KARL STERN

THE THIRD REVOLUTION

Psychiatry & Religion

A brilliant exposition of the current controversy, showing that the basic concepts of psychoanalysis, once freed from a materialist philosophy, are not only compatible with the Christian idea of man but confirm it.

by the author of THE PILLAR OF FIRE

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The Third Revolution

KARL STERN

In his new book Karl Stern discusses the current controversy between psychiatry and religion, and maintains that their reconciliation is not only possible but necessary. His title alludes to the two preceding revolutions which gave determining roles to economics (Marxism) and to biology (Racism), with consequences which would have appalled the original theorists.

As a practicing psychiatrist, Dr. Stern believes that the methods of psychoanalysis, when properly used, can offer remedy to suffering human beings. Yet as one who believes in the primacy of the spirit, he is aware of the fallacy which explains fundamental religious and moral values in terms of neuroses, and which reduces God to "nothing but" a father-image. Once we begin to reduce the spiritual to the material, he points out, we are in danger of destroying the unique nature of man.

In *The Third Revolution* Dr. Stern is concerned with the whole man. He

(Continued on back flap)

~~The Scholasticate~~
~~Abbey of Gethsemani~~
~~Kentucky~~

The Third Revolution

A STUDY OF PSYCHIATRY AND RELIGION

by Karl Stern

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first edition

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CONTENTS

Nose, and Throat" and "Surgery," we did not feel that there was anything about psychiatry which would make it essentially different from any other medical subject. If anyone had cornered us in those days and asked us the question: "What about religion and psychiatry?" I am sure we would not have known what he was talking about. It would have sounded just as rational as a question about religion and pediatrics—that is to say, not rational at all.

Those people in blue led in through the door on the right who were not insane were neurological patients (persons suffering from tumors of the brain, or softening of the spinal cord, or degeneration of nerve pathways, or other maladies of the nervous system). In all such cases one can apply methods of thought and investigation resembling those which one applies when dealing with a broken leg or typhoid fever. In cases of insanity one can do so legitimately only up to a certain point. In the universities in which I studied, we were taught very little about a chapter of psychiatry which is commonly presented under the heading of "Neuroses."

Now there are living in our midst thousands and thousands of people (there is a strong possibility that they form the majority of mankind in our present civilization) who suffer, or produce suffering among those around them, in a most puzzling manner. They live in mortal anxiety, or they are unable to hope, or they are

tioned by, elements of the material order, such as brain cells or geographical conditions.

Nevertheless, psychoanalysis itself still represents the biggest challenge to religious values. Just as the nineteenth-century controversy between biology and religion would never have started without Darwin, the present-day controversy between psychiatry and religion would never have started without Freud. Today Darwin's theory of evolution does not seem to have as much bearing on Christianity as people thought fifty years ago. With psychoanalysis, however, it is quite different. To the uninitiated, Freud's papers on psychology read for the most part like straight pornography, his pamphlets on religion represent sheer atheism. All this, the believing man thinks, cannot help having a negative effect on Christianity. On the other hand, it is confusing to learn that some serious religious thinkers, Catholic as well as Protestant, uphold psychoanalysis as a theory and as a tool of treatment, and that in the Soviet Union where atheistic materialism is the state doctrine, psychoanalysis is banned. This is typical of our time. All things seem to be complex and elusive.

However, this puts an even greater obligation on us. We cannot afford to stand by and wait for things to sort themselves out. The better one becomes acquainted with the psychoanalytic movement, the more one realizes that it represents the opening of a new era no less significant than the Galilean era in physics. Our image

of the "interior world" will never be the same as it was before the year 1894. The scope of this change will be perceptible only much later, in its historical perspective.

Moreover, we are—particularly in America—in the midst of a tremendous development in all the psychological and social sciences, one of such dimensions and potentialities that it would be no exaggeration to call it a "revolution." Let us, for the want of a better term, call it the Comtean revolution. Auguste Comte, the nineteenth-century philosopher, dreamed of a world in which revelation and faith would be entirely supplanted by science. Science in this case means first the science of man, that is, psychology and sociology.

Is it possible that we in this country are entering the age of Comte without realizing it? In the pages that follow a lot will be said to justify such an apprehension. Although the outward appearances are much less dramatic, the dehumanizing and destructive forces inherent in this development are no less formidable than they were in the case of the other two revolutions which arose out of the nineteenth century, the Marxist and the racist ones. This is an extreme comparison, but, as far as moral nihilism is concerned, the "third" revolution has full potentialities of matching the other two.

Nevertheless, buried in it are also the most precious, creative currents. There are many reasons why we as Christians cannot afford to ignore this revolution. The situation is in a way similar to the one which presented

itself in the thirteenth century: there exist outside the Christian sphere vast continents of thought which wait to be integrated. Since the beginning of modern times, the area of the gospel has been a frontier area. The Christian life is a life of challenge and response, even in the world of ideas.

In the face of these developments, a defensive attitude on the part of Christians becomes destructive. The temptation to ward off or shut out the seemingly alien is a sign of sterility. He who has the truth and does nothing but hoard it, finds himself in the role of the debtor who buried his talent. If our lives are guided by fear of error, rather than the love of truth, we are no better than those people whose lives are dominated by a fear of sin rather than the love of good.

This is a time when, in the world of ideas, we need the spirit of courage and discernment which characterized people like Saint Thomas Aquinas. Saint Thomas, who was concerned with one aspect of the unity of truth, namely the integration of philosophical thought, had no need to bother with the integration of scientific discovery or with the relation between science and value. The sociologist, Georg Simmel, has remarked that all science has its natural limits; *whenever any particular branch of science attempts to give answers of universal validity, answers on ultimate questions concerning Man and the Universe, it oversteps its borders and goes*

wrong. This thought was already implicit in Greek philosophy. What makes it so important for us today is the fact that secularism has created a philosophical vacuum in which science automatically expands. It is one of the aims of this book to rediscover the true borders of various sciences. Blurred demarcation lines have to be retraced. Therefore in the following chapters scientific discoveries will have to be discussed side by side with the philosophy of the discoverers. The former are admirable, and the latter are frequently questionable and flimsy. If this side-by-side consideration at times gives the impression that the present study is founded on an anti-scientific bias, it is erroneous.

There is a second reason for the necessity of a study such as this. The world is full of mental anguish. Our mental hospitals cannot cope with the number of patients who seek admittance. Alcohol and drug addiction are on the increase; so is the number of broken marriages. All these are signs that men are torn by irrational fear and hatred. Now just as psychologists and sociologists exhibit a bold belief in a scientific cure-all for these conditions—a naive "optimism of the technique"—the religious person is inclined to the opposite error, a naive simplification by which faith loses its heroic quality and becomes a patent formula.

Modern man is stranded, but the preachers of the gospel are in danger of developing an "I-told-you-so-if-you-only-had-followed-me" attitude. In practice this

frequently leads to the situation that believers, the priests and levites of the parable, pass by while Modern Man, beaten and helpless in the ditch, has his wounds attended to by some other fellow. A purely negative attitude has had, as many Christian writers have pointed out, a devastating effect in the early phases of the social revolution in the last century; Pope Pius XI made the famous remark that the tragedy of the nineteenth century was that the Church lost the working classes. Let us hope that in the future it will not be noted as a tragedy of the twentieth century that we have been standing by while a most important phase was being fought in the struggle for the human soul.

II

The Case of the Old Immigrant

Portions and parcels of the dreadful past.
Tennyson, *The Lotos-Eaters*

In those amphitheater lectures in my medical-student days, the boundaries of the world of insanity seemed clearly determined. The people who came through the ominous door were as different from us, the students in the audience, as an abscessed thigh is different from a healthy thigh. The borders of the world of neurosis, however, are blurred and not quite perceptible. The existentialist philosophers tell us—and they tell us nothing new—that despair and anxiety, hatred and distrust lurk in a potential pit which surrounds us all, no matter how healthy we think we are.

There are people today who think, for reasons which we shall understand better at a later point, that the distinction between "psychosis" and "neurosis" does not hold any more. However, every lay person knows that most people who are confined to our state hospitals are sicker than those around us who are subject to what is

"neurotic") is somehow less strange. There are, in the psychic life, degrees of immediate familiarity. If a hierarchy of deviation from the norm seems to exist, it is actually in terms of that "familiarity of experience."

If one studies the involved controversy which at one time in psychiatric literature arose around the distinction between "neurosis" and "psychosis," and analyzes scientific justifications for such a distinction, one can discern the following trends. In a psychotic person a "larger part" of the "total personality" is affected than in a neurotic person. In a psychotic person, the core of the personality is changed; neurosis affects a more peripheral part. In psychoses the contact with reality is more disturbed than in neuroses. As far as the *observer* (you in meeting your three friends) is concerned, the so-called function of empathy is maintained to a higher degree in the case of a neurotic than in the case of a psychotic patient.

What is meant by this last statement? By *empathy* is meant the function by which one re-feels another person's feelings, or re-experiences his experiences; it is the well-known function of "putting oneself into another person's place." What enables us to "understand" the first case—the mourner—so much more immediately than the last example—the psychotic? It is an element of immediate understandability, and that element has two components.

One is empirical: we know *from experience* that peo-

ple have certain facial expressions after certain things have happened to them. This has nothing to do with empathy. It is the same as the knowledge which we gather from inanimate nature; it is acquired in the same way as the knowledge that water begins to bubble after having been heated to a certain point. The second component is this: when you listen to the story of your friend's bereavement, you understand his reaction *as if you were he*. Even at this point attention should be drawn to a remarkable inner relationship. The three ways in which the severity of psychic disorder were characterized—the degree to which the total personality is affected, the degree to which the person has lost contact with reality, and the degree to which we perceive his plight with immediate empathic understanding—are actually related to one another. The fact that our third friend is no longer the person we have known; the fact that he does not share reality with us in the way in which one breathes the same atmosphere—what else does this convey except that we are no longer able to be with him in the same immediate manner in which we are with the mourner?

Those with clinical experience might doubt this statement. They might maintain that they are able to reexperience the experience of the third man, the psychotic patient, with the same ease as those of the preceding two. However, our clinician is probably confusing two mechanisms which are related to one another

but which are not quite the same—the mechanism of interpretation and the mechanism of empathy. What we are discussing here is simple and naive co-experience, something which all human beings have and which one cannot reduce to any technical components. But it is not quite the same thing as sympathy and pity. You might have more sympathy (meaning pity) for the insane person than for the first two. However, this does not imply that you are really able to put yourself into his place.

Let us now consider a fourth example. Toward the end of the Second World War, we had a patient in a medical ward—a woman in her thirties, pale, sick-looking, apparently underweight, who lay in bed, motionless, staring into space. She had been entirely mute for twenty-four hours, refusing to eat and completely sleepless for several days. The physician who had been treating her gave her history. She was married, had four children, and her husband had been overseas in active combat for four years. She had been told that he was due to have his first furlough in Canada, but two weeks before his arrival, she received a cable that he had been killed in action. After this, she slowed down in all her actions, became unable to eat, or sleep, and she had ideas that there was a weird plot going on in downtown Montreal, a plot of mysterious intrigues and machina-

who are interested in the philosophy of sickness in general, it is interesting in this connection that there are also in the field of physical illnesses reactions which are, in themselves, physiological but abnormal *only in degree*. In her case the reaction has assumed such proportions that her life might be endangered if no help were given to her.

Now let us regard another component of her illness, the experience of the mysterious plot, the voices, etc. It is obvious to everybody that these elements no longer constitute a quantitative exaggeration of grief. This is not, even in an exaggerated form, the normal experience one has at the loss of a beloved person. If you try the "put-yourself-into" test, the symptoms do not immediately "belong." You might perhaps say: "If I were in her shoes, I might also have gone mad," but the content of her madness is *qualitatively* different from what is known to be normal in the reaction of mourning.

Here we have to anticipate something which will become clearer in later parts of this study: a distinction between the traditional psychiatry of the medical schools on one hand, and psychoanalysis on the other. Classical psychiatry, before the advent of psychoanalysis or in complete disregard of it, would have had the following scientific theory. It is known from the relation of cause and effect in the field of physical illness that a uniformity of causes may have varying effects. For every housemaid who develops a skin rash by using a

ble of understanding the superimposed elements of insanity. I say "theoretically" because in order to understand them he would have to know not only the immediately preceding experience, the sudden bereavement, but many remote facts of our patient's history. However, in principle the causal connection which enters into this process of "understanding" is the same—it is a psychic connection, a connection of cause and effect in the psychic order.

According to psychoanalysis, our patient's condition *appears* to consist of two elements: one which is familiar to everybody, namely, the seriously aggravated state of mourning; and one which is "alien," namely, the plot, the voices, and so on. In reality, there is no such division. It is only that the first one is immediately understandable, and the second remotely understandable. The first element every human being understands who ever mourned a loss. The second one is understandable only to those who have acquired a particular kind of insight. But it *is* understandable, and that is the most important thing of all.

I have stated that for this second mechanism of understanding, the one employed by psychoanalysis, we need to know something about "the symbolic language of the unconscious." Perhaps another example will help to explain exactly what this means.

John L., a man in his sixties, was brought to the hos-

early life, is typical of the "rejected child." It can easily be visualized how he must, in his childhood fantasies, have been running back and forth between father (fatherland) and stepmother (foreign land), being refused a port of entry, a harbor of acceptance and of sheltering.

Here we have made an important discovery. In dealing with John's situation, we are confronted with two worlds. There is the world of manifest reality, with its real and objective sources of anxiety—the insecurity of old age, of the expatriate, the guilt and anxiety about a skeleton in the closet. But the other world, behind this one, is the world of infantile fantasies which is no less fear-inspiring than the world of objective reality. Of this second world the patient is only partly conscious. However, these worlds are not independent of one another. There exists a living bond between the two, a relationship which is called *dynamic*. The fantasy of being shuttled back and forth across the ocean without permission to enter either of the two ports would not be so overpowering if it did not correspond to an infantile feeling of an entirely different content—namely, the feeling of being pushed away by father and stepmother. In fact, we have very strong reason to believe that our patient would have been able to handle the real and objective elements of insecurity in his life, had it not been for the fact that his present situation reactivated feelings which were buried but not dead.

are these interpretations (of the hidden motivations, the symbolic disguise) more closely related to empathy?

The answer is not difficult. The evidence of the world of archaic imagery behind the world of objective reality, and the dynamic relationship between the two, can be obtained by an empathic process rather than by the kind of methods used in the experimental sciences. (This does not mean that the method of proof as employed by the experimental sciences does not come in at all. As we shall see, it comes into the picture in a secondary way.)

We can summarize by saying that psychoanalysis has not only employed empathic knowledge as a scientific tool, it has done more: *it has pushed back the frontiers of empathy*. This fact is much more important than it may seem at first sight, and in the following chapters we shall see its historical significance.

Those who know anything about the history of science would assume off-hand that, in the history of psychology, knowledge gained by empathy *preceded* scientific knowledge and was replaced by it. "Let's be more scientific" is, in the minds of most people, a motto for the progress of human thought, with "scientific" in this connection meaning "along the lines of the natural sciences." From what we know about the history of Western thought, we would expect a scientific lecturer to say something like this:

"Before the advent of brain physiology, people used

problem: "When a person has personality, it is generally meant that he has a pleasing personality. Now what is a pleasing personality?" Evaluating the opinions given by individuals about members of their own and the opposite sex he observes, with scientific caution: "Although the differences are not statistically reliable, it is interesting to note that men consider men less steady than women do, while women consider women less steady than they do men." He immediately adds an interpretation of his findings (a procedure not quite scientific): "This is undoubtedly a reflection of greater familiarity with one's own sex." Using common sense, most people would arrive at a different interpretation, namely, rivalry with one's own sex.

Thus we see that we come up with nonsense if we give to the quantitative method a position of absolute primacy, and if we think that it is only by the quantitative method that we ascertain truth. What the scientist attempted to do in the present case was to settle a question of value with the aid of scientific method.

