


NISHIDA KITARO
A STUDY OF GOOD

Translated by V. H. Viglielmo



JAPANESE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

A STUDY OF GOOD

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PART I PURE EXPERIENCE

Chapter 1 Pure Experience

To experience means to know events precisely as they are. It means to cast away completely one's own inner workings, and to know in accordance with the events. Since people usually include some thought when speaking of experience, the word "pure" is here used to signify a condition of true experience itself without the addition of the least thought or reflection. For example, it refers to that moment of seeing a color or hearing a sound which occurs not only before one has added the judgment that this seeing or hearing relates to something external or that one is feeling this sensation, but even before one has judged what color or what sound it is. Thus, pure experience is synonymous with direct experience. When one experiences directly one's conscious state there is as yet neither subject nor object, and knowledge and its object are completely united. This is the purest form of experience. Of course, in common usage, the meaning of the word "experience" is not clearly fixed, for men such as Wundt call even knowledge which is inferred from experience indirect experience, and he refers to physics and chemistry as the study of indirect experience. (Wundt, *Grundriss der Psychologie*, Einl. § I.) However, these forms of knowledge not only cannot be called experience in the strict sense; but even if they are phenomena of consciousness, it is clear that we are unable to experience within ourselves the consciousness of others; even if they are our own consciousness—thoughts concerning the past, or even the present—at the time that we have judged them they are no longer pure experience. True, pure experience can exist only in

at the time when it is unified within present consciousness and becomes one element, acquiring a new meaning, we can no longer say that it is the same as past consciousness. (Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 45.) Similarly, when one analyzes present consciousness, that which is analyzed is no longer the same as present experience. When seen from the vantage-point of pure experience, everything is differentiated, and with each circumstance is simple and creative. Next, let us ask how far a cluster of such pure experiences can extend. The present of pure experience is not that intellectual present which at the time that one thinks about it is no longer the present. In the present of a conscious event there must be a certain continuation of time. (James, *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, Ch. XV.) In other words, the focus of consciousness is always in the present. Thus, the area of pure experience automatically coincides with one's area of interest. Yet I think that this area is not necessarily limited to a single area of interest. We are able to shift our interest, without adding the least thought, in a state wherein subject and object are undifferentiated. For example, when one is clinging with all one's might to a cliff, or when a musician is playing a piece he knows thoroughly, we can say that it is a perfect "perceptual train." (Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, p. 252.) Also, such a psychic state certainly accompanies an animal's instinctive movements as well. In these psychic phenomena, perception maintains strict unity and cohesion, and even when consciousness shifts from one thing to another, interest is always directed toward the object, with the former action giving rise spontaneously to the latter, so that there is not the slightest crack wherein thought can enter. When we compare this with momentary perception, even though there are shifts of interest and differing lengths of time, on the points of directness and unity of subject and object there is not the slightest difference. Particularly if we consider that what

of this. Or in perceptual experience, since interest is controlled from without, perhaps it is thought that we cannot speak of a unity of consciousness. Yet, even in the background of perceptual activity, a certain unconscious unifying power must still be operating. Interest is guided by this force. Or conversely, it would seem that however much symbolic experience is unified, it belongs of necessity to subjective behavior and cannot be said to be pure experience. However, even though it be symbolic experience, when its unity is inevitable and it spontaneously unifies itself, we must consider this to be pure experience; for example, when there is nothing from outside to disrupt the unity, as in a dream, it merges perfectly with perceptual experience. Originally there was no distinction in experience on the basis of whether it was internal or external; that which makes it pure resides in its unity and not in its variety. Even if it be symbolic, when it is strictly united to sensation, it is immediately a single experience. But when this separates itself from present unity and relates itself to another state of consciousness, it is no longer present experience; it has become meaning. Moreover when it is only symbolic, it merges perfectly with perception, as in a dream. The reason that sensation can always be thought of as experience is that it always becomes the focus of interest and the center of unity.

Now we shall further establish, in somewhat more detail, the significance of unity of consciousness, and attempt to clarify the characteristics of pure experience.

That which we call a system of consciousness is that certain unified thing, which, as in all organisms, divides and develops in an orderly fashion, and actualizes its totality. While one aspect of it appears in consciousness, unifying action accompanies it as the feeling of tendency. That which guides our interest is this action; when the unity is strict or when it is not obstructed by anything else, this

action is unconscious, but when this is not so, it emerges in the consciousness transformed into symbols, and comes to be separated from a state of direct, pure experience. That is to say, while this unifying action is operating, the totality is reality; it is pure experience. Moreover all consciousness is impulsive, and if, as voluntarists state, we are able to say that the will is the basic form of the consciousness, the form of the development of the consciousness is, in the broad sense, the form of the development of the will, and as for its unifying tendency we must say that it is the object of the will. Pure experience is that state wherein there is not the slightest interval between the demands and the realization of the will, and wherein the will is at its freest and liveliest. Of course, seen from the viewpoint of the selective will, to be controlled by this kind of impulsive will is perhaps, conversely, a restriction of the will, but because that which we call the selective will is a state wherein the will has already lost its freedom, when it is disciplined it once again becomes impulsive. The basic characteristic lies not in a state of desire with regard to the future but lies in action of the present in the present. Basically, behavior which accompanies the will is not an element of the will. Viewed purely psychologically, the will is the unifying sense activity of the internal consciousness. Moreover, apart from this unifying activity there does not exist a special, separate phenomenon of the will; the peak of this unifying action is precisely the will. Thought, like the will, is a kind of unifying sense activity, but its unity is merely subjective. The will, however, is the unity of subject and object. This is the reason that the will is always also in the present. (Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, § 54.) We have stated that pure experience is the direct perception of events just as they are and that there is no meaning in it. When we speak in this way, perhaps it will be thought that pure experience is somewhat of a confused, undifferenti-

ated state; but since such things as various meanings or judgments emerge from the differentiation of experience itself, the latter is not created by the former, and experience must be something which itself possesses different aspects. For example, when one looks at a color and determines that it is blue, the original color perception is in no way clarified by this; one has merely established a relationship between this and a similar earlier perception. Or even when I indicate a single experience of visual perception as a desk and make various judgments concerning it, I have not, by this, enriched in the least the content of this experience itself. In fine, since the meaning or the judgment of experience is nothing more than the indicating of a relationship with another experience, one never enriches the content of the experience itself. That which appears within meaning or judgment is a part which has been abstracted from the original experience, and in its content it is, on the contrary, a poorer thing than the original experience. There are of course cases where, when one thinks over an original experience, that of which earlier one had been unconscious one is later made conscious of, but this is merely noticing parts which previously had been unnoticed, and it is not that something which previously did not exist has been added by meaning or judgment.

If we consider that pure experience is something which in this way automatically possesses different aspects, what are these things which we call meaning and judgment which are added to this, and furthermore what about the relationship between these things and pure experience? Usually we say that when pure experience is united to objective reality it gives rise to meaning and takes the form of judgment. But seen from the standpoint of the theory of pure experience, we are unable ever to go outside of the scope of pure experience. Even the creation of meaning and judgment still emerges from uniting present consciousness to past consciousness.

That is to say, it is based on the unifying action which unites these in a greater system of consciousness. Meaning or judgment are things which indicate the relationship between present consciousness and something else, and therefore do no more than express the position of present consciousness within the system of consciousness. For example, when one determines that a certain aural perception is the sound of a bell, one has merely established the position of this in past experience. Thus, whatever consciousness there is, while it exists in a state of strict unity it is always pure experience, or, in other words, it is simply an event. Conversely, when this unity is broken, i.e., when one enters into relationship with something else, meaning is born, judgment is created. Since, in the face of pure experience which appears to us directly, consciousness of the past immediately begins to operate, it unites with a part of present consciousness and conflicts with another part, so that thereby the state of pure experience comes to be broken down and destroyed. Meaning or judgment are the states of this disunity. However, this unity and disunity too, when we consider them carefully, are ultimately differences of degree. If there is no wholly united consciousness, there is no wholly disunited consciousness. All consciousness is systematic development. Even if it is momentary perception, since it includes various oppositions and changes, in the background of the consciousness of such relationships as meaning and judgment there must be a unifying consciousness which establishes these relationships. As Wundt has stated, all judgments emerge from an analysis of complex symbols. (Wundt, *Logik*, Bd. I, Abs. III, Kap. 1.) Moreover, when judgments are gradually disciplined and their unity becomes strict, they take on completely the form of pure experience; for example, when one learns a craft, even those things which at first were conscious become unconscious as one becomes proficient in it. If one advances yet a step further

in one's thinking, pure experience and its judgment represent both sides of consciousness, that is, they are nothing more than different ways of looking at the same thing. And as James has explained in his *Stream of Consciousness*, consciousness does not attach itself to places where it has appeared; it inclusively has relationship with something else. The present can always be seen as a part of a great system. That which we call differentiating development is a function of an even greater unity.

If this kind of meaning too is a function of a great unity, does pure experience in such a case transcend its own sphere? For example, when by memory one is related to the past and by the will one is related to the future, can one think that pure experience transcends the present? Psychologists say that consciousness is not a thing but an event; thus moment by moment is new, and the same experience cannot be reborn. I think, however, that such an idea is viewed not from the standpoint of the theory of pure experience but is deduced, on the contrary, from the nature of time wherein the past does not return and the future has not yet come. If it is viewed from the standpoint of pure experience, consciousness of the same content must ever be identical consciousness. For example, just as when one object symbol in thought or in the will continually operates we must view it as a unit, so too even if the unifying activity is chronologically interrupted, must we still think of it as a unit.

Chapter 2 Thought

Thought, viewed from psychology, is that activity which establishes relationships among symbols and unifies them. Its most simple form is judgment, which determines the relationship between two symbols and unites them. In judgment, however, we do not unite

two independent symbols but rather analyze one particular complete symbol. For example, the judgment that "a horse runs" emerges as the analysis of one symbol, namely "a running horse." Thus, in the background of a judgment there is always an event of pure experience. In judgment, the unity of the two symbols of subject and object can truly be made through this event. Of course, this is not to say that a complete symbol always appears first and that from this analysis begins. There are also instances where there is first the subject symbol from which emerge various associations in a fixed direction and where one selects and decides on one of them. But even in this case, when one finally decides on a particular association, a complete symbol including the two symbols of subject and object must first appear. In other words, this symbol which from the beginning was operating inclusively acquires judgment at the point where it becomes actuality. The fact that at the origin of such judgment there must be pure experience is true not only in cases of judgments with regard to facts but also in cases of purely logical judgment. For example, even such things as geometric axioms are all based on a kind of intuition. Even if it is an abstract concept, in comparing two things and making a judgment, at the base of it there must be the experience of a certain unifying factor. The so-called inevitability of thought emerges from this. Thus, if we can apply the term "experience" not only to those areas of intellectual perception which I have mentioned before but also to the consciousness of relationships, at the basis of purely logical judgments as well we can say that there is an event of pure experience. Furthermore, if we look too at the judgments which emerge as a result of deduction—since as Locke has said, in logical knowledge as well there must be, step by step, intuitive proof (*Essay on the Human Understanding*, Bk. IV, Ch. II, 7)—at the root of each judgment, many of which together constitute a chain, there must always be an event of pure experience. Also in

the case where one combines the judgments in various areas and puts forth a conclusion, even though there is not an actual intuition unifying the whole, a logical intuition which combines and unifies all relationships is operating. (Such things as the so-called three laws of thought too are a kind of internal intuition.) For example, even to say, deducing from various observations, that the earth must be moving, one is judging from a law of logic which is based on a kind of intuition.

Formerly it was traditionally felt that thought and pure experience were wholly differing kinds of psychical activity. But casting aside all dogmatism and considering the matter directly, as James has said in his brief essay entitled "The World of Pure Experience," when we include in the term "experience" the consciousness of relationships as well, I think we can say that thought activity also is a kind of pure experience. Intellectual perception and the elemental mental images of thought, viewed from without, can be differentiated by the fact that on the one hand they are based on the stimuli to the nerve ends coming from external objects, and on the other they are based on the stimuli to the brain cells; and even viewed internally, we normally never confuse perception with mental images. But considered purely psychologically, it is extremely difficult to say how far we can strictly distinguish them; in short, since these distinctions come merely from great differences of degree and also from the differing kinds of relationships which they have, there is not an absolute distinction. (In dreams and delusions we often confuse mental images for actual perception.) In primitive consciousness such distinctions did not exist, and they merely came to be differentiated by their various relationships. Again, according to one view, perception seems to be simple and thought seems to be a complex process, but even though we call it perception it is not necessarily simple, for perception too is a structured activity.

Thought also, viewed from its aspect of unity, is one activity and can be considered the development of a certain united entity.

Since there will be various differing opinions concerning this view of thought and perceptual experience as being of the same kind, I intend to examine these points briefly. Usually it is held that perceptual experience is passive and its activity is all unconscious whereas thought, on the contrary, is active and all its activity is conscious. But where is there such a clear distinction? Even thought, when it operates and develops freely, takes place under an almost unconscious attention, and its becoming conscious means, on the contrary, that this advance is impeded. That which causes thought to progress is not our voluntary activity; thought advances of itself. When we wholly cast away our ego and become one with the object of our thought, namely our problem, or if we speak even more appositely, when we have submerged our ego in the midst of it, we first see the operation of thought. In thought there exist spontaneously the laws of thought, and they operate spontaneously. Thought does not follow our will. Perhaps we are able to say that the merging with our object, i.e., the turning of our attention, is voluntary, but on this point I think that perception is the same; for we are able freely to turn our attention and see those objects which we wish to see. Of course since in thought the unity is broader than in perception and its changes can be considered as conscious, I have previously fixed their characteristics on this basis, but viewed strictly, these distinctions are also relative; thought too, at the moment when one shifts from one symbol to another, is unconscious, and while the unifying process is operating in reality, it must be unconscious. When one is conscious of a thing as an object, already that activity belongs to the past. Such unifying activity as thought resides wholly outside the will, and it is merely that when we consider a certain problem there are various directions, the acceptance or

examined the relationship of mental images and thought in this way, it certainly does not mean that there are not such thought areas in perception. Like all phenomena of consciousness, perception too is a systematic activity; perception, when its response on the contrary is extraordinary, appears as will and activity, but mental images, as thought, stop at internal relationships. Thus, in actual consciousness there is the distinction between perception and mental images, but it is not the difference of concrete and abstract; thought is the consciousness of events within mental images nor, as we have said before, from a strict pure-experience standpoint are we able anywhere to make the distinction between perception and mental images.

Above, from a psychological point of view we have discussed thought as also a kind of pure experience, but thought is not simply an event in the individual consciousness, for it has an objective meaning: that which becomes the main realm of thought is the expressing of truth, for even though in the event of pure experience wherein by oneself one directly perceives the phenomena of one's own consciousness there is neither truth nor delusion, in thought we can say that there is such a distinction. In order to clarify these points, there is the necessity of examining carefully the meanings of so-called objectivity, reality, and truth, but when we try to think extremely critically, I think that outside of the events of pure experience there are no realities, and their characteristics as well can be explained psychologically. As I have also said before, the meaning of consciousness arises from its relationship with other things, or in other words is determined by the system into which that consciousness enters. Even the same consciousness gives rise to various meanings according to the differing systems into which it enters. For example, even a certain mental image which is the consciousness of a meaning, when seen merely as itself alone without relation

to anything else, is simply an event of pure experience without any meaning at all. Conversely, a certain perception which is the consciousness of an event, when seen from the point that in a system of consciousness it possesses a relation with something else, acquires meaning; however, in most cases its meaning is unconscious. But concerning the question of what thought is true and what false, we always believe that the strongest one within the system of consciousness, i.e., the greatest, most profound system, is objective reality, and we think that those cases which accord with it are true and those which conflict with it are false. Viewed from this position, in perception also there are things which we can call correct or mistaken. For instance, considered from a certain system, when a thing accords well with its object it is correct, and when it opposes it it is mistaken. Of course, since within these systems there are varying means, we can make the distinction that the systems in the background of perception are mostly practical but those of thought are purely intellectual. But, just as the ultimate object of knowledge is practical, I think that we can say that at the base of the will *system?* reason lies hidden. *what is pure?* I intend to discuss this fact later when I come to the will, but the distinctions of such systems also cannot be said to be absolute. Furthermore, even if it is the same intellectual activity, association or memory are relationship unifications merely within an individual consciousness, but we can also say that thought alone transcends the individual and is general. Yet because such distinctions arise from forcibly restricting the scope of our experience to the individual, in the face of pure experience, on the contrary we do not arrive in thought at anything which does not have individual elements. (The will is the small demand of a unity of consciousness; reason is its profound demand.)

Until now I have stated that, in comparing thought and pure experience, even the position of usually considering the two as wholly

different in kind, if examined deeply, will yield a point of unity, but if I consider the origin and the tendency of thought, I think I can further clarify the relationship between the two. Everyone will allow that the primitive state of our consciousness, or even our developing consciousness, in its direct state is always a state of pure experience. The activity of reflective thought is a thing which arises from this secondarily. However, concerning the question of why this kind of activity arises, as I have stated before, consciousness is originally one system, and its spontaneously developing and completing itself is its natural state; moreover, when in its course of development, inconsistencies and conflicts of various systems arise, reflective thought appears in this instance. But those things which seen from one side are thus inconsistent and conflicting, when seen from another, are directly the beginning of an even greater systematic development. In other words, they are things which must be called incomplete states of a greater unity. For instance, when in behavior or knowledge our experience becomes complex, various associations emerge, and their natural course is obstructed, we become reflective. Behind these inconsistencies and conflicts, the possibility of unity is dimly discerned, and at the time of decision or solution already the beginning of a greater unity is established. But we certainly do not stop merely at a state of internal unity such as decision or solution; that practice accompanies decision needs hardly be stated, and thought too necessarily has some practical meaning; thought must appear in action, i.e., it must arrive at the unity of pure experience. Thus an event of pure experience is the alpha of our thought and its omega as well. In fine, thought is nothing more than a process in the development and realization of a great system of consciousness; if one dwells within a large unity of consciousness and views it, thought also is nothing more than a wave on the surface of a single large intuition. For example, when we

worry about a certain objective, a unified consciousness which is the objective is always operating in its background as an intuitive event. Thus thought does not possess a different content or form from that of pure experience; it is merely one of its deep and great, but incomplete, states; seen from another side, true pure experience is not merely passive but on the contrary possesses constructive and general areas, or we can say it includes thought.

Pure experience and thought are basically the same event seen from different points of view. If, as Hegel has previously emphasized with great force, the basic characteristic of thought resides not in that it is abstract but on the contrary in that it is concrete, it becomes almost identical with pure experience in the sense I have stated above, and it is permissible to say directly that pure experience is thought. Seen from concrete thought, the generality of a concept is not, as is usually said, that which is abstracted from similar characteristics but is rather the unifying power of concrete events; and Hegel too states that the general is the soul of concrete things. (Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, III, S. 37.) And since our pure experience is systematic development, the unifying force which is operating at its base must be directly the generality of a concept itself; the development of experience becomes directly the advancement of thought, for an event of pure experience is the so-called generality realizing itself. Even in the background of such things as sensation and association a latent unifying activity is operating. Conversely, in thought, at the moment when unity is operating, as I have stated before, that unity itself is unconscious. When the unity is abstracted and objectified, however, it appears as a different consciousness, but at that time it has already lost its unifying activity. If it is in the sense that pure experience is simple or passive, it is mutually opposed to thought, but if it is in the sense that pure experience is to know events precisely as they are, then being simple

or passive, on the contrary, cannot be said to be states of pure experience, for truly direct states are structured and active.

We usually consider that by thought we know generalities and that by experience we know specific things. Yet generalities do not exist apart from the specific; that which is truly general is the latent force in the background of the specific realization; it is the force existing within the specific and which causes it to develop. For example, it is something like the seed of a plant. If there is such a thing which, abstracted from an individual entity, opposes another particular, that is not a true generality, it is still a particular, for in such a case the generality does not rank above the particular but is on the same level with it. For instance, in the case of a colored triangle, from the viewpoint of the triangle the color is particular, but from the viewpoint of the color the triangle is particular. If it is such an abstract, powerless generality, it cannot be the basis of deduction and synthesis. Thus, in the activity of thought the truly general thing which is the basis of unity must be that latent force which is similar to the individual reality and its content, and they must differ merely by one being inclusive and the other manifest. The specific entity is the delimited form of the general. When we think in this way about the relationship between the specific and the general, logically as well, the distinction between thought and experience comes to disappear. That which we call a specific experience of the present also can actually be viewed as something in the course of development, i.e., as having the latent force which must be delimited yet more minutely. For example, even such a thing as sensation has room for division and development, and viewed from this point we can make it still more general. Conversely, even general things, if we try to limit their development at that place, can be said to be specific. Usually only things which are delimited in space and time are called specific, but such a delimitation is merely

external, and a true specific must be specific in content, that is it must be something possessing a unique characteristic; a general thing at the point where it arrives at its extreme development is a specific. In this sense such things as sensation or perception are general things which are extremely poor in content, and such a thing as an artist's intuition which is filled with deep significance is, on the contrary, able to be called specific. The calling of specific all merely material things which are delimited by space and time has, I think, materialist dogma at its roots. From the standpoint of pure experience, in comparing experiences, one must do it on the basis of their content. Such things as space and time are nothing more than forms which unify it based on this kind of content. Or again, with regard to such things as the strength and clarity of a sensory impression and their having an intimate relation with emotion, they are also reasons for making us think of it as specific, but certainly it is not that so-called thought does not have a relationship with emotion. I think the reason that that which strongly moves our emotions is particularly considered as specific is that emotion compared to knowledge is our objective itself and is close to the climax of development.

In summary, thought and experience are identical, and even though we can see relative differences between them, I think there are no absolute distinctions. But because of this I do not say that thought is merely individual and subjective, for as I have also stated before, pure experience can transcend the individual. Thus, although it may sound extremely strange, we can say that because experience knows time, space, and the individual it is above time, space, and the individual; it is not that since there is the individual there is experience, but rather that since there is experience there is the individual. Individual experience is nothing more than one particular small area delimited from within experience.

Chapter 3 The Will

I now wish to examine from the standpoint of pure experience the characteristics of the will and to clarify the relationship between the will and intelligence. The will, in most instances, makes action its objective and accompanies it, but the will is a psychical phenomenon and is innately something different from action in the external realm. Action is not necessarily a condition of the will; even if, because of a certain external situation, action did not arise, the will would still be the will. As the psychologists say, in our willing an action it suffices if we think of memories of the past; that is, it is enough if we but direct our attention to it, for activity will follow of itself; but this activity, viewed from pure experience, is nothing more than the continuation of the sensation of activity. If we look at all objects of the will directly they are still events within the consciousness; we always will our own states, and there is no distinction between the internal and external.

When we normally mention the will, it is thought to have some particular force, but actually it is nothing more than the experience of the shift from one mental image to another; for to will a certain thing is to turn the attention to it. This can most clearly be seen in so-called unwilled behavior, and even in circumstances of the continuation of perception such as I have previously mentioned, the shift of attention and the advance of the will are perfectly united. Of course it is not that the state of the attention is restricted to the circumstances of the will, for its scope appears to be broad; but usually what we call the will is the state of the attention toward a system of activity symbols, or in other words, this system occupies the consciousness, and we use the term "will" for that instance when

we have merged with this system. Or perhaps we can even think that merely turning our attention to a symbol and trying to make it the objective of our will differ, but this is rather the difference of the systems to which those symbols belong. All consciousness is systematic, and symbols too never occur alone; they necessarily belong to some system. Even if they are identical symbols, they become both intellectual objects and objectives of the will according to the system to which they belong. For instance, even if one conceives of a glass of water, when one merely associates it with the condition of the external world it is an intellectual object, but when it is associated with one's own activity it becomes an objective of the will. As Goethe has stated in the phrase, "The stars of heaven which are not desired are beautiful," anything which does not enter into the system of symbols of one's own activities does not become an objective of the will. That our desires are all established by conceiving of past experience is an obvious fact. As for those things such as the most conspicuous, strong emotion and the sensation of tension, the former is nothing other than a system of activity symbols which is based in what is to us the strongest life instinct, and the latter is nothing other than the muscular perception which accompanies activity. Also it seems that we cannot yet go so far as to say that merely to conceive of activity means this activity directly, but the reason is that the activity symbols have not yet occupied the entire consciousness, for if they truly merge with it, they become directly the decisive activity of the will.

However, what kind of difference is there between a system of activity symbols and a system of knowledge symbols? If we try to trace back to the origin of the development of consciousness, there are no such distinctions; our organism was originally made to perform various activities for the preservation of life; and since consciousness emerged accompanying such instinctive behavior, rather

than perception impulse is its primitive state. However, since, following the accumulation of activity, various associations are made, finally two kinds of systems, one with perception as its pivot, and one with activity as its pivot come into existence. But no matter how far apart the two are divided they do not become things of a wholly different kind, for even pure knowledge possesses somewhere practical meaning, and even pure will is based on some form of knowledge. Concrete psychical phenomena necessarily possess both aspects, so that knowledge and the will are merely distinctions according to the conspicuous aspects of the same phenomena; in short, perception is a kind of impulsive will, and the will is a kind of conception. In addition, even in the case of the purely intellectual element of memory symbols, it is not that they do not possess of necessity some practical meaning, and conversely, even the will which is thought of as emerging coincidentally is based in some kind of stimulus. Also it is often said that the will advances from within with an objective, but even in perception one is able previously to fix an objective and turn the sense organs toward it. Thought particularly can be said to be wholly voluntary. Conversely, such things as impulsive will are wholly passive. When we think in the above way, activity symbols and knowledge symbols are not things wholly differing in kind, but rather we must say that the distinction between the will and knowledge is merely a relative one. Even the emotions of pain and pleasure and the sensation of tension which are the special characteristics of the will are necessarily accompanied by intellectual activity even if only to a slight extent. Knowledge too, viewed subjectively, can be seen as the development of an internal latent force, and as I have said previously, both the will and knowledge can be considered as the systematic development of a certain latent element. Of course if we consider the situation after separating subjectivity from objectivity, there is the distinction that in

knowledge we make subject follow object and in the will we make object follow subject. To analyze this carefully it is necessary to clarify the characteristics and relationships of subject and object, but in these matters too I think there are points in common between knowledge and the will. In intellectual activity we first embrace a hypothesis and then we try to expose it to the facts, for no matter what kind of experiential research it be, we must of necessity first possess a hypothesis, and when this hypothesis coincides with so-called objectivity, we believe it to be the truth, i.e., we have been able to know the truth. In activity of the will as well, even though we have a desire, it does not directly become a decisive action of the will; when we expose it to objective fact and know its appropriateness and feasibility, it first moves into practice. In the former case, we completely make subjectivity follow objectivity, but in the latter can we say that we have made objectivity follow subjectivity? A desire can be realized only by being united with objectivity, for the more the will becomes distant from objectivity the more it becomes ineffective, and the more it approaches it the more it becomes effective. In the event that we try to carry out a lofty objective removed from reality, we think of various means, and by them we must advance step by step; and to think in this way of means is to seek harmony with objectivity, it is to follow it; for if finally we are unable to find that means, there is nothing to do other than to change the objective itself. Conversely, when the objective is extremely near reality, as in the habitual activity of eating and sleeping, the desire immediately becomes realization, and in such a case it can be seen that one operates not from subjectivity but, on the contrary, from objectivity.

