the Shaykhs, though every one has expressed himself in different language. The peculiarity of Muḥammad b. 'Alî (al-Hakím) lies in the fact that he applied this term to the theory of Şúfism.

*Waláyat* means, etymologically, "power to dispose" (*taṣarruf*), and *wiláyat* means "possession of command" (*imárat*). *Waláyat* also means "lordship" (*rubúbiyyat*) ; hence God hath said : "In this case the lordship (al-waláyat) belongs to God who is the

*Truth*” (Kor. xviii, 42), because the unbelievers seek His protection and turn unto Him and renounce their idols. And *wilāyat* also means “love” (*mahabbat*). *Walī* may be the form *fa’l* with the meaning of *maf’ul*, as God hath said: “*And He takes charge of (yatawallá) the righteous*” (Kor. vii, 195), for God does not leave His servant to his own actions and attributes, but keeps him under His protection. And *walī* may be the form *fa’tl*, equivalent to *fa’il*, with an intensive force, because a man takes care (*tawallí kunad*) to obey God and constantly to fulfil the obligations that he owes to Him. Thus *walī* in the active meaning is “one who desires” (*muríd*), while in the passive meaning it denotes “one who is the object of God’s desire” (*murádd*). All these meanings, whether they signify the relation of God to Man or that of Man to God, are allowable, for God may be the protector of His friends, inasmuch as He promised His protection to the Companions of the Apostle, and declared that the unbelievers had no protector (*mawlá*).<sup>1</sup> And, moreover, He may distinguish them in an exclusive way by His friendship, as He hath said, “*He loves them and they love Him*” (Kor. v, 59), so that they turn away from the favour of mankind: He is their friend (*walī*) and they are His friends (*awliyá*). And He may confer on one a “friendship” (*wilāyat*) that enables him to persevere in obedience to Him, and keeps him free from sin, and on another a “friendship” that empowers him to loose and bind, and makes his prayers answered and his aspirations effectual, as the Apostle said: “There is many a one with dirty hair, dust-stained, clad in two old garments, whom men never heed; but if he were to swear by God, God would verify his oath.” It is well known that in the Caliphate of ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭáb, the Nile, in accordance with its usual habit, ceased to flow; for in the time of Paganism they used annually to adorn a maiden and throw her into the river to make it flow again. ‘Umar therefore wrote on a piece of paper: “O river, if thou hast stopped of thy own will, thou

<sup>1</sup> Kor. xlvii, 12.

doest wrong, and if by command of God, 'Umar bids thee flow." When this paper was thrown in, the Nile resumed its course.

My purpose in discussing saintship and affirming its reality is to show you that the name of saint (*walí*) is properly applied to those in whom the above-mentioned qualities are actually present (*ḥál*) and not merely reputed (*qál*). Certain Shaykhs formerly composed books on this subject, but they became rare and soon disappeared. Now I will commend to you the explanation given by that venerable spiritual director who is the author of the doctrine—for my own belief in it is greater—in order that much instruction may be gained, not only by yourself, but also by every seeker of Súfism who may have the good fortune to read this book.

#### SECTION.

You must know that the word *walí* is current among the vulgar, and is to be found in the Koran and the Apostolic Traditions: e.g., God hath said, "*Verily, on the friends (awliyá) of God no fear shall come, and they shall not grieve*" (Kor. x, 63); and again, "*God is the friend (walí) of those who believe*" (Kor. ii, 258). And the Apostle said: "Among the servants of God there are some whom the prophets and martyrs deem happy." He was asked: "Who are they? Describe them to us that perchance we may love them." He replied: "Those who love one another, through God's mercy, without wealth and without seeking a livelihood: their faces are luminous, and they sit on thrones of light; they are not afraid when men are afraid, nor do they grieve when men grieve." Then he recited: "*Verily, on the friends of God no fear shall come, and they shall not grieve*" (Kor. x, 63). Furthermore, the Apostle said that God said: "He who hurts a saint (*walí*) has allowed himself to make war on Me."

These passages show that God has saints (*awliyá*) whom He has specially distinguished by His friendship and whom He has chosen to be the governors of His kingdom and has marked out to manifest His actions and has peculiarly favoured

with diverse kinds of miracles (*karámat*) and has purged of natural corruptions and has delivered from subjection to their lower soul and passion, so that all their thoughts are of Him and their intimacy is with Him alone. Such have been in past ages, and are now, and shall be hereafter until the Day of Resurrection, because God has exalted this (Moslem) community above all others and has promised to preserve the religion of Muḥammad. Inasmuch as the traditional and intellectual proofs of this religion are to be found among the divines (*'ulamá*), it follows that the visible proof is to be found among the Saints and elect of God. Here we have two parties opposed to us, namely, the Mu'tazilites and the rank and file of the Anthropomorphists (*Ḥashwiyya*). The Mu'tazilites deny that one Moslem is specially privileged more than another; but if a saint is not specially privileged, neither is a prophet specially privileged; and this is infidelity. The vulgar Anthropomorphists allow that special privileges may be conferred, but assert that such privileged persons no longer exist, although they did exist in the past. It is all the same, however, whether they deny the past or the future, since one side of denial is no better than another.

God, then, has caused the prophetic evidence (*burhán-i nabawí*) to remain down to the present day, and has made the Saints the means whereby it is manifested, in order that the signs of the Truth and the proof of Muḥammad's veracity may continue to be clearly seen. He has made the Saints the governors of the universe; they have become entirely devoted to His business, and have ceased to follow their sensual affections. Through the blessing of their advent the rain falls from heaven, and through the purity of their lives the plants spring up from the earth, and through their spiritual influence the Moslems gain victories over the unbelievers. Among them there are four thousand who are concealed and do not know one another and are not aware of the excellence of their state, but in all circumstances are hidden from themselves and from mankind. Traditions have come down to this effect, and the

sayings of the Saints proclaim the truth thereof, and I myself—God be praised!—have had ocular experience (*khabar-i 'iyān*) of this matter. But of those who have power to loose and to bind and are the officers of the Divine court there are three hundred, called *Akhyār*, and forty, called *Abdāl*, and seven, called *Abrār*, and four, called *Awtdād*, and three, called *Nuqabā*, and one, called *Qutb* or *Ghawth*. All these know one another and cannot act save by mutual consent.

Here the vulgar may object to my assertion that they know one another to be saints, on the ground that, if such is the case, they must be secure as to their fate in the next world. I reply that it is absurd to suppose that knowledge of saintship involves security. A believer may have knowledge of his faith and yet not be secure: why should not the same hold good of a saint who has knowledge of his saintship? Nevertheless, it is possible that God should miraculously cause the saint to know his security in regard to the future life, while maintaining him in a state of spiritual soundness and preserving him from disobedience. The Shaykhs differ on this question for the reason which I have explained. Those belonging to the four thousand who are concealed do not admit that the saint can know himself to be such, whereas those of the other class take the contrary view. Each opinion is supported by many lawyers and scholastics. Abú Ishāq Isfarā'ī<sup>1</sup> and some of the ancients hold that a saint is ignorant of his saintship, while Abú Bakr b. Fúrak<sup>2</sup> and others of the past generation hold that he is conscious of it. I ask the former party, what loss or evil does a saint suffer by knowing himself? If they allege that he is conceited when he knows himself to be a saint, I answer that Divine protection is a necessary condition of saintship, and one who is protected from evil cannot fall into self-conceit. It is a very common notion (*sukhan-i sakhs 'amiyāna*) that a saint, to whom extraordinary miracles (*karāmāt*) are continually vouchsafed, does not know himself to be a saint or these

<sup>1</sup> See Ibn Khallikān, No. 4.

<sup>2</sup> See Ibn Khallikān, No. 52; Brockelmann, i, 156.



miracles to be miracles. Both parties have adherents among the common people, but opinion is of no account.

The Mu'tazilites, however, deny special privileges and miracles, which constitute the essence of saintship. They affirm that all Moslems are friends (*awliyá*) of God when they are obedient to Him, and that anyone who fulfils the ordinances of the Faith and denies the attributes and vision of God and allows believers to be eternally damned in Hell and acknowledges only such obligations as are imposed by Reason, without regard to Revelation, is a "friend" (*walí*). All Moslems agree that such a person is a "friend", but a friend of the Devil. The Mu'tazilites also maintain that, if saintship involved miracles, all believers must have miracles vouchsafed to them, because they all share in faith (*ímán*), and if they share in what is fundamental they must likewise share in what is derivative. They say, further, that miracles may be vouchsafed both to believers and to infidels, e.g. when anyone is hungry or fatigued on a journey some person may appear in order to give him food or mount him on an animal for riding. If it were possible, they add, for anyone to traverse a great distance in one night, the Apostle must have been that man; yet, when he set out for Mecca, God said, "*And they (the animals) carry your burdens to a land which ye would not have reached save with sore trouble to yourselves*" (Kor. xvi, 7). I reply: "Your arguments are worthless, for God said, '*Glory to Him who transported His servant by night from the sacred mosque to the farther mosque*'" (Kor. xvii, 1). Miracles are special, not general; but it would have been a general instance if all the Companions had been miraculously conveyed to Mecca, and this would have destroyed all the principles of faith in the unseen. Faith is a general term, applicable to the righteous and the wicked alike, whereas saintship is special. The journey of the Companions to Mecca falls under the former category, but inasmuch as the case of the Apostle was a special one, God conveyed him in one night from Mecca to Jerusalem, and thence to a space of two bow-lengths from the Divine

presence ; and he returned ere the night was far spent. Again, to deny special privileges is manifestly unreasonable. As in a palace there are chamberlains, janitors, grooms, and viziers, who, although they are equally the king's servants, are not equal in rank, so all believers are equal in respect of their faith, but some are obedient, some wise, some pious, and some ignorant.

#### SECTION.

The Shaykhs, every one, have given hints as to the true meaning of saintship. Now I will bring together as many of these selected definitions as possible.

Abú 'Alí Júzajání says : "The saint is annihilated in his own state and subsistent in the contemplation of the Truth : he cannot tell anything concerning himself, nor can he rest with anyone except God," because a man has knowledge only of his own state, and when all his states are annihilated he cannot tell anything about himself ; and he cannot rest with anyone else, to whom he might tell his state, because to communicate one's hidden state to another is to reveal the secret of the Beloved, which cannot be revealed except to the Beloved himself. Moreover, in contemplation it is impossible to regard aught except God : how, then, can he be at rest with mankind ? Junayd said : "The saint hath no fear, because fear is the expectation either of some future calamity or of the eventual loss of some object of desire, whereas the saint is the son of his time (ibn waqtihî) : he has no future that he should fear anything ; and as he hath no fear so he hath no hope, since hope is the expectation either of gaining an object of desire or of being relieved from a misfortune, and this belongs to the future ; nor does he grieve, because grief arises from the rigour of time, and how should he feel grief who is in the radiance of satisfaction (*ridá*) and the garden of concord (*muwáfaqat*) ?" The vulgar imagine this saying to imply that, inasmuch as the saint feels neither fear nor hope nor grief, he has security (*amn*) in their place ; but he has not security, for

security arises from not seeing that which is hidden, and from turning one's back on "time"; and this (absence of security) is characteristic of those who pay no regard to their humanity (*bashariyyat*) and are not content with attributes. Fear and hope and security and grief all refer to the interests of the lower soul, and when that is annihilated satisfaction (*riḍā*) becomes an attribute of Man, and when satisfaction has been attained his states become steadfast (*muṣtaqīm*) in vision of the Author of states (*muḥawwil*), and his back is turned on all states. Then saintship is revealed to his heart and its meaning is made clear to his inmost thoughts. Abū 'Uthmān Maghribī says: "The saint is sometimes celebrated (*mashhūr*), but he is not seduced (*maftūn*)," and another says: "The saint is sometimes hidden (*mastūr*), but he is not celebrated." Seduction consists in falsehood: inasmuch as the saint must be veracious, and miracles cannot possibly be performed by a liar, it follows that the saint is incapable of being seduced. These two sayings refer to the controversy whether the saint knows himself to be such: if he knows, he is celebrated, and if he does not know, he is seduced; but the explanation of this is tedious. It is related that Ibrāhīm b. Adham asked a certain man whether he desired to be one of God's saints, and on his replying "Yes", said: "Do not covet anything in this world or the next, and devote thyself entirely to God, and turn to God with all thy heart." To covet this world is to turn away from God for the sake of that which is transitory, and to covet the next world is to turn away from God for the sake of that which is everlasting: that which is transitory perishes and its renunciation becomes naught, but that which is everlasting cannot perish, hence its renunciation also is imperishable. Abū Yazīd was asked: "Who is a saint?" He answered: "That one who is patient under the command and prohibition of God," because the more a man loves God the more does his heart revere what He commands and the farther is his body from what He forbids. It is related that Abū Yazīd said: "Once I was told that a saint of God was

detachment from the world. He was the first to explain the state of annihilation and subsistence (*faná u baqá*), and he comprehended his whole doctrine in these two terms. Now I will declare their meaning and show the errors into which some have fallen in this respect, in order that you may know what his doctrine is and what the Şúfis intend when they employ these current expressions.

*Discourse on Subsistence (baqá) and Annihilation (faná).*

You must know that annihilation and subsistence have one meaning in science and another meaning in mysticism, and that formalists (*zâhiriyyân*) are more puzzled by these words than by any other technical terms of the Şúfis. Subsistence in its scientific and etymological acceptation is of three kinds: (1) a subsistence that begins and ends in annihilation, e.g. this world, which had a beginning and will have an end, and is now subsistent; (2) a subsistence that came into being and will never be annihilated, viz. Paradise and Hell and the next world and its inhabitants; (3) a subsistence that always was and always will be, viz. the subsistence of God and His eternal attributes. Accordingly, knowledge of annihilation lies in your knowing that this world is perishable, and knowledge of subsistence lies in your knowledge that the next world is everlasting.

But the subsistence and annihilation of a state (*hál*) denotes, for example, that when ignorance is annihilated knowledge is necessarily subsistent, and that when sin is annihilated piety is subsistent, and that when a man acquires knowledge of his piety his forgetfulness (*ghaflat*) is annihilated by remembrance of God (*dhikr*), i.e., when anyone gains knowledge of God and becomes subsistent in knowledge of Him he is annihilated from (entirely loses) ignorance of Him, and when he is annihilated from forgetfulness he becomes subsistent in remembrance of Him, and this involves the discarding of blameworthy attributes and the substitution of praiseworthy attributes. A different signification, however, is attached to the terms in question by

the elect among the Şúfís. They do not refer these expressions to "knowledge" (*ilm*) or to "state" (*hál*), but apply them solely to the degree of perfection attained by the saints who have become free from the pains of mortification and have escaped from the prison of "stations" and the vicissitude of "states", and whose search has ended in discovery, so that they have seen all things visible, and have heard all things audible, and have discovered all the secrets of the heart; and who, recognizing the imperfection of their own discovery, have turned away from all things and have purposely become annihilated in the object of desire, and in the very essence of desire have lost all desires of their own, for when a man becomes annihilated from his attributes he attains to perfect subsistence, he is neither near nor far, neither stranger nor intimate, neither sober nor intoxicated, neither separated nor united; he has no name, or sign, or brand, or mark.