One might argue that it is an error to introduce the scientific method into problems involving value, but that it is an error without serious consequence. This is not quite so. Whenever one introduces quantitative methods in an area in which a hierarchy of values exists, one is apt to corrode those values. In order to have numbers work properly they have to be on an equal basis. In order to add fifteen toadstools and fifteen roses, one

under an illusion about this. Their belief is not shared by others to the same degree as they think. Hence the difference between private and public attitude in the table. This mistake also causes them to believe that there is a Church which is a mother and keeper of faith.

It is quite possible that I misunderstand the meaning and aim of such studies, but one thing is certain. Whenever the bulldozer of statistics rolls through the flowering meadow, followed by the steamroller of sociopsychological evaluation, nothing can survive. One might argue that faith can be investigated on the natural, either social or psychological, plane and not emerge the worse for it. This is true but that is not our point. What we want to show here is that the very method itself, and the position of the problem, postulate an equalization. For science of this sort, supernatural values have to be dehydrated and hardened before they can be investigated. Take a sentence like this: "Further investigations of this hypothesis are now being carried on in industrial, political, religious and economic fields." The very way in which the word "religious" is used in this sentence is alien to the Christian. Either the Church is the Mystical body of Christ, or it is nothing—a fascia in the social structure, arbitrarily accounted for somewhere between the "political" and "economic" fields.

It is doubtful whether Saint John the Baptist and Saint Paul foresaw this particular kind of paganism. But there is no doubt that they would have preferred

to be beheaded or crucified by ancient pagans than see the sacrament of baptism and the community of saints benevolently reduced to percentile columns in a study on "pluralistic ignorance." Thus we can say that things such as "religious attitudes" can be dealt with as elements of the social fabric, in statistical analyses, and in mass equations only on the basis of a fiction. They have first to be deprived of their metaphysical character, as it were, and treated as if they did not belong to the order of Grace.

The atmosphere of apparent objectivity in which the social psychologist works is actually a result and an expression of an urban, technocratic civilization which squeezes the unique and mysterious element out of things which are of the spirit. A number of sociologists realize this paradox and have made attempts to deal with the "problem of values." Whenever we encounter values, however, we arrive at the point at which science stops.

Values—"good" and "bad," or "beautiful" and "ugly" —are not the object of science. A mathematician measuring a triangle or a circle, or relating the number 73 to the number 17, does not ask which one is beautiful, ugly, good, or bad. In the world of chemistry the carbon atom is in no way "better" than the hydrogen atom. A zoologist, unless he is at the same time a poet, does not compare a rooster with a gander from a moral or aesthetic point of view—and if he does, he gets his poetry

and his science badly mixed. In natural history, in the old days before the advent of modern science, people used to make statements about the lion being nobler than the wolf; of course, no scientist would say anything like this today. It is in the nature of scientific method that it has to exclude the world of values, the moral or aesthetic hierarchy of "good" and "bad," in order to arrive at correct results.

Let us consider further what happens when we try to apply scientific method to the world of values—and we shall confine matters to aesthetic values, rather than spiritual or moral values. (It is interesting that a belief in aesthetic values is the one thing people hold on to longest. Even the most avowed amoralists and atheists believe in aesthetic values. Dostoievsky, who had such keen insight into the modern spiritual dilemma, once remarked that the world will be saved by Beauty. I have seen many atheists in rapture over a Bach fugue or Haydn quartet; they little realized that they would have to burn all the great musical scores in a bonfire if they really lived what they preached.)

We say that certain things are more beautiful than others. A symphony of Mozart is more beautiful than jukebox music; a Rembrandt painting is more beautiful than a magazine cover. But there is no method in the social sciences which would help either to support or to deny this hierarchy of values. A sociologist might find, by questionnaire methods, that there are areas in which

93 per cent of all the people prefer magazine covers to Rembrandt paintings. In another area the reverse may be true. We might even find factors which would account for these differences in taste. Yet the question of intrinsic value—what makes one thing more beautiful than another—remains untouched.

A team of research workers might tackle Beethoven's Ninth Symphony over a period of ten years. The physicists on the team could make statistical studies and graphs of the acoustical wave-lengths and amplitudes. The psychologists could scrutinize Beethoven's childhood history minutely. The social scientists could examine the European outlook at the end of the Napoleonic era. And so on. No matter how much data our scientific team compiled, it could not "explain" a single bar of the musical experience we call the Ninth Symphony. Nor could the combined team come to any conclusion as to whether or not the Ninth Symphony is more beautiful than the latest hit from a musical show. From this example alone, we must conclude that there exists a great number of truths which are not accessible to what one commonly calls scientific investigation—i.e., to an area of human endeavor in which experiments, or numbers, or the accumulation of facts dominate. Values are transcendental. They lie in an area which accumulative knowledge cannot reach.

When Francis Bacon discussed the method of scientific investigation, he was far from claiming that it

the "forces" which govern the relationships between groups of human beings—such as rivalry and the formation of social hierarchies—yet our knowledge of these things is at present the same as our knowledge of inanimate nature before the time of Galileo. Only by the discovery of laws governing group relations comparable to the laws of classical physics can we arrive at a social science in the proper sense of the word.

This trend can be studied in its purest and most coherent form in cases where experimental psychology of animals is introduced with the explicit hope of discovering exact laws *which can then be applied to human beings.* Of course, in such experiments both empathy and moral value must be discarded as factors interfering with scientific validity.

An experimental psychologist, who has contributed important observations on the social psychology of animals, studied the mechanism of rivalry in *Gallus domesticus,* or the common rooster.

Beginning at 16 weeks of age [he writes *] six young roosters are arranged in a hierarchy of dominance, the order being determined by the number of individuals in the group that each rooster is able to defeat in physical combat (Social Reflex No. 2). This order of ranking is revised at intervals of four weeks from the 16th to the 36th week. Begin-

* Carl Murchison, "The experimental measurements of a social hierarchy in *Gallus domesticus.*" Also, "The direct identification and direct measurement of Social Reflex No. 1 and Social Reflex No. 2," *Journal of General Psychology,* XII, 3-39, 1935.

amount of reading in abnormal psychology. Now let us consider the theoretical concepts which Freud introduced to explain his observations. Our soldier's first reaction (like anybody else's) might have been to cry and yell in horror when he was cut off from his unit, cornered with no chance of escape, and shot at from all sides. However, he did not give way to this impulse because it is "cowardly"—that is, not compatible with accepted moral standards. Now there exists in the psychic universe of each person a law of conservation of emotional tension which is comparable to the law of conservation of physical energy in nature. The "amount" of emotional tension repressed cannot just vanish. It is directed into another channel and it re-appears under the formation of a symptom (blindness). The symptom is produced by a "conversion" (transformation) of emotional tension. Under hypnosis the emotional tension finds an outlet which had first been blocked: the patient yells and cries with horror, and with this re-conversion the symptom of blindness disappears. This is the reason why this type of hysteria has since the early studies of Freud and Breuer been generally called "conversion" hysteria—the idea of the hysterical symptoms being something into which "psychic energy" has been "converted."

These early investigations were the test tube experiment, the small-scale model of all that psychoanalysis later developed into. Soon it was found out that the

not a malingerer—that is, intentionally and purposefully faking a sickness) is called hysterical.

Until 1894, hysterical symptoms were defined precisely in such a negative way—by the absence of any organic lesion which would account for their presence. With the observations of Freud and Breuer the hysterical symptoms received a more positive definition for the first time. Let us imagine that a soldier returns from an extremely harassing experience in combat (say at Dunkirk) with hysterical blindness. This means that he is blind, but without evidence of organic lesion of the visual apparatus from cornea to the visual cortex of the brain. This soldier is subjected to hypnotic sessions (with or without pharmaceutic aid) and given the hypnotic suggestion of battle experiences under Dunkirk-like conditions. He recalls, under hypnosis, many dreadful details which he cannot recall under the ordinary wakeful conditions of history-taking. At the same time he yells and cries like a child under the influence of something horrifying. As he wakes up from this session, he may have regained his eyesight.

In Freudian terminology, the original horrifying experience (Dunkirk) is called "trauma" (wound). The inability to recall some of the most wounding details of the experience is called "repression." The lively recall under hypnosis is called "abreaction" or "acting out" or *"katharsis."* All these concepts are well known to most people today because everyone has done a certain

overt psychic injury (Dunkirk) was only a superficial immediate cause. It was one link in a chain, or rather in an involved net of chains which reached right back into the dawn of the patient's history.

In other words, the idea of *the* trauma had to be abandoned. There was rather a multiple set of traumas. It looked almost as if life itself had been a tissue of injuries and, what was even more astonishing, the earlier one went back into the patient's past the more traumatizing the events seem to have been. In order to understand this better, one may illustrate it with the biology of physical wounds, and with certain observations on the subjective experience of time. Microscopically small wounds inflicted on embryonic tissue in experimental embryology have a more fundamental effect on the structure of the mature organism the earlier they are inflicted. A small cut which would escape notice if inflicted on the mature body after birth can produce entire malformations if applied to the embryo. The malformation is more monstrous the earlier the cut occurs. If we assume that a similar law exists in our psychic development, we understand much better why things which go wrong in a minor way ("minor" by grown-up standards) may have a tremendous impact on the formation of habits and on the structure of character when they happen early in life to a psychic tissue which, like embryonic tissue, is still fully charged with potentialities.

to give a definite time at which all this began. Thus we see that in contrast to the first observations which initiated the psychoanalytic development, in most cases we are far from having to deal with one symptom, occurring suddenly. We would invariably be wrong if we assumed the existence of *one* trauma, the punched-out event. Quite early it was discovered that hypnosis is a poor method to investigate the unconscious significance of a symptom and to heal it; there are much better methods for this.

The basic principle of psychoanalysis was nevertheless contained in the very first writings of sixty years ago. Experiences are stowed away into something which is called the unconscious; the emotional tension associated with them cannot vanish into nothingness; the neurotic symptom is the product of a metamorphosis. Whatever has been withheld from conscious life, for any reason, breaks back into it under disguise.

Even at this early stage the concept of the unconscious had acquired something peculiar. The existence of an unconscious was nothing new. It was known that the material of things remembered is stored away in us somewhere outside consciousness. If someone asks you how much three times seven is, you do not calculate; you answer from memory. But since you have not been thinking of the solution before you were asked, you must have produced it from some unlit corner of your mind. This is the neutral, bland concept of the uncon-

scious of the classical phase of experimental psychology. However, in cases of conversion hysteria the unconscious was not bland. It acted as if it withdrew certain elements because they were too heavy to bear, released them again in clever disguise, and could only with difficulty be tricked into releasing them with their full charge of feeling. The relationship between the conscious and the unconscious part of the mind was, quite contrary to the simple example of learned material, part of the human drama. The relationship was, as we put it nowadays, *dynamic*—a term we have already explained in the case history of the old immigrant. Our blind soldier, while spectator and part of a scene of horror, had been under a moral conflict. His eyes said: "We do not want to see!" In order to trace symptoms back along the stream of the psychic, along thousands of rivulets into their hidden origins, methods much better than that of hypnosis had to be employed. One of these methods was the free association of thoughts.

Most of our thinking during the day, particularly when we talk, is directed toward a goal. We intentionally set out to think about something, or we want to get something across. Thus our trend of thinking is shaped into a pattern. It has a theme. It rarely happens that our thoughts float freely without any mapped-out direction. This occurs only in certain situations—for example, for a short while before we fall asleep. This kind of thoughts appear, on the surface, meaningless.

Moreover, for many reasons it is not easy during ordinary wakeful thinking to let our thoughts drift in such a manner. This type of thinking enters, as an important element, into poetry. In fact, contemporary poetry has enriched and deepened the stream of poetic imagery precisely by this method and it is the reason why so much of it appears at first sight as a crazy-quilt. It has also quite consciously been employed in the novel, particularly by James Joyce. The apparent incoherence of those free-floating thoughts becomes suddenly meaningful when one looks at them more closely. One is able to recognize a pattern in the seemingly patternless, a grouping and coherence of a sort which is different from the logic of wakeful thinking.

These laws were discovered quite independently of Freud, by C. G. Jung at the beginning of this century. Jung's discovery consolidated the foundations of the psychoanalytic theory. The laws which seemed to govern the "crazy" flow of freely associated thoughts—as in a completely relaxed person shortly before falling asleep—were found to be closely related to the same laws which governed the connection between symptom and unconscious conflict in conversion hysteria. In fact, it was seen that there is no such thing as "meaningless" in the psychological order, provided that one admits the basic Freudian contention that there exists a dynamic relationship between the unconscious and the conscious. When the unconscious was no longer viewed

first to mention certain trends in the natural sciences of the nineteenth century which entered into its formation. One of these trends is characterized by the well-known law of the conservation of energy—that the total amount of energy in the universe remains exactly the same, even if the forms of energy change continuously into one another. The other trend is the theory of electromagnetic energy as elaborated by Maxwell which simply says that all forms of energy except gravity are, as it were, "different expressions of the same thing." Thus visible light, X-rays, heat, ultra-red, ultra-violet, and radio waves are *all* electromagnetic waves. They differ from one another only by something quantitative, namely wave lengths.

Another concept which enters into the theory of libido lies outside the realm of physics. It is borrowed from a biological discipline: embryology. The embryologist studies the human form from the stage of the fertilized ovum until birth. He follows the cell division after conception, when the cells form a round compact cluster (morula), then a hollow ball with an opening (gastrula), dim ancestral phases of life through which we all pass—up to more and more differentiated arrangements of tissues and organs, until finally the human body emerges as it appears at birth. During that process the most extraordinary transmigrations occur. It is as if Nature tried things out, rejected them as not feasible, and started them all over in a new form. And these "stabs," these achievements by "trial and error,"

down. The fact that in the case of a harelip two out of these three flaps do not fuse shows that a process has been *arrested* before its completion. This is the mechanism of many malformations. It is even the origin of certain tumors which grow in the adult body.

In other diseases it occurs that the organism reverts to forms or functions which are normal during an embryonic phase. For example, in certain diseases of the blood, there occur blood cells which under normal conditions circulate only in the embryonic blood. The same is true about certain phases of inflammatory reactions—that is to say, when the organism is in danger. Thus we see that besides arrestation at embryonic stages there occurs also a *regression* to earlier forms of life.

I have gone in detail into the theoretical elements borrowed from physics and from biology, which entered into Freud's theory of libido, because a knowledge of those elements makes this theory much more understandable. We have already seen that in the theory of the conversion symptom the human person was conceived as a universe in which no "emotional tension" can be lost. Just as in the steam-engine heat is converted into mechanical energy, thus in a child inner conflicts and the tension associated with them may be "converted" into hysterical convulsions.

Libido, in the original meaning, means pleasure as well as desire for pleasure. The word is used by ancient authors in either of these two meanings. In the Freudian

one another. Nevertheless, they all (whether associated with sex, or with eating, or with the experience of beauty in nature or in art, and so on) have something in common. This is also true as in the case of pain. A toothache, a pain of the shin-bone, the experience after receiving the news of the death of a beloved person—all are entirely different. Yet they all have something in common.

Now according to the psychoanalytic theory the various forms of desire and of pleasure are related to one another by a most extraordinary law of development. According to this theory, the most intense form of bodily pleasure, sexual orgasm, is ontogenetically (embryologically) related to *all* forms of bodily pleasure. (The words "ontogenetic" and "embryological" in this connection refer to life after birth.) It has its typical ontogenetic history. Libido, in its most archaic form, is diffusely experienced all over the body. In its earliest phase it is related to genital pleasure of the mature body as a simple, undifferentiated structure (matrix) of embryonic tissue is to the post-natal body with fully developed organs. However, even during those earlier phases, there exist areas of higher concentration, as it were. While in the infant the entire skin is erogenic, those places in which skin and mucous membranes meet —the oral, anal, and urethral area—are more so than the rest of the skin. On that archaic level it seems that the most powerful "sense" of communication, and of rela-

sensation in the oral area at the insertion of the nipple and the actual feeding is the earliest and dimmest prehistoric phase which leads up to genital sexuality. This phase is followed by the second oral phase, around the development of teeth, during which the child begins actively and aggressively to "go out" for food, and during which part of the pleasure is not only intake but also destruction (second oral phase). The passing of fecal material through the anal opening is associated with pleasure sensation (first anal phase). Later the child learns to retain or give fecal material at will, and during this phase (second anal phase) the retention and the "giving" of material is associated with pleasure or with spite. These early infantile phases which are called pregenital change at a time, around the age of four, in which there occurs for the first time concentration of pleasure and desire in the genital area. This first genital phase during infancy is something which one might regard as an abortive form of puberty. It subsides during the so-called phase of "latency" (from about the age of four to about the age of ten) which is followed by prepuberty and then puberty.