Just as in this kind of will we cannot say that one makes objectivity follow subjectivity, it cannot be said that in knowledge one makes subjectivity follow objectivity. When one's thought has become objective truth, i.e., when one has known that it is a law

of reality and that reality has moved according to it, can we not say that we have been able to realize our ideal? Thought too is a kind of united perceptual activity, an internal will based on intellectual desire. Is not having been able to attain the objective of thought a kind of will-realization? The difference between the two is merely that in one case one changes objective facts in accordance with one's ideals and in the other one changes one's ideals in accordance with objective facts. That is to say, that the one creates and the other finds; yet truth is not something that we must create but rather something according to which we must think. But is that which we call truth, after all, wholly something existing apart from subjectivity? Seen from the standpoint of pure experience, there is no such thing as objectivity separated from subjectivity. Truth is that which unifies experiential events; the most powerful, inclusive system of symbols is objective truth. To know truth or to follow it means to unify one's experience; it is to advance from a small unity to a greater unity. And if our true selves are this unifying activity itself, to know truth is to follow this greater self; it is the realization of this greater self. (As Hegel has said, the objective of all learning lies in knowing oneself in the spirit which infuses the myriad things between heaven and earth.) As knowledge becomes more profound, the self's activity becomes larger, and that which until then has been non-self enters into the system of the self. Since we always think with individual desire as the center, in knowledge it is felt as being passive, but if we change this conscious center and place it in so-called rational desire, in the realm of knowledge too it becomes active. As Spinoza has said, knowledge is power. We always believe that by the summoning up of activity symbols of the past we are able freely to move our bodies. But our bodies too are matter, and seen from this point, there is no difference from other matter. To know the changes of external objects by visual perception

and to feel the movements of one's own body by muscular perception are identical, for both are the external world. But why are we able to think that the self is freely able to control only one's body, unlike other things? We usually think that while activity symbols on the one hand are mental images, on the other they become the cause of arousing activity of the external world, but seen from the standpoint of pure experience, even the arousing of body activity by activity symbols is merely the accompanying directly of activity sensation with a certain anticipatory activity symbol, and on this point it is identical with all those anticipated changes of the external world which are realized. Actually, in the state of primitive consciousness, I think that probably the activity of one's body and that of external objects are identical, and it is merely that with the advance of experience the two have been separated. That is, those things which arise under various conditions are seen as changes of the external world while those which immediately follow anticipatory symbols come to be thought of as one's own activity. But of course since this distinction is not absolute, even one's own activity as it becomes slightly complicated is unable to follow directly the anticipatory symbols, and in this case the function of the will approaches markedly the function of the intelligence. In short, that which we call changes in the external world are really changes within our world of consciousness, i.e., within pure experience; also if the presence or absence of conditions too is a difference of degree, intellectual reality and will-reality ultimately come to have identical characteristics. Or in activity of the will anticipatory symbols have not merely preceded it, they have immediately become the cause of activity, and perhaps we say that in the changes of the external world intellectual anticipatory symbols themselves do not become the cause of change; but originally cause-and-effect was the unchanging continuation of conscious phenomena, and even if one

supposes that there is a wholly independent world separated from consciousness, in the will too intellectual anticipatory symbols cannot be said to be directly the cause of activity in the external world; one must merely say that the two phenomena parallel each other. Seen in such a way, the relations toward the activity of anticipatory symbols of the will become identical with the relations of intellectual anticipatory symbols to the external world. Actually, anticipatory symbols of the will and body activity do not necessarily accompany each other; rather they accompany each other under certain conditions.

Moreover, we usually say that the will is free. But what kind of thing do we mean by this so-called freedom? Basically our desires are things given to us; we cannot create them freely. It is merely that when one has operated according to a certain given, and most profound, motive, it is thought that the self has been active and has been free. Conversely, when one has operated contrary to this motive, one feels oppression; and herein is the true meaning of freedom. But freedom in this sense merely has the same significance as the systematic development of the consciousness, and in intelligence too, in the same case, one can say one is free. We think that we can freely desire anything, but that is merely potentiality, and actual desire is given us at that time; when a certain single motive develops, perhaps we can know in advance the next desire, but if that is not so, we cannot know what we will desire in the next moment. In short, rather than our creating desires, they are the motives of reality, namely ourselves. Usually we say that apart from desire there is a transcendental self which freely establishes motives, but it is evident that there is not this kind of mystical force, and if the decision of this kind of transcendental self exists, it is an accidental decision; it cannot be thought of as a free decision.

As I have explained above, between the will and the intelligence there does not exist an absolute distinction, and the so-called distinction is nothing more than dogma for the most part given from without. As events of pure experience, there is no distinction between the will and the intelligence, for together they are processes wherein a certain general thing realizes itself systematically, and the consummation of that unity is truth and also, at the same time, is practice. In the case of the previously-mentioned continuation of perception, intelligence and the will are not yet separated, and intelligence truly equals action. But, accompanying the development of consciousness, seen from one side, because of the clashes of various systems, and seen from another, because it advances toward an even greater unity, a distinction between the ideal and the actual arises, and the subjective world comes to be separated from the objective world; thereby the idea also arises that that which goes from subject to object is the will, and that that which comes from object to subject is the intelligence. The distinction between the intelligence and the will arises when subjectivity and objectivity are separated and when one loses the unifying state of pure experience. Both desires in the will and thoughts in the intelligence are disunited states wherein the ideal is separated from the actual. Even thoughts are a kind of desire toward objective facts, and so-called truth can probably be termed a thought which must be able to be realized in conformity with facts. Seen from this point, it can be said to be identical with the desire which must be able to be realized in conformity with facts; there is merely the difference that the former is general whereas the latter is individual. Thus, such terms as the realization of the will or the consummation of truth mean the attainment of the state of unity of pure experience from this state of disunity. To think of the realization of the will in this way is clear, but to think of truth too in this way would

* seem to require some explanation. Concerning the problem of what kind of thing truth is, there may be various discussions, but I think that that which approaches an event of the most concrete experience is truth. Usually we say that truth is general, but if this meaning merely refers to abstract, common features, such a thing is, on the contrary, far removed from truth. The consummation of truth must be that most concrete, direct fact itself which combines various aspects. This fact is the basis of all truth, and so-called truth is that which is abstracted and constructed from this. It is said that truth lies in unity, but this unity is not one of abstract concepts; true unity lies in this direct fact. Perfect truth is individual and real. Therefore, perfect truth is not that which must be expressed in words, and such a thing as so-called scientific truth cannot be said to be perfect truth.

* All standards of truth are not outside, but on the contrary are inside, our state of pure experience, and to know truth is to merge with this state. Even the basic principle of such abstract learning as mathematics lies in our intuition, i.e., our direct experience. In experience there are various classes, and as I have stated previously, when we try to consider even the consciousness of relationships as being within experience, such things as mathematical intuition too are seen to be a kind of experience. If in this way there are various kinds of direct experience, perhaps there arises doubt as to the means whereby one determines their truth or falsehood, but when two experiences are included in a third, one is able to determine this by means of this latter experience. At any rate, in the state of direct experience subject and object are mutually submerged, and the universe is the only reality, so that at that point wherein even if one wishes to doubt one cannot doubt there lies the conviction of truth. On the one hand, when we consider the activity of the will, then it is merely referring to the actualization of this kind of

direct experience, i.e., the establishment of a unity of consciousness. The realization of a desire, like the realization of a mere symbol, is an event of direct experience. A decision reached after a struggle of various desires, like a judgment made after various considerations, is the establishment of an internal unity. When the will has been realized in the external world, as in the case of one's academic ideas being proved by experiment, it is the realization of the most direct unifying experience which destroys the distinction between subject and object. We say that unity within consciousness is free but that unity with the external world must follow nature, yet even unity of the internal world is not free, for all unity is given to us, and, seen from pure experience, even the distinction of internal and external is relative. The activity of the will is not simply a state of hope, for hope is a state of disunity of the consciousness, and on the contrary is an instance when the realization of the will is obstructed; only unity of consciousness is a state of activity of the will. Even if reality is opposed to one's true hope, when one is satisfied with reality and merges with it, reality is the realization of the will. Conversely, no matter how well prepared the circumstances, when there are various other hopes and reality is a state of disunity, the will is obstructed. The will's activity or non-activity relates to homogeneity or heterogeneity, i.e., to unity or disunity.

For example, here there is a pen. At the moment when one sees it, there is neither intelligence nor will; it is simply one reality. When concerning it various associations arise, the center of consciousness shifts, and the former consciousness is viewed as object, that former consciousness is merely intellectual. Conversely, such an association arises as the one that this pen is a thing with which one must write characters. When this association is further attached to it as an extension, it is knowledge, but when this as-

sociated consciousness itself turns toward independence, i.e., when the center of consciousness shifts to it, it becomes a state of desire. And when this associated consciousness becomes more and more an independent reality, it is the will, and at the same time one also says that one truly has known it. Any state wherein a system of consciousness develops in reality is called a function of the will. Even in the case of thought, that which concentrates attention on a certain problem and seeks its solution is the will. Conversely, even such acts as drinking tea or wine, if it is only this reality, are the will, but if the consciousness of testing its taste emerges and this becomes central, it becomes knowledge; and this consciousness of testing itself in this circumstance is the will. The will is a much more basic system of consciousness than ordinary intelligence, and is that which becomes the center of unity. The distinction between intelligence and the will does not lie in the content of consciousness, but I think is determined by their rank within that system.

Reason and desire, at first glance, appear to be mutually opposed, but actually both have identical characteristics, and I think it is merely a difference of large or small, profound or shallow. That which we call the demand of reason is the demand for a still greater unity, namely it is the demand for a general system of consciousness which transcends the individual, and on the contrary can be seen as the expression of a great, trans-individual will. The scope of consciousness is certainly not restricted to the so-called individual, for the individual is nothing more than one small system within consciousness. We usually consider a small system with the fleshly existence at the core as the center, but if we consider a still greater system of consciousness as the axis, this greater system is the self, and its development is the realization of this self's will. For example, it is such a person as a zealous man of religion, a scholar, or an artist. The law of reason which states, "It must be so," and

the tendency of the will which merely states, "I desire it to be so," seem utterly antithetical, but when we look more deeply, I think there is something which makes their bases the same. At the root of all reason and law a unifying activity of the will operates, and as Schiller has argued, even an axiom is something which develops practically, and in its method of emergence it does not differ from our simple hope. (Sturt, *Personal Idealism*, p. 92) When we turn to examine the tendencies of our will, they appear to be without law, but they are spontaneously controlled by determined law. (It is the unity of individual consciousness.) Both of these are laws of the development of a system of consciousness, and it is only that they differ in the areas of their effectiveness. Or because the will is blind, there are people who distinguish it from reason, but everything which to us is a direct event cannot be explained; even if it is reason, an explanation of the intuitive principle at its basis cannot be made. Explanation is the term which means to be able to include something else within one system. That which is the axis of unity cannot be explained, and in such a circumstance is of necessity blind.

Chapter 4 Intellectual Intuition

That which I herein refer to as intellectual intuition (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) is that direct perception of so-called ideal things which are normally said to be beyond experience. One intuits that which one must know dialectically; for example, this refers to the intuition of artists or of religious figures. In the matter of direct perception it is identical with ordinary intellectual perception, but in content it is infinitely richer and more profound.

Intellectual intuition is thought of by certain people as a kind of special mystical ability, and by others as imagination wholly

outside of experiential events. I believe, however, that intellectual intuition and ordinary intellectual perception are of the same kind and that one is unable to draw a clear line of distinction between them. Even ordinary intellectual perception, as I have said before, is certainly not simple for it is of necessity structured, and contains ideal elements. I do not observe things which I am observing in the present precisely as they are in the present, but I observe them interpreted by the force of past experience. These ideal elements are not simply associations added from without but become elements which construct the intellectual perception itself, and the intellectual perception itself, by means of them, is transformed. These ideal elements which are latent at the base of consciousness are capable of becoming infinitely rich and profound. They come to differ according to each person's talents and moreover according to the development of even the same person's experience. Things which at first one could not experience and those which one was finally able to know dialectically appear as intuitive events according to the advance of experience; one is unable to limit the scope of this with one's present experience as the standard, and furthermore it is not that since one is unable to do it, other people must also be unable. It is said that when Mozart was composing a musical piece—even a long one—he was able to conceive directly of the whole of it as one would a painting or a statue, and the composition was not merely enlarged quantitatively but became qualitatively more profound. For example, the intuition of religious adepts who are able to acquire, by their love, an intuition of the unity of others and themselves probably represents its highest attainment. Whether a certain person's extraordinary intuition is merely vain imagination or truly an intuition of reality is determined by its relationship with other things, namely by its kind of effect. Seen from direct experience, both vain imagination and true intuition have the same

characteristics, and it is only a distinction of degree in the scope of their unity.

Certain people think that intellectual intuition, on the points of transcending time, space, and the individual and of viewing directly the true aspect of reality, differs in kind from ordinary intellectual perception. However, as I have said before, seen from the strict standpoint of pure experience, experience is not restricted by such forms as time, space, and the individual, and those distinctions, on the contrary, are established by the intuition which transcends them. Moreover, even concerning the direct viewing of reality, in all of the states of direct experience there is no distinction between subject and object, and these states relate, aspect by aspect, with reality; it is not that it is restricted only to a circumstance of intellectual intuition alone, and Schelling's *Identität* (identity) is the state of direct experience. The distinction of subject and object is the relative form which arises when one loses the unity of experience; and to consider these as mutually independent realities is nothing more than an arbitrary assertion. Even that which Schopenhauer calls involuntary pure intuition is not a particular ability of geniuses; on the contrary, it is our most natural unifying state of consciousness, and even the intuitions of an innocent child belong to this variety. Thus, intellectual intuition is nothing more than a further deepening and enlargement of our state of pure experience, that is, it refers to the expression of a greater unity in the development of a system of consciousness. Even a scholar's acquiring of new thoughts, a moralist's acquiring of new motives, an artist's acquiring of new ideals, a sage's acquiring of new insights—all are based in the expression of this kind of unity. (Therefore, they are all based in mystical intuition.) If our consciousness were merely a thing of sensory characteristics, it would probably stop at a state of ordinary, intellectually perceived intuition, but an ideal spirit demands infinite

unity, and this unity is given in the form of so-called intellectual intuition. Intellectual intuition, like intellectual perception, is the most unified state of the consciousness.

Just as ordinary intellectual perception is thought of as passive, so too is intellectual intuition thought of as merely a state of passive contemplation. But true intellectual intuition is the unifying activity itself in pure experience; it is the grasping of life; that is, it is like the framework of technique, or to speak more profoundly, it is such a thing as the spirit of art. For example, as the inspiration of the artist comes, and the brush moves spontaneously, in the background of a complex activity a certain unifying factor is operating. This transformation is not an unconscious one; it is the completion of the development of a certain thing. The acquiring of this one thing is intellectual intuition, and this kind of intuition is an extremely common phenomenon which can be seen not only in lofty art but in all of our disciplined behavior. Ordinary psychology has doubtless termed it merely habit or organic activity, but seen from the standpoint of the theory of pure experience, it is the state of the unity of subject and object, of the merging of the intellect and the will. It is that state wherein things and the self are mutually forgotten, wherein things neither move the self nor does the self move things, wherein there is only one world, only one prospect. The term "intellectual intuition" sounds as if it were a subjective function, but actually it is a state which has transcended subject and object, and one rather can say that the opposition of subject and object is established by this unity, and such things as inspired art will attain this realm. Also intellectual intuition does not refer to the direct perception of an abstract generality separated from actuality. Although the spirit of a painting differs from the individual elements which are drawn, it still is not something separated from them. As I have previously stated, true generality and

individuality are not mutually opposed, for by the individual limitations, on the contrary, one is able to express true generality, and the artist's skilful knife or brush is that which expresses the true sense of the whole.

If we consider intellectual intuition in the above way, it is clear that at the base of thought there reside intellectual intuitive elements. Thought is a kind of system, and at the base of a system there must be an intuition of unity. To look at this more minutely, as James has stated in *The Stream of Consciousness*, in the consciousness that "A deck of cards is on the desk," when the subject is conceived of, the predicate is dimly included, and when the predicate is conceived of, the subject is dimly included, or, in short, an intuition is operating at the base. I think that this unifying intuition is of the same characteristic as the framework of technique. Also, viewing this broadly, in the background of all great thought, as in the philosophy of Plato or Spinoza, a great intuition is operating. Since in thought both the intuition of the genius and ordinary thought differ only in quantity and not in quality, the former is nothing more than a newer, more profound intuition of unity. At the root of all relationships there is intuition, for relationships are established according to it. No matter how far we extend our thought we cannot go beyond the basic intuition, for thought is built on top of it. Thought is not a thing which can everywhere explain; for at its base there is the intuition which must not be able to explain, and all explanation is built on this. At the base of thought there is always concealed a certain mystical element; even a geometric axiom is a thing of this kind. Usually we say that thought can explain but intuition cannot, yet explanation means nothing more than being able to reduce to an even more basic intuition. This basic intuition of thought, while on the one hand it becomes the basis of explanation,

is not merely a form of quietistic thought, for on the other it becomes the strength of thought.

Just as intellectual intuition is at the base of thought, so too is it at the base of the will. Since our willing a certain thing is intuiting a state of the unity of subject and object, the will is established according to this intuition. The advance of the will is the completion of the development of this intuitive unity; at its base this intuition is already operating; and its point of completion becomes the realization of the will. The reason we think that in the will the self is active is that there is this intuition. The self does not exist apart from this. The true self means this unifying intuition. Thus the ancients said that all day they wrought but did not work, and if seen from this intuition, we can say that in the midst of activity there is calm, one acts and does not act. Furthermore, in intuition which thus transcends the intellect and the will, becoming the basis of both of them, we can find the union of the two.

True religious enlightenment is not abstract knowledge based in thought; nor is it merely blind emotion, but it is the apprehension of that profound unity which lies at the foundation of intelligence and the will, namely a kind of intellectual intuition, a deep grasp of life. Thus, no blade of logic is able to go toward it, no desire is able to move it, for it becomes the basis of all truth and satisfaction. Its forms are various, but I think that at the root of all religions there must be this basic intuition. At the root of learning and morality there must be religion, for both of these are constructed according to it.

medieval Christian philosophy developed. In the morality of China the development of philosophical realms has been extremely poor, but in the thought of the Sung Dynasty and later periods this tendency has become prominent. These facts prove that at the base of all men's souls there is the deep desire to seek for a fusion of the intelligence and the emotions. Even in looking at the development of European thought, in ancient philosophy, with Socrates and Plato as the beginning, the didactic objective has been prominent. In the modern era, while knowledge has made particularly rapid progress, the union of knowledge and the emotions has become difficult, so that the tendency has arisen for these two areas mutually to diverge. However, this is not something which meets with the original demands of man's soul.

Now if we intend to comprehend true reality and to know the true face of the universe and of life, we must begin by doubting as much as we are able to doubt, by departing from all artificial hypotheses, and by taking direct knowledge, which even though one tries to doubt one still cannot, as the base. In our common sense we think that things exist in the external world apart from consciousness, and that in the background of consciousness there is a spiritual essence which performs various operations. Moreover, this thought has become the foundation of the behavior of all men. However, the independent existence of matter and spirit is only hypothesized by the demands of our thought, and there is much margin for doubt. In addition, even science is built upon some hypothetical knowledge and is not something which has the most profound explanation of reality as its object. Furthermore, even in philosophy, which does have this as its object, there are many elements which are not sufficiently critical and which do not doubt deeply the original hypotheses at its foundation.

The independent existence of matter and spirit is thought of somewhat as an intuitive fact, but when one reflects a bit, it immediately becomes clear that this is not so. What is this desk that is now before my eyes? Its color and its form are the sensation of the eye; my feeling of resistance when I touch it is the sensation of the hand. Even such things as the form and condition, size, position, and movement of matter—all that which we directly perceive—are not the objective states of matter itself. To perceive matter itself apart from our consciousness is fundamentally impossible. Even when one looks at one's spirit itself it is precisely the same. That which we know is the functioning of the intelligence, the emotions, and the will; it is not the spirit itself. Even our thinking that we have the same self which always operates, viewed from psychology, is nothing more than the continuation of the same sensation and emotion; both matter and spirit, which we consider as intuitive facts, are merely the unchanging union of similar phenomena of consciousness. That which makes us believe in the existence of matter and spirit themselves is simply the requirements of the law of cause and effect. But whether, after all, we are able by the law of cause and effect to deduce extra-conscious existence is the problem which must first be explored.

If this be so, what is direct knowledge which allows no doubt? It consists only of events of our intuitive experience, or, in other words, it resides only in knowledge concerning phenomena of consciousness. The actual phenomenon of consciousness and being conscious of it are immediately identical, and one is unable to divide them into subjectivity and objectivity. Between the event and the realization of it there is not the slightest interval. It is truly a thing which cannot possibly be doubted. Of course, even if it is a phenomenon of consciousness, when one judges it or conceives of it, one can fall into error. But at that time it is no longer intuition,

Cogito ergo sum
it is inference. The latter consciousness and the former are different phenomena of consciousness. Intuition is not seeing the latter as a judgment of the former; it is merely knowing events just as they are. To say that one errs or does not err is meaningless. This kind of intuitive experience becomes the foundation on top of which is reared all our knowledge.

When science departs from previous hypotheses and seeks a new, firm foundation, it always returns to this kind of direct experience. This is also the reason that at the beginning of modern philosophy Bacon took experience as the basis of all knowledge, that Descartes took the motto "*Cogito ergo sum*" as his basis, and that others took similarly obvious things as truth. Yet what Bacon termed experience was not pure experience but was experience accompanied by the dogma that one is able to intuit extra-conscious events by means of it. Descartes' statement "*Cogito ergo sum*" is no longer an event of direct experience, for he has already deduced the "*sum*." Also, to consider that clear thought is able to know the basic state of matter is a dogma. According to the philosophy of Kant and later philosophers, it is impossible to receive directly truth which one cannot doubt. What I here term direct knowledge is departing from all these dogmas and recognizing it as only an intuitive fact. (Of course, if as various historians of philosophy, beginning with Hegel, have said, Descartes' "*Cogito ergo sum*" is considered as having expressed the intuitive certainty which is joined with reality and thought, then it is identical with my starting-point.)

Contrary to the making of the intuition of events in the consciousness, i.e., events of direct experience, as the starting-point of all knowledge, there are people who consider thought as the most certain standard. These people separate the true aspect of things from the appearance, and say that the events which we experience

intuitively are their appearances, and that only by the functioning of thought can we make clear their true aspect. Of course, herein common sense or science, although it does not wholly reject intuitive experience, considers a certain kind of experiential fact as the truth of things and another experiential fact as false. For example, it is such things as that the sun, moon, and stars appear small but that actually they are extremely large, and that the heavens appear to move but that actually the earth moves. But this kind of thought arises from deducing from an experiential event that arises under certain conditions an experiential event that arises under other conditions. Each is an event which under its own conditions cannot be moved. In that they are identical intuitive events, for what reason is one true and the other false? The reason that this kind of thought arises is simply that the sense of touch, compared to the other senses, is general and in practice the most important, and one considers that which comes from this sense as the true aspect of things; but when one thinks a little, it immediately becomes clear that this idea is inconsistent. When we come to a certain school of philosophers, we find that they emphasize, contrary to this, that experiential events are wholly appearances and that we are able to know the basic state of things only by means of thought. But even supposing that there is a trans-experiential reality which we are unable to experience, how are we able to know this kind of thing by thought? No one can deny that even the activity of our thought is still a kind of conscious phenomenon emerging in the consciousness. If one considers that by our experiential events we are unable to know the basic state of things, one would expect that we would still be unable to do this by thought which is an identical phenomenon. Although certain people take the generality and necessity of thought as the standards of knowing true reality, these characteristics too are only a kind of feeling which one intuitively feels in one's

consciousness, and are still events in the consciousness. The consideration of all our sensory knowledge as error and that only by thought is one able to know the true aspect of things began with the Elea school and attained its peak with Plato. In modern philosophy, men of the Descartes school all believed that by clear thought we are able to know the true aspect of reality.

It is believed that thought and intuition are wholly different functions, but when they are seen simply as events in the consciousness, they are activities of the same kind. It is believed that intuition and experience are pure, passive activities wherein one perceives directly individual things as they are without relation to anything else and that thought, as opposed to these, is an active activity wherein one compares things, judges them, and establishes their relationships, but in actuality there cannot be wholly passive functions as functions of consciousness. Intuition is immediate, direct judgment. My referring here to intuition as the starting-point of knowledge without hypotheses was made in this sense.

What I have called heretofore intuition does not refer merely to the activity of feeling. At the base of thought there is always a certain unifying element. This is that which must be directly perceived. Judgment arises from this analysis.

Chapter 2 Conscious Phenomena as the Only Reality

If, based in direct knowledge which does not contain the slightest hypothesis, we view things, we see that reality lies only in our conscious phenomena, namely in the events of direct experience. To call the rest reality is nothing more than an assumption emerging from the demands of thought. It is obvious that in the activity of thought,

which already does not go beyond the scope of conscious phenomena, there is no mystical faculty to intuit a reality beyond experience, and these hypotheses are only abstract concepts which have emerged in order that thought may organize systematically the events of direct experience.

One is utterly unable to establish in a parallel manner both the extremely critical idea which endeavors, by eliminating all dogma, to proceed from the most undoubted direct knowledge, and the idea that supposes a reality apart from the events of direct experience. Even such great philosophers as Locke and Kant were unable to escape the inconsistencies of this dualism. I intend to cast away all hypothetical ideas and to select strictly the former system. If we examine this matter from the viewpoint of the history of philosophy, I think we can say that such men as Berkeley and Fichte took this position.

Usually it is thought that our conscious phenomena are a kind of phenomenon which particularly accompanies, in the material world, the nervous system of animals. But if we reflect a moment, we see that the most direct, primitive fact is the phenomenon of consciousness and not that of matter. Our bodies too are still nothing more than a part of our conscious phenomena. It is not that consciousness resides in the body but on the contrary that the body resides in one's consciousness. To say that the phenomena of consciousness accompany the stimuli to the nerve centers is to say nothing more than that one kind of conscious phenomenon emerges accompanying another kind of conscious phenomenon. If we were able to know directly the phenomena in our brain, the relationship between the so-called phenomenon of consciousness and the stimuli in the brain would be precisely the same as that existing between what one hears in the ear as sound and feels in the eye and hand as the vibration of a string.

consciousness, seen from the standpoint of pure experience, one is unable to make absolute distinctions between oneself and another. If we are able to consider that in an individual consciousness, while yesterday's consciousness and today's consciousness are independent, because they belong to the same system, they are still one consciousness, we are probably able to find the same relationship between the consciousness of oneself and another.