In short, real annihilation from anything involves consciousness of its imperfection and absence of desire for it, not merely that a man should say, when he likes a thing, "I am subsistent therein," or when he dislikes it, that he should say, "I am annihilated therefrom"; for these qualities are characteristic of one who is still seeking. In annihilation there is no love or hate, and in subsistence there is no consciousness of union or separation. Some wrongly imagine that annihilation signifies loss of essence and destruction of personality, and that subsistence indicates the subsistence of God in Man; both these notions are absurd. In India I had a dispute on this subject with a man who claimed to be versed in Koranic exegesis and theology. When I examined his pretensions I found that he knew nothing of annihilation and subsistence, and that he could not distinguish the eternal from the phenomenal. Many ignorant Şúfís consider that total annihilation (*faná-yi kullíyyat*) is possible, but this is a manifest error, for annihilation of the different parts of a material substance (*tinatí*) can never take place. I ask these ignorant and mistaken men: "What do you mean by this kind of annihilation?" If they answer,

“Annihilation of substance” (*faná-yi ‘ayn*), that is impossible; and if they answer, “Annihilation of attributes,” that is only possible in so far as one attribute may be annihilated through the subsistence of another attribute, both attributes belonging to Man; but it is absurd to suppose that anyone can subsist through the attributes of another individual. The Nestorians of Rúm and the Christians hold that Mary annihilated by self-mortification all the attributes of humanity (*awṣáf-i nāsūtí*) and that the Divine subsistence became attached to her, so that she was made subsistent through the subsistence of God, and that Jesus was the result thereof, and that he was not originally composed of the stuff of humanity, because his subsistence is produced by realization of the subsistence of God; and that, in consequence of this, he and his mother and God are all subsistent through one subsistence, which is eternal and an attribute of God. All this agrees with the doctrine of the anthropomorphic sects of the Hashwiyya, who maintain that the Divine essence is a *locus* of phenomena (*mahall-i ḥawáðith*) and that the Eternal may have phenomenal attributes. I ask all who proclaim such tenets: “What difference is there between the view that the Eternal is the *locus* of the phenomenal and the view that the phenomenal is the *locus* of the Eternal, or between the assertion that the Eternal has phenomenal attributes and the assertion that the phenomenal has eternal attributes?” Such doctrines involve materialism (*dahr*) and destroy the proof of the phenomenal nature of the universe, and compel us to say that both the Creator and His creation are eternal or that both are phenomenal, or that what is created may be commingled with what is uncreated, and that what is uncreated may descend into what is created. If, as they cannot help admitting, the creation is phenomenal, then their Creator also must be phenomenal, because the *locus* of a thing is like its substance; if the *locus* (*mahall*) is phenomenal, it follows that the contents of the *locus* (*ḥáll*) are phenomenal too. In fine, when one thing is linked and united and commingled with another, both things are in principle as one.

Accordingly, our subsistence and annihilation are attributes of ourselves, and resemble each other in respect of their being our attributes. Annihilation is the annihilation of one attribute through the subsistence of another attribute. One may speak, however, of an annihilation that is independent of subsistence, and also of a subsistence that is independent of annihilation: in that case annihilation means "annihilation of all remembrance of other", and subsistence means "subsistence of the remembrance of God" (*baqá-yi dhikr-i haqq*). Whoever is annihilated from his own will subsists in the will of God, because thy will is perishable and the will of God is everlasting: when thou standest by thine own will thou standest by annihilation, but when thou art absolutely controlled by the will of God thou standest by subsistence. Similarly, the power of fire transmutes to its own quality anything that falls into it, and surely the power of God's will is greater than that of fire; but fire affects only the quality of iron without changing its substance, for iron can never become fire.

## SECTION.

All the Shaykhs have given subtle indications on this subject. Abú Sa'íd Kharráz, the author of the doctrine, says: "Annihilation is annihilation of consciousness of manhood (*'ubúdiyyat*), and subsistence is subsistence in the contemplation of Godhead (*iláhiyyat*)," i.e., it is an imperfection to be conscious in one's actions that one is a man, and one attains to real manhood (*bandagí*) when one is not conscious of them, but is annihilated so as not to see them, and becomes subsistent through beholding the action of God. Hence all one's actions are referred to God, not to one's self, and whereas a man's actions that are connected with himself are imperfect, those which are attached to him by God are perfect. Therefore, when anyone becomes annihilated from things that depend on himself, he becomes subsistent through the beauty of Godhead. Abú Ya'qúb Nahrajúrí says: "A man's true servanthip (*'ubúdiyyat*) lies in annihilation and subsistence," because no

one is capable of serving God with sincerity until he renounces all self-interest: therefore to renounce humanity (*‘adamiyyat*) is annihilation, and to be sincere in servanthip is subsistence. And Ibráhím b. Shaybán says: “The science of annihilation and subsistence turns on sincerity (*ikhlás*) and unity (*wáhid-iyyat*) and true servanthip; all else is error and heresy,” i.e., when anyone acknowledges the unity of God he feels himself overpowered by the omnipotence of God, and one who is overpowered (*maghlúb*) is annihilated in the might of his vanquisher; and when his annihilation is rightly fulfilled on him, he confesses his weakness and sees no resource except to serve God, and tries to gain His satisfaction (*ridá*). And whoever explains these terms otherwise, i.e. annihilation as meaning “annihilation of substance” and subsistence as meaning “subsistence of God (in Man)”, is a heretic and a Christian, as has been stated above.

Now I, ‘Alí b. ‘Uthmán al-Jullábi, declare that all these sayings are near to each other in meaning, although they differ in expression; and their real gist is this, that annihilation comes to a man through vision of the majesty of God and through the revelation of Divine omnipotence to his heart, so that in the overwhelming sense of His majesty this world and the next world are obliterated from his mind, and “states” and “stations” appear contemptible in the sight of his aspiring thought, and what is shown to him of miraculous grace vanishes into nothing: he becomes dead to reason and passion alike, dead even to annihilation itself; and in that annihilation of annihilation his tongue proclaims God, and his mind and body are humble and abased, as in the beginning when Adam’s posterity were drawn forth from his loins without admixture of evil and took the pledge of servanthip to God (Kor. vii, 171).

Such are the principles of annihilation and subsistence. I have discussed a portion of the subject in the chapter on Poverty and Súfism, and wherever these terms occur in the present work they bear the meaning which I have explained.



## CHAPTER XV.

### THE UNCOVERING OF THE FIRST VEIL: CONCERNING THE GNOSIS OF GOD (*ma'rifat Allah*).

The Apostle said: "If ye knew God as He ought to be known, ye would walk on the seas, and the mountains would move at your call." Gnosis of God is of two kinds: cognitional (*'ilm*) and emotional (*hál*). Cognitional gnosis is the foundation of all blessings in this world and in the next, for the most important thing for a man at all times and in all circumstances is knowledge of God, as God hath said: "*I only created the genii and mankind that they might serve Me*" (Kor. li, 56), i.e. that they might know Me. But the greater part of men neglect this duty, except those whom God hath chosen and whose hearts He hath vivified with Himself. Gnosis is the life of the heart through God, and the turning away of one's inmost thoughts from all that is not God. The worth of everyone is in proportion to gnosis, and he who is without gnosis is worth nothing. Theologians, lawyers, and other classes of men give the name of gnosis (*ma'rifat*) to right cognition (*'ilm*) of God, but the *Şúfi* Shaykhs call right feeling (*hál*) towards God by that name. Hence they have said that gnosis (*ma'rifat*) is more excellent than cognition (*'ilm*), for right feeling (*hál*) is the result of right cognition, but right cognition is not the same thing as right feeling, i.e. one who has not cognition of God is not a gnostic (*'arif*), but one may have cognition of God without being a gnostic. Those of either class who were ignorant of this distinction engaged in useless controversy, and the one party disbelieved in the other party. Now I will explain the matter in order that both may be instructed.

## SECTION.


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You must know that there is a great difference of opinion touching the gnosis and right cognition of God. The Mu'tazilites assert that gnosis is intellectual and that only a reasonable person (*'áqil*) can possibly have it. This doctrine is disproved by the fact that madmen, within Islam, are deemed to have gnosis, and that children, who are not reasonable, are deemed to have faith. Were the criterion of gnosis an intellectual one, such persons must be without gnosis, while unbelievers could not be charged with infidelity, provided only that they were reasonable beings. If reason were the cause of gnosis, it would follow that every reasonable person must know God, and that all who lack reason must be ignorant of Him; which is manifestly absurd. Others pretend that demonstration (*istidlál*) is the cause of knowledge of God, and that such knowledge is not gained except by those who deduce it in this manner. The futility of this doctrine is exemplified by Iblís, for he saw many evidences, such as Paradise, Hell, and the Throne of God, yet they did not cause him to have gnosis. God hath said that knowledge of Him depends on His will (Kor. vi, 111). According to the view of orthodox Moslems, soundness of reason and regard to evidences are a means (*sabáb*) to gnosis, but not the cause (*'illat*) thereof: the sole cause is God's will and favour, for without His favour (*'ináyat*) reason is blind. Reason does not even know itself: how, then, can it know another? Heretics of all sorts use the demonstrative method, but the majority of them do not know God. On the other hand, whenever one enjoys the favour of God, all his actions are so many tokens of gnosis; his demonstration is search (*talab*), and his neglect of demonstration is resignation to God's will (*taslím*); but, in reference to perfect gnosis, resignation is no better than search, for search is a principle that cannot be neglected, while resignation is a principle that excludes the possibility of agitation (*idtiráb*), and these two principles do not essentially involve gnosis. In reality Man's only guide and enlightener is God. Reason and the proofs adduced by reason

are unable to direct anyone into the right way. If the infidels were to return from the place of Judgment to this world, they would bring their infidelity back with them (cf. Kor. vi, 28). When the Commander of the Faithful, 'Alī, was asked concerning gnosis, he said: "I know God by God, and I know that which is not God by the light of God." God created the body and committed its life to the spirit (*jān*), and He created the soul (*dil*) and committed its life to Himself. Hence, inasmuch as reason and human faculties and evidences have no power to make the body live, they cannot make the soul live, as God hath said: "*Shall he who was dead and whom We have restored to life and to whom We have given a light whereby he may walk among men . . . ?*" (Kor. vi, 122), i.e. "I am the Creator of the light in which believers are illumined". It is God that opens and seals the hearts of men (Kor. xxxix, 23; ii, 6): therefore He alone is able to guide them. Everything except Him is a cause or a means, and causes and means cannot possibly indicate the right way without the favour of the Causer. He it is that imposes the obligation of piety, which is essentially gnosis; and those on whom that obligation is laid, so long as they are in the state of obligation, neither bring it upon themselves nor put it away from themselves by their own choice: therefore Man's share in gnosis, unless God makes him know, is mere helplessness. Abu 'l-Ḥasan Nūrī says: "There is none to point out the way to God except God Himself: knowledge is sought only for due performance of His worship." No created being is capable of leading anyone to God. Those who rely on demonstration are not more reasonable than was Abū Ṭālib, and no guide is greater than was Muḥammad; yet, since Abū Ṭālib was preordained to misery, the guidance of Muḥammad did not avail him. The first step of demonstration is a turning away from God, because demonstration involves the consideration of some other thing, whereas gnosis is a turning away from all that is not God. Ordinary objects of search are found by means of demonstration, but knowledge of God is extraordinary. Therefore, knowledge of Him is attained only

by unceasing bewilderment of the reason, and His favour is not procured by any act of human acquisition, but is miraculously revealed to men's hearts. What is not God is phenomenal (*muhdath*), and although a phenomenal being may reach another like himself he cannot reach his Creator and acquire Him while he exists, for in every act of acquisition he who makes the acquisition is predominant and the thing acquired is under his power. Accordingly, the miracle is not that reason should be led by the act to affirm the existence of the Agent, but that a saint should be led by the light of the Truth to deny his own existence. The knowledge gained is in the one case a matter of logic, in the other it becomes an inward experience. Let those who deem reason to be the cause of gnosis consider what reason affirms in their minds concerning the substance of gnosis, for gnosis involves the negation of whatever is affirmed by reason, i.e. whatever notion of God can be formed by reason, God is in reality something different. How, then, is there any room for reason to arrive at gnosis by means of demonstration? Reason and imagination are homogeneous, and where *genus* is affirmed gnosis is denied. To infer the existence of God from intellectual proofs is assimilation (*tashbih*), and to deny it on the same grounds is nullification (*ta'til*). Reason cannot pass beyond these two principles, which in regard to gnosis are agnosticism, since neither of the parties professing them is Unitarian (*muwahhid*).

Therefore, when reason is gone as far as possible, and the souls of His lovers must needs search for Him, they rest helplessly without their faculties, and while they so rest they grow restless and stretch their hands in supplication and seek a relief for their souls; and when they have exhausted every manner of search in their power, the power of God becomes theirs, i.e. they find the way from Him to Him, and are eased of the anguish of absence and set foot in the garden of intimacy and win to rest. And reason, when it sees that the souls have attained their desire, tries to exert its control, but fails; and when it fails it becomes distraught; and when it becomes



**I HAVE LOVED  
YOU JUST AS  
THE FATHER  
HAS LOVED ME**

**ST. JOHN**

distraught it abdicates. Then God clothes it in the garment of service (*khidmat*) and says to it: "While thou wert independent thou wert veiled by thy faculties and their exercise, and when these were annihilated thou didst fail, and having failed thou didst attain." Thus it is the allotted portion of the soul to be near unto God, and that of the reason is to do His service. God causes Man to know Him through Himself with a knowledge that is not linked to any faculty, a knowledge in which the existence of Man is merely metaphorical. Hence to the gnostic egoism is utter perfidy; his remembrance of God is without forgetfulness, and his gnosis is not empty words but actual feeling.

Others, again, declare that gnosis is the result of inspiration (*ilhām*). This also is impossible, because gnosis supplies a criterion for distinguishing truth from falsehood, whereas the inspired have no such criterion. If one says, "I know by inspiration that God is in space," and another says, "I know by inspiration that He is not in space," one of these contradictory statements must be true, but a proof is necessary in order to decide where the truth lies. Consequently, this view, which is held by the Brahmans and the inspirationists (*ilhāmiyān*), falls to the ground. In the present age I have met a number of persons who carried it to an extreme and who connected their own position with the doctrine of religious men, but they are altogether in error, and their assertion is repugnant to all reasonable Moslems and unbelievers. If it be said that whatever conflicts with the sacred law is not inspiration, I reply that this argument is fundamentally unsound, because, if inspiration is to be judged and verified by the standard of the sacred law, then gnosis does not depend on inspiration, but on law and prophecy and Divine guidance.

Others assert that knowledge of God is intuitive (*darūrt*). This also is impossible. Everything that is known in this way must be known in common by all reasonable men, and inasmuch as we see that some reasonable men deny the existence of God and hold the doctrines of assimilation (*tashbīh*) and nullification

(*ta'fil*), it is proved that knowledge of God is not intuitive. Moreover, if it were so, the principle of religious obligation (*taklif*) would be destroyed, for that principle cannot possibly be applied to objects of intuitive knowledge, such as one's self, the heaven and the earth, day and night, pleasure and pain, etc., concerning the existence of which no reasonable man can have any doubt, and which he must know even against his will. But some aspirants to Šúfism, considering the absolute certainty (*yaqín*) which they feel, say: "We know God intuitively," giving the name of intuition to this certainty. Substantially they are right, but their expression is erroneous, because intuitive knowledge cannot be exclusively restricted to those who are perfect; on the contrary, it belongs to all reasonable men. Furthermore, it appears in the minds of living creatures without any means or evidence, whereas the knowledge of God is a means (*sabab*). But Master Abú 'Alí Daqqáq and Shaykh Abú Sahl Šu'lúkí<sup>1</sup> and his father, who was a leading religious authority at Nishápúr, maintain that the beginning of gnosis is demonstrative and that its end is intuitive, just as technical knowledge is first acquired and finally becomes instinctive. "Do not you perceive," they say, "that in Paradise knowledge of God becomes intuitive? Why should it not become intuitive in this world too? And the Apostles, when they heard the word of God, either immediately or from the mouth of an angel or by revelation, knew Him intuitively." I reply that the inhabitants of Paradise know God intuitively in Paradise, because in Paradise no religious obligation is imposed, and the Apostles have no fear of being separated from God at the last, but enjoy the same security as those who know Him intuitively. The excellence of gnosis and faith lies in their being hidden; when they are made visible, faith becomes compulsory (*jabr*), and there is no longer any free will in regard to its visible substance (*ayn*), and the foundations of the religious law are shaken, and the principle of apostasy is annulled, so

<sup>1</sup> See *Nafahát*, No. 373.

that Bal'am<sup>1</sup> and Iblís and Baršišá<sup>2</sup> cannot properly be described as infidels, for it is generally allowed that they had knowledge of God. The gnostic, while he remains a gnostic, has no fear of being separated from God; separation is produced by the loss of gnosis, but intuitive knowledge cannot conceivably be lost. This doctrine is full of danger to the vulgar. In order that you may avoid its evil consequences you must know that Man's knowledge and his gnosis of God depend entirely on the information and eternal guidance of the Truth. Man's certainty in gnosis may be now greater and now less, but the principle of gnosis is neither increased nor diminished, since in either case it would be impaired. You must not let blind conformity enter into your knowledge of God, and you must know Him through His attributes of perfection. This can be attained only through the providence and favour of God, who has absolute control of our minds. If He so will, He makes one of His actions a guide that shows us the way to Himself, and if He will otherwise, He makes that same action an obstacle that prevents us from reaching Him. Thus Jesus was to some a guide that led them to gnosis, but to others he was an obstacle that hindered them from gnosis; the former party said, "This is the servant of God," and the latter said, "This is the son of God." Similarly, some were led to God by idols and by the sun and moon, while others were led astray. Such guides are a means of gnosis, but not the immediate cause of it, and one means is no better than another in relation to Him who is the author of them all. The gnostic's affirmation of a means is a sign of dualism (*zunnár*), and regard to anything except the object of knowledge is polytheism (*shirk*). When a man is doomed to perdition in the Preserved Tablet, nay, in the will and knowledge of God, how can any proof and demonstration lead him aright? The most high God, as He pleases and by whatever means He pleases, shows His servant the way to Himself and opens to him the

<sup>1</sup> See Baydáwí on Kor. vii, 174.