In order to outline the libido theory of neuroses in its most fundamental points one would have to add many things. For example, it is important to realize that according to this theory there is an early phase during which love knows no extraneous object. It is restricted to the immense world of the individual's own body.

Moreover, at that stage the border between self and the outside world is still blurred in a way which is difficult to reconstruct for us grown-up people. The mother who is actually an object of love is still something like a huge organ-like extension of the self. The object of love is a sort of pleasure-giver, not yet exteriorized by the self, and in an archaic, "magic" way part of the subject. "Lust demands infinity"; this saying of Nietzsche is particularly appropriate to that earliest phase of our libidinal development. At the time when that pleasure-giving mother becomes outlined as a clear object outside ourselves our aggressive, destructive instincts are developed. And when the child realizes that the stream of love emanating from the mother is not solely directed toward himself but partly beamed at others, he wants to eliminate those competing objects. This is the time, around the "first genital phase," when the boy experiences the father or any other male figure as a competitor for the mother's love. As is well known, this conflict is named Oedipus conflict after the famous Greek story of Oedipus who killed his father and married his mother without realizing their identity. In girls the Oedipus drama has the same powerful impact but its plot is more complex and less well understood. Normally the Oedipus conflict is resolved by the process of identification. During the "latent" phase the boy begins to pattern himself after the father, the girl after the mother. We shall later come back to the mechanism of

grand entry into the human personality only with the full development of reason.

Another aspect of psychoanalysis which we have to outline here briefly is the phenomenon of transference. Not long after the psychoanalytic method proper had been inaugurated, Freud was struck by a peculiar fact. During treatment the physician became an object of love and hatred. The patient's attitude toward the doctor went through phases of an intense emotional coloring. These phases were mysterious. They could not, like ordinary love and hatred, be explained by the actual situation. The mystery was solved when it was found that in such a setting the physician was not a neutral figure but represented, under disguise, a powerful figure from the patient's infantile background. Usually he was a parental figure, a father or a mother, or a sibling figure, a brother or sister. The love or hatred experienced during the treatment were not directed toward the analyst, but toward someone else in whose place he stood. The patient was not aware of this. But when it was interpreted to him at the proper moment he learned to realize something which is so highly important to us if we want to understand ourselves; namely, that all our emotional relationships are tainted by a carry-over. That which determines our earliest relationships—the original "plot" which is played between ourselves and those huge over-lifesize *dramatis personae* of the fam-

ily—has an impact on all the later dramas of life. We paraphrase it, we vary it a bit, but what we really want to do is to play it over and over again. And the reason why so many things go mysteriously wrong between ourselves and people around us, at school, at work, in marriage, is that we repeat performances of a play which was actually, in every single case, unique.

This carrying over of unfinished business, let us say from the relationship "son-father" to the relationship "patient-doctor," is called transference. A great deal of analytical treatment consists of interpreting again and again this transference to the patient until the gap between infantile fantasy and objective reality gradually widens. This, in fact, is the aim of all psychoanalytical therapy. It is not an exaggeration to say that the patient is well when he is able to encounter people in his everyday environment without endowing them with qualities which are borrowed from the persons who populated the primeval stage.

There is one more psychoanalytical concept which has to be briefly explained in order to make the following discussions clearer—the concept of sublimation. The word "sublimation" is borrowed from chemistry. There it means the changing of a substance from its solid to its gaseous state, without passing first through the liquid state. In psychoanalysis it means the transformation of

instinctual drives into forms of human energy on a more elevated level.

This concept existed, in various aspects, long before Freud. For example, it was a rule during antiquity that athletes should remain sexually abstinent before some sports event; this ascetic practice would enhance their athletic prowess. Several famous artists have stated that sexual abstinence increased their creativeness. All this, contrary to the psychoanalytic concept, refers to the *conscious* level. Like some other psychoanalytic concepts, the idea of sublimation was anticipated by nineteenth-century German philosophy—this one particularly by Schopenhauer. In psychoanalytic theory, due to the ideas of quantities of energy and so on, the concept of sublimation has a strongly mechanistic flavor. But it corresponds to an obvious fact just the same, and one can readily see why it should play a great role in neuroses and their therapy.

In connection with the concept of sublimation, we can anticipate something which will later be elaborated. The idea of sublimation shows clearly that something mechanistic, a "process" analogous to a chemical one, an image borrowed from the test-tube, is poorly deficient in comparison with the thing for which it stands. Actually it has vast implications. For example, suppose I could show that a headmaster of a school who is an outstanding educator has "sublimated" his "latent homosexuality" in his work. In this case I would demon-

VI

The Third Revolution

It is simply incomprehensible how anybody can consider the Christian doctrine of redemption as a guide for the difficult life of today. Joseph Goebbels, *Diaries*

Only that which is replaced, is destroyed.
Auguste Comte

The things which have been explained in the preceding chapter may be true or not. But the question whether they are true or not is not a philosophical problem. To dispute the basic tenets of psychoanalysis on philosophical grounds would be just as wrong as to dispute certain tenets of physics on philosophical grounds. All we can say is that nothing discussed in the preceding chapter is incompatible with a Christian idea of the nature of man. On the contrary, we shall see that these tenets fit in perfectly with such an idea. If the tenets are, as we think, empirically established, there is no paradox. Anything true is part of Truth itself.

It is therefore the more surprising that psychoanalysis is considered a vicious onslaught against Christianity, in fact against any religious belief. There are two main

We cannot discuss Freud's views on religion in as great detail as we should like, but this has been done by several writers.* The general nature of Freud's views on religion can be summarized in two points.

First, Freud's method in dealing with anything spiritual is *reductive*. This means that Freud reduces everything which, to the religious believer, is in the supernatural order, to something in the natural order. For example, the idea of God, says Freud, is a father image projected on the sky. The child originally has a concept of an omnipotent father who is able to fulfill all his needs. In the degree to which the child develops a grasp of reality, that image of the father is gradually erased. Instead of it, a fantasy figure, a father in heaven, becomes imbued with the same qualities of omnipotence and protectiveness.

To take another example, Freud would say that the idea of Holy Communion is derived from the primitive state (or childhood) of mankind, when the rite of oral incorporation of the father, in cannibalistic or sacrificial ceremonies, was common.

In other words, God is *nothing but* the father and Holy Communion is *nothing but* cannibalistic oral introjection. In fact, anything in the spiritual order is

* B. G. Sanders, *Christianity after Freud*, London, 1949, in which the author brings out several illuminating details. Also Roland Dalbiez, *La méthode psychanalytique et la Doctrine Freudienne*, Paris, 1936.

relationship to God," or "Even in the earliest sacrificial rituals, there is contained a crude foreshadowing of the idea of Holy Communion," and so on. Saint Paul speaks in these terms quite explicitly: "God, after Whom all fatherhood on earth is named" (Eph. 3: 15). The situation is similar to certain law-suits in which two testimonies are given which contradict each other completely. Here for once it is quite impossible that both parties are right. Contrary to the history of other clashes between science and religion, in this case a compromise or a settlement out of court will not do.

The most remarkable of all the reductive statements is this: Religion is nothing but an obsessive-compulsive neurosis. This brings us to our second point, the historical theories of religion which Freud developed in various papers and which the reader can study in detail in the author's original works. A compulsive-obsessive neurosis is a state in which the patient sees himself forced to go through apparently irrational acts. He may have to wash his hands a certain number of times in situations in which handwashing is actually not warranted; he may have to touch certain objects; he may have to avoid the touching of other objects; he may have to avoid certain steps on the staircase or repeat certain other steps a given number of times, and so on. There is something "ritualistic" about many of these compulsive-obsessive acts. For example, some of them are carried out before going to bed, and unless they are

carried out the patient cannot sleep in peace. Moreover, these acts usually have no practical meaning, and when they are carried out repeatedly one can sometimes observe a preference for "magic" numbers, such as three or seven. It occurred to Freud quite early in the course of his studies that all great religions appear like obsessive-compulsive mechanisms on a large scale—transposed into mass psychology, as it were. From this he concluded that religion *is* a compulsive-obsessive neurosis. Indeed, the liturgical ritual and the ascetic ideal, two elements which all the great religions of the world have in common, bear a striking resemblance to the compulsive symptoms of neuroses. There are certain individuals in whom even the inner experience accompanying religious activities is similar to that encountered in compulsive neurotics.

It is characteristic of compulsive-obsessive patients that in early childhood, before the latent phase, a trauma or a set of traumas occurred. This trauma is associated with guilt. The obsessive thought or the compulsive act of the patient can be shown to represent an unconscious re-enactment of the traumatic experience, or an unconscious act of penance—a ritual to ward off punishment threatening from without. Almost all children, for example, have compulsive tendencies during pre-puberty. These unconsciously self-imposed rituals of penance have something to do with the re-awakening of the sexual instinct during the second genital

of the order of Grace, set out to debunk religion and produced his own homemade theology—this is just about as close to the world of revelation as he possibly could come.

There are two big schools of anti-Christian philosophy in the world today: dialectical materialism in Russia and scientific positivism outside Russia. Freud's anti-religious writings do not fit into either of them. They are not quite rationalistic enough. They are odd. They emphasize too much an element of tragedy. And it is most characteristic of all scientific materialism (whether of the Russian or of the Western variety) that it denies tragedy. Its solutions are simple and pat. Therefore we should not be surprised that Freud's papers dealing with the historical origin of monotheism have not had a profound influence on the reading public as a whole. They have created nothing in the popular mind like the wave following the post-Darwinian evolutionist literature; there is nothing in these writings to "catch on."

It is quite easy to disprove Freud's theory on its own terms. One does not even need to bring in theology. The argument is flimsy, regardless of what one's faith or lack of faith may be. If one accepts Freud's theory of the development of libido, one thing (e.g., the Eucharist) cannot *be* another thing (primeval cannibalistic ritual). The relationship is quite different. Supposing you were enthralled by the beauty of the face of

from Nietzsche to Jean-Paul Sartre, have succumbed to this fallacy. The same thing can be said about the observations on "religion" by representatives of the so-called cultural psychoanalytical schools who are believed to have rejected Freud's materialism. It is most remarkable that Husserl, just around the beginning of this century, and apparently without being aware of the beginnings made by Freud, warned of the danger of what he called *psychologism*. Little did he realize the disastrous social implications of all this.

Like all materialist philosophies the Freudian, too, contains inner contradictions, certain idealist ° elements in disguise. For example, if one really believed wholeheartedly in the primacy of blind instinctual drives and determination by the irrational, the entire idea of sublimation would make no sense. Freud has indicated time and time again that sublimation is the ideal solution of the neurotic conflict; Thomas Mann says that this alone puts him in line with the great humanists. But this means the introduction of a moral principle which is not intrinsic to the system. As we have already pointed out, in psychoanalytical literature sublimation is usually described in mechanistic terms. Since instincts, if they were freely expressed, would clash with social taboos,

° The word "idealist" is not meant in the technical sense of a definite philosophical school but generally as indicating the opposite of "materialist."

they are channeled into something else. Actually nobody really believes in such a crude machinery. The very formation of the concept of sublimation implies the existence of something beyond it. Does anyone really believe that families are founded, orphans are cared for, the sick are tended to, cathedrals are erected, symphonies are composed—only because instinctual drives are blocked by society? The adherence to the "machinery" when it comes to these questions is due to the fear which all authors of mechanistic systems have of the idea of finality. Even if one accepted the mechanistic concept to that extent, the question would still have to be answered as to why "society" began to inhibit instinctual drives in the first place.

There is a resemblance between this paradox and the famous one in which the Marxists are involved. If one took the Marxist philosophy literally, it would be nonsense to go to prison for it, to face Siberia or a firing squad, to endure hunger and sickness, or to do anything at all so that later generations, after our death, should live in a society in which justice reigns. Yet this was the moral philosophy of many early Marxist revolutionaries.

It has frequently been pointed out that in Marx's philosophy of history, with the proletariat, the downtrodden class, in the role of a savior—there is something like a prophetic and messianic afterthought, not at all in step with dialectics. There is something similar the

from Darwin to Hitler. It seems grotesque to link up the innocent passenger of the good ship *Beagle*, one of the finest examples of what a scientist should be, with the concentration camps of Belsen and Buchenwald. Yet the fact remains that there is a link. Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest has to be judged on its own merits, as a scientific hypothesis. It referred to animals, not to men. But it contributed, quite independently of the intentions of its originator, to something which one might call the climate of our times. The beginning was harmless enough: pamphlets were tossed from rectories into laboratories and back. However, it was not long before men like the German Nietzsche and the Frenchman Gobineau appeared on the scene. These men thought that it might not be such a bad idea for society if the stronger ones stepped on their less well-endowed brethren—meaning human beings. Even at that stage there was something academic and, in a sense, aristocratic about the entire affair. If one had known one of those thinkers personally he would undoubtedly have said: "They talk like that, but they don't really mean it." It took another generation for this thought to have any influence on the lives of people, and it finally "made history."

Several things had to happen to achieve this success. This philosophy agglutinated with other similar trends. There was Wagner's and Schopenhauer's irrational "death magic"; there existed a political philosophy of

more than an academic play. Despite all the fun Freud made of the "moralists," he himself was a man of great moral nobility. There are numerous facts about his own life to substantiate this. It is the same theoretical paradox which one encounters in so many of the early dialectical materialists.

However, the psychological revolution has already sped far past the aristocratic and esoteric stages; it has entered the phase of vulgarization. The philosophical utterances of the second and third echelons lack the lonely and tragic element of the original theorists. They are related to Freud as some of the German and Austrian experts on the philosophy of the race were to Nietzsche and Gobineau. What is even more remarkable, the process of agglutination which we have seen in the development of the biological revolt is quite advanced. We have seen that behaviorism and the reflexology of Pavlov were originally quite opposed to psychoanalysis. They discard the empathic-intuitive element in psychology as unscientific. They accept only the *homme machine* of Descartes, the mechanistic model, as the last image of truth beyond which there is nothing. So does the cybernetics man turned psychiatrist. In so far as Freud introduced the terminology of the "model" (the "quantum" of libidinal energy which is shunted back and forth), he has outwardly assimilated his system to that of the *homme machine*. This is one of the reasons why he is a determinist and regards

the idea of free will as an illusion. Moreover, as we have seen, there are large areas in the social sciences in which, for the purpose of scientific inquiry, numbers of people in their relationships to one another are treated under the fictitious premise of a *mechanism*. The same is true about large sectors of anthropology and comparative sociology. In other words, the psychoanalytic movement has *fused* with a body of the most divergent kinds of science which deal with human problems.

It is a huge body of synthesis, of cross-breeding in which psychoanalysis as such, the art of the healing dialogue, can no longer be recognized. What interests us most is the fact that those sciences can be used for managerial purposes; they can easily be employed as a tool for the manipulation of great numbers of human beings. Moreover, they have an imponderable but vast influence on the common sense of values. As far as the first feature is concerned one is able, even now, to discern signs of things to come. It is little realized to what extent behavioristic and psychoanalytical knowledge is already being used for managerial purposes.*

The beginnings look harmless to the superficial observer. A chewing gum company wanted to know why people chew gum. An advertising agency which em-

* For details see Ralph Goodman, "Freud and the Hucksters," *The Nation*, CLXXVI, 143-145, 1953.

cise and valid: ". . . Love is an activity and not a passion . . . the essence of love is to 'labor' for something and 'to make something grow.' . . . To love a person productively implies to care and to feel responsible for his life, not only for his physical existence but for the growth and development of all his human powers . . . without respect for and knowledge of the beloved person, love deteriorates into domination and possessiveness."