The content of our thoughts and feelings is all general. However many thousands of years have passed or by however many thousands of miles one is separated from another, thoughts and feelings can be mutually communicated. For example, such a thing as a mathematical principle is the same no matter by whom or when or where it is thought. Thus, a great man influences many people, forming a group, and the same spirit controls it. At such a time we can consider the spirit of these people as one.

The next matter wherein one is troubled at an interpretation concerning the view of conscious phenomena as the only reality is—if we consider our conscious phenomena not as fixed things but as a continuation of events which are changing—the problem of where these phenomena arise and of where they go. But since this problem too, in short, arises from the requirement of the law of cause and effect, which states that in things there must be a cause and an effect, before we consider it, we must first investigate what sort of a thing the requirement of the law of cause and effect is. Usually we think that the law of cause and effect requires directly the existence of a thing itself established in the background of phenomena, but this is an error. The correct significance of the law of cause and effect, as Hume has said, is that in the emergence of a certain phenomenon there is of necessity a definite phenomenon which precedes it, and it does not require the existence of something beyond phenomena. Another phenomenon being born from a given

phenomenon is not that the former was included in the latter or that what was latent outside somewhere has been drawn out. It means merely that when sufficient conditions, namely causes, have been provided, of necessity a certain phenomenon, namely result, is born. When the conditions are not yet completed, the certain phenomenon, or result, which must accompany them, is nowhere existent. For example, before one creates fire by striking a stone, the fire exists nowhere. Perhaps one says that there is the power to create it, but as I have said before, that which we call power or matter is a supposition established in order to explain, and from what we know directly, there is only a certain wholly different phenomenon, namely fire. Thus, that a certain phenomenon accompanies another is the basic fact which is given to us directly, and the requirements of the law of cause and effect are, on the contrary, things which arise based on this fact. However, to think that this fact and the law of cause and effect conflict, in short, arises from a misunderstanding of the latter.

This law of cause and effect, with the changes of our phenomena of consciousness as a base, is a habit of thought arising from these changes; when we attempt to explain the entire universe by this law, we immediately realize that it falls into self-contradiction. This law requires that there must be a beginning to the world. But if we establish some place as the beginning, this law further asks what was the cause of that, and consequently, by itself, it makes clear its own imperfection.

Finally, I wish to leave a word concerning the idea of the law of cause and effect that something does not arise from nothing. In the ordinary meaning, even though there is no thing, seen from the point of intuition which destroys the distinction between subject and object, still a consciousness of "nothing" truly exists. "Nothing" is not merely a word, and when we try to give it some concrete mean-

ing, on the one hand, it is the absence of certain characteristics but on the other it possesses some positive characteristics. (For example, if one speaks from psychology, the color black too is a kind of sensation.) Thus, even if in the material world something is thought to be born from nothing, seen as a fact of consciousness, this nothing is not the true nothing, but can be seen as a certain moment of the development. If this be so, in the consciousness how can something be created from nothing? Consciousness is not something which must stand under quantitative limitations of time, place, and force; consequently, it is not something which must accept the domination of the mechanical law of cause and effect. These forms, on the contrary, are established on the unity of consciousness. In consciousness, everything is qualitative, and a thing which is of latent energy develops itself. Consciousness is Hegel's so-called "*das Unendliche*" (the unending).

Hereby, even if there is the sensation of one kind of color, we can say that within it are contained infinite differences, that is, as our consciousness becomes more precise, even in one kind of color it comes to be able to feel an infinite number of differences. Today the distinctions of our sensations have thus become specialized. Wundt thinks that the characteristics of sensations are aligned in order but that since originally a general thing specialized and emerged there is this kind of system. (Wundt, *Grundriss der Psychologie*, Einl. § 5.)

Chapter 3 The True State of Reality

What kind of thing is direct reality before we have as yet added the complexities of thought? That is, what kind of thing is an event of truly pure experience? At this time there is not as yet

the opposition of subject and object, there is not the separation into intellect, emotion, and will, there is only independent, self-contained, pure activity.

The intellectualist psychologists consider sensations and concepts as the elements of spiritual phenomena, and think that all spiritual phenomena are things which emerge from their union. If one thinks thus, one must say that an event of pure experience is the most passive state of consciousness, namely sensation. This kind of thought, however, confuses an event of direct experience with that which emerges as a result of academic analysis. In events of our direct experience there is nothing which is pure sensation. Even that which we call pure sensation is already simple perception. Moreover, perception, however simple it be, is certainly not wholly passive, and necessarily contains active, that is, constructive, elements. (This fact is clear if we look at spatial perception.) Since, if we arrive at complex intellectual functions such as association and thought, this aspect becomes even clearer, even though association is commonly said to be passive, in association as well that which establishes the direction of the union of the concepts is not only the situation of the external world but is dependent on the internal characteristics of consciousness. Between association and thought there is only a difference of degree. Since originally we divided the phenomenon of consciousness into intellect, emotion, and will because of academic convenience, in actuality there are not three kinds of phenomena, and the phenomenon of consciousness furnishes all three aspects. (For example, even such a purely intellectual process as academic research certainly is unable to exist divorced from the emotion and the will.) But among these three aspects the will is the most basic form. As the voluntarist psychologists assert, our consciousness is always active, beginning with an impulse and ending with the will. Thus, no matter how simple our most

direct phenomenon of consciousness is, it takes the form of the will. That is, we must say that the will is an event of direct experience.

Psychologists of the past were primarily intellectualists, but in recent times voluntarism has gradually come to occupy a position of strength. Men such as Wundt are its major proponents. No matter how simple consciousness is, it is of necessity structured. The contrast is a necessary condition of the establishment of consciousness. If there were a truly simple consciousness, that would be precisely unconsciousness.

Just as in pure experience there is not as yet the separation into intellect, emotion, and will and there is a single activity, so too there is not as yet the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity. Since the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity emerges from the requirements of our thought, it is not a fact of direct experience. In direct experience there is only a single, independent event, and there is neither a subject which sees nor an object which is seen. Even as when our hearts are captured by sublime music, one's self and things are both forgotten, and the whole universe becomes only one melodious sound, at this moment so-called true reality is present. Since the thought that this is the vibration of the air or that one is listening to music emerges from our reflecting and thinking separated from this true state of reality, at this time we are already separated from true reality.

Usually one thinks as if subject and object were realities able separately to be independent and that the phenomena of consciousness emerge from the workings of these two. Consequently one thinks that there are the two realities of spirit and matter, but this is all error. Subject and object are the differences in the way of examining one event, and the distinction of spirit and matter as well emerges from this viewpoint, for it is not a distinction of the event itself. An actual flower is certainly not a flower of pure

matter as the scientists say; it is an adorable flower, being beauty composed of color, shape, and scent. Heine, looking up at the stars on a still night, called them golden tacks in a blue sky, and while astronomers will probably laugh at this as the nonsense of a poet, the true aspect of stars, on the contrary, may appear in this one phrase.

This kind of independent, self-contained, true reality wherein subject and object are not as yet separated is a state wherein intellect, emotion, and the will are one. True reality is not an object of the cold intellect as is commonly thought. It is something which has emerged from our emotion and will. That is, it is not only an existence but a thing which has meaning. Thus, if we remove our emotion and will from this real world, already it is not a concrete fact but becomes simply an abstract concept. That which physicists call the world, like a line without breadth or a plane without thickness, is not a thing which really exists. Viewed from this point, it is the artist rather than the scholar who arrives at the true aspect of reality. All that which we see and hear contains our individuality. Even if we say it is the same consciousness, it is certainly not truly identical. For example, even if we view the same cow, the mental image must differ according to the farmer, the zoologist, and the artist. Even the same scene according to one's feeling may appear lucid and beautiful or gloomy and sad. Just as in Buddhism, according to our feeling, this world becomes either heaven or hell, so too is our world constructed with our emotion and will as its base. However much it is an objective world which is the object of pure intellect, it cannot escape this relationship.

It is thought that the scientifically viewed world is the most objective and that therein no element at all of our emotion and will is included. But even learning is a thing which arose from the requirements of the realities of our struggle for survival, and is

certainly not a view which is wholly divorced from the demands of the emotion and the will. Particularly, as such men as Jerusalem have said, the idea that there is a force which creates the various processes of the external world, which is the basic significance of the scientific view, must be considered as something patterned after our own will. (Jerusalem, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 6. Aufl. § 27.) Therefore, everything which explains the ancient myriad phenomena is personification, and today's scientific explanations have developed from it.

From the position where we consider that the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is basic, we come to think that only in knowledge are contained objective elements and that the emotion and the will are our individual, subjective events. This idea is already mistaken in its basic premises. But even supposing that phenomena emerge from the mutual workings of subject and object, even the content of knowledge such as color, if viewed subjectively is subjective and if viewed individually is individual. Conversely, if what we call emotion and will possess the characteristics of arousing in the external world this kind of emotion and will, they come to have an objective basis, so that to say that they are wholly individual is an error. Our emotions and wills can mutually understand and feel each other. That is to say, they contain trans-individual elements.

Because we have individual aspects and we think that they give rise to sentiments of joy, hatred, love, and desire, the idea arises that the emotion and the will are purely individual. Yet it is not that man has emotion and will, but rather that emotion and will create the individual, for emotion and will are events of direct experience.

The personification explanation of the myriad phenomena was primitive man's method of explanation, and even today as well it

is the method of explanation of innocent and naive children. So-called scientists all laugh at this, and of course this method of explanation is childish, but from a certain point of view it is the true one of explaining reality. The scientist's method of explanation emphasizes only the aspect of the intelligence. In the perfect explanation of reality, while satisfying intellectual requirements, we must not neglect the requirements of the emotion and the will.

To the Greek people nature was everywhere alive. Thunder and lightning were the wrath of Zeus on Mount Olympus, and the voice of the cuckoo was the ancient lament of Philomele. (See Schiller, *Die Götter Griechenlands*.) To the eye of the natural Greeks the true meaning of the present was apparent just as it was. Present-day art, religion, and philosophy all are trying to express this true meaning.

Chapter 4 True Reality Always Has the Same Form

As I have stated above, the conscious state of unity of intelligence, emotion, and will, wherein both subject and object are submerged, is true reality. If we conceive of an independent, self-contained, true reality, it spontaneously comes to appear in this form. The true state of this kind of reality is something which we must only apprehend and not something we must reflect upon, analyze, or must be able to express in words. However, since our various kinds of discriminating intelligence arise from reflecting on this reality, I now wish to think about the form which establishes this single reality, and to make clear how from this various differences are born.

True reality, like the true meaning of art, is a thing which cannot be transmitted from one to another. What is able to be transmitted is

simply an abstract shell. We think that we are understanding the same thing by the same words, but its content necessarily differs somewhat.

When we try to think of the method which establishes independent, self-contained, true realities, we see that all are established by the same form. That is, they are based on the following form: First the whole appears "implicitly," and from this its content differentiatingly develops; and when this differentiating development is concluded, the whole of reality has been realized and is completed. In short, a single thing by itself has completed its development. This method can be seen most clearly in the process of our active consciousness. When we examine the will, there is first that which is an object concept, and from this, in response to the situation, appropriate concepts are organized systematically to realize it; furthermore, when this organization is completed, it becomes behavior; herein the object is realized, and the process of the will is completed. Indeed it is the same if we look not only at the will but also at such things as thought and imagination which are the functions of the so-called intelligence. Similarly there is first an object concept from which various conceptual links emerge, and when one achieves the correct conceptual union, this process is completed.

As James has stated in his *Stream of Consciousness*, all consciousness possesses the above form. For example, if one conceives of a sentence in one's consciousness, when the subject has appeared in the consciousness, already the entire sentence is dimly implicit. But when the predicate comes to appear, its content has realized its development.

Concerning the developing conscious phenomena of the will, thought, and imagination, the above form is clear, but in intellectual perception and impulse it seems as if at a glance one realizes directly the whole, and thus one does not pass through the above process.

Yet as I have stated before, consciousness is certainly not simple and passive in every circumstance, but rather is active and complex. Moreover, its establishment of necessity is according to the above form. As the voluntarist theory states, since the will is the original form of all consciousness, no matter how simple all consciousness is, we must say that it is established according to the same form as the will.

The difference between impulse and intellectual perception on the one hand and the will and thought on the other is one of degree and not one of kind. Since the process which in the former is unconscious in the latter comes to express itself in the consciousness, we know, inferring from the latter, that the former too must be of an identical structure. Even that which we call intellectual perception as well, when we consider its development, we find has emerged as a result of various experiences. For example, even when one listens to music, at first it does not give the slightest sensation, but gradually as one's ear becomes accustomed to it, one comes to acquire a clear intellectual perception. Indeed there is nothing to prevent one from saying that intellectual perception is a kind of thought.

Next, I must make a brief statement concerning the misunderstanding which arises from the distinction between passive and active consciousness. In active consciousness the above form is clear, but in passive consciousness that which unites the concepts is outside, and since concepts are united merely by the circumstances of the external world, it seems as if a certain perfect thing does not complete its development from within. Our consciousness, however, cannot be rigidly distinguished according to whether it is passive or active. This too is ultimately a difference of degree. Even conscious processes such as association and memory are not, as the laws of association state, controlled by circumstances of the external world; each person's internal characteristics are their motivating force, and

we can still consider that a certain unifying thing develops from within. It is merely that in the so-called active consciousness this certain unifying thing clearly arises in the consciousness as a concept, but that in passive consciousness this thing operates as unconsciousness or as a kind of feeling.

Since the distinction between active and passive, namely whether the spirit operates from within or is operated on from without, comes from considering, having hypothesized by thought an independent existence for spirit and matter, that conscious phenomena arise from the mutual workings of spirit and external objects, it is not a distinction from the actuality of pure experience. In the actuality of pure experience it is merely a difference of degree. When we possess a clear object concept, it is thought of as active.

According to that which the experientialists emphasize, it is said that all our consciousness develops from the functions of external objects. However, no matter how much external objects operate, if there are not previously existing qualities to respond to them internally, they will not create conscious phenomena. It is like a seed which however much it is nurtured from without, if there is no growing power in it, cannot create a plant. Of course we can say conversely that if there is only the seed the plant will not grow. In effect, in both cases it is looking at only one aspect and forgetting the other. In the activity of true reality it is the self-creation and self-development of a single thing, and the distinctions of internal and external, active and passive, are developed by thought in order to explain it.

To think that all conscious phenomena are created from the same form I believe is not so difficult, but to advance yet a step further, to try to include under the same form even those events of the natural world which we commonly call phenomena of the external world perhaps is thought of as considerably difficult. As I have said

before, however, such a thing as a purely material world separated from consciousness is an abstract concept; true reality is not outside conscious phenomena, but we can say that the true reality of direct experience is always established according to the same form.

Usually one thinks that a thing which is a fixed object exists as a fact. But a fact in actuality is always an event. As the Greek philosopher Heraclitus has said, all things move and nothing stands still (*Alles fließt und nichts hat Bestand*); reality is moving and is a continuation of events which do not stand still even for a second.

Even that which we call the objective world in the external world is not outside of our conscious phenomena, but is still something which is unified according to a certain kind of unifying process. It is only that when phenomena are universal, that is, when they maintain a unity beyond the individual small consciousness, we call them an objective world independent from us. For example, here there is a lamp. If it is seen only by me, I may perhaps think it is a subjective illusion. But it becomes an objective fact when everybody similarly recognizes it. The objective, independent world arises from these universal characteristics.

Chapter 5 The Basic Form of True Reality

The facts which we experience appear to be various, but when we try to think a bit, we see that they are all the identical reality and that they are established according to the same form. I now wish to speak about this kind of basic form of all reality.

First we must recognize the working of a certain unifying thing in the background of all reality. Certain scholars think that truly simple, independent elements, for example such a thing as the atom of atomicists, are basic reality, but this kind of element is an

abstract concept established for the purpose of explanation and cannot exist in actuality. Thinking experimentally, if there now is here one atom, it must necessarily be something which possesses some characteristic or function, for that which is absolutely without characteristics or functions is identical with nothing. But the working of one thing means of necessity a working with regard to another thing, and herein there must necessarily be a third thing which, uniting these two, causes them to be able to work mutually together; for example, in saying that the movement of object A is transmitted to B, there must be a force between these two objects; moreover, concerning characteristics, one being established means necessarily that it is established in opposition to another. For example, if red were the only color, there would be no way for it to appear; in the appearance of red there must be colors which are not red; and in one characteristic being compared with and distinguished from another, both characteristics must basically be the same, for things which are wholly different in kind and do not have any point in common between them cannot be compared and distinguished. If all things in this way are established according to opposition, of necessity a certain unifying thing must be concealed in their foundation.

This certain unifying thing, among material phenomena, is considered as the material force existing in the external world, and among spiritual phenomena, it is reduced to the unifying power of consciousness, but as I have said before, since both material and spiritual phenomena are identical from the point of view of pure experience, these two kinds of unifying functions must ultimately be reduced to the same kind. The unifying force at the base of thought and the will and the unifying force at the base of universal phenomena are immediately the same; for example, the laws of logic and

mathematics are the basic principles whereby we are able to establish the phenomenon of the universe.

In the establishment of true reality, while unity at its base is necessary, as I have stated above, mutual oppositions, or contradictions, are also necessary. Just as Heraclitus has said that conflict is the father of all things, so true reality is established by contradictions; red things are established in opposition to colors which are not red, and things which operate are established in opposition to that which receives such operation. As these contradictions are destroyed, reality also disappears. Essentially, this contradiction and unity are nothing more than the same thing seen from two sides, for since there is unity there is contradiction and since there is contradiction there is unity. For example, things such as white and black which have all points but one in common are mutually the most opposed; conversely, things such as virtue and a triangle which do not have a clear opposition also do not have a clear unity. The most powerful, true reality is that which most skilfully harmonizes and unifies various contradictions.

Since to think separately of that which unifies and that which is unified is based on abstract thought, in concrete reality one is unable to separate these two. A single tree exists by having unified the parts which constitute the various different functions of branch, leaf, root, and bole, but a tree is not merely a collection of branch, leaf, root, and bole, for if there is not the unifying power of the tree as a whole, the branch, leaf, root, and bole are without significance. A tree exists above the opposition and unity of its parts.

When the unifying power and that which is unified are separated, there is no reality. For instance, when a man has piled up stones, the stones and the man are separate things; at such a time the pile of stones is artificial and does not constitute an independent reality.

Therefore the basic form of reality lies in the fact that while it is one it is many, while it is many it is one, in the midst of equality it maintains distinctions, and in the midst of distinctions it maintains equality. And since one is unable to separate these two aspects, such a thing as the self-development of a single thing is possible. Independent, self-contained, true reality always maintains this form. Those things which are not so are all our abstract concepts.

Reality is that which by itself has constituted one system. That which makes us believe in an authentic reality depends on these characteristics. Conversely, those things which do not constitute a system, for example such as a dream, one does not believe to be reality. Reality which is thus one and many must be self-operating and without cessation. A state of quiescence is an independent one which is not in opposition with another, i.e., it is a state which rejects the many. In this state, however, reality can be established. If, by unity, a certain single state is established, immediately herein another opposing state must be established. If a unity is erected, immediately a disunity which destroys it is constructed. True reality is established by this kind of infinite opposition.

Physicists state that there may be a limit to reality, invoking such ideas as the conservation of energy, but this is a hypothesis for the convenience of explanation; moreover, this kind of idea is very much the same as saying there is a limit to space, and they merely look abstractly at one side only, forgetting the other side.

Living things all contain unlimited oppositions; that is, they possess the ability to give rise to unlimited change. The reason that spirit is called a living thing is that it always possesses unlimited oppositions and nowhere ceases. If there is a time when it is fixed in a single state and furthermore is unable to move into another opposition, it is a dead object.

That reality is said to be established by things opposing it does not mean that such opposition comes forth from another but rather that it emerges from within itself. As I have said before, at the base of this opposition there is unity, and because unlimited oppositions all come to develop as inevitable results from its own internal characteristics, true reality is the free development arising from one thing's internal necessity. For example, from the limitations of space various geometric forms are possible, and these forms, being mutually opposed, preserve special characteristics. However, all are not separately opposed, but are united by the necessary characteristics of one thing, namely space; that is, just as in the case of the unlimited development of spatial characteristics, so too if one inquires into those things which we call natural phenomena, those things which are true natural phenomena, as I have said before, do not emerge from individual, independent elements nor, moreover, do they exist apart from our phenomena of consciousness. In short, because it is established by one unifying function, it must be considered the development of one nature.

Hegel has stated that anything rational is real, and reality of necessity is that which is rational. Although this statement has provoked various kinds of opposition, according to one's view it is a truth which cannot be moved. However minute a thing the universe may be, it certainly is not something which emerged coincidentally, possessing absolutely no connection with anything preceding or following. Of necessity it emerged possessing a reason why it had to emerge. Our viewing this as coincidence comes merely from our insufficiency of knowledge.

Usually we think that there is some lord of activity and that from this there has emerged activity. Seen from direct experience, however, activity itself is reality. What we call this lordly thing is an abstract concept. Since we think that the opposition of unity

and its content presents mutually independent realities, this kind of idea arises.

Chapter 6 The Only Reality

Reality, as I have stated before, is the activity of consciousness. And because the activity of consciousness, according to the usual interpretation, appears at various times and then immediately disappears, it is believed that the same activity cannot be eternally linked together. If this be so, are we to believe that, at the smallest, the activity of our lives, or at the greatest, the development of the universe up to the present, are events ultimately like voids, phantasies, and dreams, which are in utter confusion, and that there is no unifying base among them whatsoever? I intend to state positively, in the face of this kind of doubt, that reality is established in mutual relationships and that the universe is the only activity of the only reality.

I have tried to explain briefly that the activity of consciousness is established by the unity within a certain area, but there are many people who do not believe that there still exists such unity outside a certain area. For example, there are people who think that yesterday's consciousness and today's consciousness are perfectly independent and can no longer be considered as one consciousness. When we try to think from the standpoint of direct experience, however, we find that such a distinction is merely a relative one and not an absolute one. Even if we inquire into thought or the will, which anyone considers to be one unified phenomenon of consciousness, we discover that its process is nothing more than a continuation of concepts wherein each aspect is different. If one tries to distinguish these in spirit, one can think that these concepts are separate con-

sciousnesses. However, these continuous concepts are not separate, independent realities, and if we are able to view them as one activity of consciousness, there will be no case when we do not consider yesterday's consciousness and today's consciousness as one activity of consciousness; in the event that we think about a certain single problem over several days, or plan one enterprise, clearly we are able to view them as the same consciousness operating continuously but merely differing in length of time.

In the union of consciousness the simultaneous union such as intellectual perception, the continuous union such as association and thought, and also the union which covers a lifetime, such as self-perception, are all differences of degree and are things which emerge from the same characteristics.

Phenomena of consciousness are things which change from time to time and from moment to moment, and the same consciousness does not arise twice. Even if yesterday's and today's consciousness are the same in their content, the thought that they are completely different consciousnesses is not one derived from the standpoint of direct experience but on the contrary is a result of having hypothesized a thing called time and of having deduced phenomena of consciousness as things which appear therein. If one considers phenomena of consciousness as things which are established by the form called time, phenomena of consciousness which have once passed out of the characteristics of time cannot return again. Time possesses only one direction. Even if they are consciousnesses possessing entirely the same content, it cannot be said that they are still the same from the standpoint of the form of time. Yet if we now try to return to the base of direct experience, we see that these relationships must become entirely opposite. Since that which we call time is nothing more than a form which orders the content of our experience, for the idea of time to arise, the content of consciousness must first be

able to be fused, to be unified, and to become one. If this were not so, we would not be able to think temporally, linking and ordering that which takes place before and after. Thus, the unifying function of consciousness does not receive the control of time, but on the contrary time is established by this unifying function. We must say that at the foundation of consciousness there is a certain transcendent, unchanging thing beyond time.

Seen from direct experience, consciousness of the same content is directly the same consciousness, and just as truth thought by whatever person at whatever time is the same, so too because both our yesterday's and today's consciousness belong to the same system and possess the same content, they are directly fused and form one consciousness. That which we call the life of an individual is the development of consciousness constituting one system of this kind.

Viewed from this point, we see that at the foundation of spirit there is always a certain unchangeable element. This element day by day enlarges its development. With the passage of time the unifying central point accompanying this development goes on changing, and this central point is always "now."

If, as I have stated above, an unchanging unifying force is operating at the base of consciousness, doubts may arise as to the questions of the kind of form in which this unifying force exists and how it maintains itself. In psychology one reduces the origin of such a unifying function to matter called the brain. But as I have stated previously, since the hypothesizing of an independent body outside the consciousness is deduced from the unchanging union of the phenomena of consciousness, rather than this body it is the unifying function, which is the direct union of the content of consciousness, which is the basic fact. This unifying force does not emerge from a certain other reality, but reality on the contrary is established according to this function. Men all believe that there is

such a thing as a fixed, unchanging law in the universe and that all things are established according to it. This law is the unifying force of all things and at the same time is also the unifying force of the interior of consciousness; law is not maintained by matter and the spirit, but rather it is law which causes the establishment of matter and spirit. Law is independent and self-sustaining, does not differ according to time, place, or man, and does not change under any circumstance.

Usually law is thought of as the function which controls the conceptual union in the realm of our subjective consciousness. This kind of function, however, is the trace of the activity of law and not law itself. Law itself is creative, and we can develop in it and work in conformity with it, but it is something which we are unable to see as the object of consciousness. *the nature*

To say, in the usual sense, that a thing exists means it exists in a certain place at a certain time in a certain form. Yet our saying here that law exists differs in kind from this usual statement. For if it is something which is thus restricted to one place, it cannot perform the work of unification, and such a thing is not the living, true law.

Just as an individual's consciousness constitutes one reality wherein yesterday's and today's consciousness are directly united, so too can the consciousness of our lives similarly be considered as one. When we infer further from this thought, indeed we see that it is true not only within the area of one individual, but we can consider as one the consciousness jointed together, by the same reason, with that of another person too. Just as law is the same whoever thinks of it, so too at the base of our consciousness is there a universal thing. By means of it we are able mutually to understand each other and mutually to have intercourse with each other. Indeed

the so-called universal reason is not only connected at the base of man's common mind, but no matter how much a man born in one certain society is rich in originality, there is none who does not receive the control of its particular social spirit. The spirit of each individual is nothing more than one cell of this social spirit.

As I have also stated before, the linking of the consciousness of individual with individual and the linking in one individual of yesterday's consciousness with today's consciousness are identical. It may seem as if the former pair are joined indirectly from without and that the latter pair are joined directly from within, but if only the former are considered as being joined from without, we see that this is not so, for since the latter too are joined by the symbols of a certain kind of internal perception, they are identical with the consciousnesses among individuals, which are joined by the symbols of language, etc. If only the latter are considered as being joined from within, we again see that this is not so, for since in the former too there is the original, identical foundation among individuals, they too are directly joined.

That which we denominate our so-called objective world, as I have stated several times, is not something which is established apart from our subjectivity, and the unifying force of the objective world is identical with the unifying force of the subjective consciousness; in other words, both the so-called objective world and the consciousness are things established by the same law. Therefore, man, by the law existing within himself, is able to comprehend the basic principle of the establishment of the universe. Even if there should be a world different from the unity of our consciousness, such a world would be one that is utterly without communication with us. Indeed a world which we can know and comprehend must stand under a unifying force identical with our consciousness.