<sup>2</sup> See Goldziher & Landberg, *Die Legende vom Mönch Baršišā* (1896), and M. Hartmann, *Der heilige Baršišā in Der Islamische Orient* (1905), i, 23-8.



door of gnosis, so that he attains to a degree where the very essence of gnosis appears alien (*ghayr*) and its attributes become noxious to him, and he is veiled by his gnosis from the object known and realizes that his gnosis is a pretension (*da'wá*). Dhu 'l-Nún the Egyptian says: "Beware lest thou make pretensions to gnosis," and it has been said in verse—

|| " *The gnostics pretend to knowledge,  
But I avow ignorance: that is my knowledge.*"

Therefore do not claim gnosis, lest thou perish in thy pretension, but cleave to the reality thereof, that thou mayest be saved.

When anyone is honoured by the revelation of the Divine majesty, his existence becomes a plague to him and all his attributes a source of corruption. He who belongs to God and to whom God belongs is not connected with anything in the universe. The real gist of gnosis is to recognize that to God is the kingdom. When a man knows that all possessions are in the absolute control of God, what further business has he with mankind, that he should be veiled from God by them or by himself? All such veils are the result of ignorance. As soon as ignorance is annihilated, they vanish, and this life is made equal in rank to the life hereafter.

#### SECTION.

Now, for instruction's sake, I will mention some of the numerous sayings which the Shaykhs have uttered on this subject.

'Abdalláh b. Mubárák says: "Gnosis consists in not being astonished by anything," because astonishment arises from an act exceeding the power of the doer, and inasmuch as God is omnipotent it is impossible that a gnostic should be astonished by His acts. If there be any room for astonishment, one must needs marvel that God exalts a handful of earth to such a degree that it receives His commands, and a drop of blood to such an eminence that it discourses of love and knowledge of Him, and seeks vision of Him, and desires union with Him.

Dhu 'l-Nún the Egyptian says: "Gnosis is in reality God's providential communication of the spiritual light to our inmost hearts," i.e., until God, in His providence, illuminates the heart of Man and keeps it from contamination, so that all created things have not even the worth of a mustard-seed in his heart, the contemplation of Divine mysteries, both inward and outward, does not overwhelm him with rapture; but when God has done this, his every look becomes an act of contemplation (*musháhadat*). Shiblí says: "Gnosis is continual amazement (*hayrat*)." Amazement is of two kinds: (1) amazement at the essence and (2) amazement at the quality. The former is polytheism and infidelity, because no gnostic can possibly be in doubt concerning the essential nature of God; but the latter is gnosis, because the quality of God lies beyond reason's scope. Hence a certain one said: "O Guide of the amazed, increase my amazement!" In the first place, he affirmed the existence of God and the perfection of His attributes, and recognized that He is the object of men's search and the accomplisher of their prayers and the author of their amazement; then he asked for increase of amazement and recognized that in seeking God the reason has no alternative between amazement and polytheism. This sentiment is very fine. It may be, again, that knowledge of God's being involves amazement at one's own being, because when a man knows God he sees himself entirely subdued by the Divine omnipotence; and since his existence depends on God and his non-existence proceeds from God, and his rest and motion are produced by the power of God, he becomes amazed, saying: "Who and what am I?" In this sense the Apostle said: "He who knows himself has come to know his Lord," i.e. he who knows himself to be annihilated knows God to be eternally subsistent. Annihilation destroys reason and all human attributes, and when the substance of a thing is not accessible to reason it cannot possibly be known without amazement. Abú Yazíd said: "Gnosis consists in knowing that the motion and rest of mankind depend on God," and that without His permission no one has the least control of His

kingdom, and that no one can perform any action until He creates the ability to act and puts the will to act in his heart, and that human actions are metaphorical and that God is the real agent. Muḥammad b. Wási' says, describing the gnostic: "His words are few and his amazement perpetual," because only finite things admit of being expressed in words, and since the infinite cannot be expressed it leaves no resource except perpetual amazement. Shiblí says: "Real gnosis is the inability to attain gnosis," i.e. inability to know a thing, to the real nature of which a man has no clue except the impossibility of attaining it. Therefore, in attaining it, he will rightly take no credit to himself, because inability (*'ajz*) is search, and so long as he depends on his own faculties and attributes, he cannot properly be described by that term; and when these faculties and attributes depart, then his state is not inability, but annihilation. Some pretenders, while affirming the attributes of humanity and the subsistence of the obligation to decide with sound judgment (*taklíf ba-sihhat-i khitáb*) and the authority maintained over them by God's proof, declare that gnosis is impotence, and that they are impotent and unable to attain anything. I reply: "In search of what thing have you become so helpless?" Impotence (*'ajz*) has two signs, which are not to be found in you: firstly, the annihilation of the faculties of search, and secondly, the manifestation of the glory of God (*tajallí*). Where the annihilation of the faculties takes place, there is no outward expression (*'ibárat*); and where the glory of God is revealed, no clue can be given and no discrimination is conceivable. Hence one who is impotent does not know that he is so, or that the state attributed to him is called impotence. How should he know this? Impotence is other than God, and the affirmation of knowledge of other than God is not gnosis; and so long as there is room in the heart for aught except God, or the possibility of expressing aught except God, true gnosis has not been attained. The gnostic is not a gnostic until he turns aside from all that is not God. Abú Hafṣ Ḥaddád says: "Since I have known God, neither truth

nor falsehood has entered my heart." When a man feels desire and passion he turns to the soul (*dil*) in order that it may guide him to the lower soul (*nafs*), which is the seat of falsehood; and when he finds the evidence of gnosis, he also turns to the soul in order that it may guide him to the spirit, which is the source of truth and reality. But when aught except God enters the soul, the gnostic, if he turns to it, commits an act of agnosticism. There is a great difference between one who turns to the soul and one who turns to God. Abú Bakr Wásiṭí says: "He who knows God is cut off from all things, nay, he is dumb and abject (*kharisa wa-'nqama'a*)," i.e. he is unable to express anything and all his attributes are annihilated. So the Apostle, while he was in the state of absence, said: "I am the most eloquent of the Arabs and non-Arabs"; but when he was borne to the presence of God, he said: "I know not how to utter Thy praise." Answer came: "O Muḥammad, if thou speakest not, I will speak; if thou deemest thyself unworthy to praise Me, I will make the universe thy deputy, that all its atoms may praise Me in thy name."

is placed, because a lover lightly bears whatever his beloved metes out to him—honour or disgrace, pain or pleasure, fair treatment or foul”. According to others, *mahabbat* is derived from *habb*, the plural of *habbat*, and *habbat* is the core of the heart, where love resides. In this case, *mahabbat* is called by the name of its dwelling-place, a principle of which there are numerous examples in Arabic. Others derive it from *habāb*, “bubbles of water and the effervescence thereof in a heavy rainfall,” because love is the effervescence of the heart in longing for union with the beloved. As the body subsists through the spirit, so the heart subsists through love, and love subsists through vision of, and union with, the beloved. Others, again, declare that *hubb* is a name applied to pure love, because the Arabs call the pure white of the human eye *habbat al-insān*, just as they call the pure black (core) of the heart *habbat al-qalb*: the latter is the seat of love, the former of vision. Hence the heart and the eye are rivals in love, as the poet says :

“*My heart envies mine eye the pleasure of seeing,  
And mine eye envies my heart the pleasure of meditating.*”

#### SECTION.

You must know that the term “love” (*mahabbat*) is used by theologians in three significations. Firstly, as meaning restless desire for the object of love, and inclination and passion, in which sense it refers only to created beings and their mutual affection towards one another, but cannot be applied to God, who is exalted far above anything of this sort. Secondly, as meaning God’s beneficence and His conferment of special privileges on those whom He chooses and causes to attain the perfection of saintship and peculiarly distinguishes by diverse kinds of His miraculous grace. Thirdly, as meaning praise which God bestows on a man for a good action (*thandā-yi jamīl*).<sup>1</sup>

Some scholastic philosophers say that God’s love, which He has made known to us, belongs to those traditional attributes,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Qushayri (Cairo, 1328 A.H.), 170, 14 sqq.

like His face and His hand and His settling Himself firmly on His throne (*istiwā*), of which the existence from the standpoint of reason would appear to be impossible if they had not been proclaimed as Divine attributes in the Koran and the Sunna. Therefore we affirm them and believe in them, but suspend our own judgment concerning them. These scholastics mean to deny that the term "love" can be applied to God in all the senses which I have mentioned. I will now explain to you the truth of this matter.

God's love of Man is His good will towards him and His having mercy on him. Love is one of the names of His will (*irādāt*), like "satisfaction", "anger", "mercy", etc., and His will is an eternal attribute whereby He wills His actions. In short, God's love towards Man consists in showing much favour to him, and giving him a recompense in this world and the next, and making him secure from punishment and keeping him safe from sin, and bestowing on him lofty "states" and exalted "stations" and causing him to turn his thoughts away from all that is other than God. When God peculiarly distinguishes anyone in this way, that specialization of His will is called love. This is the doctrine of Ḥārith Muḥāsibī and Junayd and a large number of the Ṣūfī Shaykhs as well as of the lawyers belonging to both the sects; and most of the Sunnī scholastics hold the same opinion. As regards their assertion that Divine love is "praise given to a man for a good action" (*thand-yi jamil bar banda*), God's praise is His word (*kalām*), which is uncreated; and as regards their assertion that Divine love means "beneficence", His beneficence consists in His actions. Hence the different views are substantially in close relation to each other.

Man's love towards God is a quality which manifests itself in the heart of the pious believer, in the form of veneration and magnification, so that he seeks to satisfy his Beloved and becomes impatient and restless in his desire for vision of Him, and cannot rest with anyone except Him, and grows familiar with the remembrance (*dhikr*) of Him, and abjures the

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CHAPTER XXI.

THE UNCOVERING OF THE SEVENTH VEIL: ON FASTING  
(*al-ṣawm*).

God hath said: "O believers, fasting is prescribed unto you" (Kor. ii, 179). And the Apostle said that he was informed by Gabriel that God said: "Fasting is mine, and I have the best right to give recompense for it" (*al-ṣawm li wa-ana ajzā bihi*),<sup>1</sup> because the religious practice of fasting is a mystery unconnected with any external thing, a mystery in which none other than God participates: hence its recompense is infinite. It has been said that mankind enter Paradise through God's mercy, and that their rank therein depends on their religious devotion, and that their abiding therein for ever is the recompense of their fasting, because God said: "I have the best right to give recompense for it." Junayd said: "Fasting is half of the Way." I have seen Shaykhs who fasted without intermission, and others who fasted only during the month of Ramaḍān: the former were seeking recompense, and the latter were renouncing self-will and ostentation. Again, I have seen others who fasted and were not conscious of anyone and ate only when food was set before them. This is more in accordance with the Sunna. It is related that the Apostle came to 'A'isha and Ḥafṣa, who said to him: "We have kept some dates and butter (*ḥays*) for thee." "Bring it," said he; "I was intending to fast, but I will fast another day instead." I have seen others who fasted on the "white days" (from the 13th to the 15th of every month), and on the ten (last nights) of the blessed month (Ramaḍān), and also during Rajab, Sha'bān, and Ramaḍān. Others I have seen who observed the fast of David, which the

<sup>1</sup> The usual reading is *ajzā*, "I give recompense," but the Persian translation, *ba-jazā-yi ān man awlātaram*, is equivalent to *ana ajzā bihi*.

والصائم  
اعلم ان الصوم  
واجب على كل  
المسلم  
المعتد  
بالتدين  
والصائم  
الذي  
صام  
بغير  
عذر  
هو  
واجب  
عليه  
الصدقة  
الفاخرة  
والصائم  
الذي  
صام  
بغير  
عذر  
هو  
واجب  
عليه  
الصدقة  
الفاخرة

Apostle called the best of fasts, i.e. they fasted one day and broke their fast the next day. Once I came into the presence of Shaykh Ahmad Bukhári. He had a dish of sweetmeat (*halwá*) before him, from which he was eating, and he made a sign to me that I should do the same. As is the way of young men, I answered (without consideration) that I was fasting. He asked why. I said: "In conformity with such and such a one." He said: "It is not right for human beings to conform with human beings." I was about to break my fast, but he said: "Since you wish to be quit of conformity with him, do not conform with me, for I too am a human being."

Fasting is really abstinence, and this includes the whole method of Súfiism (*ṭarīqat*). The least degree in fasting is hunger, which is God's food on earth, and is universally commended in the eye of the law and of reason. One month's continual fasting is incumbent on every reasonable Moslem who has attained to manhood. The fast begins on the appearance of the moon of Ramaḍán, and continues until the appearance of the moon of Shawwál, and for every day a sincere intention and firm obligation are necessary. Abstinence involves many obligations, e.g., keeping the belly without food and drink, and guarding the eye from lustful looks, and the ear from listening to evil speech about anyone in his absence, and the tongue from vain or foul words, and the body from following after worldly things and disobedience to God. One who acts in this manner is truly keeping his fast, for the Apostle said to a certain man, "When you fast, let your ear fast and your eye and your tongue and your hand and every limb;" and he also said, "Many a one has no good of his fasting except hunger and thirst."