This is a fairly representative sample. *Agape* is being investigated in its mechanics, under the premise that the natural plane represents the whole. It is measured against the views of two social psychologists who have come to different results, as in the good old days when pathology professors used to dispute the definition of "inflammation." The charity of Christ does not quite make the grade. The point is not that "Christian morality" is here represented in a perfectly distorted way. The remarkable thing is how one investigator's definition is discarded *because* it is "still tinged" with Christian morality. There is a peculiar equating of that which lies in the order of psychological and social mechanics with that which is of the transcendental order. Gethsemane, which is a mystery, is treated as if it were a proposition. Saint John of the Cross, Saint Francis of Assisi, and Our Lord Himself become, as it were, subjects of a sociological investigation on "personality interaction" or something of that sort. What makes all this so hideous is not so much the factual error; it is

in completely different fields if they were not representative of a great number of those engaged in the social sciences. These things are perhaps not always expressed with the same fervor. They certainly are not literally adhered to in the private lives of those who pronounce them. The few people quoted here express bluntly what hundreds of others assume more or less without formulating it. For many intellectuals in pre-Hitler Germany it was the smart thing to believe in the primacy of the biological. For the charming people who populate Chekhov's stage it was the smart thing to be nihilistic. They never bothered to think this thought "through" so that they might be able to behold the end, the potential result, the concrete precipitate. They were not able to imagine their own persons in a world in which this thought was part of the fabric of a lived reality. It is strange that some people can think of dehumanization only in terms of Stalin, others only in terms of Hitler. To many the democratic procedure itself has become something like a rite of protection. A glance at history shows that evil never puts in an appearance twice under the same guise.

Of course there is no war between Christianity and paganism, as there has been in Russia and Germany, but there are continuous border incidents, and counted up they may amount to a war. Perhaps a state of war exists and we do not realize it. In modern times formal declarations of war are no longer necessary. Under

the Comtean idea of a science of man, disciplines which methodologically do not necessarily fit together, such as psychoanalysis and behaviorism, anthropology and psychology, psychiatry and sociology, form a kind of unified structure. They are held together by a common philosophical basis. They are beginning to form a sort of Corpus Non-Mysticum. The fulfillment of Auguste Comte's dream of a world dominated by science is not far off.

Psychoanalysis is so strongly imbedded in all this that it is difficult to recognize its basic features. Many Christian critics of psychoanalysis are evidently handicapped by the thought that one has to accept all the tenets. Moreover, they cannot believe Freud's statement that psychoanalysis, purely isolated as a therapeutic method, is philosophically neutral; that it helps to free the patient from his neurotic shackles and enables him to rediscover his basic set of beliefs, whatever they may be.

This distrust is understandable. Theoretically these statements of Freud are true. But in the reality of a living relationship between patient and physician all this is modified. The mechanism of transference and counter-transference represents many subtle currents; precisely in this lies its therapeutic strength. The unique encounter, the meeting of two human beings, with all the re-enactment of a forgotten drama, the re-presentation of that which is "familiar" (of the family)—this is the true principle of healing. And with all this goes the

dental move, did not come about in Freud's case. This is historically one of the reasons why psychoanalysis now forms, to a startling degree, part of the positivist revolution.

The thing to keep in mind is the fact that its roots lie somewhere else. Its basic intuitions come from a world which is quite opposed to that of scientific positivism. But there is no use fooling ourselves: this is the world by which the psychoanalytical movement has been to a large extent absorbed and assimilated. And there is no use fooling ourselves about something else. At first sight the examples given here seem disjointed and haphazard. But there is no doubt about it: the communications expert who abolishes "value concepts" and other "old-fashioned alternatives"; the sociologist who rejects the Christian concept of love in favor of more up-to-date psychoanalytic findings; the general who abolishes traditional morality for the establishment of a "peace-time society"; the "amoralist" who advocates a "really new education for social living"; the social psychologist who investigates scientifically how to soothe the frustrations of coal miners; the zoologist who informs us about the true origins of sexual morality—they all belong together. They are signposts on the way. Ahead of us lies the fantastic possibility of a world in which human happiness is technically assembled. In that Comtean revolution there are no atrocities. There are no martyrs. Man, the image of God, is led to a painless death.

the mathematical-experimental sciences, although essentially different from it.

There is no doubt that Freud gained all his important insights by empathy. Consider, for example, the mechanism of transference. The way in which those seemingly irrational waves of affection and hostility which well up in the patient during treatment were elucidated, the way in which all the subtle currents which modify the relationship between physician and patient *were recognized for what they are*—all this is entirely removed from the world of the experimental laboratory. It is a fact that all great psychoanalytic discoveries were first of all felt from within. For a reason which we shall presently discuss, this is best seen in some of those writings which do not refer to sweeping theoretical concepts. In Freud's little-known essay on the psychology of "the uncanny" (*das Unheimliche*), he sets out to investigate the experience of the uncanny, or the eerie. The gist of his argument is that we experience all those things as *un*canny which, in the depth of our unconscious, we actually *can* (know). As it often happens, the negation which our conscious employs (the syllable "un") serves only to conceal that which, for some reason, we do not want to see. That which appears as eerie does so because it is the appearance of something which up to that time has led a secret life within us. Freud quotes a lot of literature to substantiate this, particularly examples from one of the poets of the weird and uncanny,

analytic concepts by the way of approximate analogy. When we speak of an "amount of libidinal energy" which is "split off" or "channeled into" something or "sublimated" or "displaced," we use the language of physicists or chemists to make concepts out of something essentially preconceptual. The preconceptual, archaic, infantile world of imagery, which forms the key to the world of neurosis, reminds us of Edgar Allan Poe's "unthought-like thoughts that are the thoughts of thought." Technical terminology for such things at best partakes of the nature of parable. As Karl Jaspers has pointed out, we fool ourselves if we think that the terminology of psychoanalysis really proves that it is something of the same order as physics or chemistry. Actually, there is no such thing as an "amount of libidinal energy" which would fit into a system of references comparable to that of the sciences. Love and hate, joy and mourning cannot be quantified.

Moreover, all those forms of "nonscientific," intuitive knowledge which we have been discussing, are somehow deeply linked up with the world of values. It is noteworthy that Saint Thomas speaks of "knowledge by connaturality" in connection with the moral virtues. A human being has an immediate knowledge of concepts such as chastity, courage, and so on because it is part of human nature to have such knowledge. The Germans introduced the idea of *Einfühlung* before Dilthey, in the time of Herder, in connection with the problem of

beauty. In other words, intuitive and empathic insight get us "mixed up" with values—and anyone who attempts to create something comparable to the experimental sciences will instinctively shy away from all this. It is historically interesting that Jaspers' observation was anticipated a long time ago—in fact, at the very dawn of the psychoanalytical development. When Freud's *Studies on Hysteria* appeared in 1895, they were enthusiastically reviewed by Alfred von Berger, professor of the history of literature at the University of Vienna. The reviewer, who was a poet, critic, and literary historian, remarked that "the theory itself is in fact nothing but the kind of psychology used by poets." He illustrated this by examples from Shakespeare.* In contrast, Krafft-Ebing, who was chairman of the Society of Psychiatry and Neurology in Vienna when Freud read his paper, "The Etiology of Hysteria," in 1896, remarked: "It sounds like a scientific fairy tale." † These were the reactions of the artist on one hand, and the nineteenth-century scientist on the other. It was only by an extraordinary feat of poetic intuition that an entire early world could possibly be opened up, a world which is still far removed from circumscribed concepts, a world of feeling—particularly of proprioceptive, ‡

* Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud.* Basic Books, 1953, Vol. I, p. 253.

† *Ibid.*, p. 263.

‡ "Proprioceptive" are those sensory impressions which arise from within the body, for example, the sense of impressions by which the position of joints, the tension of muscles, etc., are conveyed.

peptic ulcer frequently has certain well-defined characteristics. They are the characteristics of a person of spartan habits, with a high sense of duty, a person who drives himself hard, a giver rather than a receiver in the exchange of life, a person of natural asceticism not infrequently found among hard-working professional people of today. One could leave it at that and say that such a person is apt to eat quickly, is unaccustomed to pay attention to the enjoyment of leisure associated with meals, and is prone to gulp down food without noticing whether it be too hot or too cold. However, careful psychoanalytic studies by Franz Alexander and his school showed that there is something more to it than that. Deep down, without being aware of it, such people have a great need to "receive"; they are people whose hard spartan shell covers a yearning for tenderness and caressing, in other words, a yearning to be *mothered.* It is understandable, on the basis of what we have said about the embryology of love, why the stomach should be the anatomical site in which that conflict manifests itself. The psychoanalytical elucidation of such a case shows that our patient was not quite prepared to be the giver without adequately receiving. From the point of health (wholeness), there was something wrong about his spartanism.

These two examples alone imply the existence of that "world" which corresponds largely to a preverbal stage; at any rate, to a stage in which abstract concepts are

that people do give headaches and pains to one another in quite a literal way. Before the advent of psychosomatic medicine (which can be historically demonstrated to be a direct descendant of psychoanalysis), people would have taken the expression, "He took it too much to heart," as a mild poetic metaphor. Now we know that people do take "it" to their hearts in a literal sense. The way in which we use names of organs in our language reflects the language in which these organs speak to us. All this can obviously have only one meaning: besides the anatomy of Vesalius, another kind of anatomy has always existed. One might call it folklore anatomy; one might call it poetic anatomy. The point is that in a scientific Cartesian world it is only that first kind of anatomy, the anatomy of Vesalius, that counts. The heart is a muscular pump of a certain appearance, a certain weight and a certain mechanism. The psyche, on the other hand, is a universe all by itself. In such a world it is quite impossible that "it" can be taken to heart because "it" and the heart belong to two universes which live side by side without communication. Yet in folklore anatomy, psychophysical unity has always been preserved. And now this psychophysical unity has been rediscovered under the impact of psychoanalysis. The anatomy of folklore spoke of a reality which was forgotten in a Cartesian world. This plane of reality has now been re-entered.

Thus we witness the extraordinary phenomenon that

human soul; but this is expressed in physical forms even down to the life of cells: the lance-shaped, mobile spermatozoon pierces the ovum.

Another example is that of the experience of birth. There are numerous examples to indicate that the mere act of being born is associated with anxiety. To leave the sheltering womb, to change from the passivity of placental nourishment to the act of breathing is a tremendous revolution. The first breath we breathe is associated with primeval anxiety. Being born means accepting something new and unknown and leaving security irretrievably behind. Here, too, there exists a continuum of images from the primeval carnal experience, which we all share, to thousands of other forms of being born. The idea of the Masculine and Feminine in us has been profoundly elaborated by Jung in his idea of *Animus* and *Anima*. The idea of the experience of birth has been elaborated by Otto Rank. Both are, in a sense, elaborations of Freudian concepts. What characterizes Freud's approach is the insistence on going through that continuum of images down to the soil—that is, to the carnal archaic experience in its concrete immediacy—if one wants really to understand a psychic disturbance and do anything about it. Quite irrespective of the validity of this, it is historically most remarkable and it is certainly no coincidence that in a world of mechanistic concepts and abstractions, the

way for us to experience light. Newton created our currently accepted theory of colors. Goethe, who was in a continuous revolt against the rationalism of the eighteenth century, evolved another theory of colors which is nonmathematical and "naive"; it is more of a physiology of colors. No physicist takes Goethe's theory seriously. Goethe fought an almost Quixotic battle against the theory of Newton. He never came to admit that reality can be presented on different planes, and in each single instance the presentation is true.

Newtonian light, the light of primary sensory experience, and the "metaphoric" light of Platonists and poets and of Saint John ("in Him was life, and the life was the light of men and the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it"), are three different aspects of the same thing. Now the first aspect does not exist in the world of the unconscious. There we encounter only the light of immediate sensory experience, and the setting in which we encounter it is such that it is intimately associated with the third aspect, the spiritual light, the light of the poetic metaphor. Here the reality of logical abstraction does not play any role; on the other hand, the two other levels (sensory imagery and its metaphoric "sphere") penetrate one another to a degree which is known to us only from poetry.

Our modern mind is such that deep down we harbor some sort of hierarchy of realities: we more or less feel

movement up into one hundred thousand or one million "stills," but the movement itself, the process of becoming, is more than a sequence of one million simple phases—it is a flow in which the end (tree) is already contained in the beginning (acorn). Or, differently expressed, the acorn contains a potential principle which points beyond itself toward the tree.

One may assume that most embryologists of the nineteenth century had the characteristic positivist outlook of the scientists of their time; in that case, they had, strictly speaking, chosen the wrong field. If when asked, "Why are you studying all these various phases in the life of the embryo?" the student answers, "Because I am interested in the way the finished human form comes into being," he has confessed to a metaphysical outlook, whether he knows it or not. He implies a *design*. However, in the case of an embryologist of the body this is not so obvious, and one can perhaps disguise it. Not so in the case of an embryologist of the psyche. The moment we introduce the Freudian ontogenetic principle into psychology, we leave the world of experimental psychology with its stopwatches, tape measures and graphs behind, and enter the world of an *unfolding form*. It is easy for an embryologist to find a title for his story. He might call it, "From the primitive cell to the human body." For a man who writes on the development of the person it is much more difficult to find an appropriate title: "From primitive nar-

with hostility by their fellows. Indeed, there seems to be an element of hostility and destructiveness in all materialist and reductive philosophers. There is an element of spite in debunking. Max Scheler and, even more so, Gabriel Marcel have emphasized how full of resentment the Marxists are when they indulge in their philosophy of "nothing but." This view is not completely justified. Both Marx and Freud were sensitive to the lies and the hypocrisy of the society in which they lived. The "nothing but," with all its crude materialism, implies apart from the *ressentiment* a moral movement, a holy impatience, something of the prophetic spirit of the Old Testament. If Marx, instead of saying, "Religion is nothing but the opiate of the people," had told some of the members of the ruling class of the early industrialist period, "Woe unto you who use religion as an opiate for the people," he would have had a strong point. Many people, from the Prophet Isaiah to Léon Bloy, have said the same thing. If Freud had told some of his patients, "What you call religion is actually your neurosis," instead of claiming that religion *is* a neurosis, he would have stated a frequently observed truth. If they are taken in the proper spirit, the debunkers fulfill an important function. They stir us out of our complacency. We see so frequently in practice that "religion" is unconsciously used as a channel of aggressiveness. The Reverend Mr. Davidson, in Somerset Maugham's *Rain*, is a famous example of something

which, unfortunately, is commonplace. It is also possible that a young woman who joins a religious community which occupies itself particularly with unmarried mothers may be in an inner state which makes her unable to provide motherly or sisterly love to such girls; she may enter on this path not in a spirit of charity but, unknowingly, out of unresolved conflicts which make for cruelty. Of course, common sense has always known about this. Such things have recently provided themes, perhaps influenced by psychoanalysis, for Catholic novelists. What should be emphasized here is the fact that the "nothing but," though philosophically wrong, contains a movement toward moral purification.

This point is closely related to something else. Anyone who has been able to gain psychoanalytic insight must feel humbled. A gaze into the interior reveals a great deal of frailty of which we have never been aware. A parade of human misery files past in our clinics, suicide and murder, cynicism and despair, drunkenness and promiscuity, miserliness and suspicion—and all the time you feel: "But for a trivial difference of circumstances, not at all merited, there go I." The moral values have not changed. But it has become quite difficult for one to feel superior. As a matter of fact, according to psychoanalytical teaching you have to know your own depth first to be able to help these people precisely

because they represent your own latent possibilities. This is a challenge to Christian consciousness.

It is also the reason why, if somebody's moral philosophy is based on the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the acquaintance with psychoanalysis often deepens his natural charity. The judge of a juvenile court, a man of deep religious convictions, once told me how his attitude toward the delinquent had changed ever since he had taken instruction in the psychology of his young defendants. This instruction had been given to him by a professor of psychology, a Dominican priest who was psychoanalytically oriented. The judge told me that he used to be rigid and dry, relying on the letter of the law, in his attitude toward the youngsters. In retrospect it seemed to him that he had gotten nowhere. This man, who goes into meditation before each court session, told me that now he *understood* and tried to love these young people. When he talked to them, it was as if he felt what they must be feeling. He said that the result of his work was so much enhanced that it now seemed as different as day from night. A Catholic psychoanalyst from France once remarked that his charity was enormously deepened ever since he himself had been analyzed. This has nothing to do with moral relativism; it means only that the hard soil of receptivity has been plowed and enriched.