Chapter 7 The Development of the Differentiation of Reality

If we start from the idea that apart from consciousness there exists a world, perhaps we can say that all things exist individually and independently, but if we start from the idea that the phenomenon of consciousness is the only reality, we must say that at the base of the myriad aspects of the universe there is only one unifying force and that all things express the same reality. As our knowledge advances, we become more and more certain of the fact that there is this identical law. Now I shall try to state how various differentiating oppositions are born from this single reality.

At the same time that reality is unified into one, it must be containing oppositions. If there is one reality here, there is of necessity another reality opposing it. And in this mutual opposition of these two things in this way, these two things are not independent realities but must be things which are united, that is, they must be the differentiating development of one reality. Furthermore, when both of these are united and appear as one reality, again one opposition must emerge. But at this time, in the rear of both of these, again one unity must be working. Thus, it advances toward unlimited unity. If we try to think in reverse from one side, we are able to think that an unlimited single reality develops itself differentiatingly from small to large, from shallow to deep. Such a process is the method of the expression of reality, and the phenomenon of the universe establishes itself and advances by means of it.

We are clearly able to see the process of this kind of development of reality in the phenomenon of our consciousness. For example, when we look at the will, we find that since that which we call the

will is the attempt to realize certain ideals, it is the opposition of the present and the ideal. But when this will is united with the ideal which has been put into practice, this present emerges as a new will, again in opposition to another ideal. In this way, while we are living, we everywhere proceed to develop and realize ourselves. We are even able to recognize this kind of method of reality if we look at organic life and development. Organic life truly is this kind of ceaseless activity. It is only that it appears somewhat difficult to apply this method to the existence of inorganic matter, but I intend to speak about this problem when I later discuss nature.

Now from the basic method of reality such as I have put forth above, how do the various distinctions of reality arise? First, from what arises the distinction between so-called subjectivity and objectivity? Subjectivity and objectivity are not things existing mutually separated but rather are the two related aspects of one reality; in other words, that which we term subjectivity is the unifying aspect, and that which we term objectivity is the aspect which is unified; we are always the unifiers of reality, and matter is that which is unified. (Here what I term objectivity is not used in the sense of a reality independent of our consciousness but merely in the sense of the object of our consciousness.) For example, in the event that we perceive something or think about something, the self is the function which compares and unifies this and that aspect, and matter is the object which stands in opposition to it, i.e., it is the material of comparison and unification. When one views a previous consciousness from a later consciousness, it seems as if one is able to view oneself as object, but the truth is that this self is not the true self, for the true self is the present observer, i.e., the unifier. At this time we must think that the previous unity has already been completed once and is that which is included as the material of the next unity within it. The self, in this way, is the unlimited unifier

and is that which can never become material for comparison and unification as object.

Even seen from psychology, our self is the unifier of consciousness. And now seen from the standpoint that consciousness is the only true reality, this self must be the unifier of reality. Although in psychology we speak as if this self which is the unifier exists separately from that which is unified, such a self is merely an abstract concept. Actually, it is not that there is a self apart from matter, but rather that our self is directly the unifier itself of the reality of the universe.

The distinction between spiritual phenomena and material phenomena too certainly does not mean that there are two kinds of reality. Since spiritual phenomena are seen from the unifying aspect, i.e., from the side of subjectivity, material phenomena are seen from that which is unified, i.e., from the side of objectivity. It is nothing more than viewing the identical reality from both mutually opposing sides. Thus, if one views it from the side of unification, everything becomes spiritual phenomena belonging to subjectivity, and if one views it apart from unification, everything becomes objective material phenomena. (The opposition of spiritualism and materialism arises from men's being strongly attached to one of these two aspects.)

Next, from what does the distinction between active and passive come to arise? Active and passive also do not mean that there is the distinction of two kinds of reality but simply that there are two aspects of the same reality, for the unifier is always active and that which receives unification is always passive. For instance, when we inquire into phenomena of consciousness, we see that since our will having operated means that a unified concept of the will, namely an object, has been realized, this in turn means that unity has been established. In addition, all spirit having operated means one has

attained the object of unity, and when this cannot be done and something is unified from another, we call this state passive. In material phenomena also, that A operates in opposition to B denotes a circumstance in which within the characteristics of A something includes a characteristic of B and has been able to control it. In this way unity is precisely the true meaning of active, for when we are in a position of unity, we are active, we are free. Conversely, when we are unified by another, we are passive, and we have come to be controlled under the laws of necessity.

Usually that which precedes in a time sequence is thought of as the actor, but this is not necessarily so, for the actor must be that which possesses power. And by power we mean the unifying function of reality. For instance, the movement of matter is said to arise from kinetic energy, but since this power simply indicates the unchanging relationship between certain phenomena, it means precisely the unifier which joins and combines these phenomena. And in the strict sense, only spirit is active.

I shall now say a word about the distinction between unconsciousness and consciousness. The subjective unifying function is always unconscious, and that which becomes the object of unification appears as the content of consciousness. Even if one examines thought, or even the will, one finds that the true unifying function itself is always unconscious. It is only when one tries to reflect on this that this unifying function appears in the consciousness as one concept. But at that time it is no longer the unifying function, for it has become the object of unification. As I have said before, since the unifying function is always subject, it consequently must always be unconscious. As Hartmann too has stated, consciousness is activity, and when we stand in a position of subjectivity and are in a condition of activity, we are always unconscious. Conversely, when we are conscious of a certain consciousness as an objective

goal, that consciousness has already lost activity. For example, even in the training in a certain art, while one is conscious of each movement it is not yet truly living art, and it is only when one arrives at a state of unconsciousness that it first becomes living art.

Since seen from psychology, spiritual phenomena are all conscious phenomena, there is the criticism that unconscious spiritual phenomena do not exist. Yet our spiritual phenomena are not merely a continuation of concepts, but of necessity there must be unconscious activity which links and unifies these, and only then are spiritual phenomena established.

Finally, even when we inquire into the relationship between phenomenon and substance, we still are able to explain it as the relationship between both sides of reality. That which we call the substance of matter refers to the unifying power of reality, and phenomenon refers to the state of opposition of its differentiating development. For instance, to say that here the substance of a desk exists means that our consciousness always appears according to a certain fixed union and to speak of an unchanging substance here indicates this unifying force.

If we speak in this way, we are forced to say that strict subjectivity is the substance of reality, and yet we usually think that on the contrary things reside in objectivity. But this latter idea emerges from thinking of an abstract subjectivity without thinking of strict subjectivity. Such abstract subjectivity is a powerless concept, and in opposition to this, it would be more accurate to say that the substance of things, on the contrary, belongs to objectivity. Yet, strictly speaking, objectivity apart from subjectivity is again an abstract concept, and powerless. Truly the substance of active things is the unifying power which is the basic function of the establishment of reality, i.e., it must be strict subjectivity.

Chapter 8 Nature

Reality is only one, but according to the different ways of looking at it presents various forms. In saying "nature," it is thought that it is an objective reality wholly independent of our subjectivity, but, strictly speaking, this kind of nature is an abstract concept and certainly is not true reality. The substance of nature is simply an event of direct experience wherein subject and object are not yet separated. For example, that which we think of as truly grass and trees are grass and trees possessing living color and form, and are our directly perceived facts. It is only when we think of this, removing for a time the aspect of subjective activity from this concrete reality, that it can be thought of as purely objective nature. And the so-called scientist's nature in the strictest sense is a thing in which one has pushed this way of thinking to the extreme, and a most abstract thing, i.e., a thing most removed from the true aspect of reality.

Nature is that which has removed the subjective area, i.e., the unifying function, from concrete reality. Thus, in nature there is no self. Nature is moved from without only according to the laws of necessity and is unable to operate automatically from itself. Therefore, the linking and unity of natural phenomena do not constitute an internal unity as in spiritual phenomena but merely an accidental linking in time and space. Since the so-called natural law which is obtained according to the inductive method arises in the unchanging continuation of two certain kinds of phenomena, it is only that one is fixed as the cause of the other; and however much the natural sciences advance, we are unable to acquire more explanation than this. It is merely that this explanation becomes more detailed and general.

The present tendency of science is to attempt to become as objective as possible. Thus it comes about that psychological phenomena must be explained physiologically, physiological phenomena chemically, chemical phenomena physically, and physical phenomena mechanically. What sort of a thing is this purely mechanical explanation which becomes the basis of this kind of explanation? Pure matter is a reality which we are wholly unable to experience, and if we are able to experience anything at all concerning it, it must be something which comes to appear in our consciousness as a phenomenon of consciousness. That which has come to appear as a fact in the consciousness, however, is wholly subjective and cannot be said to be purely objective matter, for pure matter has no positive characteristic whatsoever which can be caught, is merely something which possesses only purely quantitative characteristics such as spatial and temporal activity, and is nothing more than a perfectly abstract concept such as a mathematical concept.

One thinks of matter as if it were something which fills space and one were directly able to perceive it, but those things which are an extension of things one is able to think of concretely are nothing more than conscious phenomena of touch and sight. Even though they appear great to our senses, it cannot necessarily be said that matter is manifold. The quantity of physical matter is simply determined by the size of its energy, i.e., it is deduced from the various functional relationships, and is certainly not a directly perceived fact.

Moreover if one thinks, as above, of nature purely materially, there are no distinctions of fauna, flora, and life, for there is nothing outside of the function of mechanical energy which is everywhere the same, and natural phenomena become things which do not have any special characteristic or meaning. There is absolutely no point of difference between man and a lump of earth. The true nature

which we actually experience, however, is certainly not an abstract concept such as I have stated above, and consequently is not merely the function of an identical mechanical energy. An animal is an animal, a plant is a plant, a metal is a metal, and they are concrete facts, each possessing special characteristics and significance. Those things which we call mountains, rivers, grasses, trees, insects, fish, birds, and beasts all in this way are provided with diverse individualities, and in interpreting them we are able to explain them variously from various standpoints, but those directly given, directly perceived, factual natures are things which in no way can be moved.

That we usually consider purely mechanical nature as truly objective reality and consider concrete nature in direct experience as subjective phenomena are ideas deduced from the hypothesis that all phenomena of consciousness are subjective phenomena of the self. But, as I have stated several times, we are unable to think of reality wholly separated from phenomena of consciousness. If we say something is subjective because it has a relation to phenomena of consciousness, then purely mechanical nature as well is subjective, for we are unable to think of such things as space, time, and motion too apart from our phenomena of consciousness. It is merely that they are relatively objective and not that they are absolutely objective.

Nature as truly concrete reality is not something which is established perfectly without a unifying function. Nature too still possesses a kind of self. Also the various forms, transformations, and motions which one plant or one animal expresses are not merely combinations and mechanical movements of unconscious matter, but since each possesses an inseparable relationship with the whole, it must be considered as an expression of essentially one unified self. For instance, the paws, legs, nose, and mouth of an animal all in their own way have a close relationship with the object of survival

of the animal, and one is unable to interpret their significance apart from this. At least in the explanation of the phenomena of animals and plants one must hypothesize this kind of natural unifying power. Biologists all explain the phenomenon of life by life instinct. Indeed it is not that this kind of unifying force exists only in organic matter, for in the crystalline structure of inorganic matter as well already this function appears to some degree. That is, all minerals possess a unique crystalline form. The self, i.e., the unifying function of nature, becomes more and more evident in this way from the crystals of inorganic matter to the organisms of animals and plants. (The true self first appears with spirit.)

Seen from the standpoint of the strict mechanical explanation of present-day science, the purposeful development of organisms as well ultimately must be explained by physical and chemical laws. In other words, it becomes merely a result of coincidence. But because this kind of thought results in overlooking facts too much, scientists attempt to explain it by the hypothesis of a latent force. That is, they say that the egg or the seed of living matter each possesses the latent force to give birth to various kinds of life, and this latent force corresponds to the present so-called unifying force of nature.

In the explanation of nature, even if one allows the function of this kind of unifying force apart from mechanical force, there is no necessity for these two explanations to clash. On the contrary, the two work together to create the perfect explanation of nature. For example, if here there is one bronze statue, even though as the bronze which is its material it may follow the laws of physical chemistry, it is not merely something which must be considered as a lump of bronze but is a work of art expressing our ideals. In other words, it is something which has been expressed according to the unifying power of our ideals. Yet the unifying function of

these ideals and the laws of physical chemistry which control the material itself, while automatically belonging to different areas, certainly are not things which must mutually clash.

There is the unifying self I have mentioned above, and thereafter in nature there is purpose, there is significance, and for the first time there emerges a living nature. This kind of unifying force which is the life of nature is not merely an abstract concept contrived by our thought, but on the contrary it is a fact which comes to be realized in our direct perception. We see a flower we love, or we observe a new animal, and immediately we grasp a certain unified thing in its entirety. This is that thing's self, that thing's substance. Artists are men who most excel in this kind of direct perception. They, at a glance, penetrate the true aspect of things and capture a certain unified thing. That which they express is not a surface fact but is the unchanging substance which is deeply latent at the base of things.

Goethe immersed himself in the study of living matter and was a pioneer of today's theory of evolution. According to his theory, there is something which is the basic phenomenon (*Urphänomen*) at the rear of natural phenomena. Poets directly perceive this. He said that the various animals and plants are things which are transformations of the "basic animal" and "basic plant" which are the basic phenomena. Actually among present-day animals and plants there is a fixed unchanging model. Based on this theory, he expounded the proposition that all life has been evolved.

But what sort of a thing is this unifying self latent in the rear of nature? Because we think that natural phenomena are purely objective phenomena without relation to our subjectivity, it is thought that this unifying force of nature as well is a certain inscrutable thing which we are wholly unable to know. But as I have already discussed, true reality is something wherein subjectivity and

objectivity are not separated, and real nature is not merely a one-sidedly objective kind of abstract concept but a concrete fact of the consciousness which includes subject and object. Consequently, its unifying self is not a certain unknowable thing without any relation to our consciousness but truly the unifying function of our consciousness itself. Therefore, our understanding of nature's significance and purpose is based on the subjective unity of the self's ideals, emotions, and will. For instance, since our being able to comprehend the basic significance which lies at the root of animals' various organs and behavior is by our intuiting them directly with our own emotions and will, if there were no emotion or will in ourselves, we would ultimately be unable to understand the basic significance of animals. As our ideals and emotions become deeper and broader, we are more and more able to understand the true meaning of nature. In short, our subjective unity and nature's objective unifying force are basically the same. If one views this objectively, it becomes nature's unifying force, and if one views this subjectively, it becomes the unity of the self's intellect, emotion, and will.

It is believed that such a thing as material force is utterly without relationship to our subjective unity. Of course this may be the most meaningless unity, but even this is not wholly separated from subjective unity, and our saying that in matter there is energy and that it constitutes various functions is simply our viewing the self's function of the will objectively. Usually it is thought that our inferring of nature's significance, employing the self's ideals or emotions, is merely an analogical inference and not a firm truth. Yet this arises from thinking of subjectivity and objectivity independently and considering spirit and nature as two kinds of reality. If one speaks from pure experience, it is correct to view these directly as identical.

Chapter 9 Spirit

Nature, at a glance, appears as if it were a purely objective reality independent of our spirit, but actually it is not a reality separated from subjectivity. If we look at so-called natural phenomena from the side of their subjective aspect, i.e., their unifying function, they all become phenomena of consciousness. For example, here there is a stone, and if one considers this stone as a thing which has appeared by the force of a certain unknowable reality independent of our subjectivity, it becomes nature. But if one sees this thing which is a stone immediately as a fact of direct experience, it is not merely an objectively independent reality, it is a union of our senses of sight and touch, i.e., it is a phenomenon of consciousness which is established by our unity of consciousness. Thus, when we return to the base of direct experience and view so-called natural phenomena, everything becomes phenomena of consciousness of the self established by subjective unity. Spiritualists' statement that the world is one's idea is seen from this position.

When we view the same stone, we believe that each person has the same idea. But actually it differs according to each person's characteristics and experience. Therefore concrete reality is all subjective and individual, and that which is an objective reality does not exist. Objective reality is nothing more than an abstract concept common to each person. However, what is that which we usually call spirit in opposition to nature? That is, what kind of thing is a subjective phenomenon of consciousness? So-called spiritual phenomena are merely the unifying aspects, i.e., the active aspects, of reality considered abstractly. As I have said previously, there is no distinction in the true aspect of reality

between subjectivity and objectivity, spirit and matter, but in the establishment of reality all unifying functions are necessary. These unifying functions are not things which exist separately apart from reality, but when we abstract them and think of them in opposition to unified objectivity, they become so-called spiritual phenomena. For instance, here there is one sensation, but this one sensation does not exist independently, for of necessity it is established in opposition with another, i.e., it is established by being compared and distinguished from another. These functions of comparison and distinction, i.e., unifying functions, are our so-called spiritual elements. Thereby, as these functions advance, the distinctions between spirit and matter become increasingly noteworthy. In childhood our spirits are natural; consequently, the subjective functions are weak. As we grow, however, the unifying functions flourish, and we come to be aware of that which is the heart of the self as distinguished from objective nature.

Usually it is thought that that which is our spirit is an independent reality distinguished from objective nature. But just as purely objective nature separated from the subjective unity of spirit is an abstract concept, purely subjective spirit separated from objective nature too is an abstract concept. If there is that which is unified, there is the function which unifies. Even if one considers that there is a substance of spirit which is sensitive to the function of things in the outside world, there are things which operate, and there is a heart which feels. Inoperative spirit itself, like inoperative matter itself, is unknowable.

For what reason, however, is the unifying function of reality particularly distinguished from its content, i.e., from that which must be unified, and appears precisely as if it were an independent reality? This undoubtedly arises from the contradictions and clashes of the various kinds of unity in reality. In reality there are various

systems, i.e., there are various unities, and when these systematic unities mutually clash and are mutually contradictory, these unities come to appear clearly in the consciousness. Where there are conflicts and contradictions there is spirit, and where there is spirit there are contradictions and conflicts. Even if we inquire into the activity of our will, for example, when there is no conflict of motives, it is unconscious, i.e., it is close to so-called objective nature. But as the conflict of motives becomes prominent, the will clearly is made conscious, and one is able to perceive that which is the heart of the self. Yet whence arise the contradictions and conflicts of this system? They arise from the characteristics of reality itself. As I have said previously, while on the one hand reality is unlimited conflict, on the other it is also unlimited unity. Conflict is the half of unity which must not be lacking. By conflict we advance further to still greater unity. Our spirit which is the unifying function of reality is conscious of itself not when its unity is active but on the occasion of this conflict.

When we have matured in a certain art, i.e., when we have acquired unity of reality, on the contrary we are unconscious, that is, we do not know this unity of the self. But when we try to advance more deeply, arousing conflict with that which we have already acquired, here we again become conscious, for consciousness always arises from this kind of conflict. Moreover, in connection with the fact that where there is spirit there is necessarily conflict, it is well to consider that spirit is accompanied by ideals. An ideal signifies a contradiction and conflict with actuality. (In this way, because our spirit emerges by conflict, in spirit of necessity there is suffering, and the pessimists' saying the world is one of pain includes one facet of truth.)

When we consider our spirit as being the unifying function of reality, we must say that in reality everywhere there is unity, i.e.,

in reality everywhere there is spirit. On what, however, are based our differentiating between lifeless and living matter and our distinguishing between that which has spirit and that which does not? Strictly speaking, it is well to say that there is spirit in all reality, and as I have stated before, there is a unifying self in nature as well; this is precisely the same unifying force as our spirit. For example, if a conscious phenomenon such as a tree appears here, usually we think of this as an objective reality which is established by natural power, but if we consider it as a thing which constitutes one system of a phenomenon of consciousness, it is established by the unifying function of consciousness. However, in so-called inert matter, this unifying self has not yet appeared in reality as an event of direct experience. The tree itself is not aware of the unifying function of the self, for its unifying self is within the consciousness of another and not within the tree itself, i.e., it is merely a thing which is unified from outside, and is not yet something unified internally. Thus, it cannot yet be said to be an independent, self-sustaining reality. Among animals, contrary to this, internal unity, i.e., a thing which is the self, actually appears, and the various phenomena (for example, their form and behavior) of animals all can be viewed as expressions of this internal unity. Reality everywhere is established by unity, but in spirit that unity appears as a clear fact. Reality in spirit first becomes perfect reality, i.e., it becomes independent, self-sufficient reality.

In a so-called spiritless thing, since its unity is given from without, it is not the internal unity of the self. Thus, according to the person who observes, its unity can change. Usually, however, we think that there is one unified reality such as a tree, but if seen from a chemist's eye, it is one organic compound, merely a combination of elements, and one is able to say that there is not separately a reality called a tree. But one cannot view the spirit of an animal

in this way, for although one can also view the flesh of an animal, like a plant, as a compound, spirit itself cannot be transformed by the free will of the person who is observing; however one interprets this, it still factually expresses one reality which must not be moved.

In present-day evolutionary theory, one can say that in the evolving of inorganic matter, plants, and man, reality gradually comes to express its hidden basic substance as actuality. In the development of spirit the basic characteristic of the establishment of reality comes to appear. As Leibniz has said, "evolution" is "involution."

That which is our self, which is the unifier of spirit, is originally the unifying function of reality. Among one school of psychologists it is said that our self is nothing more than a combination of concepts and emotions, and apart from these things there is no self elsewhere, but this is merely viewing from the aspect of analysis alone and forgetting the aspect of unity. If one tries to think by analyzing all things, one cannot recognize the unifying function, but for this reason one cannot overlook this unifying function. Things are established by unity, and the transforming of concepts and emotions into concrete realities also is based on the power of the unifying self. Concerning the question of whence comes this unifying power, i.e., the self, in short, it is the expression of the unifying power of reality, i.e., it is eternal, unchanging power. This is the reason that our self is always felt as creative, free, unlimited activity. As I have said before, our turning inward and feeling as if there somehow is a kind of emotion called the self is not the true self. This kind of self is unable to perform any activity at all. Only at the time when the unity of reality works within do we feel as if we control reality as the ideals of the self and is the self performing free activity. And since this unifying function of reality is infinite, our self is felt as if it were infinite and embraces the universe.

If seen from the standpoint of pure experience which I have previously established, that which I here call the unifying function is perhaps thought of as merely an abstract concept and not as a fact of direct experience. The facts of direct experience, however, are not concepts and emotions but are the activity of the will, and this unifying function is an absolutely necessary element in direct experience.

Heretofore I have considered spirit in opposition to nature, but henceforth I wish to think a bit about the relationship between spirit and nature. Our spirit is thought of as the unifying function of reality and as being a special reality with regard to nature, but actually it is not that there is a unifying function apart from that which is unified and there is no subjective spirit apart from objective nature. Our saying that we know a thing is nothing more than saying that the self is united to a thing. When one sees a flower, it means that the self becomes a flower. To say that one has studied a flower and made clear its basic character means that, casting aside subjective conjecture, one has united with the basic character of the flower itself. Even in the instance when one thinks about reason, reason is certainly not our subjective fancy, for it is not only held in common by all people, it is moreover the basic principle according to which objective reality is actually established. Incontrovertible truth is always obtained by submerging the subjective self and becoming objective. This, in fine, means that our knowledge becomes deeper, i.e., it unites with objective nature. Indeed this is not only so in knowledge, in the will as well this is so. Purely subjectively one can perform nothing whatever. The will is able to realize itself only by following objective nature. To move water is to follow the character of water; to control man is to follow the character of man, and to control oneself is to follow one's own character; to the extent that our will becomes objective, only to that extent does

it become powerful. The reason that Sakyamuni and Christ, even after thousands of years, possess the power to move all men is that their spirit was truly able to be objective. Those without self, i.e., those who have destroyed the self, are the ones who are the greatest.

Usually one distinguishes spiritual phenomena from material phenomena according to whether they are internal or external, for one thinks that the former are within and the latter are without. But since this kind of thought arises from the arbitrary assumption that spirit lies inside the flesh, if seen from direct experience, they all are the same phenomena of consciousness, and it is not that there is the distinction of interior and exterior. That which we merely call internal subjective spirit is extremely superficial, weak spirit, namely individual fancy. In opposition to this, great, profound spirit is the activity of the universe itself which is joined to the truth of the universe. Thus, this kind of spirit spontaneously accompanies the activity of the external world, and one is unable to think that it would not be active. Such a thing as the genius of an artist is one example of this.

Finally, I shall say a word about the pain and pleasure of the human heart. In brief, when our spirit is in a state of perfection, i.e., a state of unity, it is in joy, and when it is in a state of imperfection, i.e., a state of rupture, it is in pain. As I have asserted above, spirit is the unifying function of reality, and in the rear of unity of necessity contradictions and clashes appear. On the occasion of these contradictions and conflicts there is always pain, but infinite unifying activity immediately attempts to escape from these contradictions and conflicts and attain further an even greater unity. At this time, in our heart, various desires and ideals are born. And when we have been able to attain this even greater unity, i.e., when we have been able to satisfy our desires and ideals, then we are in joy. Therefore, in one facet of joy of necessity there is pain, and one

facet of pain of necessity is accompanied by joy; thereby the human heart will probably be unable to attain absolute joy, for only when, by effort, it becomes objective and is united with nature will it be able to maintain infinite happiness.

Psychologists say that what aids our life is joy, and that what hinders it is pain. Life is the development of the basic character of living matter, i.e., it is the maintenance of the unity of the self; this is simply the same as saying that that which aids unity is joy and that that which harms it is pain.

As I have said before, since spirit is the unifying function of reality and since great spirit is the becoming one with nature, when we construct a self with a small self, pain is great, but as the self enlarges and becomes one with objective nature, we become happy.

Chapter 10 God as Reality

When we view the problem according to what we have discussed heretofore, both that which we have named nature and that which we have called spirit are not two varieties of reality perfectly different in kind. It is simply a distinction which arises from the difference in the way of looking at the same reality. If one profoundly understands nature, one must recognize a spiritual unity at its base; moreover, perfect, true spirit must be one with nature, i.e., in the universe only one reality exists. And this single reality, as I have said previously, while on one side it is infinite opposition and conflict, on another it is infinite unity; in a word, it is independent, self-sufficient, infinite activity. We call the base of this infinite activity God. God is certainly not a thing transcendent outside this reality, for the foundation of reality is directly God; that which submerges the distinctions between subjectivity and objectivity, and unites both spirit and nature is God.

In no matter what period, among no matter what people, there is none which does not have a word for God. But it is interpreted in various senses according to the degree of intelligence and the differences of the requirements. Most so-called men of religion think that God stands outside the universe and is something like a human being which controls this universe. But this kind of idea of God is very childish, and indeed it not only clashes with today's learning and knowledge, but in the religious realm too I think that this kind of God and we human beings cannot acquire intimate unity in the inmost heart. But I am also unable to think like today's extreme scientists that matter is the only reality and that material force is the basis of the universe. As I have said above, at the foundation of reality there is a spiritual basic principle, and this basic principle is namely God. It is identical with the Atman and Brahman which are the fundamental principles of the Hindu religion. God is the great spirit of the universe.