I dreamed that I saw the Apostle and asked him to give me a word of counsel, and that he replied: "Imprison thy tongue and thy senses." To imprison the senses is complete self-mortification, because all kinds of knowledge are acquired through the five senses: sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch. Four of the senses have a particular *locus*, but the fifth, namely touch, is spread over the whole body. Everything that becomes



known to human beings passes through these five doors, except intuitive knowledge and Divine inspiration, and in each sense there is a purity and an impurity; for, just as they are open to knowledge, reason, and spirit, so they are open to imagination and passion, being organs which partake of piety and sin and of felicity and misery. Therefore it behoves him who is keeping a fast to imprison all the senses in order that they may return from disobedience to obedience. To abstain only from food and drink is child's play. One must abstain from idle pleasures and unlawful acts, not from eating lawful food. I marvel at those who say that they are keeping a voluntary fast and yet fail to perform an obligatory duty. Not to commit sin is obligatory, whereas continual fasting is an apostolic custom (which may be observed or neglected). When a man is divinely protected from sin all his circumstances are a fast. It is related by Abú Ṭalḥa al-Málíkí that Sahl b. 'Abdalláh of Tustar was fasting on the day of his birth and also on the day of his death, because he was born in the forenoon and tasted no milk until the evening prayer, and on the day of his decease he was keeping a fast. But continual fasting (*rúza-i wişál*) has been forbidden by the Apostle, for when he fasted continually, and his Companions conformed with him in that respect, he forbade them, saying: "I am not as one of you: I pass the night with my Lord, who gives me food and drink." The votaries of self-mortification assert that this prohibition was an act of indulgence, not a veto declaring such fasts to be unlawful, and others regard them as being contrary to the Sunna, but the fact is that continuance (*wişál*) is impossible, because the day's fast is interrupted by night or, at any rate, does not continue beyond a certain period. It is related that Sahl b. 'Abdalláh of Tustar used to eat only once in fifteen days, and when the month of Ramaḍán arrived he ate nothing until the Feast, and performed four hundred bowings in prayer every night. This exceeds the limit of human endurance, and cannot be accomplished by anyone without Divine aid, which itself becomes his nourishment. It is well known that Shaykh

Abú Naṣr Sarráj,<sup>1</sup> the author of the *Luma'*,<sup>2</sup> who was surnamed the Peacock of the Poor (*Ṭá'ūs al-fuqarā*), came to Baghdád in the month of Ramaḍán, and was given a private chamber in the Shúníziyya mosque, and was appointed to preside over the dervishes until the Feast. During the nightly prayers of Ramaḍán (*tardwíh*) he recited the whole Koran five times. Every night a servant brought a loaf of bread to his room. When he departed, on the day of the Feast, the servant found all the thirty loaves untouched. 'Alí b. Bakkár relates that Ḥaṣṣ Miṣṣísí ate nothing in Ramaḍán except on the fifteenth day of that month. We are told that Ibráhím Adham fasted from the beginning to the end of Ramaḍán, and, although it was the month of Tammúz (July), worked every day as a harvester and gave his wages to the dervishes, and prayed from nightfall to daybreak; they watched him closely and saw that he neither ate nor slept. It is said that Shaykh Abú 'Abdalláh Khaff during his life kept forty uninterrupted fasts of forty days, and I have met with an old man who used annually to keep two fasts of forty days in the desert. I was present at the death-bed of Dánishmand Abú Muḥammad Bángharí; he had tasted no food for eighty days and had not missed a single occasion of public worship. At Merv there were two spiritual directors; one was called Mas'úd and the other was Shaykh Abú 'Alí Siyáh. Mas'úd sent a message to Abú 'Alí, saying: "How long shall we make empty pretensions? Come, let us sit fasting for forty days." Abú 'Alí replied: "No; let us eat three times a day and nevertheless require only one purification during these forty days." The difficulties of this question are not yet removed. Ignorant persons conclude that continuance in fasting is possible, while physicians allege that such a theory is entirely baseless. I will now explain the matter in full. To fast continuously, without infringing the Divine command, is a miracle (*karámat*). Miracles have a special, not a general, application: if they were vouchsafed to all, faith would be an act of necessity

<sup>1</sup> *Nafahát*, No. 353.<sup>2</sup> "Brilliances." *Naf.* entitles it *awá*.

Illumination

The same story is related by Sarraj in his book about the night of the feast in the month of Ramaḍán. I have seen the original in the library of the British Museum. No. 463

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(*jabr*) and gnostics would not be recompensed on account of gnosis. The Apostle wrought evidentiary miracles (*mu'jizat*) and therefore divulged his continuance in fasting; but he forbade the saints (*ahl-i karámat*) to divulge it, because a *karámat* involves concealment, whereas a *mu'jizat* involves revelation. This is a clear distinction between the miracles performed by Apostles and those performed by saints, and will be sufficient for anyone who is divinely guided. The forty days' fasts (*chilla*) of the saints are derived from the fast of Moses (Kor. vii, 138). When the saints desire to hear the word of God spiritually, they remain fasting for forty days. After thirty days have passed they rub their teeth; then they fast ten days more, and God speaks to their hearts, because whatever the prophets enjoy openly the saints may enjoy secretly. Now, hearing the word of God is not compatible with the subsistence of the natural temperament: therefore the four humours must be deprived of food and drink for forty days in order that they may be utterly subdued, and that the purity of love and the subtlety of the spirit may hold absolute sway.

*Chapter on Hunger and matters connected with it.*

Hunger sharpens the intelligence and improves the mind and health. The Apostle said: "Make your bellies hungry and your livers thirsty and your bodies naked, that perchance your hearts may see God in this world." Although hunger is an affliction to the body, it illumines the heart and purifies the soul, and leads the spirit into the presence of God. To eat one's fill is an act worthy of a beast. One who cultivates his spiritual nature by means of hunger, in order to devote himself entirely to God and detach himself from worldly ties, is not on the same level with one who cultivates his body by means of gluttony, and serves his lusts. "The men of old ate to live, but ye live to eat." For the sake of a morsel of food Adam fell from Paradise, and was banished far from the neighbourhood of God.

He whose hunger is compulsory is not really hungry, because

one who desires to eat after God has decreed the contrary is virtually eating; the merit of hunger belongs to him who abstains from eating, not to him who is debarred from eating. Kattání<sup>1</sup> says: "The novice shall sleep only when he is overpowered by slumber, and speak only when he must, and eat only when he is starving." According to some, starvation (*fáqa*) involves abstention from food for two days and nights; others say three days and nights, or a week, or forty days, because true mystics believe that a sincere man (*sádiq*) is only once hungry in forty days; his hunger merely serves to keep him alive, and all hunger besides is natural appetite and vanity. You must know that all the veins in the bodies of gnostics are evidences of the Divine mysteries, and that their hearts are tenanted by visions of the Most High. Their hearts are doors opened in their breasts, and at these doors are stationed reason and passion: reason is reinforced by the spirit, and passion by the lower soul. The more the natural humours are nourished by food, the stronger does the lower soul become, and the more impetuously is passion diffused through the members of the body; and in every vein a different kind of veil (*hijábt*) is produced. But when food is withheld from the lower soul it grows weak, and the reason gains strength, and the mysteries and evidences of God become more visible, until, when the lower soul is unable to work and passion is annihilated, every vain desire is effaced in the manifestation of the Truth, and the seeker of God attains to the whole of his desire. It is related that Abu 'l-'Abbás Qaṣṣáb said: "My obedience and disobedience depend on two cakes of bread: when I eat I find in myself the stuff of every sin, but when I abstain from eating I find in myself the foundation of every act of piety." The fruit of hunger is contemplation of God (*musháhadat*), of which the forerunner is mortification (*mujáhadat*). Repletion combined with contemplation is better than hunger combined with mortification, because contemplation is the battle-field of men, whereas mortification is the playground of children.

<sup>1</sup> *Nafahát*, No. 215.

a youth who stood silent with bowed head while all the people were praying aloud, and I asked him why he did not pray like them. He answered that he was in great distress, having lost the spiritual state (*waght*) which he formerly enjoyed, and that he could by no means cry aloud unto God. I said: 'Pray, in order that through the blessings of this multitude God may accomplish thy desire.' He was about to lift up his hands and pray, when suddenly he uttered a shriek and died on the spot." Dhu 'l-Nún the Egyptian says: "At Miná I saw a young man sitting quietly while the people were engaged in the sacrifices. I looked at him to see what he was doing. He cried: 'O God, all the people are offering sacrifice. I wish to sacrifice my lower soul to Thee; do Thou accept it.' Having spoken, he pointed with his forefinger to his throat and fell dead—may God have mercy on him!"

Pilgrimages, then, are of two kinds: (1) in absence (from God) and (2) in presence (of God). Anyone who is absent from God at Mecca is in the same position as if he were absent from God in his own house, and anyone who is present with God in his own house is in the same position as if he were present with God at Mecca. Pilgrimage is an act of mortification (*mujáhadat*) for the sake of obtaining contemplation (*musháhadat*), and mortification does not become the direct cause of contemplation, but is only a means to it. Therefore, inasmuch as a means has no further effect on the reality of things, the true object of pilgrimage is not to visit the Ka'ba, but to obtain contemplation of God.

#### *Chapter on Contemplation.*

The Apostle said: "Make your bellies hungry and your livers thirsty and leave the world alone, that perchance ye may see God with your hearts"; and he also said, "Worship God as though thou sawest Him, for if thou dost not see Him, yet He sees thee." God said to David: "Dost thou know what is knowledge of Me? It is the life of the heart in contemplation of Me." By "contemplation" the *Şúffis* mean spiritual vision of

God in public and private, without asking how or in what manner. Abu 'l-'Abbás b. 'Aṭá says in reference to the words of God : "*As to those who say, 'Our Lord is God,' and who become steadfast*" (Kor. xli, 30), i.e. "they say 'Our Lord is God' in self-mortification and they 'become steadfast' on the carpet of contemplation".

There are really two kinds of contemplation. The former is the result of perfect faith (*siḥhat-i yaqín*), the latter of rapturous love, for in the rapture of love a man attains to such a degree that his whole being is absorbed in the thought of his Beloved and he sees nothing else. Muḥammad b. Wási' says : "I never saw anything without seeing God therein," i.e. through perfect faith. This vision is from God to His creatures. Shiblí says : "I never saw anything except God," i.e. in the rapture of love and the fervour of contemplation. One sees the act with his bodily eye and, as he looks, beholds the Agent with his spiritual eye ; another is rapt by love of the Agent from all things else, so that he sees only the Agent. The one method is demonstrative (*istidlálí*), the other is ecstatic (*jadhbí*). In the former case, a manifest proof is derived from the evidences of God ; in the latter case, the seer is enraptured and transported by desire : evidences and verities are a veil to him, because he who knows a thing does not reverence aught besides, and he who loves a thing does not regard aught besides, but renounces contention with God and interference with Him in His decrees and His acts. God hath said of the Apostle at the time of his Ascension : "*His eyes did not swerve or transgress*" (Kor. liii, 17), on account of the intensity of his longing for God. When the lover turns his eye away from created things, he will inevitably see the Creator with his heart. God hath said : "*Tell the believers to close their eyes*" (Kor. xxiv, 30), i.e. to close their bodily eyes to lusts and their spiritual eyes to created things. He who is most sincere in self-mortification is most firmly grounded in contemplation for inward contemplation is connected with outward mortification. Sahl b. 'Abdalláh of Tustar says : "If anyone shuts his

eye to God for a single moment, he will never be rightly guided all his life long," because to regard other than God is to be handed over to other than God, and one who is left at the mercy of other than God is lost. Therefore the life of contemplatives is the time during which they enjoy contemplation (*musháhadat*): time spent in seeing ocularily (*mu'áyanat*) they do not reckon as life, for that to them is really death. Thus, when Abú Yazíd was asked how old he was, he replied: "Four years." They said: "How can that be?" He answered: "I have been veiled (from God) by this world for seventy years, but I have seen Him during the last four years: the period in which one is veiled does not belong to one's life." Shiblí cried in his prayers: "O God, hide Paradise and Hell in Thy unseen places, that Thou mayest be worshipped disinterestedly." One who is forgetful of God nevertheless worships Him, through faith, because human nature has an interest in Paradise; but inasmuch as the heart has no interest in loving God, one who is forgetful of God is debarred from contemplating Him. The Apostle told 'Á'isha that he did not see God on the night of the Ascension, but Ibn 'Abbás relates that the Apostle told him that he saw God on that occasion. Accordingly, this remains a matter of controversy; but in saying that he did not see God the Apostle was referring to his bodily eye, whereas in saying the contrary he was referring to his spiritual eye. Since 'Á'isha was a formalist and Ibn 'Abbás a spiritualist, the Apostle spoke with each of them according to their insight. Junayd said: "If God should say to me, 'Behold Me,' I should reply, 'I will not behold Thee,' because in love the eye is other (than God) and alien: the jealousy of other-ness would prevent me from beholding Him. Since in this world I was wont to behold Him without the mediation of the eye, how should I use such mediation in the next world?"

*"Truly, I envy mine eye the sight of Thee,  
And I close mine eye when I look on Thee."*

Junayd was asked: "Do you wish to see God?" He said:

"No." They asked why. He answered : "When Moses wished, he did not see Him, and when Muḥammad did not wish, he saw Him." Our wishing is the greatest of the veils that hinder us from seeing God, because in love the existence of self-will is disobedience, and disobedience is a veil. When self-will vanishes in this world, contemplation is attained, and when contemplation is firmly established, there is no difference between this world and the next. Abú Yazíd says : "God has servants who would apostatize if they were veiled from Him in this world or in the next," i.e. He sustains them with perpetual contemplation and keeps them alive with the life of love ; and when one who enjoys revelation is deprived of it, he necessarily becomes an apostate. Dhu 'l-Nún says : "One day, when I was journeying in Egypt, I saw some boys who were throwing stones at a young man. I asked them what they wanted of him. They said : 'He is mad.' I asked how his madness showed itself, and they told me that he pretended to see God. I turned to the young man and inquired whether he had really said this. He answered : 'I say that if I should not see God for one moment, I should remain veiled and should not be obedient towards Him.'" Some Şúffis have fallen into the mistake of supposing that spiritual vision and contemplation represent such an idea (*súrat*) of God as is formed in the mind by the imagination either from memory or reflection. This is utter anthropomorphism (*tashbih*) and manifest error. God is not finite that the imagination should be able to define Him or that the intellect should comprehend His nature. Whatever can be imagined is homogeneous with the intellect, but God is not homogeneous with any *genus*, although in relation to the Eternal all phenomenal objects—subtle and gross alike—are homogeneous with each other notwithstanding their mutual contrariety. Therefore contemplation in this world resembles vision of God in the next world, and since the Companions of the Apostle (*aṣḥáb*) are unanimously agreed that vision is possible hereafter, contemplation is possible here. Those who tell of contemplation either in this or the other world only say



that it is possible, not that they have enjoyed or now enjoy it, because contemplation is an attribute of the heart (sirr) and cannot be expressed by the tongue except metaphorically. Hence silence ranks higher than speech, for silence is a sign of contemplation (mushâhadat), whereas speech is a sign of ocular testimony (shahâdat). Accordingly the Apostle, when he attained proximity to God, said: "I cannot tell Thy praise," because he was in contemplation, and contemplation in the degree of love is perfect unity (*yugânagî*), and any outward expression in unity is other-ness (bégânagî). Then he said: "Thou hast praised Thyself," i.e. Thy words are mine, and Thy praise is mine, and I do not deem my tongue capable of expressing what I feel. As the poet says:

*"I desired my beloved, but when I saw him  
I was dumbfounded and possessed neither tongue nor eye."*

covered up the face of her idol in order that it might not witness her want of propriety. And when the Apostle was borne to Heaven at the Ascension, his observance of discipline restrained him from paying any regard either to this world or to the next.

The second kind of discipline is that which is observed towards one's self in one's conduct, and which consists in avoiding, when one is in one's own company, any act that would be improper in the company of one's fellow-creatures or of God, e.g., one must not utter an untruth by declaring one's self to be what one is not, and one must eat little in order that one may seldom go to the lavatory, and one must not look at anything which it is not decent for others to see. It is related that 'Alí never beheld his own nakedness, because he was ashamed to see in himself what he was forbidden to see in others.

The third kind of discipline is that which is observed in social intercourse with one's fellow-creatures. The most important rule for such intercourse is to act well, and to observe the custom of the Apostle at home and abroad.

These three sorts of discipline cannot be separated from one another. Now I will set them forth in detail as far as possible, in order that you and all my readers may follow them more easily.

*Chapter on Companionship and matters connected therewith.*

God hath said: "*Verily, the merciful God will bestow love on those who believe and do good works*" (Kor. xix, 96), i.e., He will love them and cause them to be loved, because they do their duty towards their brethren and prefer them to themselves. And the Apostle said: "Three things render thy brother's love toward thee sincere: that thou shouldst salute him when thou meetest him, and that thou shouldst make room for him when he sits beside thee, and that thou shouldst call him by the name that he likes best." And God said, "*The believers are brethren: therefore reconcile your two brethren*"

(Kor. xlix, 10); and the Apostle said, "Get many brethren, for your Lord is bashful (*hayt*) and kind: He will be ashamed to punish His servant in the presence of his brethren on the Day of Resurrection."

But companionship must be for God's sake, not for the purpose of gratifying the lower soul or any selfish interest, in order that a man may be divinely rewarded for observing the rules of companionship. Málik b. Dínár said to his son-in-law, Mughíra b. Shu'ba: "If you derive no religious benefit from a brother and friend, abandon his society, that you may be saved," i.e. associate either with one who is superior or with one who is inferior to yourself. In the former case you will derive benefit from him, and in the latter case the benefit will be mutual, since each will learn something from the other. Hence the Apostle said, "It is the whole of piety to instruct one who is ignorant;" and Yahyá b. Mu'ádh (al-Rázi) said, "He is a bad friend to whom you need to say, 'Remember me in thy prayers'" (because a man ought always to pray for anyone with whom he has associated even for a moment); and he is a bad friend with whom you cannot live except on condition of flattering him (because candour is involved in the principle of companionship); and he is a bad friend to whom you need to apologize for a fault that you have committed (because apologies are made by strangers, and in companionship it is wrong to be on such terms). The Apostle said: "A man follows the religion of his friend: take heed, therefore, with whom you form a friendship." If he associates with the good, their society will make him good, although he is bad; and if he associates with the wicked, he will be wicked, although he is good, because he will be consenting to their wickedness. It is related that a man said, while he was circumambulating the Ka'ba, "O God, make my brethren good!" On being asked why he did not implore a boon for himself in such a place, he replied: "I have brethren to whom I shall return; if they are good, I shall be good with them, and if they are wicked, I shall be wicked with them."