From what we have said in this chapter two things have become clear. First, psychoanalysis contains pre-

cious elements which point in the direction of a Christian personalism. In order to see this one has to divest it of the philosophy of its founder, and of all the accretions which have been gathering to imbed it in the current of "the third revolution." Second, while no psychological discovery, however startling, can undo or reshape Christian values, on the plane of practical exigencies—in the educational field, in the field of therapy, and so on—those who regard the Gospel as the basis for their lives can only gain from all genuine discoveries. For the rest of this book, we shall enlarge on these two points.

without the least sign of bad conscience. There lies a mystery.

The problem of guilt is inextricably interwoven with the problem of anxiety.

A student nurse was so tense and anxious that she found herself unable to go on with her studies. Whenever she was called to the office of the head nurse, the superintendent of nursing, or in fact any woman who was above her in the hierarchy of nursing, she developed a rapid pulse, her knees began to shake, her voice became hoarse, she grew pale and her eyes had a fearful expression. This reaction did not develop because of an expected reproach; it accompanied any routine call. Nor did it depend on whether there was anything severe or forbidding in her superior's manner. The girl was intelligent and pleasant, and her record at the nursing school was good. Yet she felt that her reaction was uncontrollable and that it was sufficient reason for her to stop her career. It did not take long to find out that any female person in authority unconsciously represented a maternal image to the patient. Any maternal image inspired fear. But the true origin of fear was the girl's own hostile reaction to the mother, a reaction of which she had never become conscious and which she had never resolved.

In following the case only to this point, we see three things: the reaction of fear in the absence of objective

danger; the fact that the feared object represents something else in disguise—namely, some archaic image which must be endowed with extraordinary power; and a poorly controlled force within the anxious subject.

What does this mean? The word fear is used by psychologists to connote the reaction of the organism to danger. If one walks alone in the forest and is confronted by a wild animal, one experiences the emotional state called "fear," and at the same time one has all the physical symptoms which our student nurse reported. The skin is pale, the mouth feels dry, the heart beats fast, the knees shake, the pupils dilate, one may have a tendency to empty bowels and bladder. If the blood could be examined biochemically at that moment, one would discover certain things in addition, such as the fact that the blood sugar is rising. The great American physiologist Cannon has developed a widely known hypothesis concerning this reaction. He drew people's attention to the fact that all these autonomic * reactions are controlled by the medulla of the adrenal gland and the sympathetic nervous system. Then he stated hypothetically that the entire reaction had a teleological significance or, in other words, a meaningful purpose. The "meaning" of this reaction, according to Cannon, is

* "Autonomic" because most of these reactions cannot be controlled by our intention. You can willfully open or close your fist, but you cannot willfully make your pupils wider or narrower, your heart beat faster, etc.

ent. Our student nurse behaves *as if* there were a tiger in the underbrush, or *as if* there were a gunman waiting in the dark. It is one of the merits of Freud to have shown that a danger actually does exist in these situations. However, contrary to the reaction of normal fear in man, the source of danger lies not in the outside world but within the depth of the person. The situation of the student nurse is somewhat similar to those picture puzzles we used to study when we were children. A pen and ink drawing of many intricate lines would be presented with a caption: "Where is the tiger?" or "Where is the dog?" or "Where is the child?" Only after studying the drawing from many angles did the missing figure become discernible. Our student nurse who experiences all of Cannon's symptoms poses the question: "Where is the tiger?"

Psychoanalytic theory claims *the tiger must be somewhere.* Since we cannot see him, we must look for him, in contrast to the situation described in the famous poem, inside the lady. Consider this extraordinary phenomenon. Not only is there an aspect to the reaction of fear which makes it appear anachronistic, even under the circumstances of objective danger—as if the human organism had to repeat reactions which at one time were meaningful—but there is the further element that our young lady reacts to an image of her inner reality, an image which looms in the subterranean layers of her

at an awkward moment in the history of her family. After the three girls one child, the boy, would have been enough—to put it in a way in which it was probably never consciously formulated by anyone in the family. As is well known, parents' feelings at the arrival of children are not always feelings of love and acceptance. There is a great body of scientific evidence to prove the Freudian contention (originally an hypothesis) that the mother's anxiety and the mother's ambivalent feelings during the early phase of feeding has a decisive influence on the world of feelings in which the child finds himself when grown up. According to that Freudian "embryology," the earliest fantasies of destruction are those associated with biting and swallowing. In our patient's setting all the food of love had to go for two, and it is not difficult to see the point in psychoanalytical theory. Eating together is the oldest symbol of fraternal love; Plato's *Symposium* is the love-feast par excellence. Yet it was just the idea of the shared meal which struck terror into our patient's heart, so that she began to tremble at the approach of the situation. This interpretation was borne out by the material she provided under treatment. That world of troglodytes, with its law of "devour or be devoured," is potentially slumbering in all of us. Her particular history had been such that this law still entered into her relationship with other people. Incidentally, the story of her "foreigner complex" also becomes more understandable: the fact that in early

of sedatives. Even then he often had to leave the meeting in an inner state of panic after ten minutes, using any excuse which came to mind. During the war he had some important government function besides his business and at times he would be summoned on short notice to go somewhere by plane. It was often necessary for him to refuse. While his history was being taken he suddenly said: "I am going to tell you something you ought perhaps to know. I've never told this to anybody before. . . ." He had grown up in the north of England under very poor circumstances. His father had been a peddler. "I used to get along well with my father, I think, but one day we had a most awful row, and I told him I wished he were dead. And the most extraordinary thing happened. That very day my father went out and never returned. He was drowned in the moors."

Without going into the remaining details of this man's history, something should be mentioned at this point. We not infrequently see men who suffer from what one might call "fear of success." Just when they are at the height of their career, they do something to fail; they engineer this failure with the sureness of a sleepwalker and one can often show conclusively that the failure has been engineered as a kind of atonement. In these cases success, in the language of their unconscious, means a tremendous aggression against the father, and failure is an irrational penance which is attained with an inner necessity which is startling. This

psychological material, and it is of no particular interest to us at this moment.

These three examples all have certain features in common. As I have already indicated above, they all refer to a world of archaic imagery. This world, which is fantastic compared to the world of objective reality in which the adult moves, is at the same time purely concrete; it consists only of somatic and spatial concreteness. One could say that "guilt" is actually an abstract concept, and in such a world of early fantasy the abstract concept has no place.

Secondly, the fantasy of aggression and destruction on one hand, and the fantasy of punishment on the other are so intricately interlaced that it is hard to say what is actually the source of anxiety. After working with these patients, one is almost tempted to say that it is purely academic to know which it is that inspires anxiety—grinding the brother up or being ground up, outdoing the father or being outdone. The fact that in the beginning there is no abstract concept, but merely a spatial and somatic image, with certain physiological equivalents—is again apparent in the etymology of many words. For example, *remorse* is, literally speaking, "that which *bites back.*" The reversal of oral aggression, as the earliest and crudest prototype of that which we later call guilt, is clearly expressed in this. Remorse, in that naked somatic sense, is never experienced by a healthy person. Only our lady who was ter-

rified of eating in the presence of other people experienced *remorse* on that level of primeval concreteness.

Thirdly, if we interpret the three instances as instances of self-punishment, we see another remarkable feature: in objective reality there is either nothing, or very little, to punish. The patient is afraid of a danger which does not really exist, and this danger represents a punishment for something he desired to do but never did. The widow who broke down with morbid delusions of guilt after her husband's death felt guilty about a harmless incident with one of her husband's friends thirty years before. Psychoanalysis would demonstrate (in cases in which analytical investigation is possible) that at that time she most probably had strong temptations which were repressed. Under certain psychological constellations, repressed wishes evoke more violent guilt feelings than many real acts which, from the point of view of Christian morality, are objectively wrong. In the case of our widow, we also see that that force which produces the experience of guilt in her, has a quality which one might call *maximalism* if this word were not already used for something else. In the fantasy of these patients, nothing short of complete and utter annihilation will do for atonement, and no forgiveness is possible. This becomes quite clear in psychotic depressions. But even in the two cases of phobia (fear of eating and of height), the anxiety has this "all-out" quality. True guilt is related to debt. In several lan-

fession, and has to make it over and over again. Or he has to repeat a certain prayer over and over, because something may have been wrong with it. One peculiar aspect of compulsions is that the patient has partial or full insight: he knows that the act he feels compelled to carry out is "crazy," and yet the compelling force seems irresistible. Moreover, when he makes an effort to resist the compulsion (for example, if he tries hard *not* to count the windows), he is filled with anxiety which gradually mounts until he carries his ritual out; then a momentary relief from tension follows until the first faint impulse appears again.

Closely related to those compulsive states are cases of a "compulsive character," as they are commonly called. These people, unlike compulsive-obsessive neurotics, do not suffer subjectively and would never seek the help of a psychiatrist. Everybody knows someone of a compulsive character in his own personal experience. The office manager cannot begin his work in the morning unless three sharpened pencils lie in parallel arrangement on the right side of the blotter, the calendar is at the left top side of the blotter, the files are clipped together in sequence, and there is a perfectly clean sheet of blotting paper. If any of these things is not "just so," the manager is disturbed; he is either unable to work, or he starts off the day on the wrong foot. It is often difficult for this type of person to regard his work as finished because there are always a few minor

of one's consciousness as a recipient. The great French psychiatrist Pierre Janet, the most important forerunner of Freud, called people with compulsive-obsessive symptoms *psychasthenic*. This expression implied that their psyche was too weak to prevent certain thoughts from intruding. It even implied that the healthy psyche is strong enough to keep those thoughts "out," but that they are potentially there to pounce on it. This concept of Janet's conjures up an image of consciousness comparable to a torch-lit camp in the jungle surrounded by animals prowling in the dark, and ready to intrude the moment the fire goes out and the defenses are weakened.

When we contemplate the *content* of these symptoms, we make a simple observation. These examples of compulsive acts all resemble penances. An overstrict parent or a cruel headmaster could say: "You go back and do these stairs over again, and woe unto you if there is even a suspicion you might have touched one of the steps in between! You'll have to do them all over again. . . ." Or, "I want you to count all the windows and don't dare miss one before you come home." How horrible, you would say, to encounter in reality a person who imposes such penances on a child. And yet the majority of people (perhaps everybody) carry such a person around, in potential latent form, inside themselves.

There is nothing punitive about obsessive thoughts,

however. On the contrary, it is as if something which is not tamed at all welled up in the patient. In fact, they simply express crude unbridled aggression. In the language of psychoanalysis, such thoughts originate in the "area" of the unconscious which is called the *id.* The compelling thoughts which resemble penances arise from that area of the unconscious which is called the *superego.*

There is a good deal of confusion regarding the nature of the superego in psychoanalytical literature and in textbooks. Freud himself was not consistent throughout his life when it came to these concepts which he had created. The triad by which the human person is represented in a schematic diagram (superego, ego, id) may have to be discarded again in a hundred years. Nevertheless, as a diagram which enables us to explain phenomena, it is indispensable. The situation is comparable to that created by the physicist Bohr in his planetary model of the atom. Subsequent studies showed that things were more complicated; yet many discoveries in atomic physics were based on Bohr's concept of a nucleus which corresponds to the sun and electrons which correspond to the planets.

Some of the textbooks, particularly some of the popular writings on psychoanalysis, state flatly that the word superego is just another word for conscience. Some statements of Freud would lead to the same assumption.

However, consider the examples which we have dis-

cussed in this chapter: the girl who is stricken by terror at the idea of eating in the presence of others; the man who is seized by panic while he is "high up"; the young man who in his dream vision (and in the agony of his waking hours) pays dearly for having rebelled against the father; those who are compelled to go through painful bizarre compulsive rituals. The stage on which all their dramas of fear and penance are played differs from the world of Good and Evil, from the world of virtue and wickedness of which Plato and Aristotle speak, as a nightmare differs from the mild light of day in which the objects of wakeful reality are bathed. One of the keenest and most decisive intuitions of Freud is the fact, so easily discernible in the examples quoted above, that the currents emanating from the primitive superego have much in common with our instinctual drives.

The young lady with the eating phobia does not really expect punishment (as our reason conceives of this idea). To her, it is just a crude, brutal question of eating or being eaten. The compulsive patient does not really undergo penance, as our reason understands the word. He experiences a seemingly irresistible urge which leads to mounting tension. The tension is temporarily relieved when the urge is satisfied but it soon returns like the first pianissimo of a slow crescendo. The eating phobia, the phobia of heights, the compulsive acts all have the earmarks of blind force and of

cruelty. With regard to our two phobic patients, I have said that the act of aggression (eating; killing) and the act of atonement (being eaten; falling) penetrate one another. They are interchangeable. They represent drives, except that in the fantasy of atonement the drive is centripetal instead of centrifugal, so to speak: it is a "drive" all right, but turned against the person himself. We understand why compulsive acts resembling penance, and obsessive thoughts resembling aggression, are so often found in one and the same patient. As we have said, the patient's self resembles a campfire weakly protected against animals prowling in the dark. But the species of prowlers is irrelevant: the patient cannot resist the urge either to self-punitive or to aggressive thoughts. The famous French psychiatrist Henri Ey objects to the term superego. The prefix "super," he says, is misleading. Actually the archaic infantile imagery of punishment is on the same level as the untamed animal of aggressiveness. In his diagram the superego and the id are on the same level. They surround reason on all sides.

What then is the difference between guilt and neurotic guilt? The concept of guilt is closely associated with the concept of justice. Guilt has the quality of proportion.* The greater your wrong, the guiltier you are. There is something about this proportion which can

* As Aristotle has pointed out so beautifully, ethics is related to harmony.

almost be quantified. If you find and keep a hundred dollars which belongs to your neighbor, common sense would say that you are much guiltier than if you took a couple of postage stamps from him without returning them. A compulsive-obsessive ("scrupulous") person may feel guiltier for not having returned a couple of postage stamps than a man convicted of the theft of one hundred dollars. Secondly, objective guilt can be assuaged. Like debt, to which it is related, it can be paid. Neurotic guilt is insatiable. You cannot appease it. You cannot pay it off. Thirdly, objective guilt does not necessarily depend on emotion. A man may regard himself as guilty and be perfectly relaxed about it. Neurotic guilt is so inextricably interwoven with anxiety, that that which is experienced subjectively is at times only the anxiety without conscious feelings of guilt. Finally (and this is related to point number one) neurotic guilt is related to repressed drives just as much as to realized acts. Objective guilt refers to realized acts only.

All this points in favor of those who draw a clear line between conscience on one hand and the primitive superego on the other. The former is the product of consciousness and the light of reason; the latter is unconscious—it becomes consciously manifest only in a masked form. Conscience has all the characteristics of human reason, primarily those of harmony and of proportion; the superego is originally related to primitive libidinal drives. Conscience is associated with

wise self-restraint; the superego is related to blind self-destructiveness. Basically no dread is involved in conscience; the superego, with its element of back-firing aggression, pulsates with anxiety. To be sure, positive elements enter into the formation of the superego at a later stage of the child's development. But conscience contains something which transcends our psychological data.

In a previous chapter we indicated that there is a basic difference between the embryology of the personality as conceived by Freud, and the embryology of the human body as studied by the anatomist. The organs, in their post-uterine shape, have normally lost their embryonic structure once and for all; while psychic functions of the highest order, such as *agape* and conjugal love, seem to retain in a shadowy and latent form all the previous archaic phases of libido, and there is a continuous possibility of regression. Something similar seems to exist as far as the relationship between conscience and superego is concerned, with the possibility of reverting back to archaic levels, and the possibility of a penetration of the archaic into the mature structure.

The cases which I chose to illustrate our argument were somewhat extreme and had a strongly clinical flavor. There are innumerable borderline problems which indicate more clearly the penetration of sublayers into the area which we call conscience. These

Don Bosco or Saint Francis of Assisi or Saint John of the Cross? Because their asceticism was, within the hierarchy of the personality, in the place where it belonged. In other words, it was subordinated to charity.