From ancient times there have been various controversies about proving the existence of God. Certain people say this world cannot begin from nothingness, that there must be something which created this world, and that this kind of creator of the world is God. That is, based on the law of cause and effect, they make God the cause of this world. Certain people say that this world is not a thing which exists by coincidence and is something wherein each thing has meaning, i.e., with the fact that it is something organized and directed toward a certain fixed objective as a base, they deduce that there must be something which gives this kind of organization, and they say that the one who guides this kind of universe is precisely God, i.e., they think the relationship between the world and God is like the one between a work of art and an artist. These all are people who attempt to prove the existence of God from the aspect of knowledge and to fix His characteristics, but in addition there are

those who, wholly apart from knowledge, try to prove the existence of God on the basis of moral requirements. According to what these people say, we human beings are persons with moral requirements, i.e., persons with consciences, but if there is no great judge in this universe to encourage good and reprove evil, our virtues become meaningless; moreover, they say that we must absolutely recognize the existence of God as the maintainer of virtue; such a man as Kant is a thinker of this kind. But are these arguments, after all, able to prove the true existence of God? Some say that since there must be a cause for the world we must recognize the existence of God, but if they speak in this way, with the law of cause and effect as a base, why can we not advance a step further and inquire into the cause of God? If they say that God is without beginning or end, and exists without cause, why can we not say that this world too exists in this way? Moreover, in deducing that there must be an omniscient supervisor from the fact that the world is organized conveniently following a certain objective, we must actually prove that all things in the universe are created for a purpose, but this is an extremely difficult thing. If we say that if this kind of fact cannot be proved God's existence cannot be proved, then the existence of God becomes extraordinarily uncertain. Certain people will probably believe it, but certain people will probably not. Moreover, even if this fact were proved, we are able to think that this world was thus created purposeful by coincidence. To attempt to prove the existence of God by moral requirements is even weaker. If we think that there is something which is an omniscient, omnipotent God who maintains our morality, doubtless this gives great strength to our morality, but the mere fact that it is beneficial to think this from the standpoint of our behavior is not proof that there must be such a being. This kind of thinking can be viewed merely as an expedient. Since all of these theories attempt to prove God indi-

rectly, from outside, it does not prove God immediately in the direct experience of the self. (*unum!*)

If this be so, how are we able to seek the existence of God in the facts of our direct experience? Even inside the breasts of our small selves restricted within time and space an infinite power is latent. This means that the unifying power of infinite reality is latent, and because we possess this power, through learning we are able to probe the truth of the universe, in art we are able to express the true meaning of reality, and we are able to know the basis of the reality which composes the universe in the depths of our hearts, i.e., we are able to capture the face of God. The infinitely free activity of the human heart directly proves God Himself. As Jacob Boehme has said, we see God with the "open eye" (*umgewandtes Auge*).

If one has sought God in the facts of the external world, God ultimately cannot escape being a God of hypothesis. Moreover, a God who is the creator or superintendent of a universe and who stands outside the universe truly cannot be said to be an absolute, infinite God. I think that the Hindu religion in the remote past and the mystical school which flourished during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Europe were seeking God by intuition in the human heart, and this is the most profound knowledge of God.

In what form does God exist? Seen from one viewpoint, God, as such men as Nicholas of Cusa have said, is all negation, for that which one specifies or must affirm, i.e., that which must be seized, is not God, for if He is that which is specific and must be seized, He is already finite, and is unable to perform the infinite function of unifying the universe. (*De docta ignorantia*, Cap. 24.) Seen from this point, God is absolute nothingness. However, if one says that God is merely nothingness, this is certainly not so. At the base of the establishment of reality there is a unifying function

which clearly cannot be moved. Reality is truly established according to this. For example, where is the law that the sum of all the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles? We are neither able to see nor hear the law itself, and yet here does there not clearly exist an incontrovertible law? Again, even with regard to a famous painting, we see that there is in its entirety something which strikes the sensitive man as ethereal and lofty, yet even if we try to look at each thing and each scene within it for a reason why it is that way, we are wholly unable to find it. God is the unifier of the universe in these various senses, He is the basis of reality, and only because He is able to be nothingness, is there no place whatsoever where He does not operate.

Just as to those who are unable to comprehend mathematics even the most profound mathematics does not give any knowledge, and to those who do not understand beauty even the most sublime painting does not give any sensation, so too to the mediocre, shallow man God's existence is thought of as fancy and is felt as if it is without any significance; and thus he considers religion as useless. *Consider*

Those who desire to know the true God must by all means discipline themselves to that extent and must prepare their eyes to be able to know Him. To this kind of man, that which is the power of God in the entire universe is active like the spirit of a painter within a famous painting, and is felt as a fact of direct experience. We call this the event of seeing God. When seen from that which I have stated above, perhaps it is felt as if God were a cold philosophical existence like the basis of the unification of reality and had no relationship to the activity of our warm emotions, but actually this is certainly not so. As I have said above, since our desires arise from seeking greater unity, when this is attained, we are joyful. Even the so-called individual self-love is ultimately nothing more than this kind of unified demand. Basically, however,

? our infinite spirit is certainly not that which is satisfied with the individual unity of the self. We must advance further and demand even greater unity. Since our larger self includes the self and others, we come to express sympathy for the other and come to seek fusion and unity of the self with the other. Our altruism is the demand for trans-individual unity which comes to arise in this way. Therefore, in altruism we feel an even greater peace and joy than in self-love. And God who is the unity of the universe is truly the basis of this kind of unifying activity. The basis of our love is the basis of our joy. God is infinite love, infinite joy, and peace.

PART III GOOD

Chapter 1 Behavior—A

Since I think I have explained broadly what kind of a thing reality is, I should like henceforth to discuss such practical problems as what we human beings must do, what kind of a thing good is, and where man's activity ought to adhere. And since we are able to subsume all the phenomena of man's various practical aspects within behavior, before treating these problems, I should like first to consider what kind of a thing behavior is.

That which we call behavior, seen from the exterior, is the activity of the flesh, and it differs from such material activity as merely the flowing of water or the falling of a stone. It is activity with a purpose and possessing a kind of consciousness. However, there is a purpose such as appears merely in organisms, but it is accompanied by various reflex motions which are wholly unconscious; moreover, there is a purpose such as one sees in somewhat higher animals which is accompanied by some consciousness, but they must be distinguished from the instinctive actions where purpose is not yet clearly conscious. Behavior means action wherein one is clearly conscious of its purpose. We human beings too, since we possess flesh, perform various material motions or reflex motions, or instinctive actions, but particularly that which we must call the functions of the self are restricted to this behavior.

This behavior, in many instances, accompanies activity, i.e., actions of the outside world, but of course since its important area lies in phenomena of consciousness of the inside world, let us consider psychologically what kind of a phenomenon of consciousness

behavior is. Behavior, as I have said above, is action which arises from an objective of which one is conscious, i.e., it means so-called willed action. If we use the term "behavior," we mean to include in it actions of the external world as well, but since when we use the term "will" we refer mainly to internal phenomena of consciousness, the discussion of the phenomenon of consciousness of behavior now becomes a discussion of the will. Now in what way does the will arise? Basically our body is constructed, for the most part, in order to maintain and develop the life of the self and so as automatically to perform suitable activity, and since the consciousness emerges accompanying this activity, in the beginning it is a simple emotion of pain and pleasure. But, as the concepts with regard to the external world gradually become clearer and the function of association becomes active, the previous activity with regard to stimuli from the external world does not emerge unconsciously; first it creates the concept of result, and from this it creates in conjunction the concept of the activity which must become its means; afterwards it comes to pass into activity, i.e., that which is the will emerges. Thus, in the emergence of the will, there must first be the direction of the activity, or if we speak in the area of consciousness, there must be the physical or spiritual basic cause which establishes the direction of association. This thing comes to appear in the consciousness as a kind of impulsive feeling. Without inquiring whether this is innate or acquired, it is something which must be termed the power of the will, but here I shall simply term it motivation. Next, the concept of result, i.e., purpose, or if we speak precisely, the purpose concept, which is acquired by experience and arises from association, must accompany the above motivation. At this time, since the form of the will is finally established, we call it desire, i.e., the first stage of the will. When this desire is single, it emerges in activity accompanying the concept of activity, but when there are more than

two desires, a so-called conflict of desires arises, with the strongest among them occupying the main position of consciousness, and emerging in action. This we call decision. What we call the will indicates the entirety of this kind of phenomenon of consciousness, but at times, in the narrow sense, it refers to the momentary function just before passing into action, or particularly to such a thing as decision. Since the main part of behavior actually lies in this internal phenomenon of consciousness, the will, the actions of the external area are not its main part. Even if, because of some obstacle, action has not emerged, if the will has strongly existed, we can call this behavior, and conversely, even if action has emerged, if there was not sufficient will, we cannot call this behavior. When the internal activity of consciousness flourishes, the will arises, making from the first the events within the consciousness the objective. Even in this circumstance of course we can call it behavior. The psychologists make the distinction of external and internal, but as phenomena of consciousness they possess wholly identical characteristics.

Since what I have stated above is merely a notation of the process of the will, which is the main area of behavior, I shall now try to advance a step further, to explain what kind of characteristics the will possesses as a phenomenon of consciousness and what kind of a position it occupies within consciousness. Seen from psychology, it is the function of unifying concepts. In other words, it must belong to a kind of unified perception. In consciousness there are two kinds of functions of combining concepts, one, the cause of the combining of concepts, mainly exists in the conditions of the external world, and because in consciousness the direction of combination is not clear, it is felt as passive, and we call this association of ideas; in the other, the cause of combination lies in the consciousness, and because one is clearly conscious of the direc-

tion of combination and the consciousness is felt as combining actively, we call this unified perception. But as I have said above, because in the will there is first something which is an object concept which decides the direction of the combination of concepts, and from this one constructs, within the various activity concepts one has acquired in former experiences, the suitable combination of concepts for the realization of the self, it is utterly one function of unified perception. That this kind of will is a function of the unification of concepts becomes increasingly clear in the case of a struggle of desires.

If this be so, in what kind of relationship does the function of unified perception of the will stand with regard to other functions of unified perception? In addition to the will, the functions of thought and the imagination as well similarly belong to functions of unified perception. Since in these functions too a certain unifying concept becomes the base, and from this they unify concepts so as to meet with their objectives, in the form of conceptual activity they are precisely the same as the will. It is merely that since the objectives of their unification are not the same, and consequently the laws of unification are different, they are each thought of as mutually different functions of consciousness. But now let us investigate more carefully on what points they differ and on what points they are the same. First, when we try to compare imagination with the will, we find that the object of imagination is the imitation of nature, and the object of the will is its own activity. Thus, while in the imagination we unify concepts so as to coincide with the true state of nature, in the will we unify them so as to coincide with the desires of the self. But when we think more carefully, we see that prior to the activity of the will one must first have once imagined that activity; also, in imagining nature, one must first try to think as if one has become that thing. It is just that one has the feeling

that, because in imagination one must imagine external objects, the self is utterly unable to unite with it, and consequently it is not the realization of the self. That is, to imagine a certain thing and to realize it must be thought of as differing. But if we advance a bit further in considering the matter, we discover that this is a difference of degree and not a difference of quality. In imagination too, as we can see in the imagination of artists, if they attain the state of inspiration, they wholly submerge the self in it, the self and the thing are perfectly fused, and the activity of the thing comes to be felt directly as the activity of the will of the self. Next, if we try to compare thought and the will, we find that since the object of thought lies in truth, the laws controlling the combination of its concepts are laws of logic. That which we can consider truth is not necessarily restricted to that which we can will; also, that which we can will is not necessarily to be thought of as truth. In addition, the unity of thought is merely a unity of abstract concepts, but both the will and the imagination are the unity of concrete concepts. On these points, at a glance there is clearly a distinction between thought and the will, and there is no one who would confuse them, but again when we try to think about the matter carefully, we see that this distinction too, rather obviously, is not something immovable. In the rear of the will a considerable reason is always latent. Even if this reason is not perfect, the will is a thing which operates on certain truths, i.e., it is established according to thought. Conversely, as Wang Yang-ming (Ōyōmei) has emphasized, "knowledge and action are identical," and true knowledge of necessity must accompany the putting into practice of the will. One thinks in this way, but to say that one does not desire in this way is to say that one does not yet truly know. When we try thinking in this manner, we see that the three unified perceptions of thought, imagination, and the will in their bases are identical unifying functions. Among

them, thought and the imagination are unifying functions with regard to concepts relating to everything of matter and the self, but the will is a unifying function of concepts relating particularly to the activity of the self alone. Conversely, the former are merely ideal, i.e., potential, unities, but the latter is actual unity, i.e., we can say that it is the consummation of unity.

Since I have already outlined the position the will occupies in the functions of unified perception, I shall now state the relationship with other conceptual combinations, namely with association and fusion. Concerning association, I have previously stated that that which decides the direction of its conceptual combination lies in the external, not the internal, world, but since this was discussed merely from the point of degree, in association as well it cannot be said that its unifying function utterly does not exist internally. It is only that it clearly does not appear in the consciousness. With fusion, the combination of concepts is even more unconscious, and one is not conscious of even the function of combination, but even so, it is certainly not that there is no internal unity. In summary, phenomena of consciousness all possess the same form as the will, and we can say that all, in a certain sense, are the will; moreover, if we call the unifying power which is the base of these unifying functions the self, the will, among them, is that which expresses the self most clearly. Thus, in the activity of the will we are most clearly conscious of the self.

Chapter 2 Behavior—B

Heretofore I have discussed what kind of a phenomenon of consciousness behavior is psychologically, but henceforth I should like to discuss the problem of whence arises the unifying force of

the will which is the base of behavior, and what kind of significance this power has in the realm of reality, and to clarify the characteristics of the will and behavior philosophically.

From what, after all, arises the unity of the will which unifies concepts from within according to a certain fixed object? Seen from the scientist's viewpoint that apart from matter there is no reality, there is probably nothing to say other than that this power arises from our bodies. Our bodies, like those of animals, are organisms constituting a single system. Animal organisms, without reference to the presence or absence of spirit, are able to perform activity based mechanically on various orders in the center of the nervous system. That is, they are able to perform reflex activity, automatic activity, and more complex instinctive action. Since our will too originally came to develop from these unconscious activities, and since even now when the will is disciplined it returns again to these states of unconscious activity, we are forced to think that it is activity of the same kind which arises from the same power. And since they reduce all the various objectives of organisms to the maintenance and development of life in the self or the self's species, they say that the objectives of our will too are probably only the preservation of life. It is just that since in the will the objective becomes conscious it appears to differ from the others. Thus, scientists attempt to explain all the various lofty spiritual demands in us human beings too from this objective of life.

To seek, however, in this way in material force the origin of the will and to try to explain the subtle and profound demands of human life simply from desire for life is a considerably difficult matter. Even supposing that the development of a higher will simultaneously accompanies the flourishing of the life functions, the highest objective lies in the former and not in the latter. The latter, on the contrary, must be thought of as a means of the former. If,

however, putting behind us these discussions for a time, we consider our will, as the scientists say, as something arising from the material functions of organisms, must we hypothesize matter as something possessing some kind of ability? In saying that the purposeful activity of organisms arises from matter there are two ways of thinking. One is to view nature as something purposeful and to consider that as in the seeds of living things so too in matter must there be included latently a purposeful force, and the other is to view matter as possessing only material force and to consider all purposeful natural phenomena as things arising coincidentally. The strictly scientific viewpoint lies rather in the latter, but I think that both these views represent an identical way of thinking and certainly are not things differing in their bases. Even if one takes the latter view, one must hypothesize that somewhere there is a force which brings forth a certain fixed, unchanging phenomenon. One must hypothesize that in the creation of mechanical activity a force to create it is latent within matter. If we are able to speak in this way, why are we unable to think that for the same reason the purposeful force of organisms is latent within matter? Or perhaps there are those who, without hypothesizing this kind of force such as in the purposeful activity of organisms say they can explain everything according to the even simpler laws of physical chemistry. But if we speak in this way, we must realize also that we shall be able to explain even today's laws of physical chemistry according to still simpler laws. Nay, since the advance of knowledge is unlimited, I think they must necessarily be so explained. If we think in this way, truth is merely relative. Instead, I oppose this view, and placing emphasis on synthesis rather than analysis, think it correct to see purposeful nature advancing to synthesis by individual differentiation, and by passing through stages expressing its true significance.

Furthermore, according to the view of reality which I have stated before, since matter is nothing more than the name we give to the unchanging relationships of phenomena of consciousness, matter does not give birth to consciousness, but consciousness creates matter. Since even such things as the most objective, mechanical activity are established according to our logical unity, certainly it is not something separated from the unity of consciousness. Advancing beyond this, as it becomes the life phenomenon of living things, and advancing yet further, the phenomenon of consciousness of animals, its unity becomes increasingly clear, many-faceted, and also profound. The will is the most profound unifying power of our consciousness and also the most profound expression of the unifying force of reality. Those things which, viewed from the outside, are merely mechanical activities and processes of life phenomena, in their true internal significance are the will. Even as things which one has thought of as being merely wood and stone in their true significance are statues of the merciful and placid Buddha or of the two brave and stalwart Deva Kings, so too so-called nature is an expression of the will, and we are able to capture the true significance of mysterious nature through the will of the self. Of course when we divide phenomena into internal and external, and consider spiritual and material phenomena as utterly differing phenomena, perhaps the above theory is thought of as mere fancy, but in the concrete facts in direct experience there is no distinction between internal and external, and this kind of thought, on the contrary, is a direct fact.

What I have stated above agrees with what scientists say who make the mechanical activity of matter and the will, in that they possess the purposefulness of organisms, basically one, and who consider the functions as the same; yet those things which constitute their bases are diametrically opposed.

According to this idea, although previously I analyzed behavior and made two things of will and action, the relationship of these two is not one of cause and effect but rather of two aspects of the same thing. Action is the expression of the will. That which from outside is seen as action, seen from within is the will.

Chapter 3 Freedom of the Will

I have discussed the fact that the will, psychologically speaking, is nothing more than one phenomenon of consciousness but that in its substance it is the basis of reality. Now I should like to discuss in what sense this will is free activity. Whether the will is free or determined is a problem which has perplexed scholars for a very long time. This discussion is not only important morally, but also by means of it one can clarify the philosophical characteristics of the will as well.

First of all, seen from that which we usually believe, there is no one who does not believe that his own will is free. According to that which one experiences concerning one's consciousness, if one is able within a certain scope to perform a certain thing, one is also able not to perform it. That is to say, we believe that within a certain scope we are free. Because of this, such ideas as responsibility, irresponsibility, self-confidence, repentance, praise, and criticism come to arise. I now wish to consider, however, in a slightly more detailed fashion what this "within a certain scope" means. We are unable freely to control all things which belong to the elements of the external world. It cannot be said that even one's own body can be handled freely everywhere. Voluntary muscle activity appears to be free, but if one should fall ill for a while, one is unable to move one's muscles freely. That one is able to act freely is merely

a phenomenon of consciousness of the self. But even with regard to the phenomena within one's own consciousness we do not possess even the freedom to create a concept anew, nor do we even possess the freedom always to recall a fact that we have once experienced. Indeed what is thought of as freedom is merely a function of a combination of concepts. That is to say, how one analyzes concepts and how one synthesizes them belong to the freedom of the self. Of course, even in this circumstance, in the analysis and synthesis of concepts there is something which is an immovable *a priori* law, and it is not that we are able to do as we wish, for when the combination within concepts is unique or when a certain combination is particularly strong, we must by all means follow this combination. Only within the scope of the *a priori* law of the establishment of concepts and only in the event that in the combination of concepts there are two or more roads and the strength of these combinations is not oppressive do we wholly possess freedom of choice.

People who assert the theory of freedom of the will for the most part establish their theory with the events of the experience of the internal world as their base. Within the above scope, the choosing and deciding of motives belong wholly to our freedom and there is no reason other than ourselves; these decisions are thought of as things dependent on a mystical power of the will which is independent of the conditions of the external world and of the temper, habits, and character of the internal world. In other words, it is thought that apart from the combination of concepts there is a force which controls them. Conversely, those who emphasize the theory of the determination of the will usually deduce their theory with the observation of facts in the external world as their base. Among the phenomena of the universe there is not one which arises coincidentally, and even an extremely minute fact, if one investigates it carefully, of necessity possesses a considerable cause. This way of

thinking provides the basic idea for all that we call learning, and with the development of science this idea becomes increasingly certain. Among natural phenomena even the cause and effect of those things which previously were thought of as mysterious have one by one become clear, and we have even progressed to the point where we are able to assess them mathematically. Today the only thing which is still thought of as not having a reason is our will. But even the will cannot depart from these immovable great laws of nature. The reason that today one thinks the will is free is simply that science is still young and we are unable to explain the causes one by one. Moreover, actions of the will too appear in each circumstance to be actually irregular and at first glance there does not appear to be a fixed cause, but when we try to consider the actions of a great number of people statistically, they are unexpectedly orderly, and certainly it cannot be said that there are no fixed causes and effects. These ideas increasingly strengthen the conviction that there is a cause to our will and that our will, like all natural phenomena, is something which is controlled by determined, mechanical laws of cause and effect, and one arrives at the conviction that there is not separately any kind of mystical power called the will.

Now which of these two opposing theories is correct? Extreme free will theoreticians, as I have said above, hold that there is a mystical ability which freely determines motive utterly without either cause or reason. But if one asserts the freedom of the will in this sense, this is utterly an error. When we decide on a motive there must be some considerable reason. Even supposing that this does not appear clearly in the consciousness, there must be some cause in the subconscious. Moreover, if as these theoreticians say, there were something which decides things wholly accidentally without any reason, at that time we would not feel freedom of the will,

but conversely we would think of it as a thing operated on from without as an accidental event. Consequently our feeling of responsibility with regard to it would be slight. Free will theoreticians say that they establish their theory with the experience of the internal world as the base, but the experience of the internal world, on the contrary, proves the opposite fact.

Next I should like to put forth a slight criticism concerning the theory of the determinists. This kind of theoretician says that since natural phenomena are controlled by laws of mechanical necessity phenomena of consciousness as well must be so controlled, but originally in this theory the hypothesis that phenomena of consciousness and natural phenomena (in other words, material phenomena) are identical and are things which must be controlled by the same laws forms its base. But is this hypothesis, after all, a correct one? Whether phenomena of consciousness are things which must be controlled by the same laws as material phenomena or not is an unsettled controversy. We must say that a theory built on this kind of hypothesis is extraordinarily weak. Even supposing that today's physiological psychology advances extraordinarily and we are able to explain the functions of the brain which are the base of phenomena of consciousness one by one physically and chemically, are we able to assert according to this that phenomena of consciousness are things which must be controlled according to laws of mechanical necessity? For example, the bronze which constitutes the material of a bronze statue probably does not extend beyond the control of laws of mechanical necessity, but does not the meaning which this bronze statue expresses exist outside of it? We must say that so-called spiritual meaning is something which cannot be seen, heard, or counted, and is a transcendental thing outside of laws of mechanical necessity.

To sum this up, there is nowhere a will, such as the free will theoreticians describe, wholly without any cause or reason. This

* kind of accidental will can certainly not be felt as freedom but, on the contrary, is felt as oppression. When we work from a certain reason, i.e., when we work from the internal characteristics of the self, conversely it is felt that we are free. That is, when the cause of the motive emerges from the most profound internal characteristics of the self we feel most free. That which is the so-called reason of the will, however, is not the mechanical cause of which determinists speak. In our spirit there are laws of spiritual activity. When spirit operates following these laws of itself it is truly free. In freedom there are two meanings. One is freedom where there is utterly no cause, namely, of the same significance as coincidence, and the other is freedom where one receives no outside restriction and in the sense that one works by oneself. In other words, it is in the sense of determined freedom. That which we call freedom of the will is freedom in the latter sense. In this, however, the following kind of problem comes to arise. If we say that to work according to the characteristics of the self is freedom, there is nothing among the myriad things which does not work according to its own characteristics; both the flowing of water and the burning of fire follow their own characteristics. For what reason, therefore, do we consider the others to be necessity and consider only the will as free?

In the so-called natural world, the emergence of a certain single phenomenon is decided strictly according to its conditions. From a certain fixed condition only a certain single phenomenon is born and it does not allow the slightest possibility of another. All natural phenomena are born following this kind of law of blind necessity. Phenomena of consciousness, however, are not merely born, they are phenomena of which one is conscious. That is to say, they are not only created but they themselves know the fact of their creation. And this saying that one knows and one is conscious means

precisely that one includes other possibilities. Our being conscious of taking something means that we include, in its reverse aspect, the possibility that we do not take it. If one speaks in an even more detailed way, in consciousness there is of necessity something of a general characteristic, i.e., consciousness possesses ideal elements. If this is not so, it is not consciousness. And the fact that there are these characteristics means that in addition to this kind of event of actuality, it possesses still other possibilities. To be in actuality and contain an ideal and to be ideal and not separated from actuality is a special characteristic of consciousness. Indeed consciousness is certainly not something controlled by another, but always controls the other. Therefore, even if our behavior is born according to the laws of necessity, since we know this, we are not confined within this behavior. Seen from the aspect of the ideal which forms the foundation of consciousness, this actuality is nothing more than one particular example of the ideal. That is, the ideal is nothing more than one process in actualizing itself. Such behavior did not come from without but came from within. Moreover, since we consider this kind of actuality as nothing more than one example of the ideal, it comes to include any number of possibilities in addition.

Thus, it is not that that which we call freedom of consciousness is free because it operates accidentally, breaking the laws of nature, but on the contrary because it follows its own nature. It is not that it is free because it operates without reason, but it is free because it knows well the reason. As knowledge advances we can become increasingly freer men. Even if man is controlled and oppressed by others, because he knows this he escapes from this oppression. If, advancing further, he is aware of the reasons why this must be so, oppression on the contrary becomes freedom of the self. Socrates was a freer man than the Athenians who poisoned him. Pascal, too, has said that man is as weak as a reed; but man is a thinking

reed, and even if the entire world tries to destroy him, since he is aware that he dies, he is greater than that which kills him.

The ideal elements, or, in other words, that which is the unifying function which is the foundation of consciousness, as I have discussed in the previous section, "Reality," are not a product of nature but on the contrary nature is established according to this unity. This is truly the infinite force which is the foundation of reality, and we cannot limit it quantitatively. It is a thing which exists wholly outside the determined laws of nature. Because our will becomes an expression of this force, it is free, and it does not receive the control of natural law.

Chapter 4 A Study of Value

We are able to view all phenomena, or events, from two points. One is the investigation of how they arose, or the cause or reason they must be this way; and the other is the investigation of the objective for which they arose. For example, let us imagine that here there is a blossom. If we ask how this arose, we must say that it did so according to the condition of plants and its surroundings, and according to the laws of physics and chemistry; if we ask for what reason, we shall say in order to bear fruit. The former is merely a logical study which investigates the laws of the establishment of things, and the latter is a practical study which investigates the laws of the activity of things.