The Şúfi Shaykhs demand from each other the fulfilment of the duties of companionship and enjoin their disciples to require the same, so that amongst them cõpanionship has become like a religious obligation. The Shaykhs have written many books explaining the rules of Şúfi companionship; e.g., Junayd composed a work entitled *Taṣḥīḥ al-irádat*,<sup>1</sup> and Aḥmad b. Khaḍrúya of Balkh another, entitled *Al-Ri'áyat bi-ḥuqúq<sup>2</sup> Allah*,<sup>3</sup> and Muḥammad b. 'Alí of Tirmidh another, entitled *Ádáb al-muridín*.<sup>4</sup> Other exhaustive treatises on this subject have been written by Abu 'l-Qásim al-Ḥakím,<sup>5</sup> Abú Bakr al-Warráq, Sahl b. 'Abdalláh (al-Tustarí), Abú 'Abd al-Raḥmán al-Sulamí, and Master Abu 'l-Qásim Qushayrí. All those writers are great authorities on Şúfism, but I desire that my book should enable anyone who possesses it to dispense with other books and, as I said in the preface, be sufficient in itself for you and for all students of the Şúfi doctrine. I will now classify in separate chapters their various rules of discipline relating to conduct.

*Chapter concerning the Rules of Companionship.*

Since you have perceived that the most important thing for the novice is companionship, the fulfilment of its obligations is necessarily incumbent on him. Solitude is fatal to the novice, for the Apostle said, "Satan is with the solitary, but he is farther away from two who are together;" and God hath said, "*There is no private discourse among three persons but God is the fourth of them*" (Kor. lviii, 8). I have read in the Anecdotes that a disciple of Junayd imagined that he had attained to the degree of perfection, and that it was better for him to be alone. Accordingly he went into retirement and withdrew from the society of his brethren. At nightfall a camel used to appear, and he was told that it would take him to Paradise; on

<sup>1</sup> "The Rectification of Discipleship."

<sup>2</sup> So all the texts, instead of the correct *li-ḥuqúq*.

<sup>3</sup> "The Observance of what is due to God."

<sup>4</sup> "Rules of Conduct for Disciples."

<sup>5</sup> *Nafahát*, No. 129.

mounting it, he was conveyed to a pleasant demesne, with beautiful inhabitants and delicious viands and flowing streams, where he stayed till dawn ; then he fell asleep, and on waking found himself at the door of his cell. These experiences filled him with pride and he could not refrain from boasting of them. When Junayd heard the story he hastened to the disciple's cell, and having received from him a full account of what had passed, said to him : "To-night, when you come to that place, remember to say thrice, 'There is no strength or power but in God, the High, the Great.'" The same night he was carried off as usual, and though in his heart he did not believe Junayd, by way of trial he repeated those words thrice. The crew around him shrieked and vanished, and he found himself seated on a dunghill in the midst of rotten bones. He acknowledged his fault and repented and returned to companionship.

The principle of the Sūfis in companionship is that they should treat everyone according to his degree. Thus they treat old men with respect, like fathers ; those of their own sort with agreeable familiarity, like brothers ; and young men with affection, like sons. They renounce hate, envy, and malice, and do not withhold sincere admonition from anyone. In companionship it is not permissible to speak evil of the absent, or to behave dishonestly, or to deny one another on account of any word or deed, because a companionship which is begun for God's sake should not be cut short by human words or acts. The author says : "I asked the Grand Shaykh Abu 'l-Qásim Gurgání what obligations were involved in companionship. He replied : 'It involves this, that you should not seek your own interest ; all the evils of companionship arise from selfishness. Solitude is better for a selfish man. He who neglects his own interests and looks after the interests of his companion hits the mark in companionship.'" A certain dervish relates as follows : "Once I set out from Kúfa to visit Mecca. On the way I met Ibráhím Khawwás and begged him to let me accompany him. He said : 'In companionship it is necessary that one should command and the other should obey : which

do you choose?' I answered: 'You be the commander.' He said: 'Now do not fail to comply with my orders.' When we arrived at the halting-place, he bade me sit down, and himself drew water from the well and, since the weather was cold, he gathered sticks and kindled a fire, and whenever I attempted to do anything he told me to sit down. At nightfall it began to rain heavily. He took off his patched frock and held it over my head all night. I was ashamed, but could not say a word on account of the condition imposed on me. When morning came, I said: 'To-day it is my turn to be commander.' He said: 'Very well.' As soon as we reached the halting-place, he began to perform the same menial offices as before, and on my telling him not to disobey my orders he retorted that it was an act of disobedience to let one's self be served by one's commander. He continued to behave in this way until we arrived at Mecca; then I felt so ashamed that I fled from him. He espied me, however, at Miná and said to me: 'O son, when you associate with dervishes see that you treat them in the same fashion as I treated you.'

Dervishes are divided into two classes: residents (*muqimán*) and travellers (*musáfirán*). According to the custom of the Shaykhs, the travelling dervishes should regard the resident ones as superior to themselves, because they go to and fro in their own interest, while the resident dervishes have settled down in the service of God: in the former is the sign of search, in the latter is the token of attainment; hence those who have found and settled down are superior to those who are still seeking. Similarly, the resident dervishes ought to regard the travelling ones as superior to themselves, because they are laden with worldly encumbrances, while the travelling dervishes are unencumbered and detached from the world. Again, old men should prefer to themselves the young, who are newer to the world and whose sins are less numerous; and young men should prefer to themselves the old, who have outstripped them in devotion and service.

## SECTION.

Culture (*adab*) really means "the collection of virtuous qualities", though in ordinary language anyone is called "cultured" (*adīb*) who is acquainted with Arabic philology and grammar. But the Ṣūfīs define culture as "dwelling with praiseworthy qualities", and say that it means "to act with propriety towards God in public and private"; if you act thus, you are "cultured", even if you are a foreigner (i.e. a non-Arab), and if not, you are the opposite. Those who have knowledge are in every case more honoured than those who have intelligence. A certain Shaykh was asked: "What does culture involve?" He said: "I will answer you by quoting a definition which I have heard, 'If you speak, your speech will be sincere, and if you act, your actions will be true.'" An excellent distinction has been made by Shaykh Abú Naṣr Sarráj, the author of the *Luma'*, who says: "As regards culture (*adab*), there are three classes of mankind. Firstly, worldlings, whose culture mainly consists in eloquence and rhetoric and learning and knowledge of the nightly conversations (*asmár*<sup>1</sup>) of kings and Arabic poetry. Secondly, the religious, whose culture chiefly consists in disciplining the lower soul and correcting the limbs and observing the legal ordinances and renouncing lusts. Thirdly, the elect (i.e. the Ṣūfīs), whose culture consists for the most part in spiritual purity and keeping watch over their hearts and fulfilling their promises and guarding the 'state' in which they are and paying no heed to extraneous suggestions and behaving with propriety in the positions of search (for God), in the states of presence (with God), and in the stations of proximity (to God)." This saying is comprehensive. The different matters which it includes are discussed in several places in this book.

*Chapter on the Rules of Companionship affecting Residents.*

Dervishes who choose to reside, and not to travel, are bound to observe the following rules of discipline. When a traveller

<sup>1</sup> Another reading is *asmá*, "names," but I find *asmár* in the MS. of the *Kittáb al-Luma'* belonging to Mr. A. G. Ellis, where this passage occurs on f. 63a.

of 'Irâq, I was restlessly occupied (*tâpâkt mîkardam*) in seeking wealth and squandering it, and I had run largely into debt. Everyone who wanted anything turned to me, and I was troubled and at a loss to know how I could accomplish their desires. An eminent person wrote to me as follows: "Beware lest you distract your mind from God by satisfying the wishes of those whose minds are engrossed in vanity. If you find anyone whose mind is nobler than your own, you may justly distract your mind in order to give peace to his. Otherwise, do not distract yourself, since God is sufficient for His servants." These words brought me instant relief.

*Chapter concerning their Rules in Travel.*

When a dervish chooses to travel, not to reside, he ought to observe the following rules. In the first place, he must travel for God's sake, not for pleasure, and as he journeys outwardly, so he should flee inwardly from his sensual affections; and he must always keep himself in a state of purity and not neglect his devotions; and his object in travelling must be either pilgrimage or war (against infidels) or to see a (holy) site or to derive instruction or to seek knowledge or to visit a venerable person, a Shaykh, or the tomb of a saint; otherwise his journey will be faulty. And he cannot do without a patched frock and a prayer-rug and a bucket and a rope and a pair of shoes (*kafsh*) or clogs (*na'layn*) and a staff: the patched frock to cover his nakedness, the prayer-rug to pray on, the bucket to cleanse himself with, and the staff to protect him from attacks and for other purposes. Before stepping on the prayer-rug he must put on his shoes or clogs in a state of purity. If anyone carries other articles, for the sake of keeping the Sunna (Apostolic custom), such as a comb and nail-scissors and a needle and a little box of antimony (*mukhula*), he does right. If, however, anyone provides himself with more utensils than those which have been mentioned, we have to consider in what station he is: if he is a novice every article will be a shackle and a stumbling-block and a veil to him, and will



afford him the means of showing self-conceit, but if he is a firmly grounded adept he may carry all these articles and more. I heard the following story from Shaykh Abú Mûslim Fâris b. Ghâlib al-Fârisî. "One day (he said) I paid a visit to Shaykh Abú Sa'îd b. Abi 'l-Khayr Faḍlallâh b. Muḥammad. I found him sleeping on a couch with four cushions (*takhtî chahâr-bâlish*), one of his legs thrown across the other; and he was dressed in fine Egyptian linen (*diqqî Mişri*). My garment was so dirty that it resembled leather, and my body was emaciated by austerities. On looking at Abú Sa'îd a feeling of scepticism overcame me. I said to myself: 'He is a dervish, and so am I, yet he is in all this luxury and I in this sore tribulation.' He immediately divined my thoughts and was aware of my vainglory. 'O Abú Muslim,' said he, 'in what *dîwân* have you read that a self-conceited man is a dervish? Since I see God in all things, God sets me on a throne, and since you see yourself in everything, God keeps you in affliction: my lot is contemplation, while yours is mortification. These are two stations on the Way to God, but God is far aloof from them both, and a dervish is dead to all stations and free from all states.' On hearing these words my senses forsook me, and the whole world grew dark in my eyes. When I came to myself I repented, and he accepted my repentance. Then I said: 'O Shaykh, give me leave to depart, for I cannot bear the sight of thee.' He answered, 'O Abú Muslim, you speak the truth;' then he quoted this verse:—

*'That which my ear was unable to hear by report  
My eye beheld actually all at once.'*"

The travelling dervish must always observe the custom of the Apostle, and when he comes to the house of a resident he should enter his presence respectfully and greet him; and he should first take off the shoe on his left foot, as the Apostle did; and when he puts his shoes on, he should first put on the shoe belonging to his right foot; and he should wash his right foot before his left; and he should perform two bowings

of the head by way of salutation (in prayer) and then occupy himself with attending to the (religious) duties incumbent on dervishes. He must not in any case interfere with the residents, or behave immoderately towards anyone, or talk of the hardships which he may have suffered in travelling, or discourse on theology, or tell anecdotes, or recite traditions in company, for all this is a sign of self-conceit. He must be patient when he is vexed by fools and must tolerate their irksomeness for God's sake, for in patience there are many blessings. If residents or their servants bid him go with them to salute or visit the townspeople, he must acquiesce if he can, but in his heart he ought to dislike paying such marks of respect to worldlings, although he should excuse the behaviour of his brethren who act thus. He must take care not to trouble them by making any unreasonable demand, and he must not drag them to the court of high officials with the purpose of seeking an idle pleasure for himself. Travelling, as well as resident, dervishes must always, in companionship, endeavour to please God, and must have a good belief in each other, and not speak ill of any comrade face to face with him or behind his back, because true mystics in regarding the act see the Agent, and inasmuch as every human being, of whatever description he may be—faulty or faultless, veiled or illuminated—belongs to God and is His creature, to quarrel with a human act is to quarrel with the Divine Agent.

*Chapter concerning their Rules in Eating.*

Men cannot dispense with nourishment, but moral virtue requires that they should not eat or drink in excess. Sháfi'í says: "He who thinks about that which goes into his belly is worth only that which comes out of it." Nothing is more hurtful to a novice in Súfism than eating too much. I have read in the Anecdotes that Abú Yazíd was asked why he praised hunger so highly. He answered: "Because if Pharaoh had been hungry he would not have said, 'I am your Supreme Lord,' and if Qárún (Korah) had been hungry he would not

have been rebellious." Tha'aba<sup>1</sup> was praised by all so long as he was hungry, but when he ate his fill he displayed hypocrisy. Sahl b. 'Abdalláh (al-Tustarí) said: "In my judgment, a belly full of wine is better than one full of lawful food." On being asked the reason of this he said: "When a man's belly is filled with wine, his intellect is stupefied and the flame of lust is quenched, and people are secure from his hand and tongue; but when his belly is filled with lawful food he desires foolishness, and his lust waxes great and his lower soul rises to seek her pleasures." The Shaykhs have said, describing the Ṣúfís: "They eat like sick men, and sleep like shipwrecked men, and speak like one whose children have died."

It is an obligatory rule that they should not eat alone, but should unselfishly share their food with one another; and when seated at table they should not be silent, and should begin by saying "In God's name"; and they should not put anything down or lift anything up in such a way as to offend their comrades, and they should dip the first mouthful in salt, and should deal fairly by their friends. Sahl b. 'Abdalláh (al-Tustarí) was asked about the meaning of the verse: "*Verily God enjoins justice and beneficence*" (Kor. xvi, 92). He replied: "Justice consists in dealing fairly with one's friend in regard to a morsel of food, and beneficence consists in deeming him to have a better claim to that morsel than yourself." My Shaykh used to say: "I am astonished at the impostor who declares that he has renounced the world, and is anxious about a morsel of food." Furthermore, the Ṣúfí should eat with his right hand and should look only at his own morsel, and while eating he should not drink unless he is extremely thirsty, and if he drinks he should drink only as much as will moisten his liver. He should not eat large mouthfuls, and should chew his food well and not make haste; otherwise he will be acting contrary to the custom of the Apostle, and

<sup>1</sup> See Baydāwí on Kor. ix, 76.

will probably suffer from indigestion (*tukhama*). When he has finished eating, he should give praise to God and wash his hands. If two or three or more persons belonging to a community of dervishes go to a dinner and eat something without informing their brethren, according to some Shaykhs this is unlawful and constitutes a breach of companionship, but some hold it to be allowable when a number of persons act thus in union with each other, and some allow it in the case of a single person, on the ground that he is not obliged to deal fairly when he is alone but when he is in company; consequently, being alone, he is relieved of the obligations of companionship and is not responsible for his act. Now, the most important principle in this matter is that the invitation of a dervish should not be refused, and that the invitation of a rich man should not be accepted. Dervishes ought not to go to the houses of rich men or beg anything of them: such conduct is demoralizing for Şúfis, because worldlings are not on confidential terms (*mahram*) with the dervish. Much wealth, however, does not make a man "rich" (*dunyá-dár*), nor does little wealth make him "poor". No one who acknowledges that poverty is better than riches is "rich", even though he be a king; and anyone who disbelieves in poverty is "rich", even though he be reduced to want. When a dervish attends a party he should not constrain himself either to eat or not to eat, but should behave in accordance with his feelings at the time (*bar hukm-i waqt*). If the host is a congenial person (*mahram*), it is right that a married man (*muta'ahhil*) should condone a fault; and if the host is uncongenial, it is not allowable to go to his house. But in any case it is better not to commit a fault, for Sahl b. 'Abdalláh (al-Tustarí) says: "Backsliding is abasement" (*al-zillat dhillat*).