This then seems to be part of the Christian tragedy: guilt reaches into the transcendental above and the temporal-accidental below. Just as love, on the natural plane, has a forerunner in an element of crude possessiveness, the moral idea has a forerunner in an element of dumb fear. Psychoanalytically speaking, every man is his own primitive ancestor. In order to face his guilt in the light of the Gospel, the neurotic has to be freed from the dim, wordless anxiety which is the mark of slavery and which derives from a world without freedom. Neurotic guilt is ancestral. It stems not only from an infantile archaic world; it is not only of the biological order. It keeps us imprisoned in a pre-Christian pagan circle.

In an unredeemed world, guilt is deadweight. All it can do is pull down. In the world of the Gospel, guilt is no longer deadweight; it becomes building material. In Greek tragedy, the guilty man is haunted by the Furies. Guilt is purely of the past, it follows from behind, it does not beckon from in front. It is part of a world of binding necessity, not of free motivation.

When Saint Paul confronts fear and love, he is not merely talking history but he is saying something ontological. In our relationship with Christ, the sense of sin

formation, the genetic principle. The question of the formation of personality in itself has strong moral implications. Consider the *diversity* of character—people as different as Hamlet and Falstaff, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, Alyosha Karamazov and Smerdiakov, Faust and Wagner! How does character ("a person's moral and mental make-up") come about?

This question can be approached in two ways. One can group people *statically* into certain types and have it over with, or one can attempt *dynamically* to trace the development of traits back to a meeting of two currents: formative forces from within and formative forces from without.

The static attitude is a tacitly assumed premise in many books on characterology. The four classical temperaments (sanguine, melancholic, choleric, and phlegmatic), which played so considerable a role in antiquity and the Middle Ages, formed a static concept. People were pigeon-holed. If in those days one had known the laws of heredity and chromosomes, one would undoubtedly have assumed that temperaments were produced very much as are colors of eyes, pigment, and hair. The same attitude is implicit in more recent so-called typologies, such as the one introduced by Kretschmer and later confirmed in a modified form by Sheldon. Kretschmer was struck by the fact that certain forms of insanity do not affect people at random, on the basis of chance occurrence. He found that mentally healthy

should form part of a current which reacted against the rationalism of the eighteenth century. The body is not conscious; it forms part of our "unconscious." The idea that that which is unconscious should express in its form something psychic is quite alien to the spirit of the eighteenth century. The work of Kretschmer and Sheldon in our century was a scientific step in that Goethean direction. However, even their work, particularly that of Kretschmer, is similar to that of the classical biologist who was mainly interested in description and classification.

It is interesting that all typologies should be so suggestive. No matter how one classifies people, whether into the four categories of antiquity; or the two categories of Kretschmer (schizothymic and cyclothymic); or the two categories of Jung (intravert and extravert); or many others, one begins to see such types. For this reason it seems easy to establish a new series of types and make them famous. After studying Kretschmer, you find offices or restaurants crowded with Kretschmerian types. After reading Jung, or one of the typologies created by famous educational psychologists, you begin to see their respective types all over the place. You wonder why you never saw them before. The danger in all this pigeonholing is that it robs the personality of its mystery, of the uniqueness which is wrought in all human development.

Parallel with a static way of looking at human char-

acter (the view of the butterfly collector) is the dynamic trend. This is contained in Goethe's expression, *"geprägte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt."* * It is this dynamic approach to the formation of character which attracts the Catholic philosopher. Life with the Gospel and the sacraments implies development. On the natural plane we have to distinguish between two things in the psychology of development. There are *conscious* mechanisms, which are dealt with in works on educational psychology, all the way from Plato to our time. And there are *unconscious* mechanisms. It is here that psychoanalysis has contributed a great wealth of observation. In this connection, we shall deal particularly with the phenomenon of identification, as understood by the psychoanalysts, and the mechanisms related to it.

I have already indicated that the borderlines of the archaic ego are not clearly defined. During the earliest phase of feeding, we are something like an extension of the mother, or the mother is an extension of us. This is the time when, in our fantasy, either the living objects in our surroundings are incorporated and swallowed by us, or we are swallowed and incorporated by them. After all, in the earliest phase of our life the main relationship between us and the world of objects is one of intake and elimination. If you grant the existence of a pre-

* Form imposed, yet livingly evolving.

verbal, preconceptual world in which the somatic and psychic are still *one*, an undissociated and undifferentiated form (and all the facts of observation point at the existence of this world), then you will understand why there is at that stage such an extraordinarily intimate exchange between us and the personalities with whom we are in contact. They become food for our growth, or we become engulfed by them, or we expel them. But the relationship which we have on our conscious, rational, grown-up level—such as choosing our friends, and keeping them at distances graded according to our sympathy—this is not possible. Walter de la Mare's observation on Miss T.,

> *It's a very odd thing,*
> *As odd as can be,*
> *That whatever Miss T. eats*
> *Turns into Miss T.,*

is not necessarily true with regard to our psychic growth —not according to Freud, at least. Here the process is rather reversed. Miss T. turns into that which she eats.

If this is true it means that the mechanism of imitation, which is so important in the formation of the personality and in education generally, is preceded by some sort of archaic forerunner, a process for which the word "imitation" is misleading because it implies the conscious and intentional. The term "identification" is much better. Particularly in the early infantile phase

the mechanism of identification is on a primitive, vegetative plane—something comparable to biochemical assimilation. Mechanisms of identification which are characteristic of later phases of childhood are more active and are associated with a greater detachment from the object of identification. But even these mechanisms are still quite remote from conscious intentional imitation.

On this basis, Freud's concept of "pseudo-heredity" becomes understandable. By pseudo-heredity is meant the fact that a resemblance in character between child and parent is not necessarily due to a transmission of traits through chromosomes but may come about in a purely psychic way, i.e., precisely through identification. Proofs of the mechanism of pseudo-heredity are encountered daily in our work. In one of the Social Welfare Agencies there was a woman whose only child, a young man of twenty-three, disappeared without a trace. Seventeen years before, her husband had done the same. Needless to say, she was heartbroken; she did not even know whether her son was still alive. It seemed incredible that this experience should happen under identical circumstances twice in her lifetime! Every psychiatrist has seen several cases of a similar constellation of circumstances. It is highly unlikely that there should be a sex-linked quality of "running-away-from-home-without-a-trace" anchored in the chromosomes, which would manifest itself regardless of outer circumstances. Without further investigation one can-

not exclude the fantastic possibility of such a mechanical transmission of destinies. But *with* further investigation one finds that everything points in the direction of "pseudo-heredity" or identification in the sense in which Freud has used these terms.

There are a few noteworthy points about this story. It is obvious that this boy did not sit down at an early age and plan to do what his father did, once he grew up. From other similar situations it is not even likely that he consciously imitated his father's action when he did so, at the age of twenty-three. Moreover, it is likely that the mother unconsciously repeated something in her attitude which prompted the son to run away. He re-enacted a drama, and she may have contributed her role to the re-enactment. In other words, this is not an imitation of the father's action in the sense in which actors re-enact the assassination of Julius Caesar on the stage. It is much less conscious and planned than that, much less intellectual and arbitrary. There is more of a "must" in it; it is more "biological." Yet it is less biological than if it were really anchored in the chromosomes in such a way that it would have to roll off the tape quite mechanically and independent of outer circumstances, as we see it in certain hereditary illnesses.

Again we have entered a strange layer of the psychic, a realm in which freedom is not the same as in deliberate planning and yet is not excluded as in a machine. Contrary to those processes which are laid down in the

chromosomes and roll off the tape, we can *get at* this process of pseudo-hereditary destiny in the psychoanalytic situation and modify it.

To illustrate the meaning of identification in the Freudian sense, we have chosen an example of abnormality because it lends itself exceptionally well to this purpose. The mechanism of identification is just as important, however, for the understanding of the normal growth of the personality. Under normal circumstances the Oedipus conflict is solved by a healthy identification of the boy with the father. The father changes from a rival into a model. In order to attain to the love and admiration of the mother the boy must become like the father. For this reason the boy goes, or rather under normal circumstances should go, through a phase during which he patterns himself after the father. This phase of the father model or father hero replacing the father rival has its greatest significance from around the age of four well into pre-puberty, around the age of twelve.

In girls this development is more complex and less well understood. The original profound maternal identification, or rather undissolved maternal union, through which we all pass is in girls replaced by a phase during which the father is an object of love, the prototype of all masculine love objects which are later to come. After this, also chiefly during the latent phase, the healthy girl should go through a second phase of identification

to achieve sexual gratification at all, she has to re-enact a scene of violence.

In both these examples the mother with whom the patient identifies is symbolized by something which corresponds to an early ontogenetic image. Moreover, in each of these two cases the patient *shares the fate* of the mother, she identifies with a mother *to whom something happens.* Nevertheless it should be noted that the mechanisms are different. In the first case the patient is passively engulfed by something which might destroy her. In the second case the patient dives actively into that same thing—a gesture of hiding from danger, at the same time a gesture by which she becomes subject to danger.

In the case of male juvenile delinquents we not infrequently see that there has never been any wholesome identification with the father, or with any paternal figure. Deep down the patient is still strongly identified with the mother and is simply terrified of that tender core, and fights it with all his might. He becomes destructive and brutal. He "acts" tough and hard because, deep down, there is no genuine toughness and hardness in him. The best thing which can happen in cases like this is that, while we are working with the patient, he goes through all the vicissitudes of transference, hostility, and love—until he begins to identify with the physician. What happens is a delayed process of something which should have happened before, in the nat-

ural setting of the family. In the English language the word "role" has several meanings. In cases like these juvenile delinquents, the patient actually develops from role-playing toward an acceptance of his role in life.

It should not surprise us to find that the process of identification in the language of the unconscious is often symbolized by the putting on of clothes. A sixteen-year-old girl who had never identified in a positive, healthy way with her mother and who was always in search of her place in life as a woman, produced repeatedly during the analysis a dream in which she was choosing clothes in a ladies' store. She would waver between tweed suits on the one hand, and cocktail dresses and evening gowns on the other.

We see in these last examples that the person is no longer suffering, through identification, from what happened to someone else but is actively following someone else's pattern. He is no longer a victim, but a follower; he is no longer being molded, but he models himself.

It is obvious that a lot of what goes wrong with people is due to what goes wrong with the process of identification. It happens quite frequently that a boy is not able to dissolve his identification with the mother. This may be due to fear of the father, or it may be due to the fact that the father is not close enough to the child. In order to facilitate a strong identification with the father, the latter must be the son's friend. There

which has been kept from them. In such cases the child's unconscious is the closet which contains the parents' skeleton.

The trouble is that, in the world of our infantile ego, there is something like a law of "all or none." To us grownups there are very clear gradations of hostility: some unhappy marriages are less unhappy than others. The child's dim, prehistoric experience of hostility is frequently bizarre, blown-up and distorted. There are two huge troglodytic images—one of an aggressor and one of a victim. Both images are over-life-size, and have an all-out quality, perhaps more so the earlier the imprint is made. A lot of the sadistic pattern with which some people walk through life is caused by the aggressor whom they have "taken in" at an early phase. A lot of the masochistic pattern of others is due to the fact that they are permanently identified with the victim.

To what extent does a child really identify himself with what he grasps intellectually in the image of a person? To what extent do those features enter which lie underneath the threshold of rational understanding—all that which is lived, but not communicated? These are questions difficult to answer in any given case. Some years ago a young man of eighteen was treated who presented the classical picture of the so-called "asocial psychopath." He played the role of a big shot, and in order to attain this purpose he swindled, embezzled, forged checks and traveled under assumed high-sound-

on the son's development. Such a rift between outer appearance and inner character exists in many of us. Many psychologists have made a distinction between "social ego" and ego proper, between "role" and person. Jung called the social ego *persona* in contrast to personality. The word *persona* is derived from the concept of the mask. The actors on the stage of ancient Rome wore masks with mouthpieces through which the words sounded (*per-sonare*). The person in his social role is often quite different from the person as he appears in his intimate life. Many people become more dependent on their own *persona.* Their social ego, their role as bank president or railway conductor, has the same function as the exterior skeleton in crustaceae. They are so united to their social ideal that they would collapse, and very little would remain, if one robbed them of their position in society. Children's growing selves are quite sensitive to this discrepancy. By a number of factors they become identified with social ideals rather than with human beings of flesh and blood.

Tragic examples of this were encountered in our work in an Old Age Counseling Service which was run in association with social welfare agencies. We saw old ladies emerging from the poorest downtown rooming areas of Montreal, speaking and moving in the manner of the Edwardian drawing room, lavender scent and all. One elderly bachelor appeared with double-breasted suit, wore his pince-nez attached to a black cord, and

addressed me in a peculiarly stilted manner. Two days after the first interview, I received a letter indicating his address in a manner which somehow succeeded in imitating the formal letterheads of the upper-class society of his childhood days. He indicated to me in a few lines how pleased he was to have obtained insight into my work—the sort of note the Governor General of Canada might have written. This man, who was on the point of starvation, came from a family which forty years before had been close to the Prime Minister, and which entertained on Sunday afternoons in their home a young student who himself was later to become Prime Minister.

My first impression on encountering these people was that I was dealing with what is called "genteel poverty." I felt that they overemphasized their higher social origin because of the humiliating situation of receiving "charity," and hence the lavender scent and the formal letters of acknowledgment. On studying these cases more closely, however, I discovered that the situation was almost the reverse: they did not re-enact the Edwardian drawing room because they received public assistance—they had become recipients of public assistance because they kept up the Edwardian drawing room. It could be shown in every one of these cases that quite early in childhood the person had identified himself strongly with the *persona,* the social role and the social ideals of a parent, that his entire attitude toward

life had become unrealistic or, it might be better said, un-real. It was exceedingly difficult to approach these clients psychotherapeutically, not only because of their advanced age but because it was well-nigh impossible to penetrate the mask and meet the human being. They were culturally displaced persons; one had the feeling of encountering petrifactions.

During the process of identification children absorb, as if by osmosis, our sense of values. If our scale of values is that of an external hierarchy, our children cannot grow. Nobody can grow on synthetic stuff. Saint John of the Cross said that "ambition in the hierarchy is an abomination before God," and this applies not only to ecclesiastical hierarchy but to social hierarchies in general.

The importance of the good example and model in education has always been known. The new vista opened up by psychoanalysis is the mechanism by which that which is not expressed in words communicates itself. Here is something like an embryology of learning; a scale that reaches from the quasi-mystic participation of the infant in the person of the mother into later phases, in which that which is not spoken and even withheld or disguised is nevertheless effective; a dynamic interchange between parent and child which reaches very far beyond the borders of consciousness.

Freud has remarked how baffling it is to see patients go through life relentlessly haunted by a cruel, puni-

tive superego while it is clear that their parents were anything but cruel or overdemanding. In these cases, he claimed, it can be shown that the parents themselves had a powerful, morbid superego. This element did not overtly enter into the upbringing of the children. Nevertheless the child adopts, as if by silent agreement, that part of the parent's personality.

A lady of sixty-three was treated for a serious state of melancholia. She suffered from bizarre delusions of guilt. She was convinced she was condemned to eternal perdition because of "impure thoughts." Some time before she had acutely broken down, she had developed involved compulsive rituals which forced her to go on praying all night until she was exhausted and fell asleep in the morning. Like so many patients of this kind, she paced restlessly up and down the ward and would speak of nothing but hellfire. The most pertinent fact about her childhood history was the loss of her mother in early infancy. The father did not remarry. She described him as a gentle, mild-mannered man who was "very kind" to her. The only distinct episode of her childhood she remembered was a remark made by her father about the question of getting remarried: he felt that, if he remarried, he might bring misfortune to the family. From the way she put it, it was obvious that he did not mean that he might be marrying the wrong woman. He was actually expressing some dark and sinister prophecy that anything which would make life

easier for him would inevitably be followed by disaster. It was precisely this element, and not the kind and loving care of her father, which threatened to destroy her when the forces of her own ego had grown weak.