Among the phenomena of the so-called inorganic world, we may ask how they arose, but we cannot ask for what reason, that is, we must say that there is no objective. But even in this case we can say that the objective and the cause have become identical. For example, if on a billiard-table one pushes a billiard-ball with a certain

power in a certain direction, it necessarily rolls in a fixed direction, but at that time it is not that there is any objective in the billiard-ball. Perhaps there is some objective in the man who pushes the billiard-ball, but this is not an internal objective of the ball itself, for this ball is moved of necessity according to a cause of the outside world. Seen another way, however, precisely because there is a force of this kind of activity in the billiard-ball itself, does the ball move in a fixed direction. If one speaks from the viewpoint of the internal force of the billiard-ball itself, one can consider it as a purposeful function to realize itself. When, advancing further, we come to animals and plants, while that which is the internal objective of the self becomes clearer, one comes to be able to distinguish between cause and objective. While phenomena which arise in animals and plants do so following the determined laws of physics and chemistry, they are not wholly unconscious phenomena. They are phenomena which have as objective the survival and development of the living thing in its entirety. Within this kind of phenomenon something which has arisen as a result of a certain cause cannot necessarily be said to be purposeful; there are instances where the objective of the whole and some of the phenomena come into conflict. Therefore, it comes about that we must make a value study of the phenomena, asking what kind of phenomenon most coincides with the objective.

Among the phenomena of living things it is not that we are still unable to consider that that which is their unified objective is nothing more than a fantasy added by us human beings from without, and to abolish it. That is to say, we are able to consider the phenomena of living things as merely an unconscious combination constituted by the concentration of a certain quantity of energy. It is only when we arrive at our phenomena of consciousness that we are certainly unable to think in this way; for phenomena of conscious-

ness from the outset are not combinations of unconscious elements but are one unified activity. If we removed their unifying activity from the functions of thought, the imagination, and the will, we should destroy these phenomena. Concerning these functions, rather than the question of how they arise, the first problem to discuss is how one must think, how one must imagine, and how one must act. In this regard, the studies of logic, aesthetics, and ethics come to arise.

Among certain scholars there are those who attempt to abstract from the laws of existence the laws of value. I think, however, that merely by saying that the latter are born from the former we are unable to abstract value judgments of things. From the law of cause and effect which states that a red flower produces this kind of effect or that a blue flower produces that kind of effect we are unable to explain why this flower is beautiful and that flower is ugly or why one possesses great value and the other does not possess it. In these value judgments there must be another principle which becomes the standard for them. Also in such things as our thoughts, imagination, and will, since they have already arisen as facts, however mistaken a thought it be, however bad a will it be, or however gross an imagination it be, all arise according to their own considerable cause. Both the will to kill a man and the will to save a man arise with a certain necessary cause, and create a necessary result. On these points neither possesses the slightest inferiority or superiority. However, if herein such standards as the demands of conscience or the desire for life exist, for the first time a tremendous difference of superiority and inferiority arises between these two forms of behavior. Some thinkers state that that which gives greater pleasure possesses the greater value, and according to this they think they have been able, from the laws of cause and effect, to deduce the laws of value. However, for what reason does a certain result

give us pleasure and a certain other result not give us pleasure?—this cannot be explained according to the laws of cause and effect. What kind of things we like and what kind of things we hate are facts of direct experience possessing a different basis. Psychologists say that that which increases our life-force is pleasure; however, why is that which increases the life-force pleasure, for do not pessimists, on the contrary, think that life is the source of pain? Also certain other thinkers contend that powerful things are of value. But with regard to the human heart what kind of a thing is most powerful; for we cannot say that materially powerful things necessarily are powerful for the human heart: a powerful thing for the human heart is that which most moves our desires, that is, something which for us has value. It is not that value is decided according to power, but on the contrary that whether something is powerful or not is decided according to value. All our desires and demands are given facts which cannot be explained. We say that we eat in order to live, but this saying “in order to live” is an explanation added afterwards. It is not that our appetite arose from this kind of reason. An infant’s first drinking milk as well does not occur because of this kind of reason, for he simply drinks in order to drink. Not only are our desires or demands indeed facts of this kind of inexplicable direct experience, but even more are they the secret keys by means of which we are able to comprehend the true significance of reality. The perfect explanation of reality is not merely an explanation of how we exist but must be an explanation of why we exist.

Chapter 5 Various Theories of Ethics (A)

Since I have already discussed what kind of a thing a study of value is, henceforth I should like to turn to the problem of what

judging the good or evil of behavior, we do not think of this or that reason but we usually judge intuitively. There is so-called conscience, and even as the eye judges the beauty and ugliness of things, so too is conscience able to judge directly the good and evil of behavior. The intuitive theory is the one which takes this fact as its base and is the theory closest to fact. In addition, to say that the good and evil of behavior do not permit of an explanation of reason is extremely useful in maintaining the dignity of morality.

Despite the fact that the intuitive theory is simple and useful in practice, what kind of value does it have as an ethical theory? In the intuitive theory, that which one says is intuitively obvious is not such a thing as the ultimate objective of human life but rather the laws of behavior. Of course in the intuitive theory as well, there are two statements, one that the good and evil of all behavior are intuitively obvious in each situation and one that the basic moral law which includes each moral judgment is intuitively clear, but in either case, that there is a certain direct, self-evident law of behavior constitutes the heart of the intuitive theory. However, are we able, after all, to find in the moral judgments, that is, the so-called commands of conscience which we give concerning our everyday behavior, a direct, self-evident, and consequently correct, contradiction-less moral law such as those who hold this intuitive theory contend? First of all, when one inquires into each circumstance, it is certainly obvious that there is not this kind of precise judgment. There are instances in each circumstance when we err in our judgments of good and evil and there are also instances when what we now think is correct we afterwards think false, and also even in the same circumstance there are cases where, according to the person, judgments of good and evil differ greatly. Such an idea as that in each circumstance there is a precise moral judgment cannot after all be held by people who possess a slightly reflective

spirit. If this be so, what about most cases, for, after all, is there really a self-evident principle such as the theorists describe? In the first place, that which the so-called intuitive theorists present as a self-evident principle differs according to the person, and the fact that it certainly is not always consistent proves the fact that there is not this self-evident principle to the extent that it must be recognized generally. In addition, among those things which they recognize as self-evident duties, we are unable to find even one principle of this kind. Such things as loyalty and filiality of course are natural duties, but within them there are various conflicts and changes, and it certainly is not clear what kind of thing true loyalty and filiality are. Even when we try to think about the significance of wisdom, bravery, benevolence, and justice as well, it cannot be said what kind of wisdom or what kind of bravery constitutes true wisdom and bravery, nor that all wisdom and bravery are good, for, on the contrary, they can even be employed on behalf of evil. Among these, benevolence and justice are the closest to self-evident principles, but it cannot be said that the former always and in every circumstance is absolutely good, for a wrongful benevolence, on the contrary, has given rise to evil results. Moreover, even concerning the latter one cannot say that it is certainly self-evident what kind of thing true justice is; for example, even in dealing with a person, what way is the correct one? For merely the equality of each person is not justice but, on the contrary, to treat people according to the value of each is justice. If, however, one considers that it is according to the value of each person, what is it that decides this? In short, in our moral judgments we do not possess even one of the self-evident principles which the intuitive theorists describe. At times what is thought of as a self-evident principle is nothing more than a proposition which merely repeats words of the same meaning without any content.

If, as I have discussed above, we are unable to prove the intuition of good and evil as the intuitive theory emphasizes, as a theory it has extraordinarily little value; but if there is this kind of intuition and if we consider that to follow the laws given according to it is good, I should now like to consider what kind of an ethical theory the intuitive theory becomes. Strictly speaking, intuition cannot be explained according to reason as the theorists say; moreover, we must say that it is an utterly direct, meaningless consciousness without any relation to the emotions of pain and pleasure and to good and evil desires. If to follow this kind of intuition we consider to be good, good is a meaningless thing for us, and our following good is merely blind obedience, i.e., the laws of morality become for human life an oppression imposed from without, and the intuitive theory must become identical with heteronomous ethics. Most intuitive theorists, however, do not assert intuition in the above sense. Certain people view intuition as identical with reason, i.e., they think that the basic laws of morality are self-evident according to reason. If one speaks in this way, however, good is to follow reason and the distinction of good and evil is not evident according to intuition but rather is able to be explained according to reason. Moreover, certain intuitive theorists view intuition as identical with direct happiness or unhappiness, or that which we call liking and disliking. If one thinks in this way, however, since good is good because it gives a kind of pleasure or satisfaction, then the standard of good and evil comes to shift to the greatness or smallness of pleasure or satisfaction. In this way, according to the meanings of the word "intuition," the intuitive theory approaches various other ethical theories. Of course if one speaks of the pure intuitive theory, it must mean an utterly meaningless intuition, but this kind of ethical theory is similar to heteronomous ethics and does not explain why we must follow the good. The basis of morality becomes

That which is thought of as the authority figure of the external world in this kind of theory of course must be something which possesses automatically absolute authority and power over us. Among the authority theories which have appeared in the history of ethics, there are two kinds, one is the lord-authority authority theory with a lord as its base and the other is the god-authority theory with a god as its base. Since the god-authority ethics was practiced in the Middle Ages when Christianity possessed supreme power, such people as Duns Scotus are its exponents. According to him, God is One who possesses infinite power over us, and moreover God's will is perfectly free. God does not ordain something because it is good nor does He act on behalf of reason, for God perfectly transcends these restrictions. It is not that God ordains things because they are good but things are good because God ordains them. Duns Scotus, pushing this theory to the extreme, went so far as to say that if God carried out His orders to us by means of massacre even such massacre would become good. Moreover, one who advocated the lord-authority theory was the Englishman Hobbes, who emerged at the beginning of the modern era. According to him, human life is utterly evil and that "the weak are prey to the strong" is the state of nature. The escape from the unhappiness in human life, which arises from this state, lies only in each man's handing over all authority to one lord, and in his being absolutely obedient to his laws. Thus he said that to follow this lord in everything is good and to rebel against him is evil. In addition, in China Hsün-tzū's saying that to follow the way of the former kings in everything is good is also a kind of authority theory.

If we think strictly according to the standpoint of the above authority theory, to what kind of a conclusion do we arrive? In the authority theory one cannot explain why we must perform the good; nay, that one is unable to explain is the basic meaning of the

authority theory. Simply because it is authority do we obey it. If we obey it for some certain reason, already we do not obey on behalf of the authority itself, but we come to obey on behalf of the reason. Certain people say that fear is the most suitable motive for obeying authority, but in the rear of that which we call fear are included the advantages, disadvantages, gains, and losses of the self. If, however, we obey on behalf of the advantages and disadvantages of the self, already we do not obey on behalf of authority. Such men as Hobbes for this reason depart from the standpoint of the pure authority theory. Moreover, according to the theory of Kirchmann, who recently explained the authority theory most interestingly, when we approach anything which possesses absolute power, for example such a thing as a high mountain or a great sea, we are automatically struck by this absolute power, and an emotion of awe is born; this emotion is not fear, it is not pain, but rather it is a state wherein the self is made captive by a tremendous fact of the external world, and surrendering to it, merges with it. And if this absolute powerful thing is something which possesses will, automatically herein the idea of reverence must be born, i.e., one comes to be obedient to the commands of this thing with a feeling of reverence; thus he says that the feeling of reverence is the motive for following authority. If one considers this carefully, however, to say that we revere another does not mean that we revere wholly without reason, for we revere because he has been able to realize the ideals which we have been unable to attain. It is not that we revere merely the man himself but that we revere ideals. To birds and beasts both Sakyamuni and Confucius do not even have the value of a farthing. Thus, in the strict authority theory morality must be perfectly blind obedience. Even if we call it fear or reverence it must still be a perfectly blind emotion without any significance. In one of Aesop's fables, at a certain time a fawn sees the mother

deer fleeing, having been frightened by the sound of a dog, and asks why his mother, who has a large body, should flee in fright at the sound of a small dog. The story relates, however, that the mother deer said she did not know why, she merely fled because the sound of the dog was extremely frightening. I think that this kind of meaningless fear is the most suitable moral motive in the authority theory. For after all, if it is this kind of thing, morality and knowledge are perfectly opposed, and the ignorant person is the best man. It comes about that man in advancing and developing must escape as soon as possible from the restrictions of morality. Moreover, in no kind of good behavior is there the idea of obeying the commands of authority, since for one to behave while being aware of a reason why one ought not so to behave is not moral good behavior.

It is not only impossible to explain moral motivation in this way, according to the authority theory, but the so-called moral law as well becomes almost meaningless; consequently, the distinction of good and evil as well comes utterly to lose its standard. If we say that merely because it is authority we obey it blindly, in authority there are various kinds. If there is tyrannical authority, there is also lofty, spiritual authority. However, since to follow either is to follow authority, we must say that they are perfectly identical. That is to say, the standard of good and evil becomes utterly unable to be established. Of course the strength or weakness, greatness or smallness of power can be thought of as the standard, but even the strength or weakness, greatness or smallness of power too are able to be discussed only after our establishing something which we consider an ideal. The question as to who is stronger, Jesus or Napoleon, depends on how we decide our ideals. If we say that merely those who possess power which exists in the world are

powerful, then those who possess physical force become the most powerful.

As Saigyō Hōshi has declared, "Although I know not what thing it is, my tears flow in the face of awesomeness," the awesomeness of morality truly exists in an unfathomable region. That the authority theory arrived at this point means that it includes one area of truth, but that it was utterly oblivious to the demands of human life and nature because of this truth is its great defect. Morality is something which possesses its basis in human life and nature, and why man must perform the good must be explained from within human life.

Chapter 7 Various Theories of Ethics (C)

According to heteronomous ethics, as I have stated before, we are utterly unable to explain why we must perform the good. Good becomes a perfectly meaningless thing. Therefore, it comes about that we must seek the basis of morality within human life. It comes about that we must explain the problems of what kind of a thing good is and why we must perform the good from within human life. I call this kind of ethics autonomous ethics. Within this there are three kinds: the first, with reason as its base, I call the rational theory, or the intellectual theory; the second, with the emotions of pain and pleasure as the base, I call the pleasure theory; and the third, with the activity of the will as the base, I call the activity theory. Now I should first like to speak of the rational theory.

That which I call rational or intellectual ethics (dianoetic ethics) views as identical both good and evil, right and wrong in morality, and truth and falsehood in knowledge. It considers that the true aspect of things is precisely the good, and that if one knows the true aspect of things it automatically becomes evident what one must do;

rational animals must follow reason. He even goes so far as to say that one who at times attempts to operate in opposition to righteousness is like someone who desires to change the characteristic of things, and he utterly confuses what *is* with what *must be*.

Although it is splendid that the rational theory attempts to clarify the generality of the moral law and to make duty solemn, we are unable to consider that thereby it is able to explain all aspects of morality. Is the moral law which guides our behavior, as these theorists state, something which we are able to know *a priori* according to the formal powers of understanding? The pure, formal powers of understanding merely can give the laws of formal understanding such as the so-called three laws of logical thought but they are unable to give any content. Theorists like to take their examples from geometry, but in geometry as well this axiomatic thing is not obvious merely according to the formal powers of understanding but comes from the characteristics of space. The syllogisms of geometry concerning the characteristics of space are things which apply the laws of logic to the basic intuition. In ethics too, since the basic principles have already become obvious, in applying them we doubtless must proceed according to the laws of logic, but it is not that these principles themselves have become clear according to the laws of logic. For example, is the moral law which states that one must love one's neighbor clear merely according to the powers of comprehension? If there are in us the characteristics of altruism, there are also the characteristics of self-love. For what reason, therefore, is one of them superior and the other inferior? What decides this problem is not the power of understanding but rather our emotions and desires. Even if we have been able to know the true aspect of things simply intellectually, we are unable to know from this what is the good. We are unable to know from the fact that it *is* this way the fact that it *must* be this way. Clarke states that we are able to know

the suitability and unsuitability from the true aspect of things, but suitability and unsuitability already are not judgments of the pure intellect but are value judgments. First there is someone who seeks something, and thereafter the judgments of suitability and unsuitability come to arise.

Next, the theorists in explaining why we must perform the good say that because we are rational animals we must follow reason. It is natural that people who understand reason must follow reason intellectually. However, what is merely logical judgment and the choice of the will are different things. Judgments of logic do not necessarily become causes of the will. The will is something which arises from emotion and impulse and is not something which arises merely from abstract logic. Even the maxim, "Do not do unto others what you do not desire others to do unto you," is almost meaningless for us if there is not the motivation of sympathy. If abstract logic is something which is able to become directly a motive of the will, then we must say that the man most proficient in reasoning is the best man. No one can deny, however, that at times in fact, in opposition to this, an ignorant man on the contrary is a far better man than one who has knowledge.

Previously I have mentioned Clarke as a representative of the rational theory, but while he is a representative of the logical aspects of this theory, those who represent the practical aspect are rather the so-called Cynic school. This school, based on Socrates' view of good and knowledge as identical, considered all sensual desire and pleasure as evil, and it considered the only good as residing in vanquishing these and in following pure reason; moreover, their so-called reason existed merely to oppose sensual desire and was a negative reason without any content. The object of morality lay merely in overcoming sensual desire and pleasure and in maintaining freedom of the spirit. Such a man as the renowned Diogenes is its best model.

of the other? As in Epicurus, it leads instead to selfishness, and this is doubtless the necessary result of the pleasure theory. Both Bentham and Mill stoutly contend that the pleasure of the self and the pleasure of the other person are things which merge, but I think that this kind of statement cannot be proved in the realm of experiential events.

Since hitherto I have stated generally the main points of the pleasure theories, I wish henceforth to turn to a criticism of them. First of all, having recognized the fact that the pleasure which is the basic hypothesis of these pleasure theories is the sole object of human life, is one able after all to provide a sufficient standard of behavior according to these theories? If one views the matter from the standpoint of the strict pleasure theory, all kinds of pleasure are similar, and there must only be quantitative differences. For if there are various characteristic distinctions, and one considers that the value differs according to them, then one must allow a principle which establishes value apart from pleasure. That is to say, this would conflict with the doctrine that pleasure is the only principle which fixes the value of behavior. Mill, who was influenced by Bentham, allowed that there are various characteristic distinctions in pleasure, and thought that the superiority and inferiority of two kinds of pleasure were easily determinable by a man who could experience similarly these two kinds. For example, anyone would wish rather to be dissatisfied as a Socrates than to be satisfied as a pig. Moreover one thinks that these distinctions come from the feeling of man's worth (sense of dignity). Such ideas as those of Mill, however, are obviously far removed from the standpoint of the pleasure theory, for, if one follows it rigidly, then one is not allowed to say that one pleasure, without relationship to its being smaller than another pleasure, is a more valuable thing than another pleasure. If this be so, as in the various theories of Epicurus and

Bentham, pleasures are purely identical, but as things which differ only quantitatively, how do we establish their quantitative relationships? Also, according to this theory, are we able to fix the value of behavior? Aristippus and Epicurus merely say that we are able to discriminate by means of knowledge, and they do not give a clear standard. Only Bentham, as I have stated above, discusses this standard in detail. The emotion of pleasure, however, is something which even in one person is extraordinarily easily changed according to the time and circumstance; and it is not very clear how one pleasure is superior in strength to another. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to determine what kind of strength corresponds to what kind of duration. If we realize that even in one person it is difficult to establish a yardstick for pleasure, it is even more difficult, as in the public pleasure theory, to attempt to fix the extent of pleasure when calculating that of another person. Usually it appears that the value of pleasure has been traditionally fixed so that spiritual pleasure is considered higher than all physical pleasure, honor more important than wealth, and that the pleasure of the majority is worthier than the pleasure of the individual self, but since this kind of standard has emerged from the observation of various aspects, it certainly cannot be thought of as something which has been established according to the extent of simple pleasure.

Above I have discussed the basic principles of the pleasure theories as being correct, but even if one views them in this way, it is very difficult to acquire, by means of these pleasure theories, a correct model which must establish the value of our behavior. Now I should like, advancing a step, to investigate the basic principles of these theories. That all people hope for pleasure and that pleasure is the sole objective of human life are the basic hypotheses of these theories, and indeed this is what all people say,

but if we try to consider the matter more carefully, it is obvious that this is certainly not the truth. We must allow that in man, in addition to selfish pleasure, there are lofty, altruistic, or idealistic desires. For example, such ideas as that even if one suppresses one's desires one wishes to give something to a beloved person or even if one loses one's life one must put into practice an ideal, are to a greater or lesser degree latent in everyone's breast. The instances are not rare when these motives come to express extraordinary force and even cause a man involuntarily to perform a tragic, sacrificial act. That man utterly seeks the pleasure of the self, as the pleasure theorists state, appears to be a truth which is very astutely proved, but on the contrary it is something far removed from fact. Of course it is not that the pleasure theorists also do not recognize these facts, but they think that since even a man who possesses these desires and dares to perform sacrificial acts because of them is simply attempting to satisfy the desires of self, these acts, if seen from the rear aspect, are simply nothing more than a seeking of pleasure of the self. However, that every man in every situation is seeking satisfaction of desire is a fact, but one cannot say that he who seeks satisfaction of desire is precisely one who seeks pleasure. When one is able to realize an ideal even with an unlimited amount of pain, of necessity an emotion of satisfaction accompanies such realization. And doubtless this emotion is a kind of pleasure, but it cannot be said, because of this, that this sensation of pleasure from the outset is the object of behavior. In the emergence of this kind of pleasant sensation of satisfaction, there must first be in us that which we call natural desire. Only if there is this desire does the pleasure of satisfaction in realizing it emerge. Because there is this pleasant sensation, however, to say that desire takes as its object all pleasure is to confuse cause and effect. In us human beings there is *a priori* the instinct of altruism. Because

there is this instinct, to love others gives us infinite satisfaction. Because of this, however, it cannot be said that we love others for the sake of the pleasure of the self. For if there is even the slightest idea of doing this for the sake of pleasure of the self, we certainly are unable to acquire the emotion of satisfaction which comes from altruism. Indeed not only altruistic desires but what are called desires of complete self-love as well are not things which merely have pleasure as their object. For example, the desires for food and sex too are things which, rather than having pleasure as their object, are driven, on the contrary, by the necessity of a kind of *a priori* instinct. A man who is starving conversely deplores the fact that there is appetite, and a man suffering from unrequited love conversely may hate the fact that there is love. If for man pleasure is the only object, there is indeed nothing so rich in contradiction as human life. Rather, for man to cast aside all desire is the road which leads to pleasure. This is the reason that Epicurus' considering a state wherein one has escaped all desire, namely tranquillity of mind, as the highest pleasure merged with the ideal of the Stoics which was established instead from a diametrically opposite principle.

Certain pleasure theorists, however, argued that since even what today is considered as a natural desire not having pleasure as its object, in the life of an individual or in the course of biological evolution, has become, by means of habit, a second nature, that which originally sought pleasure consciously has become unconscious. That is to say, that natural desire which does not make pleasure its object or that which is simply a means for acquiring pleasure according to habit has become the object itself. (Such people as Mill often give the example of money concerning this.) Of course, among our desires there probably are also things which have become second nature according to this kind of psychological function.

It cannot be said, however, that desires which do not make pleasure their object all emerge according to this kind of process. Our spirit like our body is active from birth. It possesses various instincts. That a chick at birth picks up rice and that a duckling at birth enters water stem from the same principle. Did these acts which we must call instinct, after all, become unconscious habits through heredity when they had originally been conscious? If we follow today's theory of biological evolution, the instincts of living things certainly did not emerge by means of this kind of process. Originally it was potentiality which was inherent in the eggs of living matter, and it came about that what was suited to the situation survived, finally manifesting a kind of special instinct.

As I have discussed above, the pleasure theories, if compared with the rational theory, approach even more the nature of human life, but by means of them we are able to establish the distinction between good and evil merely according to the emotions of pain and pleasure; they are unable to give a correct objective standard, and they are unable to explain the imperative elements of moral good. In addition, it can be said that to consider pleasure as the sole object of human life does not yet truly conform to the facts of human life and nature. We certainly are unable to be satisfied by means of pleasure. If there is a man who considers only pleasure his goal, he is a man who has gone against life.

Chapter 9 Good (A Theory of Activity)

Since I have already discussed various opinions concerning good and also indicated the points of their insufficiency, I think it has automatically become obvious what kind of thing the correct opinion of good is. Where must we seek a good which our will must make

its object, i.e., a model which must establish the value of our behavior? As I have stated previously in the section where I discussed the basis of value judgments, we must by all means seek this basis of judgment in the direct experience of consciousness. Good is something which must only be explained by the internal demands of the consciousness and is not something which must be explained from outside. We are unable to explain merely from the fact that an event *is* this way or that it *emerged* in that way the fact that it *must* be this way. The standard of truth, in the final analysis, resides in the internal necessity of consciousness, and just as men such as Augustine and Descartes, who pondered the problem most deeply, all established it from this point, we must seek the basic standard of good herein. However, heteronomous ethics attempts to seek the standard of good and evil outside. Thus, after all, it cannot explain why one must perform the good. We can say that the rational theory which attempts to decide the value of good and evil from reason, which is one internal function of consciousness, when compared with heteronomous ethical theories, has advanced a step, but reason is not that which must decide the value of the will. As Höffding has stated, the consciousness both begins and ends with the activity of the will, and the will is a more basic fact than the function of abstract comprehension. It is not that the latter transcends the former, but on the contrary that the former controls the latter. If this be so, it may be correct for the pleasure theories to consider that the emotions and the will are differences of strength of almost identical phenomena, but, as I have stated before, pleasure is something which rather emerges from the satisfaction of the *a priori* demands of the consciousness, and we must say that such *a priori* demands as so-called impulse and instinct are more basic than the emotions of pleasure and displeasure.

Thus it is evident that we must seek the explanation of good in the characteristics of the will itself. The will is the basic unifying function of the consciousness and is directly also an expression of the unifying force which is the basis of reality. The will is not an activity on behalf of another but is activity on behalf of the self. There is nothing to do other than seek the basis which decides the value of the will within the will itself. The characteristic of the activity of the will, as I stated previously when I discussed the characteristics of behavior, resides in the fact that in its foundation the will possesses something which is an *a priori* demand (the primary cause of consciousness), which appears as an object concept in the consciousness, and by means of which, it unifies the consciousness. When this unification is completed, i.e., when the ideal has been realized, an emotion of satisfaction is born in us, and when this is not so, an emotion of dissatisfaction is born. Since that which decides the value of behavior resides completely in this *a priori* demand which is the basis of the will, when one has been able to realize this demand, i.e., one's ideal, this behavior is praised as good, and when this is not so, it is criticized as evil. Thus it comes about that we say that good is the realization of our internal desires, i.e., ideals, or, in other words, the development and perfection of the will. We call this kind of ethical theory which is based in the fundamental ideal the activity theory (energetism).

This theory begins with Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle particularly organized an ethic based on it. According to him, the object of human life is happiness (*eudaimonia*). Attainment of this, however, is not based on seeking pleasure but is based on perfect activity.