*Chapter concerning their Rules in Walking.*

God hath said: "*And the servants of the Merciful are they who walk on the earth meekly*" (Kor. xxv, 64). The seeker of God, as he walks, should know at each step he makes whether

that step is against God or of God: if it is against God, he must ask for pardon, and if it is of God, he must persevere in it, that it may be increased. One day Dáwud ʾĪʿí had taken some medicine. They said to him: "Go into the court of this house for a little while, in order that the good result of the medicine may become apparent." He replied: "I am ashamed that on the Day of Judgment God should ask me why I made a few steps for my own selfish pleasure. God Almighty hath said: '*And their feet shall bear witness of that which they used to commit*'" (Kor. xxxvi, 65). Therefore the dervish should walk circumspectly, with his head bowed in meditation (*muráqabat*), and not look in any direction but in front. If any person meets him on the way, he must not draw himself back from him for the sake of saving his dress, for all Moslems are clean, and their clothes too; such an act is mere conceit and self-ostentation. If, however, the person who meets him is an unbeliever, or manifestly filthy, he may turn from him unobtrusively. And when he walks with a number of people, he must not attempt to go in front of them, since that is an excess of pride; nor must he attempt to go behind them, since that is an excess of humility, and humility of which one is conscious is essentially pride. He must keep his clogs and shoes as clean as he can by day in order that God, through the blessings thereof, may keep his clothes (clean) by night. And when one or more dervishes are with anyone, he should not stop on the way (to talk) with any person, nor should he tell that person to wait for him. He should walk quietly and should not hurry, else his walk will resemble that of the covetous; nor should he walk slowly, for then his walk will resemble that of the proud; and he should take steps of the full length (*gám-i tamám nihad*). In fine, the walk of the seeker of God should always be of such a description that if anyone should ask him whither he is going he should be able to answer decisively: "*Verily, I am going to my Lord: He will direct me*" (Kor. xxxvii, 97). Otherwise his walking is a curse to him, because right steps (*khaṭarwát*) proceed from right thoughts (*khaṭarát*): accordingly if a man's thoughts

are concentrated on God, his feet will follow his thoughts. It is related that Abú Yazíd said: "The inconsiderate walk (*rawish-i bé muráqabat*) of a dervish is a sign that he is heedless (of God), because all that exists is attained in two steps: one step away from self-interest and the other step firmly planted on the commandments of God." The walk of the seeker is a sign that he is traversing a certain distance, and since proximity to God is not a matter of distance, what can the seeker do but cut off his feet in the abode of rest?

*Chapter concerning their Rules of Sleeping in travel and at home.*

There is a great difference of opinion among the Shaykhs on this subject. Some hold that it is not permissible for a novice to sleep except when he is overpowered by slumber, for the Apostle said: "Sleep is the brother of Death," and inasmuch as life is a benefit conferred by God, whereas death is an affliction, the former must be more excellent than the latter. And it is related that Shiblí said: "God looked upon me and said, 'He who sleeps is heedless, and he who is heedless is veiled.'" Others, again, hold that a novice may sleep at will and even constrain himself to sleep after having performed the Divine commands, for the Apostle said: "The Pen does not record (evil actions) against the sleeper until he awakes, or against the boy until he reaches puberty, or against the madman until he recovers his wits." When a man is asleep, people are secure from his mischief and he is deprived of his personal volition and his lower soul is prevented from gaining its desires and the Recording Angels cease to write; his tongue makes no false assertion and speaks no evil of the absent, and his will places no hope in conceit and ostentation; "he does not possess for himself either bane or boon or death or life or resurrection." Hence Ihu 'Abbás says: "Nothing is more grievous to Iblís than a sinner's sleep; whenever the sinner sleeps, Iblís says, 'When will he wake and rise up that he may disobey God?'" This was a point of controversy between Junayd and 'Alí b.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

THE UNCOVERING OF THE TENTH VEIL : EXPLAINING THEIR PHRASEOLOGY AND THE DEFINITIONS OF THEIR TERMS AND THE VERITIES OF THE IDEAS WHICH ARE SIGNIFIED.

Those employed in every craft and business, while discussing its mysteries with one another, make use of certain words and expressions of which the meaning is known only to themselves. Such expressions are invented for a double purpose : firstly, in order to facilitate the understanding of difficulties and bring them nearer to the comprehension of the novice ; and secondly, in order to conceal the mysteries of that science from the uninitiated. The Şúffís also have technical terms for the purpose of expressing the matter of their discourse and in order that they may reveal or disguise their meaning as they please. I will now explain some of these terms and distinguish between the significations attached to various pairs of words.

### *Hál and Waqt.*

*Waqt* (time) is a term with which Şúffís are familiar, and concerning which much has been said by the Shaykhs, but my object is to establish the truth, not to give long explanations.

*Waqt* is that whereby a man becomes independent of the past and the future, as, for example, when an influence from God descends into his soul and makes his heart collected (*mujtami'*) he has no memory of the past and no thought of that which is not yet come. All people fail in this, and do not know what our past has been or what our future will be, except the possessors of *waqt*, who say : " Our knowledge cannot apprehend the future and the past, and we are happy with God in the present (*andar waqt*). If we occupy ourselves

with to-morrow, or let any thought of it enter our minds, we shall be veiled (from God), and a veil is a great distraction (*parāgandagī*)." It is absurd to think of the unattainable. Thus Abū Sa'īd Kharrāz says: "Do not occupy your precious time except with the most precious of things, and the most precious of human things is the state of being occupied between the past and the future." And the Apostle said: "I have a time (*waqt*) with God, in which none of the cherubim nor any prophet rivals me," that is to say, "in which the eighteen thousand worlds do not occur to my mind and have no worth in my eyes." Therefore, on the night of the Ascension, when the kingdom of earth and heaven was arrayed before him in all its beauty, he did not look at anything (Kor. liii, 17), for Muṣṭafá was noble (*azīz*), and the noble are not engrossed save by that which is noble. The "times" (*awqát*) of the Unitarian are two: one in the state of loss (*faqd*) and one in the state of gain (*wajd*), one in the place of union and one in the place of separation. At both these times he is overpowered (*maghūr*), because both his union and his separation are effected by God without such volition or acquisition on his part as would make it possible to invest him with any attribute. When a man's power of volition is cut off from him, whatever he does or experiences is the result of "time" (*waqt*). It is related that Junayd said: "I saw a dervish in the desert, sitting under a mimosa-tree in a hard and uncomfortable spot, and asked him what made him sit there so still. He answered: 'I had a "time" and lost it here; now I am sitting and mourning.' I inquired how long he had been there. He answered: 'Twelve years. Will not the Shaykh offer up a prayer (*himmattū kunad*) on my behalf, that perchance I may find my "time" again?' I left him," said Junayd, "and performed the pilgrimage and prayed for him. My prayer was granted. On my return I found him seated in the same place. 'Why,' I said, 'do you not go from here, since you have obtained your wish?' He replied: 'O Shaykh, I settled myself in this place of desolation where I lost my capital: is it right that I should



leave the place where I have found my capital once more and where I enjoy the society of God? Let the Shaykh go in peace, for I will mix my dust with the dust of this spot, that I may rise at the Resurrection from this dust which is the abode of my delight.' No man can attain to the reality of "time" by exerting his choice, for "time" is a thing that does not come within the scope of human acquisition, that it should be gained by effort, nor is it sold in the market, that anyone should give his life in exchange for it, and the will has no power either to attract or to repel it. The Shaykhs have said, "Time is a cutting sword," because it is characteristic of a sword to cut, and "time" cuts the root of the future and the past, and obliterates care of yesterday and to-morrow from the heart. The sword is a dangerous companion: either it makes its master a king or it destroys him. Although one should pay homage to the sword and carry it on one's own shoulder for a thousand years, in the moment of cutting it does not discriminate between its master's neck and the neck of another. Violence (*qahr*) is its characteristic, and violence will not depart from it at the wish of its master.

*Hál* (state) is that which descends upon "time" (*waqt*) and adorns it, as the spirit adorns the body. *Waqt* has need of *hál*, for *waqt* is beautified by *hál* and subsists thereby. When the owner of *waqt* comes into possession of *hál*, he is no more subject to change and is made steadfast (*mustaqim*) in his state; for, when he has *waqt* without *hál*, he may lose it, but when *hál* attaches itself to him, all his state (*ri'zgar*) becomes *waqt*, and that cannot be lost: what seems to be coming and going (*ámad shud*) is really the result of becoming and manifestation (*takarwun ú zuhúr*), just as, before this, *waqt* descended on him who has it. He who is in the state of becoming (*mutakawwin*) may be forgetful, and on him who is thus forgetful *hál* descends and *waqt* is made stable (*mutamakkin*); for the possessor of *waqt* may become forgetful, but the possessor of *hál* cannot possibly be so. The tongue of the possessor of *hál* is silent concerning his *hál*, but his actions proclaim the reality

of his *hál*. Hence that spiritual director said: "To ask about *hál* is absurd," because *hál* is the annihilation of speech (*maqál*). Master Abú 'Alí Daqqáq says: "If there is joy or woe in this world or the next world, the portion of *waqt* is that (feeling) in which thou art." But *hál* is not like this; when *hál* comes on a man from God, it banishes all these feelings from his heart. Thus Jacob was a possessor of *waqt*: now he was blinded by separation, now he was restored to sight by union, now he was mourning and wailing, now he was calm and joyful. But Abraham was a possessor of *hál*: he was not conscious of separation, that he should be stricken with grief, nor of union, that he should be filled with joy. The sun and moon and stars contributed to his *hál*, but he, while he gazed, was independent of them: whatever he looked on, he saw only God, and he said: "*I love not them that set*" (Kor. vi, 76). Accordingly, the world sometimes becomes a hell to the possessor of *waqt*, because he is contemplating absence (*ghaybat*) and his heart is distressed by the loss of his beloved; and sometimes his heart is like a Paradise in the blessedness of contemplation, and every moment brings to him a gift and a glad message from God. On the other hand, it makes no difference to the possessor of *hál* whether he is veiled by affliction or unveiled by happiness; for he is always in the place of actual vision (*'iyán*). *Hál* is an attribute of the object desired (*murád*), while *waqt* is the rank of the desirer (*muríd*). The latter is with himself in the pleasure of *waqt*, the former with God in the delight of *hál*. How far apart are the two degrees!

*Maqám* and *Tamkín*, and the difference between them.

*Maqám* (station) denotes the perseverance of the seeker in fulfilling his obligations towards the object of his search with strenuous exertion and flawless intention. Everyone who desires God has a station (*maqám*), which, in the beginning of his search, is a means whereby he seeks God. Although the seeker derives some benefit from every station through which he passes, he finally rests in one, because a station and the

quest thereof involve contrivance and design (*tarkīb. ū hīla*), not conduct and practice (*rawīsh ū mu'āmalat*). God hath said: "*None of us but hath a certain station*" (Kor. xxxvii, 164). The station of Adam was repentance (*tawbat*), that of Noah was renunciation (*zuhd*), that of Abraham was resignation (*taslīm*), that of Moses was contrition (*indbat*), that of David was sorrow (*huzn*), that of Jesus was hope (*rajā*), that of John (the Baptist) was fear (*khawf*), and that of our Apostle was praise (*dhikr*). They drew something from other sources by which they abode, but each of them returned at last to his original station. In discussing the doctrine of the Muḥāsibīs, I gave a partial explanation of the stations and distinguished between *hāl* and *maqām*. Here, however, it is necessary to make some further remarks on this subject. You must know that the Way to God is of three kinds: (1) *maqām*, (2) *hāl*, (3) *tamkīn*. God sent all the prophets to explain the Way and to elucidate the principle of the different stations. One hundred and twenty-four thousand apostles, and a few over that number, came with as many stations. On the advent of our Apostle a *hāl* appeared to those in each station and attained a pitch where all human acquisition was left behind, until religion was made perfect unto men, as God hath said: "*To-day I have perfected your religion for you and have completed My bounty unto you*" (Kor. v, 5); then the *tamkīn* (steadfastness) of the steadfast appeared; but if I were to enumerate every *hāl* and explain every *maqām*, my purpose would be defeated.

*Tamkīn* denotes the residence of spiritual adepts in the abode of perfection and in the highest grade. Those in stations can pass on from their stations, but it is impossible to pass beyond the grade of *tamkīn*, because *maqām* is the grade of beginners, whereas *tamkīn* is the resting-place of adepts, and *maqāmat* (stations) are stages on the way, whereas *tamkīn* is repose within the shrine. The friends of God are absent (from themselves) on the way and are strangers (to themselves) in the stages: their hearts are in the presence (of God), and in the presence every instrument is evil and every tool is (a token of)

absence (from God) and infirmity. In the epoch of Paganism the poets used to praise men for noble deeds, but they did not recite their panegyric until some time had elapsed. When a poet came into the presence of the person whom he had celebrated, he used to draw his sword and hamstring his camel and then break his sword, as though to say : " I needed a camel to bring me from a far distance to thy presence, and a sword to repel the envious who would have hindered me from paying homage to thee : now that I have reached thee, I kill my camel, for I will never depart from thee again ; and I break my sword, for I will not admit into my mind the thought of being severed from thy court." Then, after a few days, he used to recite his poem. Similarly, when Moses attained to *tamkîn*, God bade him put off his shoes and cast away his staff (Kor. xx, 12), these being articles of travel and Moses being in the presence of God. The beginning of love is search, but the end is rest : water flows in the river-bed, but when it reaches the ocean it ceases to flow and changes its taste, so that those who desire water avoid it, but those who desire pearls devote themselves to death and fasten the plummet of search to their feet and plunge headlong into the sea, that they may either gain the hidden pearl or lose their dear lives. And one of the Shaykhs says : "*Tamkîn* is the removal of *talwîn*." *Talwîn* also is a technical term of the Sûfis, and is closely connected in meaning with *tamkîn*, just as *hâl* is connected with *maqâm*. The signification of *talwîn* is change and turning from one state to another, and the above-mentioned saying means that he who is steadfast (*mutamakkin*) is not vacillating (*mutaraddid*), for he has carried all that belongs to him into the presence of God and has erased every thought of other than God from his mind, so that no act that passes over him alters his outward predicament and no state changes his inward predicament. Thus Moses was subject to *talwîn* : he fell in a swoon (Kor. vii, 139) when God revealed His glory to Mount Sinai ; but Muḥammad was steadfast : he suffered no change, although he was in the very revelation of glory from Mecca to a space of

two bow-lengths from God; and this is the highest grade. Now *tamkín* is of two kinds—one referring to the dominant influence of God (*sháhíd-i haqq*), and the other referring to the dominant influence of one's self (*sháhíd-i khud*). He whose *tamkín* is of the latter kind retains his attributes unimpaired, but he whose *tamkín* is of the former kind has no attributes; and the terms effacement (*maḥw*), sobriety (*saḥw*), attainment (*lahiq*), destruction (*maḥq*),<sup>1</sup> annihilation (*faná*), subsistence (*baqá*), being (*wujúd*), and not-being ('*adam*) are not properly applied to one whose attributes are annihilated, because a subject is necessary for the maintenance of these qualities, and when the subject is absorbed (*mustaghriq*) he loses the capacity for maintaining them.

*Muḥáḍarat* and *Mukáshafat*, and the difference between them.