Thus far we have dealt with the unconscious process of identification only in one direction. In all these episodes, it is the "I" who identified himself with someone. It would need an entire chapter to describe the way in which we unconsciously identify others with others—with persons who at one time, usually in early childhood, played an eminent role in our lives. Compared with the objective reality in which we adults live, the persons of our early life are overcharged with emotional significance. They are larger than life-size. And they have the peculiar property of being able to *stain* the image of persons whom we encounter subsequently. Anyone who has acquired a little knowledge of psychoanalysis, particularly through the reading of popular treatises, knows that a man's choice of a wife is influenced by the character of his mother, his sister, or any woman who was prominent in his childhood. Naturally the same thing holds true with reference to a woman's choice of a husband and her early relationships to male figures. No case of irrational hostility in marriage could be explained without the psychoanalytic theory of interpersonal relationship. It is as if the earliest human figures who surrounded us had been endowed with such affective power that it lasts for a lifetime.

A great deal of our work consists of difficulties of interpersonal relationships—difficulties at work with superiors or with co-workers; or difficulties in the family with one's marital partner or with one's children. Many of these difficulties are not based on the actual data of the objective situation; they are of a neurotic nature. Or they are partly based on the objective situation but they are endowed by the patient with an extra something which is not really there. For example, in the office the boss may be difficult to get along with. But for some peculiar reason the employee, who has to endure this difficulty, seems neither able to dissolve or surmount the relationship nor to stand it. He cracks under it. He has brought a problem of his own into the relationship. Without the employee's knowledge, the boss becomes a figure stained with an affective dye which the employee has carried over from somebody else. He is part of what some German psychoanalysts call the "nest situation." And all figures of the nest situation are *dramatis personae* par excellence. We meet them again and again in the most clever disguises. The word "identification" is possibly wrong in this connection; it might be better to speak of "transference," if this term were not associated with the therapeutic situation.

Thus we see how identification enters into development; the subtle currents by which conscious and unconscious penetrate one another; the analogy which

exists between somatic forms and those forms which are psychic, but not conscious; the extension of the laws of organic growth and the laws of assimilation far beyond the limits of consciousness, into the unfolding of the highest form—the person.

Let us assume that the psychoanalytical observations about the development of the personality are correct; that there really exists an archaic ego which is intertwined with the body image in a way difficult for grownups to define; that there is an early form of identification which is nothing but oral incorporation; that, even later, more mature forms of identification are still related to this psychophysical unit; that identification is something simpler and more intimate, less intellectual and more immediate than intentional imitation.

If all these observations are correct, then Christian philosophy has found support from a most unlikely ally. The entire concept is quite strange to us modern people. We think much too mechanistically. It would not be strange at all to a person brought up in an Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. It presupposes the living idea of a unit of body and mind from which we have become quite alienated by the development of the last few centuries. Of all the psychological systems, this is the one which approximates most closely a parallel to things which are actually of an ontological order. This explains

model. We cannot grow without a trellis. This mechanism is removed from the intimacy of oral incorporation, yet it occurs on a deep level. The dream of the child who tried on many clothes is a frequently occurring pattern. We are in search of a person to put on. But there is an important difference from the role of the actor. We *become* that which we put on.

It almost seems as if Saint Paul knew about the symbols of the unconscious. He speaks of "putting on" Christ. This phase of identification is no less real than the Eucharistic one. It is hard for us ordinary people to realize what it means "to put on" Christ. But we get an idea from the lives of the saints. Incidentally, there is one remarkable feature about this form of identification. Don Bosco was surrounded by children. Saint John of the Cross lived in the night of Gethsemane. Saint Benedict Joseph Labre had no place to rest his head. It is as if each Saint chose one facet of a huge image. We cannot quite think of Saint John of the Cross spending his life with children, or Don Bosco remaining in contemplative solitude. Their gifts were diverse. In this respect we see again that Grace builds on Nature.

At any rate, whether we think of Christ in the sacramental life or of Christ as *causa exemplaris*, the main point of our argument is this: there exists a remarkable analogy between two mechanisms of *becoming*. What depth psychology has discovered about the laws of growth on the natural plane bears an uncanny resem-

"healthier" than most of us; the word "health" is etymologically related to "whole" and to "holy."

Nevertheless there always remains an element of madness in the spiritual encounter. Just think of Abraham, the father of Faith. What would happen today if a man took his son to the summit of a mountain in order to kill him as a sacrifice to God? No matter how much he tried to persuade us that God had told him to do so, we would not hesitate for a moment to treat him as insane. Whenever in the history of revelation man and God meet face to face, as it were, something happens which is not at all normal. This is the sign of paradox which marks the entire story of revelation. Unlike the God of the philosophers, who is an object of demonstration, the God of revelation in His relationship with man does not proceed *more geometrico;* it is a relationship of love. God loves man with the madness of love, and He tries man's love to the point of madness. It is only in this way that we can understand the story of a jealous, angry God of the Old Testament, a God who chooses one particular people from other peoples; a God of whom Abraham is an archetype—yet He really did sacrifice His only Son. It is a mad story, and those who get involved must be affected by divine madness. "God is a devouring fire."

Think what would happen today if a man undressed in the public square, as Saint Francis of Assisi did, and flung his clothes in his father's face. Or consider Saint

of Abraham. This is what he postulated in a living relationship with God. It is a total abandoning, a foolish surrender—from man to God and God to man. The saints move outside the *juste milieu* and belong to what well-integrated bourgeois people call the "lunatic fringe."

Thus we see that clinical concepts which refer to reason and order in the practical things of everyday life lose their significance when we enter the life of the spirit. We have indicated in other places that psychiatry and psychoanalysis are unable to penetrate into the mystery of the Person. Nowhere does this become as apparent as in connection with the supernatural life. The natural sciences and technology occupy themselves with problems; the classical descriptive psychiatrist of the nineteenth century labeled and pigeonholed human beings; the experimental psychologist tests his subject and symbolizes functions in a graph; the psychoanalyst uses a dynamic formula. And all the while the contours of each single human person are far outside the range of comprehension, imperceptibly dissolving into something which is of the metaphysical order.

We have seen that the psychoanalytic approach is more related to a Christian concept of the human person and more akin to the movement of charity, than other psychological methods. Yet when we approach the range of divine folly, the clinical formula fails. And this is a good thing. Man would cease to be man if there

ical schools. This was not only a revolutionary step; in German-speaking countries, it was unique. Even today the psychiatric departments of nearly all German medical schools keep more or less aloof from psychoanalysis. Jung and Freud can be seen together in an early group photograph of the participants at a psychoanalytic convention in Weimar. Soon, however, Jung came to conclusions which varied from classical psychoanalysis so much that a break became inevitable.

In the original Freudian concept, the unconscious contained nothing but repressed material. According to a famous comparison, the Freudian concept of the unconscious resembles an attic into which all those things are stored which cannot be retained elsewhere in the house. The only difference is that what is repressed does not behave like old wicker chairs, bundled letters, or tailors' dummies; it is alive. It makes a noise which often disturbs life in the living room, or it even puts in an appearance at an inconvenient moment. In the course of his work with patients, Jung came to the conclusion that the unconscious contained not only discarded material. It seemed also to contain positive elements which could not be explained on the basis of a mechanism of disposal. Apart from the function of repression, the unconscious seemed to represent a creative principle.

Jung's point of departure was his observation that his patients produced some dream images, daytime fan-

tasies, paintings and verbal utterances which could not be explained on the "discard" principle and which, moreover, bore an extraordinary resemblance to the imagery and symbols of the great religions and of ancient myths and folklore. From this he concluded that we have not only an individual unconscious (which is probably nothing but the lively attic) but also a *collective unconscious*, a deep vault in which ancient images are stored, images which we have inherited from the human race. Jung called those images "archetypes." It is well known that this was just his starting point and from it Jung evolved his own school of analytical psychology.

It is obvious that the religious element plays a great role in the Jungian type of analysis. It is also obvious that this school opens up fascinating problems for a Christian philosopher. There exist two separate sets of controversy. One involves a confrontation of the concepts of Jung with those of Freud. The other involves a confrontation of Jung with Catholic philosophy. Strange as it may first appear, these two controversies are related to one another and cannot be treated separately.

This can be illustrated by an example. About nine years ago I treated a patient who had been referred to me for psychoneurotic depression. She was an unmarried woman of twenty-eight, a member of the Communist Party employed by a Communist paper. She

cussed this and similar productions of other patients with analysts of the Jungian school, and they told me that life constellations and images such as that are quite common in their experience. To them there was no doubt about the "archetypical" interpretation.

In this girl's neurosis, however, the figure of the father and the figure of the brother played such a role as to allow an entirely different interpretation. Her relationship with the father and the brother, and the nature of her transference to the physician at that particular point of the analysis, were such that her "refusal of the lift" had another meaning besides the one of which she became aware. Her spontaneous thought associations which touched upon her relationship with God made the interpretation valid on a certain plane. But the individual interpretation which refers to her early story is equally valid. Dreams and other manifestations of the unconscious can have several meanings, all of which are true. This was recognized quite early by Freud himself. He spoke of overdetermination. For example, a man who dreams that he is scolded by his boss at work may be referring to his actual working situation (the so-called manifest dream content) and at the same time to a forgotten childhood scene between the father and himself. Here, however, we are referring to something more specific—namely, the co-existence of the "archetypical" and the "individual" plane of symbolic condensation.

The idea of two such planes of reality, superimposed one on the other, is quite familiar in the history of Christian thought. When Peter and John rushed together to the empty tomb after the resurrection, John arrived earlier but he hesitated, and Peter went in before him. John went in after Peter, saw and believed. The Fathers of the Church say that this story has, apart from its immediate significance, another meaning. The two apostles represent, as "types," the story of the salvation of the Jews and the Gentiles. Taking it in this sense the story also has a prophetic meaning just as, in the story of Abraham and Isaac, Abraham prefigured the Divine Father. When Christ said on the cross to Saint John the Apostle: "Behold your Mother," He meant not only Saint John but He addressed all mankind. Patristic literature contains many similar examples; the episode is a symbol, and the concrete historical event is the condensation of something transhistorical, and both are equally true.

There is something analogous in Jung's psychology. The dream of our patient has two meanings: one meaning is historical. It refers to a unique, one-time setting in the patient's life, namely her relation to her father and brother. Then, transposed onto another plane, the religious symbol appears. That symbol, from the point of view of the patient's life, is transhistorical. In the actual therapeutic situation the patient is perhaps never helped unless he "works" his conflict "through" on the

personal, historical, "Freudian" level. In most cases, perhaps in all, the patient has to live his problems, as it were. He has to experience it in the flesh, in the concrete analytical situation. Even if Freud had believed in the reality of all things of the spirit, he would probably have opposed Jung, simply on a clinical empirical basis. Jung himself compared the analytical procedure with death and rebirth. In order for this to be possible, it is necessary for the patient to journey once more through the embryonic night.

We have pointed out that the success of psychoanalysis consists in widening the gap between two worlds. One world is that of infantile fantasy and of everything with which our infantile Ego endows the objects of reality at every second of our existence. The other world is that of the adult Ego, that part of us which alone is capable of experiencing the reality of everyday life without distortion. In order to strengthen the adult Ego, the patient has to be led up against the actors and scenes of the primitive stage setting. This is tedious and painful, and it is done only by repeated experiences. The process of healing is similar to that of immunization by repeated small infections. Yet the Jungian discovery was tremendously significant. The fact that the young woman of our story experienced a spiritual crisis at that moment of the analysis was no accident.

Perhaps we are all on a dark and cold road and at one

time God offers us a lift. The fact that the Jungian "archetype" and the Freudian "nest figure" not only do not exclude one another but are even complementary is no coincidence. It is linked up with the mystery of the Incarnation. God is our father and Christ is our brother. God Himself has acted with us on two levels. Throughout the drama of salvation—up to the Incarnation, the Sacrifice, and the Resurrrection—He was a definite historical person. He was part of "once upon a time," but He is also universal and timeless. Whatever was "once upon a time" also belongs to the future. "Time future contained in time past." Just because we are human; because our primeval experiences, all those things which determine us, are things of the flesh; because the figures which shape our fate are Father, Mother, Brother, Sister—because of all this God took human flesh. Between Jung's "archetype" and Freud's "nest figure" there exists not only a psychological connection but a mysterious ontological correspondence. On this basis, we now understand more fully why Freud, who denied the reality of the Spirit, came to the conclusion that God was nothing but a father figure and reconstructed "the Christian myth" as a neurosis.

Some Freudian critics of Jung's work argue that the "archetypes" cannot possibly have an importance in the origin of neuroses because they represent material we have learned rather than rock-bottom primitive experience. Our patient, for example, has learned about God

lies in the fact that, in the history of the patient's neurosis, they *point forward.* To explain this on the basis of our example of the young Communist woman: the "Freudian" constellation (the girl's father and brother) is that which *has happened;* the Divine Father and Son is that which, speaking in terms of the soul's movement, *will be,* that which is preparing itself in her. We shall presently come back to this. The trouble with most of the Jungian studies is the impression they convey that Grace did not come in at all; as if the Freudian structure had only been enlarged by simply adding one floor: that of the "collective unconscious."

XI

Psychiatry and the Life of the Spirit: II

He who is starving to death must be fed before he is taught; likewise it is better for the needy "to obtain possessions than to pursue philosophy" [Aristotle] though the latter be of greater worth.

St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summ. Theol.* II, IIae, qu.32, a.3

But as I rav'd and grew more fierce and wild
At every word,
Methought I heard one calling 'Child'
And I replied 'My Lord.'

George Herbert

Now we come to the general question of the role of religion in psychotherapy. Many people say, if there were more faith in the world we would not have to cope with so much neurosis. This may be true as far as the role of religion in the total fabric of society is concerned. Even so it is a statement of doubtful validity. In past times when the Church dominated the life of society, there existed neurotic upheavals albeit with a different clinical appearance. One has only to remember the hysterical disturbances which, in the Middle Ages,

took often the form of widespread epidemics. These disturbances have disappeared and others have come instead. It is quite possible that the mentally suffering, like the poor, will always be with us. Even if overt anxiety has increased tremendously in our time, as it seems to have, it is dangerously fallacious to link this up with the position of the person within the order of Grace. What do we know about the true spiritual state of any soul? One can show many atheists who have never known a sleepless night or a dark hour, as against saintly people of the most intense mystic life who are torn by the temptation of despair. If a person suffers from a phobia, one often hears this remark: "If he would only pull himself together!" Many religious books on psychiatry, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, and written by well-meaning people, are on the same level. They say instead: "If he would only have faith!" The fallacy is the same. It treats the neurosis apart from the category of suffering.

On the deepest, ontological level, it is true that where there is Neurosis there is something wrong with Faith, Hope, and Charity. If the Redemption had its full concrete impact now, in Time, there would be no anxiety. But then there would be no cancer, or tuberculosis, or head colds either. It is true that Christ said to his disciples when they were afraid: "Oh ye of little faith." But He Himself knew the agony of the darkest night.

Apart from the fallacy of the pat formula and the

easy spiritual recipe, there is another fallacy. It is more hidden. When we say about the neurotic sufferer: "If he only had more faith . . ." we ourselves fall into the danger of Pharisaism. We are tempted to say, or we feel without quite realizing it: "Look at me, I believe and I have no anxiety. I thank you, God, that you have not made me like those."

None of this is said to minimize the healing power of faith. Faith is one thing; the religious argument is another. The religious argument as a therapeutic measure stands refuted by Job, a man writhing in the grip of melancholia. After his friends have been going at him in repeated sessions, he bursts forth: "How long do you afflict my soul, and break me in pieces with words? Behold, these ten times you confound me, and are not ashamed to oppress me. For if I have been ignorant, my ignorance shall be with me" (Job 19, 2-4). Job was healed by faith, not by his friends' discourses.