Many so-called moralists of the world overlook this active aspect. Speaking of such things as duty and law, they conceive of the basic characteristic of good as lying in vainly suppressing the desires of the self and in restricting activity. Of course, since there are many

instances where we who are imperfect, without at all comprehending the true significance of activity, fall into a predicament, it is natural that this kind of tendency should be created, but precisely because there is something which must foster an even greater demand does the necessity arise to suppress the small demand; for vainly to suppress a demand, on the contrary, is something which goes against the basic characteristic of good. In good the characteristic of imperative dignity must be included, but that which is a natural liking is a much more necessary characteristic than this. In such things as so-called moral duty or law, it is not that there is value in duty or law themselves, but rather that they arise based on great demands. Seen from this point, not only do good and happiness not mutually clash, but instead we can say that the good about which Aristotle spoke is happiness. In fulfilling the demands of the self and also in realizing ideals we are always happy. In the rear aspect of good the emotion of happiness must, of necessity, be present. It cannot be said, however, as the pleasure theory states, that the will is something which makes the emotion of pleasure its object and that pleasure is precisely the good. Pleasure and happiness, while resembling each other, are opposite. Happiness one can acquire by means of satisfaction, and satisfaction arises in the realization of ideal demands. As Confucius has said, "To eat coarse food, drink water, and bend one's elbow to make a pillow of it—pleasure also resides therein," according to the circumstances, even while in pain we are still able to maintain happiness. True happiness is rather something which must be acquired by means of the realization of strict ideals. Most people, if they speak of such things as the realization of ideals of the self and the satisfaction of demands, usually view them as identical with egotism and selfishness. The voice of the most profound internal demand of the self, however,

for us possesses great and awesome force, and there is nothing in human life more rigorous than this.

Now if we consider good to be the realization of ideals and the satisfaction of demands, from what do these demands and ideals come to arise, and what kind of characteristics does good possess? It is correct to say that since the will is the most profound unifying function of the consciousness, i.e., the activity of the self itself, the original demands or ideals which are the cause of the will emerge in short from the characteristics of the self itself, i.e., they are the power of the self. Since our consciousness in thought, imagination, and the will, as well as in so-called intellectual perception, emotion, and impulse too, all have in their foundation an internal unity which is operating, the phenomena of consciousness all are a development and perfection of this one thing. Moreover, the most profound unifying force which unifies the whole is our so-called self, and the will is that which expresses this force. Since, if we try to think in this way, the development and perfection of the will become directly the development and perfection of the self, we can say that good is the development and perfection (self-realization) of the self. That is to say, our spirit's developing various abilities and achieving a full development is the highest good. (Aristotle's so-called *entelechie* is the good.) Even as a bamboo manifests fully a bamboo's nature and a pine a pine's nature, so too is man's manifesting man's innate nature man's good. Spinoza also stated that virtue means nothing more than operating according to the special characteristics of the self.

Herein the concept of good comes to approach the concept of beauty. Beauty is felt in the circumstance wherein things, like ideals, are realized. To be realized like an ideal means that a thing brings forth its basic characteristic of nature. Thus, just as when a flower has expressed a flower's basic characteristic is it most

beautiful, so too when man has expressed the basic characteristic of man has he attained the summit of beauty. Good is precisely beauty. Even if behavior itself, seen from the great demands of human life, is a thing without any value, when that behavior is natural behavior, which has truly emerged from the genius of that man, it comes to evoke a kind of sensation of beauty; so too in the moral realm does it create a kind of emotion of magnanimity. The Greeks viewed good and beauty as identical. This idea was best expressed in Plato.

Moreover, if seen from another side, the concept of good comes also to merge with the concept of reality. As I have discussed previously, the development and perfection of one thing is the basic form of the establishment of all reality, and spirit, nature, and even the universe, all are established in this form. If we consider the matter in this way, the good which I have now stated to be the development and perfection of the self means following the laws of the reality of the self. That is to say, the self's fusion with true reality becomes the highest good. Therefore, the laws of morality come to be included within the laws of reality, and good comes to be able to be explained according to the true nature of the reality of the self. The internal demands which are the basis of so-called value judgments and the unifying force of reality are one, they are not two. Since to consider existence and value separately arises from the abstract function which divides the object of knowledge from the object of the emotions and the will, in concrete, true reality these two are basically one. In other words, to say one seeks the good and one returns to the good becomes simply to know the truth of the self. The rational theorists' considering truth and good as identical also includes one facet of truth. Abstract knowledge and good, however, do not necessarily merge. For in this circumstance to know must mean so-called experience. I think that such ideas constitute

the basic thought of Plato in Greece and of the Upanishads in India, and are the most profound thought with regard to good. (There are expressions such as that of Plato that the ideal of good is the basis of reality, and in medieval philosophy as well such as that "all reality is good" [*omne ens est bonum*].)

Chapter 10 Good in the Personality

Previously I discussed first what kind of a thing good must be, and I presented a general concept of good, but henceforth I should like to investigate what kind of a thing the good of us human beings is and to clarify its special characteristics. It is an obvious fact to everyone that our consciousness is certainly not a single, simple activity but is a combination of various activities. When we look at the matter in this way, it is clear that our demands too are certainly not simple but that there are various demands. If this be so, the fulfillment of which among these various demands is the highest good? The problem comes to arise of what kind of thing the good of our entire self is.

In our phenomena of consciousness there is not one thing which is solitary; of necessity all are established in relationship with another. Even the consciousness of a moment is already not simple; for within it are included complex elements. And these elements are not mutually independent things, but rather each of them is a thing which in various relationships possesses a kind of meaning. Indeed it is not only that a moment's consciousness is organized in this fashion, but the consciousness of a lifetime as well is one system of this kind. We have called this unity of the entirety the self.

Furthermore, our demands too are certainly not things which emerge in solitude. They come to arise of necessity in relationship

with others. It is clear that our good does not mean the satisfaction only of a certain kind of demand or of a demand of the moment; but a certain single demand only becomes good when it is first in relationship with the whole. For example, it is identical with the fact that the good of the body lies not in the health of one of its parts but lies in the healthy relationships of the entire body. Thus, seen from the activity theory, good must be first the fusion and harmony or the mean between various activities. Our conscience becomes the conscious function of harmony and unity.

That harmony is the good is an idea of Plato. He compared the good to musical harmony. Such men as the Englishman Shaftesbury also adopted this idea. Moreover, that the mean is the good is an Aristotelian theory, and in the Orient in *The Book of the Mean* as well this idea appears. Aristotle considered that all virtue resides in the mean; for example, he said that bravery is the mean between violence and timidity, and that economy is the mean between miserliness and extravagance. This closely resembles the idea of Confucius. Moreover, the statement of such a man as the ethicist of the theory of evolution, Spencer, that the good is the average of various abilities also is simply of the same meaning.

However, the significance of the statements that the good is merely harmony or the mean is not yet clear. As for harmony, it is harmony in what kind of sense? And as for the mean, it is the mean in what kind of sense? Consciousness is not a collection of activities on the same level but is one unified system. This harmony or mean does not have a quantitative meaning but must be in the sense of a systematic order. If this be so, what kind of a thing is this special order in the various activities of our spirit? Our spirit also on its low level is merely instinctive activity similar to the spirit of animals. That is to say, since it operates impulsively with regard to an object in front of one, it is wholly moved according

to desires of the flesh. Phenomena of consciousness, however, no matter how simple they are, necessarily are provided with the demands of concepts. Thus, no matter how much the activity of consciousness is said to be instinctive, at its rear there must be latent conceptual activity. (I think that among animals too the higher ones of necessity are probably this way.) Among every kind of human being, so long as he is not someone such as an idiot, he certainly is not one who is satisfied with purely physical desires; necessarily at the bottom of his heart conceptual desires are working. In other words, all kinds of men embrace some ideal. Even a miser's greed for profit comes from a kind of ideal. If stated in a different way, it is not that man survives in the flesh but rather that he possesses a life in the realm of concepts. In Goethe's poem "The Violet" he says that a violet of the field attained the satisfaction of love by being trodden upon by a young shepherdess. I think that this is the true emotion of all mankind. Thereby conceptual activity is the basic function of the spirit, and our consciousness is something which must be controlled according to it. In other words, the satisfaction of demands which arise from it we must say is our true good. If this be so, and, advancing a step further, if we ask what sort of thing the basic law of conceptual activity is, we should say that it is precisely the law of reason. The law of reason is something which expresses the most general and the most basic relationship between concept and concept, and it is the highest law which controls conceptual activity. Therefore reason is also the basic faculty which must control our spirit, and the satisfaction of reason is our highest good. We can say that to follow reason in anything is human good. The Cynics and Stoics are those who emphasize this idea in the extreme, and because of this even say, expelling all other demands of the human heart as evil, that in following reason alone resides the only good. In the thought of the later years of Plato and in

Aristotle, however, it is stated that that which arises from the activity of reason is the highest good but also that the controlling and governing of other activity by it also is good.

In Plato's famous *Republic* he views as identical the organization of the human spirit and the organization of the state, and declares that the situation which is governed by reason in both the state and in the individual is the highest good.

If our consciousness is something which is formed by a synthesis of various abilities and is constructed so that one of them controls another, good in the activity theory, as I have stated above, must be said to reside in following reason and restraining other forces. Our consciousness, however, originally is one activity. In its foundation a single force is always operating. In momentary activity of consciousness, such as intellectual perception or impulse too, already this force appears. Advancing further and arriving at conscious activity such as thought, imagination, and the will, this force comes to appear in still deeper forms. Even our following reason means simply nothing other than following this profound unifying force. If this is not so, reason merely thought of abstractly, as I have stated when I previously criticized the rational theory, provides nothing more than a formal relationship without any content. This unifying power of consciousness certainly does not exist apart from the content of consciousness; on the contrary, the content of consciousness is established according to this power. Of course when we consider the matter, analyzing individually the contents of consciousness, we cannot find this unifying power. And yet it appears clearly as one immovable fact above this synthesis. For example, such things as a kind of ideal which appears in a painting or a kind of emotion which appears in music are not things which must be analyzed and understood but are things which must be intuited and self-acquired. And if we here call this kind of unifying power the human personality

of each individual, the good resides in the maintenance and development of this kind of human personality, i.e., unifying force.

Here I do not mean that the power of the so-called human personality is merely a natural, material force such as the life-force of animals and plants. Nor do I mean an unconscious ability such as instinct. The instinctive faculty is a kind of material force which emerges from organic faculties. Human personality, contrary to this, is the unifying force of consciousness. If I speak in this way, however, I do not mean that human personality is a thing such as various extremely subjective hopes existing as the center of the superficial consciousness of each man. These hopes doubtless are things which express somewhat the character of that man, but it is rather at the point where one has suppressed these hopes and has forgotten the self that the true human personality appears. If I say this, I also do not mean the function of general, pure reason in each individual separated wholly from the experiential content, as Kant has said. Human personality must be something which possesses a particular significance according to each and every man. True unity of consciousness is a pure, simple function which comes to appear naturally without our knowing it; it is the basic state of an independent, self-sufficient consciousness without any distinction of intelligence, emotion, and will, and without any isolation of subject and object. Our true human personality at such times expresses this whole. Therefore, human personality is not merely reason, it is not desire, nor is it unconscious impulse; very much like the inspiration of a genius, it is the infinite unifying force which is active directly and automatically from within each individual. (The ancients also said that the Way does not belong to either knowledge or ignorance.) And, if as I stated previously in my discussion of reality, phenomena of consciousness are the only reality, our human personality is directly the activity of the unifying force of the

universe. That is to say, the single reality which destroys the distinction of matter and spirit appears in certain special forms responding to the situation.

Since our good is the realization of this kind of tremendous force, its demands are extremely rigorous. Kant stated too that there are always two things which we view with praise and reverence: one is the vast, starry heaven stretching above, and the other is the moral law within the heart.

Chapter 11 The Motivation of Good Behavior (The Form of Good)

To summarize what I have discussed previously, I contend that since good refers to that which satisfies the internal demands of the self and since the greatest demands of the self are those of the basic unifying force of consciousness, i.e., of human personality, the satisfaction of these, i.e., the realization of human personality, is for us the absolute good. Moreover, while the demands of this human personality are the unifying power of consciousness, they are also the manifestation of the infinite unifying force at the foundation of reality, and to realize our human personality means to become one with this force. If one considers good to be of this kind, I think that one is able to determine from this what kind of behavior good behavior is.

Proceeding from the above idea, it first becomes clear that good behavior is all behavior which has human personality as its object. Human personality is the foundation of all values, and within the universe only the human personality possesses absolute value. Within us there are, of course, various demands: if there are physical demands, there are also spiritual ones; consequently, there

is no doubt that there are various things which must be valued, such as wealth, power, intelligence, and art. Yet no matter how strong or how lofty the demand, if it is separated from the demands of the human personality, it possesses no value whatsoever; for it is only as a part or a means of the demands of human personality that it possesses value. Honor, authority, health, talent, and learning as well are not good in themselves, for when they are in opposition to the demands of the human personality, on the contrary they become evil. Therefore, absolute good behavior must be behavior performed with the realization of the human personality itself as the object, i.e., it must be performed on behalf of the unity of consciousness itself.

If one follows Kant, matter has its value decided from without, and its value is relative, but since only our will decides its value itself, then the human personality possesses absolute value. As everyone knows, he taught that one should revere one's personality and that of others, that one should treat it as the object itself (end in itself), and that one should never use it as a means.

If this be so, what kind of behavior must the good behavior be which truly has the personality itself as object? In answering this question one must discuss the objective content of the activity of personality, and one must clarify the object of behavior, but I wish first to discuss the subjective characteristics in good behavior, i.e., its motivation. Good behavior must be all behavior which arises from the internal necessity of the self. I have said this before, but the demands of our entire personality are only able to be perceived in a state of direct experience wherein we do not as yet think and judge. The personality comes to appear in this situation from the depths of the spirit, and is the voice of a kind of internal demand which gradually embraces the entire spirit. Good behavior which has the personality itself as object must be behavior which follows this kind of demand. If it goes against this, it is something

which denies the personality of the self. Sincerity is a condition which must not be lacking in good behavior. Christ too has said that only those who are like a simple child can enter heaven. The good of sincerity is not good because of the results which arise from it but is the good in itself.

The reason we say that to deceive a man is evil, rather than being based on the results which arise from so doing, is that one thereby deceives oneself and denies the personality of the self.

Such terms as "the internal necessity of the self" and "spontaneous demands" often cannot escape misunderstanding. Certain people think that heedlessly and recklessly to overlook the codes of society and not to restrain the sensual desires of the self is naturalness. The internal necessity of the personality, i.e., sincerity, however, is the demand based on the fusion of intelligence, emotion, and the will. It does not mean merely to follow impulse blindly in opposition to the judgments of intelligence and the demands of human feeling. After one has exhausted one's intelligence and exhausted the emotions, the true demand of the personality, i.e., sincerity, first comes to appear. At the point where one thoroughly exhausts the entire force of the self, one almost loses consciousness of the self, and only where the self is not conscious of the self does one first see the true activity of the personality. Let us try to look at works of art. The true personality, i.e., originality, of the painter appears in what kind of circumstances? We are not as yet truly able to see the personality of the painter while he consciously is making various plans. We are able to see it first when, as a result of many years of labor, he is matured in technique and arrives at the point that wherever his will tends his brush automatically follows. The expression of human personality in the moral realm as well does not differ from this. To express the personality is not to follow the emotions and desires of a moment but is to follow the most

solemn internal demands. License and pusillanimousness are diametrically opposed to it, for on the contrary it is an enterprise of difficulty and pain.

The self's following its sincere internal demands, i.e., the realization of the true personality of the self, does not mean to establish subjectivity in opposition to objectivity and to make external objects obey the self. At the point where one utterly extinguishes the subjective fancy of the self and is wholly fused with a thing, on the contrary one satisfies the true demands of the self and one can see the true self. If seen from one aspect, we can say that the objective world of each person is the reflection of the personality of each person. Nay, the true self of each person does not exist outside of the independent, self-sufficient system of reality itself which appears before each person. Thus, for every person, the truest demands of the person always must be those which are ever fused with the ideals of the objective world seen by that person. For example, no matter how selfish a human being may be, if he possesses some sympathy, his greatest demand, after having acquired the satisfaction of the self, necessarily is to wish to give satisfaction to another. If we say that the demands of the self are not merely limited to physical desires but include ideal demands as well, then we must by all means speak in this way. The more one becomes selfish, the more one feels the not inconsiderable suffering within one's heart at having impeded another person's selfish desires. Conversely, I think that by being a man without selfishness one is first able to calm the spirit and to destroy the selfish desires of another. Thus, to fulfill the greatest demands of the self and to realize the self become the realization of the objective ideals of the self, i.e., the fusion with objectivity. Seen from this point, one is able to say that good behavior of necessity is love. Love is everywhere the emotion of fusion of the self with the other. It is the emotion of the union

of subject and object. Indeed love exists not only when one man faces another man but also when a painter faces nature.

Plato in his famous *Symposium* states that love is the emotion wherein that which is lacking attempts to return to its original perfect state.

If we try to advance a step further in our consideration of the problem, however, we find that true good behavior is neither making objectivity follow subjectivity nor is it subjectivity following objectivity. Only when subject and object are mutually submerged, the thing and the self are mutually forgotten, and one arrives at a state wherein there is only the activity of a single reality in heaven and earth, does one first attain to the consummation of good behavior. It is the same if things move the self or if the self moves things. It is the same if Sesshū painted nature, or if nature, through Sesshū, painted itself. Originally it is not that there was a distinction between things and the self, for just as the objective world can be said to be a reflection of the self, so too is the self a reflection of the objective world. Apart from the world which the self sees, there is no self. (Consult Chapter 9 of "Reality," the chapter entitled "Spirit.") Heaven and earth are of the same root, and the myriad things are of one substance. The ancient sages of India said, "That is Thou," (*Tat twam asi*), Paul said that it was no longer he who lived but Christ who lived in him (Galatians 2:20), and Confucius said that in following that which the heart desires one does not go beyond the rule.

Chapter 12 The Object of Good Behavior (The Content of Good)

In my explanation of good behavior which has the personality itself as object, I first indicated what kind of motivated behavior

good behavior must be, but henceforth I wish to discuss what kind of object this behavior possesses. Since even good behavior is not merely a fact of the interior of consciousness but is also an act which has the creation of a certain objective result in this actual world as object, we must now clarify the concrete content of this object. What I have previously discussed is the so-called form of good, and what I now wish to discuss is the content of good.

Human personality, which is both the unifying force of consciousness and the unifying force of reality, first is realized in individuals. At the base of our consciousness there is the unanalyzable thing called individuality. The activity of consciousness is the exercising of all individuality. The intelligence, emotion, and will of each person all possess special characteristics in that person. It is not only in phenomena of consciousness but in the features, speech, and manners of each person that this individuality appears. What a portrait attempts to express is indeed this individuality. Such individuality begins activity at the same time that the person is born in this world, and until death it performs various developments in accordance with the various experiences and vicissitudes. Scientists may reduce this to the elemental character of the brain, but as I have stated often, I think that it is the expression of the infinite unifying force of reality. Thus we must first make this realization of individuality the object. That is to say, this is the most direct good. Of course, such things as health and knowledge are things to be valued. Health and knowledge themselves, however, are not good. We are unable to be satisfied merely by these. That which gives absolute satisfaction in an individual is the realization of the individuality of the self. That is, it is expressed in the practice of one's own special characteristics which cannot be imitated by others. The manifestation of individuality is possible for everyone without reference to the talents or circumstances of that person. Just as

*Is this a source of the
fundamentals of Buddhism??*

every person has a different face, so too does he possess unique characteristics which cannot be imitated by another. Moreover, the realization of them gives each person supreme satisfaction and makes him a necessary component in the evolution of the universe. Formerly many people did not place too much emphasis on individual good. However, I think that the good of the individual is a most important thing and probably becomes the basis of all other good. A truly great man is not great because of the greatness of his exploits but because he has manifested his strong personality. If one climbs to a high place and calls out, one's voice will probably reach a distant place, but this is not because the voice is great but because the place where one stands is high. I think that a man who skilfully exhibits the basic characteristics of himself is greater than a man who, forgetting the self's duty, vainly runs about on behalf of others.

What I here call individual good, however, differs from selfish profit and selfish desire. We must strictly distinguish between individualism and self-interest. Self-interest is simply selfishness which has the pleasure of the self as object. Individualism is the direct opposite of this. For each person to give free rein to the material desires of the self means, on the contrary, the submerging of individuality. Even if there are several pigs there is not individuality among them. Moreover, people say that individualism and cooperationism are mutually opposed, but I think that they are things which merge. Precisely when each individual living in a society acts fully and displays his talents does a society first progress. It certainly cannot be said that a society which overlooks the individual is a healthy one.

In individual good the most necessary virtue is a strong will. A person such as Ibsen's Brand is the ideal of individual virtue. In contradistinction to this, weakness of will and vanity are the evils most to be despised. (Both arise from losing the idea of self esteem.)

Moreover, he who commits the greatest crime towards an individual is the one who, in the extreme of disappointment, commits suicide.

As I have said above, true individualism certainly is not something which must be attacked, nor is it something which must conflict with society. But are the so-called individualities of each person each independent realities without relation to one other? Or at the base of us individuals is there something which is a social self, and are we individuals its expression? If it is the former, individual good must be our highest good. If it is the latter, we must say that in us there is an even greater social good. I think that Aristotle's statement at the beginning of his study on government to the effect that man is a social animal is an immovable truth. If we try to think from the standpoint of today's physiology, we find that our bodies are already not individual things. The origin of our bodies lies in the cells of our ancestors. We are people who, together with our descendants, are born from the splitting up of the same cell. Throughout all the species of life we are able to see an identical life. Biologists today say that living matter does not die. Even if we look at conscious life, this is so. At the place where man builds a cooperative life, of necessity there is something which is a social consciousness unifying the consciousness of each person. Speech, customs, habits, systems, laws, religions, and literatures, etc. are all phenomena of this social consciousness. Our individual consciousness is something which emerges within this, is nurtured within this, and is nothing more than one cell composing this great consciousness. Knowledge, morality, and taste too all possess social significance. Even the most universal learning does not escape social convention. (That today in each country there is such a thing as an academic tradition is a result of this.) The so-called special characteristics of the individual are nothing more than various changes which come to appear on this foundation which is the social consciousness; no matter

how outstanding a genius there be, he cannot escape the limits of this social consciousness. On the contrary, he is one who brings out the deepest significance of the social consciousness. (Christ's relationship toward Judaism is one example of this.) One who truly has no relationship whatever with the social consciousness is nothing more than one who has the consciousness of a madman.

Nobody can deny such facts as the above, but now when we arrive at the question of whether we can view this cooperative consciousness as something which exists in the same sense as individual consciousness and as one personality, there are various differing opinions. Höffding and others deny the reality of unified consciousness, and state that a grove is a collection of trees, for if one divides it there is no such thing as a grove, and that society too is a collection of individuals, for apart from the individual there is not an independent existence called society. (Höffding, *Ethik*, S. 157) It cannot be said, however, that because after analysis unity is not realized that there is no unity. Even if one analyzes individual consciousness, one cannot find a separate thing which is the unified self. But since we must consider that there is one special characteristic in unity and that various phenomena are established according to this unity, we consider it as one living reality. We are able to view social consciousness also as one living reality for the same reason. In the social consciousness also, as in the individual consciousness, there are both a center and connections, and it splendidly constitutes one system. In individual consciousness, however, there is a foundation called the fleshly body. On this point it differs from the social consciousness, but what we call the brain is certainly not a simple thing; it is a collection of cells. There is no difference from the fact that society is composed according to the cells called individuals.

Since there is this kind of social consciousness of which our individual consciousness is a part, our demands are largely social.

If we remove from our desires the altruistic elements, almost nothing remains. This is clear if we view even our desire for life as having its major cause in altruism. We are satisfied more by the satisfaction of that which the self loves and by the satisfaction of the society to which the self belongs than by the satisfaction of the self. Originally the center of our self was not a thing restricted within the individual body. The self of the mother resides within the child, and the self of the loyal subject resides within the lord. As one's character becomes great, the demands of the self begin to become social.

Henceforth I wish to discuss somewhat the classes of social good. In the social consciousness there are various classes. The smallest and most direct within it is the family; for we must say that the family is the first class wherein our character develops in society. The object of a man and woman joining together and forming one family is more than merely to leave descendants, it is an even deeper spiritual (moral) object. In Plato's *Symposium* there is the story that since originally man and woman were one body and were divided by God, down to the present man and woman love each other. This is a rather interesting idea. If viewed from the ideal of mankind, individual men and women are not perfect men, but that which combines man and woman is a perfect man. Otto Weininger states that man in both body and spirit is composed of a union of masculine and feminine elements, and the mutual love of the sexes arises from the fact that these two elements join and become the perfect human being. Just as the male character is not the perfect ideal of mankind, so too is the female character not the perfect ideal. Both sexes, male and female, mutually complement each other and are able to develop the perfect human personality.

The development of our social consciousness, however, is not something limited within a small group such as the family. Our spiritual and material life can develop in all the various social groups.

After the family, that which unifies the whole of our conscious activity and must also be considered an expression of one personality is the state. There are various theories concerning the object of the state. Certain people place the basic substance of the state in the power of sovereignty and think that its object resides merely in defending against enemies from without and protecting the life and property among its people within. (Such men as Schopenhauer, Taine, and Hobbes belong to this group.) Certain people also place the basic substance of the state in the individual and think that its object lies merely in the harmony of the development of the personality of the individual. (This is the theory of such men as Rousseau.) The true object of the state, however, is not a material and negative thing such as the first theorists describe, nor as the second group of theorists say is the personality of the individual the foundation of the state. We individuals, on the contrary, are things which have come to develop as cells of one society. The basic substance of the state is the expression of the cooperative consciousness which is the base of our spirit. We are able to achieve a great development of the personality in the state. The state is one unified personality, and its systems and laws are the expression of the will of this kind of cooperative consciousness. (This theory is that of Plato and Aristotle in ancient times and of Hegel in modern times.) Our exhausting ourselves on behalf of the state is on behalf of the development and perfection of a great personality. Moreover, the reason that the state punishes a man is not one of revenge, nor is it one of social tranquillity but rather so that there be an authority which must not be flouted by human personality.

The state in the present day is the greatest expression of a unified cooperative consciousness, but the expression of our personality cannot stop here, for it demands something still greater, namely a union of human society having destroyed distinctions within man-

kind. This kind of ideal has already appeared in the Christianity of Paul and in the Stoics also. This ideal, however, cannot be easily realized. Today is still a period of armed peace.

When we try to retrace the development of mankind from the beginning of ancient history, we find that the state is not the ultimate objective of man. In the development of mankind there is a consistent meaning and objective, and the state appears to be something which rises and falls, flourishes and declines in order to fulfill part of mankind's mission. (The history of all nations is the development of Hegel's so-called world-spirit.) True universalism, however, does not mean that each state ceases to be. It means that each state becomes increasingly strong, brings forth its particular characteristics, and contributes to the history of the world.