*Muḥáḍarat* denotes the presence of the heart in the subtleties of demonstration (*bayán*), while *mukáshafat* denotes the presence of the spirit (*sirr*) in the domain of actual vision ('*iyán*). *Muḥáḍarat* refers to the evidences of God's signs (*áyat*), and *mukáshafat* to the evidences of contemplation (*musháhadát*). The mark of *muḥáḍarat* is continual meditation upon God's signs, while the mark of *mukáshafat* is continual amazement at God's infinite greatness. There is a difference between one who meditates upon the Divine acts and one who is amazed at the Divine majesty: the one is a follower of friendship, the other is a companion of love. When the Friend of God (Abrahám) looked on the kingdom of heaven and meditated on the reality of its existence, his heart was made "present" (*ḥáḍir*) thereby: through beholding the act he became a seeker of the Agent; his "presence" (*ḥudúr*) made the act a proof of the Agent, and in perfect gnosis he exclaimed: "I turn my face with true belief unto Him who created the heavens and the earth" (Kor. vi, 79). But when the Beloved of God (Muḥammad) was borne to Heaven he shut his eyes from the sight of all things; he saw neither God's act nor created beings

<sup>1</sup> *Maḥq* denotes annihilation of a man's being in the essence of God, while *maḥw* denotes annihilation of his actions in the action of God (Jurjání, *Ta'rifát*).

nor himself, but the Agent was revealed to him, and in that revelation (*kashf*) his desire increased: in vain he sought vision, proximity, union; in proportion as the exemption (*tanzih*) of his Beloved (from all such conceptions) became more manifest to him the more did his desire increase; he could neither turn back nor go forward, hence he fell into amazement. Where friendship was, amazement seemed infidelity, but where love was, union was polytheism, and amazement became the sole resource, because in friendship the object of amazement was being (*hastí*), and such amazement is polytheism, but in love the object of amazement was nature and quality (*chigúnagí*), and this amazement is unification (*tawhíd*). In this sense Shiblí used always to say: "O Guide of the amazed, increase my amazement!" for in contemplation (of God) the greater one's amazement the higher one's degree. The story of Abú Sa'íd Kharráz and Ibráhím b. Sa'd 'Alawí<sup>1</sup> is well known—how they saw a friend of God on the seashore and asked him "What is the Way to God?" and how he answered that there are two ways to God, one for the vulgar and one for the elect. When they desired him to explain this he said: "The way of the vulgar is that on which you are going: you accept for some cause and you decline for some cause; but the way of the elect is to see only the Causer, and not to see the cause." The true meaning of these anecdotes has already been set forth.

*Qabđ* and *Bast*, and the difference between them.

*Qabđ* (contraction) and *bast* (expansion) are two involuntary states which cannot be induced by any human act or banished by any human exertion. God hath said: "*God contracts and expands*" (Kor. ii, 246). *Qabđ* denotes the contraction of the heart in the state of being veiled (*hijáb*), and *bast* denotes the expansion of the heart in the state of revelation (*kashf*). Both states proceed from God without effort on the part of Man. The *qabđ* of gnostics is like the fear of novices, and the *bast* of gnostics is like the hope of novices. This is the sense in

<sup>1</sup> *Nafahát*, No. 15.

which the Şúfís use the terms *qabđ* and *bast*. Some Shaykhs hold that *qabđ* is superior in degree to *bast*, for two reasons: (1) it is mentioned before *bast* in the Koran, (2) *qabđ* involves dissolution and oppression, whereas *bast* involves nutrition and favour: it is undoubtedly better to dissolve one's humanity and oppress one's lower soul than to foster and favour them, since they are the greatest veil (between Man and God). Others, again, hold that *bast* is superior to *qabđ*. The fact, they say, that *qabđ* is mentioned before *bast* in the Koran shows the superiority of *bast*, for the Arabs are accustomed to mention in the first place that which is inferior in merit, e.g. God hath said: "*There is one of them who injures his own soul, and one who keeps the middle way, and one who outstrips the others in good works by the permission of God*" (Kor. xxxv, 29). Moreover, they argue that in *bast* there is joy and in *qabđ* grief; gnostics feel joy only in union with the object of knowledge, and grief only in separation from the object of desire, therefore rest in the abode of union is better than rest in the abode of separation. My Shaykh used to say that both *qabđ* and *bast* are the result of one spiritual influence, which descends from God on Man, and either fills the heart with joy and subdues the lower soul or subdues the heart and fills the lower soul with joy; in the latter case contraction (*qabđ*) of the heart is expansion (*bast*) of the lower soul, and in the former case expansion of the heart is contraction of the lower soul. He who interprets this matter otherwise is wasting his breath. Hence Báyzíd said: "The contraction of hearts consists in the expansion of souls, and the expansion of hearts in the contraction of souls." The contracted soul is guarded from injury, and the expanded heart is restrained from falling into defect, because jealousy is the rule in love, and contraction is a sign of God's jealousy; and it is necessary that lovers should reproach one another, and expansion is a sign of mutual reproach. It is a well-known tradition that John wept ever since he was born, while Jesus smiled ever since he was born, because John was in contraction and Jesus in expansion. When they met John used to say,

“ O Jesus, hast thou no fear of being cut off (from God) ? ” and Jesus used to say, “ O John, hast thou no hope of God’s mercy ? Neither thy tears nor my smiles will change the eternal decree of God.”

*Uns* and *Haybat*, and the difference between them.

*Uns* (intimacy) and *haybat* (awe) are two states of the dervishes who travel on the Way to God. When God manifests His glory to a man’s heart so that His majesty (*jalál*) predominates, he feels awe (*haybat*), but when God’s beauty (*jamál*) predominates he feels intimacy (*uns*): those who feel awe are distressed, while those who feel intimacy are rejoiced. There is a difference between one who is burned by His majesty in the fire of love and one who is illuminated by His beauty in the light of contemplation. Some Shaykhs have said that *haybat* is the degree of gnostics and *uns* the degree of novices, because the farther one has advanced in the presence of God and in divesting Him of attributes the more his heart is overwhelmed with awe and the more averse he is to intimacy, for one is intimate with those of one’s own kind, and intimacy with God is inconceivable, since no homogeneity or resemblance can possibly exist between God and Man. If intimacy is possible, it is possible only with the praise (*dhikr*) of Him, which is something different from Himself, because that is an attribute of Man ; and in love, to be satisfied with another than the Beloved is falsehood and pretension and self-conceit. *Haybat*, on the other hand, arises from contemplating greatness, which is an attribute of God, and there is a vast difference between one whose experience proceeds from himself through himself and one whose experience proceeds from the annihilation of himself through the subsistence of God. It is related that Shiblí said : “ For a long time I used to think that I was rejoicing in the love of God and was intimate with contemplation of Him : now I know that intimacy is impossible except with a congener.” Some, however, allege that *haybat* is a corollary of separation and punishment, while *uns* is the



two bow-lengths from His presence. The Apostle conversed secretly with God, and when he reached the goal his tongue became dumb before the revelation of God's majesty, and his heart was amazed at His infinite greatness, and he said: "I cannot tell Thy praise." *Muhádathat* is connected with the state of Moses, who, seeking communion with God, after forty days came to Mount Sinai and heard the speech of God and asked for vision of Him, and failed of his desire. There is a plain difference between one who was conducted (Kor. xvii, 1) and one who came (Kor. vii, 139). Night is the time when lovers are alone with each other, and day is the time when servants wait upon their masters. When a servant transgresses he is reprimanded, but a lover has no law by the transgression of which he should incur blame, for lovers cannot do anything displeasing to each other.

*'Ilm al-Yaqín* and *'Ayn al-Yaqín* and *Haqq al-Yaqín*, and the difference between them.

According to the principles of theology, all these expressions denote knowledge (*'ilm*). Knowledge without certain faith (*yaqín*) in the reality of the object known is not knowledge, but when knowledge is gained that which is hidden is as that which is actually seen. The believers who shall see God on the Day of Judgment shall see Him then in the same wise as they know Him now: if they shall see Him otherwise, either their vision will be imperfect then or their knowledge is faulty now. Both these alternatives are in contradiction with unification (*tawhíd*), which requires that men's knowledge of God should be sound to-day and their vision of God should be sound to-morrow. Therefore certain knowledge (*'ilm-i yaqín*) is like certain sight (*'ayn-i yaqín*), and certain truth (*haqq-i yaqín*) is like certain knowledge. Some have said that *'ayn al-yaqín* is the complete absorption (*istighrâq*) of knowledge in vision, but this is impossible, because vision is an instrument for the attainment of knowledge, like hearing, etc.: since knowledge cannot be absorbed in hearing, its absorption in vision is

equally impossible. By *'ilm al-yaqín* the *Şúfis* mean knowledge of (religious) practice in this world according to the Divine commandments; by *'ayn al-yaqín* they mean knowledge of the state of dying (*nas'*) and the time of departure from this world; and by *haqq al-yaqín* they mean intuitive knowledge of the vision (of God) that will be revealed in Paradise, and of its nature. Therefore *'ilm al-yaqín* is the rank of theologians (*'ulamá*) on account of their correct observance of the Divine commands, and *'ayn al-yaqín* is the station of gnostics (*'arifán*) on account of their readiness for death, and *haqq al-yaqín* is the annihilation-point of lovers (*dústán*) on account of their rejection of all created things. Hence *'ilm al-yaqín* is obtained by self-mortification (*mujáhadat*), and *'ayn al-yaqín* by intimate familiarity (*mu'anasat*), and *haqq al-yaqín* by contemplation (*musháhadat*). The first is vulgar, the second is elect, and the third is super-elect (*kháṣṣ al-kháṣṣ*).

*'Ilm* and *Ma'rifat*, and the difference between them.

Theologians have made no distinction between *'ilm* and *ma'rifat*, except when they say that God may be called *'álim* (knowing), but not *'arif* (gnostic), inasmuch as the latter epithet lacks Divine blessing. But the *Şúfí* Shaykhs give the name of *ma'rifat* (gnosis) to every knowledge that is allied with (religious) practice and feeling (*hál*), and the knower of which expresses his feeling; and the knower thereof they call *'arif*. On the other hand, they give the name of *'ilm* to every knowledge that is stripped of spiritual meaning and devoid of religious practice, and one who has such knowledge they call *'álim*. One, then, who knows the meaning and reality of a thing they call *'arif* (gnostic), and one who knows merely the verbal expression and keeps it in his memory without keeping the spiritual reality they call *'álim*. For this reason, when the *Şúfis* wish to disparage a rival they call him *dánishmand* (possessing knowledge). To the vulgar this seems objectionable, but the *Şúfis* do not intend to blame the man for having acquired knowledge, they blame him for neglecting the practice

of religion, because the *'álim* depends on himself, but the *'árif* depends on his Lord. This question has been discussed at length in the chapter entitled "The Removal of the Veil of Gnosis", and I need not say any more now.

*Shari'at* and *Haqiqat*, and the difference between them.

These terms are used by the Şúfís to denote soundness of the outward state and maintenance of the inward state. Two parties err in this matter: firstly, the formal theologians, who assert that there is no distinction between *shari'at* (law) and *haqiqat* (truth), since the Law is the Truth and the Truth is the Law; secondly, some heretics, who hold that it is possible for one of these things to subsist without the other, and declare that when the Truth is revealed the Law is abolished. This is the doctrine of the Carmathians (*Qardmíta*) and the Shí'ites and their satanically inspired followers (*muwaswisán*). The proof that the Law is virtually separate from the Truth lies in the fact that in faith belief is separate from profession; and the proof that the Law and the Truth are not fundamentally separate, but are one, lies in the fact that belief without profession is not faith, and conversely profession without belief is not faith; and there is a manifest difference between profession and belief. *Haqiqat*, then, signifies a reality which does not admit of abrogation and remains in equal force from the time of Adam to the end of the world, like knowledge of God and like religious practice, which is made perfect by sincere intention; and *shari'at* signifies a reality which admits of abrogation and alteration, like ordinances and commandments. Therefore *shari'at* is Man's act, while *haqiqat* is God's keeping and preservation and protection, whence it follows that *shari'at* cannot possibly be maintained without the existence of *haqiqat*, and *haqiqat* cannot be maintained without observance of *shari'at*. Their mutual relation may be compared to that of body and spirit: when the spirit departs from the body the living body becomes a corpse and the spirit vanishes like wind, for their value depends on their conjunction with one another.

Similarly, the Law without the Truth is ostentation, and the Truth without the Law is hypocrisy. God hath said: "*Who-soever mortify themselves for Our sake, We will assuredly guide them in Our ways*" (Kor. xxix, 69): mortification is Law, guidance is Truth; the former consists in a man's observance of the external ordinances, while the latter consists in God's maintenance of a man's spiritual feelings. Hence the Law is one of the acts acquired by Man, but the Truth is one of the gifts bestowed by God.

Another class of terms and expressions are used by the Šúfís metaphorically. These metaphorical terms are more difficult to analyse and interpret, but I will explain them concisely.

*Haqq.* By *haqq* (truth) the Šúfís mean God, for *haqq* is one of the names of God, as He hath said: "*This is because God is the Truth*" (Kor. xxii, 6).

*Haqíqat.* By this word they mean a man's dwelling in the place of union with God, and the standing of his heart in the place of abstraction (*tanzih*).

*Khatarát.* Any judgments of separation (*ahkám-i tafriq*) that occur to the mind.

*Waṭandát.* Any Divine meanings that make their abode in the heart.

*Ṭams.* Negation of a substance of which some trace is left.

*Rams.* Negation of a substance, together with every trace thereof, from the heart.

*Alá'iq.* Secondary causes to which seekers of God attach themselves and thereby fail to gain the object of their desire.

*Wasá'it.* Secondary causes to which seekers of God attach themselves and thereby gain the object of their desire.

*Zawá'id.* Excess of lights (spiritual illumination) in the heart.

*Fawá'id.* The apprehension by the spirit of what it cannot do without.

*Malja'.* The heart's confidence in the attainment of its desire.

*Manjá.* The heart's escape from the place of imperfection.

*Kullíyyat.* The absorption (*istighráq*) of the attributes of humanity in the Universal (*kullíyyat*).

*Lawá'ih.* Affirmation of the object of desire, notwithstanding the advent of the negation thereof (*ithbát-i murád bá wurád-i nafy-i an*).

*Lawámi'.* The manifestation of (spiritual) light to the heart while its acquirements (*fawá'id*) continue to subsist.

*Ṭawáli'.* The appearance of the splendours of (mystical) knowledge to the heart.

*Ṭawáriq.* That which comes into the heart, either with glad tidings or with rebuke, in secret converse (with God) at night.

*Laṭá'if.* A symbol (*isháratt*), presented to the heart, of subtleties of feeling.

*Sirr.* Concealment of feelings of love.

*Najwá.* Concealment of imperfections from the knowledge of other (than God).

*Ishárat.* Giving information to another of the object of desire, without uttering it on the tongue.

*Ímá.* Addressing anyone allusively, without spoken or unspoken explanation (*bé 'ibárat ú ishárat*).

*Wárid.* The descent of spiritual meanings upon the heart.

*Intibáh.* The departure of heedlessness from the heart.

*Ishtibáh.* Perplexity felt in deciding between truth and falsehood.

*Qarár.* The departure of vacillation from the reality of one's feeling.

*Inzi'áj.* The agitation of the heart in the state of ecstasy (*wajd*).

Another class of technical terms are those which the Şúfís employ, without metaphor, in unification (*tawhíd*) and in setting forth their firm belief in spiritual realities.

*'Álam.* The term *'alam* (world) denotes the creatures of God. It is said that there are 18,000 or 50,000 worlds. Philosophers say there are two worlds, an upper and a lower,

while theologians say that *'alam* is whatever exists between the Throne of God and the earth. In short, *'alam* is the collective mass of created things. The *Şúfís* speak of the world of spirits (*arwâh*) and the world of souls (*nufûs*), but they do not mean the same thing as the philosophers. What they mean is "the collective mass of spirits and souls".

*Muhdath.* Posterior in existence, i.e. it was not and afterwards was.

*Qadím.* Anterior in existence, i.e. it always was, and its being was anterior to all beings. This is nothing but God.

*Azal.* That which has no beginning.

*Abad.* That which has no end.

*Dhát.* The being and reality of a thing.

*Şifat.* That which does not admit of qualification (*na't*), because it is not self-subsistent.

*Isn.* That which is not the object named (*ghayr-i musammá*).

*Tasmiyat.* Information concerning the object named.

*Nafy.* That which entails the non-existence of every object of negation.

*Ithbát.* That which entails the existence of every object of affirmation.

*Siyán.* The possibility of the existence of one thing with another.

*Diddán.* The impossibility of the existence of one thing simultaneously with the existence of another.

*Ghayrán.* The possibility of the existence of either of two things, notwithstanding the annihilation of the other.

*Jawhar.* The basis (*aşl*) of a thing ; that which is self-subsistent.

*'Arađ.* That which subsists in *jawhar* (substance).

*Jism.* That which is composed of separate parts.