During psychotherapy, particularly during psychoanalysis, it is very tempting to take the "religious line," like Job's friends. For example, when our Communist girl had her tearful crisis, it seemed the obvious thing to pitch right in. Her relationship to me was such that I could easily have used persuasion. This was even more tempting after she had produced the dream which she herself realized was related to God. This is the moment when the physician has to resist the temptation to be a preacher. After all, she herself had supplied the inter-

pretation, and clinical experience shows that this is much more potent than any direction on the psychotherapist's part. In such a case there is danger that the patient might exploit the religious plane in order to escape the conflict on the natural plane. Philosophical discussions are at times used as a tool of resistance; philosophy is employed to camouflage something else. In the psychoanalytic process the *praeter-verbal* (all that which lies outside the territory of the spoken word) is as important as that which is spoken. The total moral attitude of the physician, though never formulated, forms the rock bottom. Just as in a piece of music the rests are as important as the tones, the unspoken is as important in the psychotherapeutic process as the spoken. *"Ce sont les silences qui comptent,"* a French psychoanalyst once remarked. This is the reason why a psychotherapeutic procedure, no matter of what school, is one thing when conducted in a hedonistic laissez-faire atmosphere, and quite another when conducted in the atmosphere of the Gospel—though neither philosophy may ever be a point on the agenda.

In this connection we once more touch upon the question of moral judgment, which has already been dealt with in the chapter on guilt. It is a time-honored tradition in the history of medicine that the physician is not to judge his patient morally. This principle can be followed from antiquity right through the Christian era. Apparently in all civilizations, it is one of the un-

written rights of patients to be treated without moral judgment. Even during the puritanical Victorian period, when moral condemnation and a sort of Pharisaical discrimination belonged much more to the overt mechanics of society than now, the same unwritten law prevailed. A patient who had acquired a venereal infection extramaritally, or a young girl who had committed an abortion, had the right to be treated like any other medical case, in an atmosphere of moral detachment—regardless of the physician's personal philosophy. In the psychiatrist's case this point assumes special significance, but the situation is fundamentally the same. The psychiatrist works continuously in that peculiar twilight in which it is impossible to distinguish between freedom and necessity, and it is his work to widen the area of freedom. But he must give the sick person the benefit of the doubt. Neurotic patients are extremely sensitive to this. They "feel" it if there is even a trace of condemnation, though never formulated, in the very depth of the physician's mind. And once that exists, the therapeutic relationship is destroyed. Nowhere does the saving power of charity become more apparent.

It often happens, for example, that the patient, out of motives which are related to certain phases of transference, wants to "arouse" the physician of whose Christian convictions he is aware. Or he wants, unconsciously, to be condemned. This is not a healthy desire for moral restitution but a wish to re-enact, on the

therapeutic stage, an infantile scene. This happens particularly in patients with asocial or antisocial behavior. A thirty-four-year-old married woman, the mother of two boys (one eight, the other six) was referred to me because of a serious character neurosis which manifested itself in drinking, promiscuity, and various forms of social scandal which were at times quite startling. She had been brought up as a Catholic but had ceased practicing her religion many years before. Like many character neuroses of that particular asocial pattern, her state bordered on the psychotic. On one occasion she told the story of having had sexual relations with a man, not her husband, in front of her two boys. There is no doubt whatsoever that I should have lost her if I had begun to "preach," or appeal to her sense of rectitude, or do anything along those lines. At times it was apparent that she related her stories (which were true) in the most scandalizing terms because she wanted a (moral) beating. The fact that her desire for punishment, rejection, or condemnation within the psychotherapeutic situation was frustrated contributed powerfully to her moral regeneration. This sounds paradoxical. There is no contradiction between this and what has been remarked in the preceding paragraph. On the contrary. Whether the physician maintains an attitude of "Judge not!" out of supernatural motives, or whether he maintains a neutral attitude because he thinks that morality is a pragmatic but arbitrary social fiction—

these are two opposite worlds from the point of view of the inner dynamics of treatment, particularly the dynamics of transference. When I am confronted with a case of antisocial or asocial tendencies, no matter how scandalizing to my sense of moral harmony, my psychoanalytic knowledge of myself teaches me that, but for a trivial change of circumstances, I might be in the patient's boots and doing the things he is doing. This is where psychoanalysis has deepened and enriched the Christian moral conscience. On the other hand, this is precisely the point at which the Christian moral conscience is able to deepen and enrich psychoanalysis.

In this connection we have to refer briefly once more to Jung. In cases like that of the promiscuous woman, one can observe that during the therapeutic process fantasies and images turn up which seem to be related to Jungian archetypes. This is at times the first indication of a creative solution of the neurotic conflict. Frequently one is able to explain the choice of symbols merely on the basis of the mechanism of transference, and out of the fact that the patient is approaching the road toward sublimation. This is obvious whenever the symbols are not religious.

I worked at one time in an out-patient department with a juvenile delinquent. This boy, whom I saw first when he was sixteen, had a long record of seriously antisocial activities, with trials in Juvenile Courts and several periods in reformatories. He was a pleasant,

has not had any relapses into his antisocial activities, though he still has far to go.)

The point I wanted to make is that the dream chooses symbolic material which is explained out of certain features of the transference, and which indicates *things to be*. If a patient in a similar situation has dreams with religious images, the reason for such a choice of symbols might be similar. This, for example, could be observed in the case of the promiscuous woman. In other words, the coincidence of religious symbols is dynamically significant (from the point of view of "sublimation" and "transference") but it does not make the assumption of true archetypes necessary.

This may sound as if we were trying to say that that which is of the spiritual order were one thing and the sickness another; or that the life of prayer and of the sacraments play no role when it comes to mental suffering. This would be a wrong impression. My purpose is to warn against a false "spirituality" in the approach to neurotic suffering; to show that often the vessel of reception is sick so that which is of the supernatural order is incapable of penetrating in a way we are used to when we think of the spiritual life; to show how subtle and complex the relationship between Grace and Nature is in those cases in which the vessel is disfigured; to emphasize how the structure of the neurotic illness is intimately interwoven with profound biological layers of the personality.

This does not mean that the life of prayer loses its significance in that area. Wherever there is enough faith left, it works in its own mysterious way. I do not like to talk about the work of Alcoholics Anonymous in terms of "sublimation," because it is too mechanistic an explanation. Mat Talbot was cured of alcoholism much more effectively than any form of psychotherapy could ever have achieved it. But this is in the nature of *gratia gratis data.* The same thing can probably be said of many persons who achieved sanctity out of a background of neurosis. Ever since the time of the Psalmist, man has turned to God whenever he was beset by worries and conflicts. From the time of the Fathers of the Church until now, many beautiful spiritual treatises have been written especially designed for those who labor and mourn. Catholic literature is probably the richest in the world precisely for that purpose. All this is outside the range of the present study. What we want to discuss here are those huge dark uncharted areas in which the needle of the spiritual compass itself seems to deviate.

There are phases during which the spiritual life of a person takes on a strange coloring; phases which are marked by turmoil and upheaval; phases during which the metaphysical chasm opens up, and the person is threatened by primeval fear or swallowed up in ecstasy. This happens particularly during the turning points of life, during adolescence and during the climacteric

phase. It is here where the distinction between mystical experience and clinical phenomenon, between compulsiveness and asceticism, between elements of the "nothing but" and elements of a transcendental order, is often most difficult. Here a physician of religious convictions particularly needs careful discernment, a respect for the mystery of the person, and just plain clinical experience.

At times it is practically necessary to illuminate that strange frontier area in which Neurosis and Faith meet. In these instances the physician himself, no matter how firm his belief is, has to use the reductive method, the argument of "nothing but." By and large the distinction between morbid and healthy is not difficult. For example, where spiritual ascetisism ends and compulsiveness (the "scruple") begins is usually quite apparent in the picture of the total personality. What we have said about sanctity holds true also here: quite often, the distinction between what is healthy and what is morbid in the spiritual life comes down to the simple rule—by their fruits you shall know them.

We have seen that, in distinguishing the healthy from the morbid, it is not the phenomenological structure which matters. If the creative artist or the mystic hears something which for us "is not there," he is outside the range of the normal, but he may be supranormal rather than abnormal. What matters is the content and above all, to use the words of the gospel, the "fruits."

In a rationalist society, *all* faith is abnormal. We are fools in Christ. To feel certainty about something we have not seen, and which in its manifestations runs against the ordinary laws of Nature, is madness as long as experimental evidence is the sole criterion of truth. Phenomenologically there is a close resemblance between faith and paranoia. Yet in content they are perfectly opposed to each other. Paranoia, according to classical descriptive psychiatry (and in this connection I am not going into the psychoanalytical interpretation), is characterized by delusional ideas which form a logically coherent system of thought and leave the rest of the personality intact. A paranoiac may have an extraordinary set of ideas about the role of, let us say, the Freemasons in his life and in the world in general. You may meet him in a railway compartment, have a couple of hours of pleasant conversation, and never realize that he is a madman unless you or he happen to touch on his subject. Even then, if he is intelligent and a good talker, you may have the feeling after listening for a while: "Maybe he's got something there." Paranoic patients have been known to influence juries in court. It is, incidentally, no coincidence that I chose the example of Freemasons. All paranoic patients (the condition in its pure clinical form is rare), no matter whether we encounter them in mental hospitals in Paris, New York, or Rio, have certain pet themes, particularly the Jews, the Freemasons, the Communists, and the

nificant for the psychology of masses; in times of political restlessness, paranoiac personalities (blatant clinical and milder subclinical cases) come to the front. They have an extraordinary power to mobilize latent paranoid tendencies in the population. Vigilance turns into distrust. And in the end hatred becomes a strange bond of union. In totalitarian countries that strange Gift of Distrust, the readiness to see machinations behind events, is systematically mobilized and channeled.

There is another difference between paranoia and faith. The paranoiac patient has no choice between doubt and certainty. In the classical definition, paranoiac delusions are held with absolute certainty and cannot be shaken. Yet it is the characteristic feature of faith that it can be tried. The person who has faith is aware of the fact that there exists no scientific proof. Faith is blind. There are mystics who hold that even the Blessed Virgin lived on faith up to the hour of the Resurrection. She was tried. Thus faith is inextricably interwoven with Love and Hope, not only as regards the *content* of what we believe but also as regards the nature of the *inner movement*.

To the spiritual life of most Catholic people, the Gospel of Rationalism and Pragmatism constitutes no danger. It constitutes a danger in so far as it forms part of the fabric of the society in which they live but it is not much of an interior danger. To many of us the true

danger lies somewhere else. It is more subtle but no less formidable. It is characterized by what one might perhaps best call the "communion of distrust." Today, while we are facing the evil of Communism, vigilance is more necessary than at any other time. Everybody agrees about that. But vigilance has a tendency to open, in a subtle and imperceptible way, frontiers in the human soul which had better be forever closed. Vigilance in the face of evil may give rise to preoccupation with evil. And, as the Fathers of the Church taught, if we are unduly preoccupied by evil, we become evil. There is danger in giving more thought to the things we are *against* than the things we are *for*. It is easier to have distrust than to have faith. The story of the early church shows clearly that it is the *positive* in faith which conquers the world.

An interesting story from the life of Saint Thérèse of Lisieux concerns a book written by a convert, presenting what today would be called the "inside story" of the Freemasons. This book was apparently a best-seller at that time and it was enthusiastically received by the good nuns of her community. Only Thérèse, in opposition to her superior and everybody else, disliked it intensely. The author was later unmasked as a psychopathic swindler. Today, when Communists and secret Communist machinations present an objective danger, we face a great pitfall. It is not a question of paranoia in the clinical sense. It is an imponderable something

which happens to a Community of Faith. We have our nose to the ground to ferret out the scent of the adversary; we have our ears to the ground to hear the distant rumbling; before we know it, something decisive has happened to us. We are no longer upright. Our gaze is no longer fixed on God and Man in charity.

As it is at times important to scrutinize spiritual upheavals purely on the psychological plane, it is equally important to scrutinize crises of doubt and unbelief in the same way. Lack of faith or loss of faith is at times so obviously structured within the entire context of the neurosis that anyone but the most prejudiced must see the connection. In the numberless psychoanalytical papers on religious phenomena, studies which usually end up by reducing everything spiritual to the dynamic formula, hardly anything has ever been said about *the neurosis of unbelief*. This is not surprising, since to most investigators faith ("the certainty of things we have not seen") is an abnormal or at least a suspect phenomenon.

In my own experience, lack of religious faith or loss of faith has often proved to be a serious indication of a disordered person. The most frequent mechanism I have encountered can perhaps best be described as follows. In order to have faith, we have to be childlike. Now in terms of our unconscious—that is to say, in the Freudian archaic strata which make up the preconcep-

tual and instinctual—that which is childlike is pregenital. The believer is in a state of passive receptiveness. If we refuse to believe something, we say: "You can't make me swallow that." Of a person who believes something readily or without difficulty, we say: "He swallowed it hook, line, and sinker." A person who believes too easily is called "gullible" or a "sucker." In German one says about a lifelong belief: "He took it in with his mother's milk." In the life of the unconscious, on the purely natural plane believing is an oral mechanism.

I have seen many cases in which this is quite apparent. In a great number of neurotic people, the dynamic constellation of childhood is such that childlikeness means powerlessness. In their fantasy that which is pregenital is emasculated. If you are passive-receptive, if you "swallow" things, all your power and your potential aggressiveness disappear. This is a bizarre and fearful fantasy. In everyday language, not only are you made to "swallow" beliefs, you are also "taken in." I have also noticed that neurotic unbelievers in their fantasies endow the purely intellectual, nonintuitive and nonpoetic side of human thought (the sort of thinking which a logical positivist would claim to be the only proper mode of human reason) with extraordinary, limitless power.

I once treated a man in his early forties, a very successful businessman, who had symptoms of anxiety and a problem of overt marital maladjustment. This man

fantasies which showed that he was simply terrified by his own potential femininity, by all that was passive-receptive. There were reasons for this which I shall not discuss here in detail. Suffice it to say that behind his rejection of religion there was that same fear of the passive-receptive. To be passive and receptive was to him a fantasy of utter annihilation. (On one occasion this patient told of an anxiety dream in which he was a piece of blotting paper absorbing milk. In this image, he was a "sucker" par excellence.)

When it comes to the neurosis of unbelief, this pattern is typical and repetitive. One could say that to this man faith was associated with the oppressive atmosphere of poverty or of narrowness, and leave it at that. In our psychoanalytical experience this would not be enough. You have to go down to the archaic level of the "somatic cosmos," the "Freudian" level, really to understand this neurosis.

The searching reason of science is a masculine, aggressive principle. It pierces the reality of objects. It proceeds according to a plan of attack. The world of faith is just the opposite. "I shall comfort you as a Mother comforts." "Unless you be like unto one of these children . . ." We have to remain open for God. We have to wait for Him. Mankind's relationship to God contains the relationship of the bride to the groom; according to the Gospel, we are seed grounds. There is also a relationship of child to mother. Just as science

is a masculine principle, wisdom (*Sophia*) is in classic imagery and in the life of the unconscious a feminine principle. She receives and she nourishes, like nature itself.

A man who denies these elements in himself is deeply affected. He is denatured. So often in our work people tell us how, during adolescence, they had an experience of awakening, something like a conversion—but away from faith. From then on truth was limited only to that which calipers and test-tubes taught. Here, more than anywhere else, the neurosis of Western man and the individual neurosis overlap. Unless Reason and Contemplation are balanced, we are sick. Reason tackles problems; it is associated with activity. Contemplation beholds mysteries; it is associated with silence. Scripture tells us how the prophet Ezekiel was made to swallow a scroll. The modern skeptic refuses to swallow anything. He does not want to take in for fear of being taken in.

It is interesting how anxiety manifests itself on the natural level. In the mass of population as a whole it would seem that "oral" insatiability were steadily on the increase. From the increase of alcoholism down to the harmless levels of oral pleasures (which have created entire industries), anxiety appears to assume a uniform epidemic pattern. Psychoanalytically there exists a close relationship between oral and visual primitive libidinal patterns, which means that the tremendous modern

that, but for an apparently trivial difference, that which is morbid may be healthy in the highest meaning of the word. The English language expresses this difference in the words "childish" and "childlike"; to be the first is to be silly and to be the second is wise. We have seen that all neurosis means either arrestation at, or regression to, the infantile level. Apart from that primeval schema of the child, there is another child in every one of us. That is the child we have to keep preciously alive. The world of neurosis is characterized by an infantile dependence on people, on things; the world of faith is characterized by a childlike dependence on God. The one must diminish so that the other can be completed.

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(Continued from front flap)

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