*Su'dl.* Seeking a reality.

*Jawáb.* Giving information concerning the subject-matter of a question (*su'dl*).

*Husn.* That which is conformable to the (Divine) command.

*Qubh.* That which is not conformable to the (Divine) command.

*Safah.* Neglect of the (Divine) command.

*Zulm.* Putting a thing in a place that is not worthy of it.

*'Adl.* Putting everything in its proper place.

*Malik.* He with whose actions it is impossible to interfere.

Another class of terms requiring explanation are those which are commonly used by the Şúfís in a mystical sense that is not familiar to philologists.

*Khátir.* By *khátir* (passing thought) the Şúfís signify the occurrence in the mind of something which is quickly removed by another thought, and which its owner is able to repel from his mind. Those who have such thoughts follow the first thought in matters which come directly from God to Man. It is said that the thought occurred to Khayr Nassáj that Junayd was waiting at hiš door, but he wished to repel it. The same thought returned twice and thrice, whereupon he went out and discovered Junayd, who said to him: "If you had followed the first thought it would not have been necessary for me to stand here all this time." How was Junayd acquainted with the thought which occurred to Khayr? This question has been asked, and has been answered by the remark that Junayd was Khayr's spiritual director, and a spiritual director cannot fail to be acquainted with all that happens to one of his disciples.

*Wáqi'a.* By *wáqi'a* they signify a thought which appears in the mind and remains there, unlike *khátir*, and which the seeker has no means whatever of repelling: thus they say, *khatará 'alá qalbí*, "it occurred to my mind," but *waga'a fí qalbí*, "it sank into my mind." All minds are subject to *khátir* (passing thought), but *wáqi'a* is possible only in a mind that is entirely filled with the notion of God. Hence, when any obstacle appears to the novice on the Way to God, they call it "a fetter" (*qayd*) and say: "A *wáqi'a* has befallen him." Philologists also use the term *wáqi'a* to signify any difficult question, and when it is

answered satisfactorily they say, *wáqi'a hall shud*, "the difficulty is solved." But the mystics say that *wáqi'a* is that which is insoluble, and that whatever is solved is a *kháṭir*, not a *wáqi'a*, since the obstacles which confront mystics are not unimportant matters on which varying judgments are continually being formed.

*Ikhtiyár.* By *ikhtiyár* they signify their preference of God's choice to their own, i.e. they are content with the good and evil which God has chosen for them. A man's preference of God's choice is itself the result of God's choice, for unless God had caused him to have no choice, he would never have let his own choice go. When Abú Yazíd was asked, "Who is the prince (*amír*)?" he replied, "He to whom no choice is left, and to whom God's choice has become the only choice." It is related that Junayd, having caught fever, implored God to give him health. A voice spoke in his heart: "Who art thou to plead in My kingdom and make a choice? I can manage My kingdom better than thou. Do thou choose My choice instead of coming forward with thine."

*Imtihán.* By this expression they signify the probation of the hearts of the saints by diverse afflictions which come to them from God, such as fear, grief, contraction, awe, etc. God hath said: "*They whose hearts God hath proved for piety's sake: they shall win pardon and a great reward*" (Kor. xlix, 3). This is a lofty grade.

*Balá.* By *balá* (affliction) they signify the probation of the bodies of God's friends by diverse troubles and sicknesses and tribulations. The more severely a man is afflicted the nearer does he approach unto God, for affliction is the vesture of the saints and the cradle of the pure and the nourishment of the prophets. The Apostle said, "We prophets are the most afflicted of mankind;" and he also said, "The prophets are the most afflicted of mankind, then the saints, and then other men according to their respective ranks." *Balá* is the name of a tribulation, which descends on the heart and body of a true believer and which is really a blessing; and inasmuch as



the mystery thereof is concealed from him, he is divinely recompensed for supporting the pains thereof. Tribulation that befalls unbelievers is not affliction (*balā*), but misery (*shaqāwat*), and unbelievers never obtain relief from misery. The degree of *balā* is more honourable than that of *imtihān*, for *imtihān* affects the heart only, whereas *balā* affects both the heart and the body and is thus more powerful.

*Tahallī*. Imitation of praiseworthy people in word and deed. The Apostle said : " Faith is not acquired by *tahallī* (adorning one's self with the qualities of others) and *ramannī* (wishing), but it is that which sinks deep into the heart and is verified by action." *Tahallī*, then, is to imitate people without really acting like them. Those who seem to be what they are not will soon be put to shame, and their secret character will be revealed. In the view of spiritualists, however, they are already disgraced and their secret character is clear.

*Tajallī*. The blessed effect of Divine illumination on the hearts of the blest, whereby they are made capable of seeing God with their hearts. The difference between spiritual vision (*ru'yat ba-dil*) and actual vision (*ru'yat-i 'iyān*) is this, that those who experience *tajallī* (manifestation of God) see or do not see, according as they wish, or see at one time and do not see at another time, while those who experience actual vision in Paradise cannot but see, even though they wish not to see; for it is possible that *tajallī* should be hidden, whereas *ru'yat* (vision) cannot possibly be veiled.

*Takhallī*. Turning away from distractions which prevent a man from attaining to God. One of these is the present world, of which he should empty his hands; another is desire for the next world, of which he should empty his heart; a third is indulgence in vanity, of which he should empty his spirit; and a fourth is association with created beings, of which he should empty himself and from the thought of which he should disengage his mind.

*Shurūd*. The meaning of *shurūd* is "seeking restlessly to escape from (worldly) corruptions and veils"; for all the

All Moslems, pious and disobedient alike, are commanded to listen to the Koran, for God hath said : "*When the Koran is recited hearken thereto and be silent that perchance ye may win mercy*" (Kor. vii, 203).<sup>1</sup> And it is related that the Apostle said to Ibn Mas'úd : "Recite the Koran to me." Ibn Mas'úd said : "Shall I recite it to thee, to whom it was revealed?" The Apostle answered : "I wish to hear it from another." This is a clear proof that the hearer is more perfect in state than the reader, for the reader may recite with or without true feeling, whereas the hearer feels truly, because speech is a sort of pride and hearing is a sort of humility. The Apostle also said that the chapter of Húd had whitened his hair. It is explained that he said this because of the verse at the end of that chapter : "*Be thou steadfast, therefore, as thou hast been commanded*" (Kor. xi, 114), for Man is unable to be really steadfast in fulfilling the Divine commandments, inasmuch as he can do nothing without God's help.<sup>2</sup>

#### SECTION.

Zurára b. Abí Awfá, one of the chief Companions of the Apostle, while he was presiding over the public worship, recited a verse of the Koran, uttered a cry, and died. Abú Ja'far Juhaní,<sup>3</sup> an eminent Follower, on hearing a verse which Šáliḥ Murri<sup>4</sup> read to him, gave a loud moan and departed from this world. Ibráhím Nakha'<sup>5</sup> relates that while he was passing through a village in the neighbourhood of Kúfa he saw an old woman standing in prayer. As the marks of holiness were manifest on her countenance, he waited until she finished

<sup>1</sup> Here the author quotes a number of Koranic verses in which the faithful are enjoined to listen heedfully to the recitation of the sacred volume, or are rebuked for their want of attention.

<sup>2</sup> I have omitted here a story related by Abú Sa'íd al-Khudrí concerning Muḥammad's interview with a party of destitute refugees (*muhájirín*), to whom the Koran was being read.

<sup>3</sup> BI. Abú Juhayn, J. Abú Juhani.

<sup>4</sup> Sha'rání, *Tabaqát al-Kubrâ*, i, 60.

<sup>5</sup> Ibn Khallikán, No. 1.

praying and then saluted her in hope of gaining a blessing thereby. She said to him, "Dost thou know the Koran?" He said, "Yes." She said, "Recite a verse." He did so, whereupon she cried aloud and sent her soul forth to meet the vision of God. Aḥmad b. Abi 'l-Hawári relates the following tale. "I saw in the desert a youth, clad in a coarse frock, standing at the mouth of a well. He said to me: 'O Aḥmad, thou art come in good time, for I must needs hear the Koran, that I may give up my soul. Read me a verse.' God inspired me to read, *'Verily, those who say, "God is our Lord," and then are steadfast'* (Kor. xli, 30). 'O Aḥmad,' said he, 'by the Lord of the Ka'ba thou hast read the same verse which an angel was reading to me just now,' and with these words he gave up his soul."

*Chapter on the Audition of Poetry, etc.*

It is permissible to hear poetry. The Apostle heard it, and the Companions not only heard it but also spoke it. The Apostle said, "Some poetry is wisdom;" and he said, "Wisdom is the believer's lost she-camel: wherever he finds her, he has the best right to her;" and he said too, "The truest word ever spoken by the Arabs is the verse of Labíd,

*'Everything except God is vain,  
And all fortune is inevitably fleeting.'*"

'Amr b. al-Sharíd<sup>1</sup> relates that his father said: "The Apostle asked me whether I could recite any poetry of Umayya b. Abi 'l-Şalt, so I recited a hundred verses, and at the end of each verse he cried, 'Go on!' He said that Umayya almost became a Moslem in his poetry." Many such stories are told of the Apostle and the Companions. Erroneous views are prevalent on this subject. Some declare that it is unlawful to listen to any poetry whatever, and pass their lives in defaming their brother Moslems. Some, on the contrary, hold that all poetry is lawful, and spend their time in listening to love-songs and descriptions

<sup>1</sup> B. al-Rashíd.

of the face and hair and mole of the beloved. I do not intend to discuss the arguments which both parties in this controversy bring forward against each other. The Şúfî Shaykhs follow the example of the Apostle, who, on being asked about poetry, said: "What is good thereof is good and what is bad thereof is bad," i.e., whatever is unlawful, like backbiting and calumny and foul abuse and blame of any person and utterance of infidelity, is equally unlawful whether it be expressed in prose or in verse; and whatever is lawful in prose, like morality and exhortations and inferences drawn from the signs of God and contemplation of the evidences of the Truth, is no less lawful in verse. In fine, just as it is unlawful and forbidden to look at or touch a beautiful object which is a source of evil, so it is unlawful and forbidden to listen to that object or, similarly, to hear the description of it. Those who regard such hearing as absolutely lawful must also regard looking and touching as lawful, which is infidelity and heresy. If one says, "I hear only God and seek only God in eye and cheek and mole and curl," it follows that another may look at a cheek and mole and say that he sees and seeks God alone, because both the eye and the ear are sources of admonition and knowledge; then another may say that in touching a person, whose description it is thought allowable to hear and whom it is thought allowable to behold, he, too, is only seeking God, since one sense is no better adapted than another to apprehend a reality; then the whole religious law is made null and void, and the Apostle's saying that the eyes commit fornication loses all its force, and the blame of touching persons with whom marriage may legally be contracted is removed, and the ordinances of religion fall to the ground. Foolish aspirants to Şúfîsm, seeing the adepts absorbed in ecstasy during audition (*samâ'*), imagined that they were acting from a sensual impulse and said, "It is lawful, else they would not have done so," and imitated them, taking up the form but neglecting the spirit, until they perished themselves and led others into perdition. This is one of the great evils of our time. I will set it forth completely in the proper place.

*Chapter on the Audition of Voices and Melodies.*

The Apostle said, "Beautify your voices by reading the Koran aloud;" and God hath said, "*God addeth unto His creatures what He pleaseth*" (Kor. xxxv, 1), meaning, as the commentators think, a beautiful voice; and the Apostle said, "Whoso wishes to hear the voice of David, let him listen to the voice of Abú Músá al-Ash'arí." It is stated in well-known traditions that the inhabitants of Paradise enjoy audition, for there comes forth from every tree a different voice and melody. When diverse sounds are mingled together, the natural temperament experiences a great delight. This sort of audition is common to all living creatures, because the spirit is subtle, and there is a subtlety in sounds, so that when they are heard the spirit inclines to that which is homogeneous with itself. Physicians and those philosophers who claim to possess a profound knowledge of the truth have discussed this subject at large and have written books on musical harmony. The results of their invention are manifest to-day in the musical instruments which have been contrived for the sake of exciting passion and procuring amusement and pleasure, in accord with Satan, and so skilfully that (as the story is told) one day, when Isháq of Mawsil<sup>1</sup> was playing in a garden, a nightingale, enraptured with the music, broke off its song in order to listen, and dropped dead from the bough. I have heard many tales of this kind, but my only purpose is to mention the theory that the temperaments of all living creatures are composed of sounds and melodies blended and harmonized. Ibráhím Khawwás says: "Once I came to an Arab tribe and alighted at the hospitable abode of one of their chiefs. I saw a negro lying, shackled and chained, at the tent door in the heat of the sun. I felt pity for him and resolved to intercede with the chief on his behalf. When food was brought for my entertainment I refused to eat, knowing that nothing grieves an Arab more than this. The

<sup>1</sup> *Aghání*, 5, 52-131.

a great calamity to religion that the Imám should have made lawful an amusement which is the root of all immorality." "If you do not hold it to be lawful," said he, "why do you practise it?" I answered: "Its lawfulness depends on circumstances and cannot be asserted absolutely: if audition produces a lawful effect on the mind, then it is lawful; it is unlawful if the effect is unlawful, and permissible if the effect is permissible."

*Chapter on the Principles of Audition.*

You must know that the principles of audition vary with the variety of temperaments, just as there are different desires in various hearts, and it is tyranny to lay down one law for all. Auditors (*mustami'án*) may be divided into two classes: (1) those who hear the spiritual meaning, (2) those who hear the material sound. There are good and evil results in each case. Listening to sweet sounds produces an effervescence (*ghalayán*) of the substance moulded in Man: true (*haqq*) if the substance be true, false (*bátil*) if the substance be false. When the stuff of a man's temperament is evil, that which he hears will be evil too. The whole of this topic is illustrated by the story of David, whom God made His vicegerent and gave him a sweet voice and caused his throat to be a melodious pipe, so that wild beasts and birds came from mountain and plain to hear him, and the water ceased to flow and the birds fell from the air. It is related that during a month's space the people who were gathered round him in the desert ate no food, and the children neither wept nor asked for milk; and whenever the folk departed it was found that many had died of the rapture that seized them as they listened to his voice: one time, it is said, the tale of the dead amounted to seven hundred maidens and twelve thousand old men. Then God, wishing to separate those who listened to the voice and followed their temperament from the followers of the truth (*ahl-i haqq*) who listened to the spiritual reality, permitted Iblís to work his will and display his wiles. Iblís fashioned a mandoline and a flute and took up a station opposite to the place where David was singing.

David's audience became divided into two parties: the blest and the damned. Those who were destined to damnation lent ear to the music of Iblís, while those who were destined to felicity remained listening to the voice of David. The spiritualists (*ahl-i ma'ni*) were conscious of nothing except David's voice, for they saw God alone; if they heard the Devil's music, they regarded it as a temptation proceeding from God, and if they heard David's voice, they recognized it as being a direction from God; wherefore they abandoned all things that are merely subsidiary and saw both right and wrong as they really are. When a man has audition of this kind, whatever he hears is lawful to him. Some impostors, however, say that their audition is contrary to the reality. This is absurd, for the perfection of saintship consists in seeing everything as it really is, that the vision may be right; if you see otherwise, the vision is wrong. The Apostle said: "O God, let us see things as they are." Similarly, right audition consists in hearing everything as it is in quality and predicament. The reason why men are seduced and their passions excited by musical instruments is that they hear unreally: if their audition corresponded with the reality, they would escape from all evil consequences. The people of error heard the word of God, and their error waxed greater than before. Some of them quoted "*The eyes attain not unto Him*" (Kor. vi, 103) as a demonstration that there shall be no vision of God; some cited "*Then He settled Himself on the throne*" (Kor. vii, 52) to prove that position and direction may be affirmed of Him; and some argued that God actually "comes", since He has said, "*And thy Lord shall come and the angels rank by rank*" (Kor. lxxxix, 23). Inasmuch as error was implanted in their minds, it profited them nothing to hear the Word of God. The Unitarian, on the other hand, when he peruses a poem, regards the Creator of the poet's nature and the Disposer of his thoughts, and drawing an admonition therefrom, sees in the act an evidence of the Agent. Thus he finds the right way even in falsehood, while those whom we have mentioned above lose the way in the midst of truth.

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