Chapter 13 Perfect Good Behavior

Good, in a word, is the realization of personality. If we view it from within, it is the satisfaction of our sincere demands, i.e., the unity of consciousness, and its extreme must arrive at the point where self and other are mutually forgotten, and subject and object are mutually submerged. If viewed as a fact which appears from without, it advances from the development of the smallest entity, individuality, until it arrives at its peak, the unified development of mankind in general. Considering the matter from these two interpretations, the necessity comes to arise that one must explain still another important problem. Is that which gives great satisfaction within of necessity also that which must be called a great good in actuality? That is, it is the problem of whether the two kinds of interpretation with regard to good always coincide.

I assert, first deducing from my discussion of reality which I have stated previously, that these two opinions certainly do not contradict and conflict with each other. Originally there is not a distinction of internal and external in phenomena, and since both subjective consciousness and the objective world of reality are ways of viewing the identical phenomenon from differing aspects, they concretely constitute only one fact. As I have often stated, it is correct to say both that the world is established according to the conscious unity of the self and also that the self is a certain particular small system of reality. As in the basic thought of Buddhism, the self and the universe possess the same foundation; nay, they are directly the identical thing. Therefore, we are able to feel within the soul of the self, in knowledge as infinite truth, in emotion as infinite beauty, and in the will as infinite good, all of the infinite significances of reality. Our saying that we know reality does not mean knowing things outside the self but knowing the self itself. The truth, good, and beauty of reality must be directly the truth, good, and beauty of the self. If this be so, for what reason does there arise the doubt that there is within this world falsehood, evil, and ugliness? If we try to think about the matter deeply, in the world there are neither absolute truth, good, and beauty nor absolute falsehood, evil, and ugliness. Falsehood, evil, and ugliness always appear at the point where one looks at one aspect of things abstractly and does not know the whole view, and where, leaning to one side, one goes against the entire unity. (As I have stated in the fifth chapter of "Reality," if seen from one side, falsehood, ugliness, and evil are necessary in the establishment of reality, and are born from so-called opposing principles.)

If we follow Augustine, originally in the world there was no evil, the nature created by God was all good, and only the lack of essential qualities is evil. Moreover, God adorned the world with oppositions

as in a beautiful poem, and just as shadow increases the beauty of a painting, when one views it philosophically, the world is beautiful while having sin.

If we try to think about the circumstances where the fact of good and the demands of good conflict, there are two. One occurs when a certain behavior is good as a fact but its motive is not good, and the other occurs when the motive is good but as a fact it is not good. If we first try to consider the first situation, it certainly cannot be said that if the internal motive is self-interest and selfish desire and if only in external fact it joins with a good object that it is good behavior which has the realization of the human personality as object. There are probably times when we praise this kind of behavior too. This is certainly not viewing the matter from the point of morality, however, but merely viewing it from the point of profit. If viewed from the point of morality, this kind of behavior is inferior to that wherein even if one be foolish the self has exhausted itself in sincerity. Or one individual may say that to a good act of one person which purifies himself behavior which brings benefit to many people, even if it does not emerge from a pure, good motive, is superior. In saying one benefits a man, however, there are various meanings; for if one refers merely to giving material profit, if that profit is used for a good object, it becomes good, but if it is used for a bad object, it comes instead to aid evil. Moreover, if one speaks truly in the sense of moral good which benefits public morals, if that behavior is not a true, good act internally, then it merely is a means of aiding good behavior and is not good behavior itself; it cannot be compared with true good behavior itself even though the latter be small. Next let us consider the second situation. Even if the motive be good, there are instances where one cannot call that act necessarily good in fact. People often say that there are instances when individual sincerity and the highest good of mankind in general will

conflict. I think that those who speak in this way, however, are not interpreting the word "sincerity" correctly. I almost think that if one uses the word "sincerity" truly in the sense of the deepest demands of the entire spirit, then what these people say is not a fact. Our sincere demands are not things artificially created by us, they are facts of nature. Just as in truth and in beauty the base of man's heart contains a general element, so too in good does it contain a general element. Just as when Faust who, after suffering about life, in the depth of night returned to his lonely study from a walk across the fields, in the quiet of the night when one's soul is at peace one finds that this emotion of the universality of the good automatically comes to operate. (Goethe, *Faust*, Erster Teil, Studierzimmer) If there is something wherein we and the foundation of consciousness utterly differ, nevertheless to the extent that we are human beings who possess reason common to all men, we must think the same and seek in the same way. Of course, the greatest demands of mankind, according to the circumstance, stop merely at potentiality, and there are probably instances where they do even not operate having become reality; however, even in this kind of circumstance, it is not that there are not demands but that they are covered up, and the self does not know the true self.

According to the reasons which I have stated above, I think that our deepest demands and greatest objectives are things which automatically merge. At the same time that one internally disciplines the self and attains the true substance of the self, externally one comes to create love of one's fellow man and joins with the highest good objective; we call this perfect, true good behavior. This kind of perfect good behavior, if seen from one aspect, appears to be an extremely difficult thing, but if seen from another, it is something which anyone must be able to do. One must not seek the facts of morality as things existing outside of the self, for one finds only

that which is within the self. Since most people often confuse the basic substance of good with its external shell, they think that if something is not a world-wide enterprise for all mankind it is not the greatest good. The varieties of enterprise, however, are determined according to the abilities and circumstances of that man, and no one can perform the same enterprise. No matter how the enterprises differ, however, we can operate with the same spirit. We must say that men who, no matter how small the enterprise, are always working from the love of their fellow man are men who are realizing a great, all-embracing personality. Raphael's lofty and sublime character perhaps acquired its most appropriate material of realization in the Madonna as well, yet Raphael's character appeared indeed not only in the Madonna but in all the paintings which he made. Even if Raphael and Michelangelo selected the same subject for painting, Raphael would express Raphael's character and Michelangelo would express Michelangelo's character. The basic substance of art and morality lies in spirit and not in the facts of the external world.

As I approach the end of this chapter, I wish to leave one thing with you. If one tries to explain good academically, various explanations are possible, but in practice there is only one true good, i.e., that which is exhausted in saying to know the true self. Our true self is the basic substance of the universe, and if one knows the true self, one indeed is not only linked with the good of mankind in general but one melts with the basic substance of the universe and one is divinely united with the will of God. Both religion and morality are truly exhausted at this point. The law of knowing the true self and of uniting with God lies only in becoming aware of the force of the union of subject and object. Moreover, the acquiring of this force is the utter killing of this false self and by once dying to the desires of this world one is reborn. (As Mohammed has said, heaven lies in the shadow of the sword.) By acting in

PART IV RELIGION

Chapter 1 The Religious Demand

The religious demand is the demand with regard to the self; it is the demand concerning the life of the self. It is the demand wherein at the same time that our self perceives intellectually its relativity and finiteness, it joins with the absolute and infinite power, and desires, by means of this, to acquire the true life of eternity. It is the emotion such as Paul has described, "Already it is not I who lives but Christ who lives in me," wherein one attempts to live according to one God by nailing utterly all of one's fleshly life on the cross. True religion seeks the transformation of the self and the renovation of life. Christ has said, "All those who do not take up the cross and follow me have no part in me," and indeed while there is still a particle of an idea of believing in the self it cannot be said that there is as yet the true religious spirit.

It is not necessary to mention such things as praying to God on behalf of this-worldly profit, but even praying to the Buddha vainly with rebirth in paradise as object is not the true religious spirit. If this be so, in the *Tannishō* too it is said: "Even the striving in my soul for works that will cause rebirth in paradise, and the prayers to the Buddha which I say are performed as acts for the self." Moreover, in Christianity as well, such things as merely relying on God's help and fearing God's punishment are not true Christianity. All of these are nothing more than metamorphoses of selfishness. In addition, I wonder whether even the religion to which many people at present refer, which is on behalf of peace for

the self, is not mistaken. Since one possesses this kind of idea, it comes about that one feels one has acquired the true significance of religion by extinguishing the temperament of enterprise and activity and by taking up a negative life of small desire and no distress. We ought not to seek religion on behalf of peace for the self, for peace is nothing more than a result coming from religion. The religious demand is the great demand of life which one is unable to end even if one wishes to do so; it is the demand of a solemn will. Religion is man's object itself and certainly is not something which must be a means for another.

As the voluntarist psychologists say, the will is the basic function of spirit, and if we consider all spiritual phenomena as constituting forms of the will, we can say that our spirit is a system of desires and that the most powerful desire which is the center of this system is our self. And that which proceeds to unify everything from this center, i.e., that which maintains and develops the self, is our spiritual life. While this unity advances, we are living, but when this unity is broken, even if we live in the flesh, in the spirit it is the same as if we were dead. Are we able, however, to unify everything with individual desires as the center? In other words, is the individual life something which can unlimitedly be maintained and developed? The world is not something created on behalf of the individual, nor are individual demands the greatest demands of human life. The individual life must of necessity conflict with the world outside, and inside automatically must fall into contradiction. Herein it comes about that we must demand an even greater life, i.e., it comes about that we must demand an even greater unity according to the changing phases of the center of consciousness. We are able to see this kind of demand in the circumstances of the emergence of all our collective spirit, but only the religious demand is the extreme point of such a demand. While

we set up a subjective self with regard to the objective world and attempt to unify the latter according to it, no matter how large that subjective self is, it cannot escape the fact that its unity is still relative; for absolute unity can only be acquired by casting aside wholly subjective unity and by merging with objective unity.

Originally the unity of consciousness was a necessary condition for the establishment of consciousness and its basic demand. Consciousness without unity is the same as nothingness; consciousness can be established according to the opposition of content, and the more that content becomes varied, the more one demands a greater unity. The extreme point of this unity is our so-called objective reality, and when this unity arrives at the union of subject and object it attains its peak. Even objective reality does not exist separately apart from subjective consciousness, and the result of the unity of consciousness we call that which even if we desire to doubt we cannot doubt and even if we desire to seek there is no means by which we can seek beyond this. And the peak of this kind of unity of consciousness, i.e., the state of union of subject and object, is indeed not only the basic demand of consciousness but truly the original state of consciousness. As Condillac has said, when we have first seen light, rather than our seeing it, we are the light itself. All first sensations for the child must be directly the universe itself. In this situation there is not yet separation of subject and object, the thing and the self are one body, and there is only one fact. Since the self and the thing have become one there is nothing which must be sought further as truth nor is there any desire which must be satisfied, for man is with God, and we may call this kind of state the Garden of Eden. Together with the differentiation and development of consciousness, however, subject and object have become mutually opposed, the thing and the self have mutually gone against each other, and it has come about that

in human life, hereby, there are demands, there is suffering, man is separated from God, and paradise has forever been closed to the descendants of Adam. No matter how much consciousness has been differentiated and has developed, however, we are still unable to withdraw from the unity of the union of subject and object; and in knowledge and in the will we are always seeking this unity. The differentiation and development of consciousness are the other side of unity, and are after all the necessary conditions of the establishment of consciousness. The differentiating and developing of consciousness, on the contrary, are the seeking of a still greater unity. We must say that unity is truly the alpha and omega of consciousness. The religious demand is the demand of the unity of consciousness in this sense, and at the same time is the demand for union with the universe.

In this way the religious demand is the deepest and greatest one of men's hearts. We possess various physical and spiritual demands. These, however, are all only a part of the demands of the self, for religion alone is the solution of the self itself. In knowledge and in the will we seek a unity of consciousness and we seek a union of subject and object; however, these are still nothing more than the unity of one aspect, for religion seeks the deepest unity behind these, the unity existing before the separation of the intelligence and the will. It is correct to say that all our demands are things which have been differentiated from religious demands and the results of that development are resolved into them. When man's intelligence was still unopened, man, on the contrary, was religious, and it seems that with the consummation of learning and morality we must enter again into religion. There are people in the world who often ask such questions as why religion is necessary. This kind of question, however, is identical with the question as to why it is necessary to live. Religion does not exist apart from the life

of the self, and its demands are those of life itself. The emergence of this kind of question indicates the lack of earnestness of the life of the self. Those who sincerely think and sincerely desire to live of necessity must feel ardent religious desires.

Chapter 2 The Essence of Religion

Religion is the relationship between God and man. There are undoubtedly various ways of thinking about God, but I think that the most appropriate is to consider Him as the foundation of the universe; and by man I mean our individual consciousness. Various religions come to be determined according to the ways of thinking of the relationship of these two. If this be so, what kind of a relationship is the true religious one? If we consider that God differs in essence from us in His foundation and that He is merely something like a tremendous force higher than man, we are unable to find the slightest religious motive with regard to Him. We may either fear Him and follow His commands or we may curry favor with Him and seek happiness and profit. These, however, all emerge from mere selfishness, and the mutual relationship of things differing in essence cannot be established outside of selfishness. William Robertson Smith too has stated that religion does not arise from fearing an inscrutable force, but arises from revering a God who has a blood relationship with one's self; moreover, religion is not the voluntary relationship of the individual with a supernatural force but is the collective relationship of each individual of one society towards the force which maintains the peace and order of that society. At the base of all religions there must be the relationship of a God and man of the same nature, i.e., there must be the relationship of father and son. But merely for God and man to have the

same interests and for Him to help us and protect us is not yet true religion; God must be the foundation of the universe and at the same time must be our foundation, for our returning to God is returning to that source. Moreover, God must be the object of all things, i.e., He must be also the object of man, and each man must find the true object of himself in God. Just as hands and legs are things of man, so too is man a thing of God. Our returning to God seems from one aspect to be the losing of the self, but if seen from another aspect it is the reason for the acquiring of the self. Christ's having said, "He who gains his life shall lose it but he who loses his life for My sake shall gain it," is the purest form of religion. The relationship of God and man in true religion must necessarily be this kind of thing. Also our praying to God and our thanking Him are not done on behalf of the existence of the self; we pray that we may return to God who is the home of the basic nature of the self, and we are grateful for the fact that we have returned to Him. Moreover, that God loves man does not mean that He gives happiness to this world but that He makes man return to himself. God is the source of life, and we live only in God. Precisely because it is this way is religion filled with life and truly devout thoughts also come to emerge. Moreover, in merely such things as resigning oneself and committing oneself to another's care one still has not escaped from the stench of the self, and these cannot be said to be truly devout thoughts. Perhaps such statements as finding one's true self in God are thought of as placing emphasis on the self, but on the contrary in truly abandoning the self one praises God.

That God and man have the same nature and that man returns to his origin in God is the basic thought of all religion. And I think that what is based in this thought can first be called true religion. Even in this kind of single thought, however, we can still think in various ways about the relationship between God and man. We

can think both that God is something transcendent, outside the universe, that He controls the world from without, and even with regard to man operates from without, and we can think also that God resides within, that man is a part of God and that God operates in man from within. The former is the idea of so-called "theism" and the latter is the idea of so-called "pantheism." When we think in the latter way, perhaps it is rational, but most religious thinkers are opposed to this. For the viewing of God and nature as identical comes to destroy the personality character of God; moreover, in considering the myriad existences as metamorphoses of God one not only loses the transcendence of God and impairs His majesty, but also there arises the dilemma of having to attribute the origin of evil to God. When one tries to think carefully, however, one cannot say that these flaws necessarily exist in pantheistic thought, nor can it be said that these flaws do not necessarily exist in theism. Even if one views God and the basic substance of reality as identical, if one considers the base of reality as spiritual, one does not necessarily lose the character of the personality of God. Moreover, no matter what kind of pantheism it is, it does not say that each of the myriad things, just as it is, is God directly; even in Spinoza's philosophy the myriad things are distinctive aspects ("modes") of God. Also, even in theism the omniscience and omnipotence of God cannot be easily harmonized with the existence of evil in this world. Indeed even in medieval philosophy this was a problem which vexed the minds of many men.

The thought of a transcendental God who controls the world from without indeed not only conflicts with our reason, but I think that it cannot be said that this kind of religion is its most profound form. What we must know as the divine will is only the law of nature, and apart from this there is nothing which must be called divine revelation. Of course, since God is unfathomable, that which

we know is probably only a part of Him. But even if apart from this there is something which is revelation, we are unable to know it, and if we suppose that there is a revelation opposing this, this, on the contrary, indicates a contradiction of God. The reason that we believe in the divinity of Christ is that His life includes the deepest truth of human life. Our God fixes heaven and earth according to this truth, and must be the internal unifying force of the universe which nurtures the myriad things according to it; apart from this truth there is nothing which must be called God. If we say that God is personal, it must be in the sense that we recognize directly the significance of the personality at the base of this kind of reality. If this is not so, what we separately call supernatural, and the like, if it is not based on historical legend, is merely our own subjective fancy. Moreover, precisely if we see God directly in the foundation of this nature and also in the foundation of the self, do we feel infinite warmth in God and are we able also to attain to the essence of religion, which is living in Him. The truly reverent thought about God can only emerge from within this attitude. Love means that two personalities join and become one; reverence is the emotion which in the partial personality is aroused toward the complete personality. At the base of reverence and love there must of necessity be the unity of the personality. Thus the ideas of reverence and love not only arise between man and man but appear also within the consciousness of the self. Because our mutually different consciousnesses of yesterday and today possess an identical center of consciousness they are filled with the ideas of self-reverence and self-love, and so too the reason for our revering and loving God must be that we possess the same foundation with Him and that our spirit is the partial consciousness of God. Of course even though God and man possess the foundation of an identical spirit, we can think that just as the spirits of two people

possessing identical thoughts are mutually independent so too are they, God and man, independent. This, however, is viewing from the flesh and distinguishing spirit temporally and spatially. Those who possess the same foundation in spirit are the same spirit. Because our daily changing consciousness possesses the same unity it is seen as the same spirit, and so too must our spirit be of the same substance as God. In this way even our saying that we live in God is not merely a metaphor but can be a fact. (Even Bishop Westcott stated, in commenting on John 17:21, that the unity of believers is not merely "moral unity" of such things as objects and emotions but is a "vital unity.")

This kind of deepest religion can be established on the basis that God and man are the same substance, and the true meaning of religion resides in acquiring this significance of the union of God and man. In other words, it resides in experiencing in the foundation of our consciousness the lofty universal spirit which operates, destroying the consciousness of the self. Faith is not something which must be given from without according to legend and logic, but is something which must be cultivated from within. As Jacob Boehme has said, we arrive at God through the deepest internal life (*die innerste Geburt*). At the same time that in this internal rebirth we see God directly and we believe in Him, herein we also find the true life of the self and feel unlimited power. Faith is not mere knowledge, for at the same time that it is intuition in this sense, it is a living force. At the base of all our spiritual activity one unifying force is working, which we call both our self and our human personality. It goes without saying that such things as desires are included in it, but even the most objective things, such as knowledge, cannot but take on the color of this unifying force, i.e., of the personality of each person. Indeed both knowledge and desire are all established according to this force. Faith is the unify-

ing force transcending this kind of knowledge. Rather than faith being supported by knowledge and the will, knowledge and the will are supported by faith. Faith in this sense is mystical. But to say that faith is mystical does not mean that it is contrary to knowledge; for if it is faith of a kind which conflicts with knowledge, we cannot make it the source of life. After we have exhausted knowledge and exhausted the will, we acquire from within the faith such that even if we wished not to believe we would be unable not to believe.

Chapter 3 God

We call the foundation of this universe God. As I have stated above, I do not view God as a transcendent creator outside the universe, but I think He is directly the foundation of this reality. The relationship between God and the universe is not a relationship such as that between an artist and his work, but is the relationship between essence and phenomenon, and the universe is not a thing created by God, but is a "manifestation" of God. From the movement of the sun, moon and constellations to the inner workings of the human soul, among all there is nothing which is not a manifestation of God; at the foundation of these things, through each one we are able to worship the spiritual light of God.

Just as Newton and Kepler in seeing the order of the movement of the heavens were struck with the idea of devotion, the more we study natural phenomena the more we are able to know that one unifying power behind them is in control. The advance of learning is nothing more than the unity of this kind of knowledge. In this way, just as we recognize without, in the foundation of nature, the control of one unifying force, so too must we recognize within, in

the foundation of the human soul as well, the control of one unifying force. Even though the human heart appears in a thousand forms and ten thousand states and appears to be almost without a fixed law, when we contemplate it, it seems that both in the past and the present, throughout East and West, a tremendous unifying force is in control. When, advancing further, we consider the matter, we see that nature and spirit are not things which are utterly without communication but that one has an intimate relationship with the other. We are unable not to think of the unity of these two, i.e., that there must be an even greater single unifying force at the foundation of these two. In both philosophy and science there is no one who does not recognize this unity. And this unity is precisely God. Of course, if as materialists and most scientists say, matter is the only reality and the manifold things merely follow the laws of material force, we probably are unable to think that there is such a thing as God. But is the true aspect of reality after all this kind of thing?

As I have discussed previously concerning reality, we are unable to know even matter separately as an independent reality apart from our phenomena of consciousness. The facts of direct experience which are given to us are only these phenomena of consciousness. Space, time, and material force are all nothing more than concepts established on behalf of unifying and explaining these facts. Such a thing as pure matter which has excluded the nature of all of us individuals, such as physicists speak of, is an abstract concept most distant from concrete fact. The more one approaches concrete facts, the more they become individual. The most concrete fact is that which is most individual. For this reason, primitive explanations, as in mythology, were all personificatory, but as pure knowledge advanced, they became increasingly general and abstract, and finally we arrived at creating a concept such as that of pure matter. While

this kind of explanation is extremely external and shallow, however, we must not forget that in back of it also there is concealed a thing which is our subjective unity. The most basic explanation necessarily comes to return to the self. The secret key of explaining the universe lies in this self. We must say that to attempt to explain spirit according to matter is to have inverted cause and effect.

Also that which Newton and Kepler observed and considered as the order of natural phenomena actually is nothing more than the order of our phenomena of consciousness. Consciousness is all established according to unity. And this unity, from the smallest, the unity within the daily consciousness of each individual, arrives at the largest, the universal unity of consciousness which combines the consciousness of all men. (To limit the unity of consciousness within individual consciousness is nothing more than a dogmatism added to pure experience.) The natural world is one system of consciousness composed according to this kind of trans-individual unity. We unify the experience of the self according to individual subjectivity and we further proceed to unify the experience of each individual according to the trans-individual subjectivity, and the natural world is born as the object of this trans-individual subjectivity. Royce too stated that the existence of nature is combined with the faith in the existence of our fellow man. (Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Second Series, Lect. IV.) Thus it comes about that we say that even the unity of the natural world is ultimately nothing more than a kind of unity of consciousness. It is not that originally there are two kinds of reality, spirit and nature; the distinction of these two arises from the difference of the way of looking at an identical reality. In the facts of direct experience there is not the opposition of subject and object, there is not the distinction of spirit and matter; matter equals spirit, spirit equals matter, and there is only one actuality. However, the conflict of the systems of this kind of

reality, i.e., if seen from one side, the opposition of subject and object from their development, comes to appear. In other words, in the continuation of intellectual perception there is not the distinction of subject and object; however, this opposition comes to arise by means of reflection. At the time of conflict of systems of reality the aspect of their unifying function is thought of as spirit, and the aspect which opposes as its object is thought of as nature. So-called objective nature too, however, actually cannot exist apart from subjective unity, and in subjective unity as well it cannot be expected that there exists unity without the object of unity, namely, content. Both together are the same kind of reality, and merely differ in the form of their unity. Moreover, each of these which leans to one side is an abstract, incomplete reality. This kind of reality in the union of the two first becomes perfect, concrete reality. That which is the unity of spirit and nature does not unify two kinds of systems; originally they are under the identical unity.

If in this kind of reality there is not the distinction between spirit and nature and consequently there are not two kinds of unities, and only the facts of the identical direct experience themselves create various distinctions according to the way of looking at the matter, the God who is the foundation of the reality I mentioned previously must be the foundation of the facts of this direct experience, i.e., of our phenomena of consciousness. However, all of our phenomena of consciousness are things which constitute a system. Even the so-called natural phenomena which are formed according to the trans-individual unity cannot depart from this form. The self-development of a certain unifying thing is the form of all reality, and God is the unifier of this kind of reality. The relationship of the universe and God is the relationship of our phenomena of consciousness with their unity. Even as in both thought and the will mental images are unified by means of one object concept, and all

are considered as expressions of this unifying concept, God is the unifier of the universe, and the universe is the expression of God. This comparison is not merely metaphoric, it is fact. God is the greatest and ultimate unifier of our consciousness; nay, our consciousness is a part of the consciousness of God, and its unity comes from the unity of God. From the smallest, our single joy and single sorrow, to the largest, the movement of the sun, moon, and constellations—in all there is nothing which is not based on this unity. Newton and Kepler too were struck by the unity of this tremendous universal consciousness.

If this be so, what kind of a thing is God who in this sense is the unifier of the universe and the foundation of reality? That which controls spirit must be the laws of spirit. Such a thing as matter, as I have said above, is nothing more than a most shallow, abstract concept established on behalf of explanation. Spiritual phenomena are the function of so-called intelligence, emotion, and will, and that which controls them must also be the laws of intelligence, emotion, and will. And spirit is not merely the combination of these functions, but behind it there is one unifying force, and these phenomena are its expression. If we now call this unifying force personality, we must say that God is one great personality who is the foundation of the universe. From the phenomena of nature to the historical development of mankind, in each great thought there is nothing which does not have the form of a great will, and the universe we come to call the personality expression of God. However, even speaking in this way, I cannot think, as people of a certain school think, that God transcends the universe and is something like our subjective spirit possessing separately a particular thought and will apart from the advance of the universe. In God intelligence equals action and action equals intelligence; reality must be directly the thought and the will of God. (See Spinoza, *Ethica*, I Pr., 16 Schol.) Such things

as our subjective thought and will are imperfect, abstract realities arising from the conflict of various systems. We are unable to compare these kinds of things with God directly. Illingworth, in his book entitled *The Personality of God and Man*, gives three things as the elements of personality: self-awareness, freedom of the will, and love. Before one considers these three things as elements of personality, however, one must make clear what kind of facts these functions mean in practice. Self-awareness is a phenomenon which accompanies the circumstance wherein a partial system of consciousness is unified in the center of the entire consciousness. Self-awareness emerges according to reflection, and reflection of the self is the function which seeks the center of this kind of consciousness. The self does not exist outside of the unifying function of consciousness, and if this unity is changed the self too changes; apart from this such a thing as the basic substance of the self is nothing more than an empty term. We think that turning inwardly we acquire the consciousness of a kind of special self, but as the psychologists say, this is nothing more than an emotion which accompanies this unity. It is not that if there is this kind of consciousness, this unity takes place, but if there is this unity, this kind of consciousness is born. This unity itself cannot become the object of knowledge; we can become this thing and operate but we cannot know it. True self-awareness resides rather in the activity of the will and not in intellectual reflection. If there is self-awareness in the personality of God, the unity of the phenomena of this universe must be those self-awarenesses one-by-one. For example that the sum of all the angles of a triangle equals two right angles must be thought of in this way by everyone in every era. This too is one self-awareness of God. It is probably correct to say that all the ideas of universal unity which control our spirit are the self-same consciousness of God. The myriad things are established according to the unity of

God, in God everything is actuality, and God is always active. In God there is neither past nor future; time and space are born according to the universal unity of consciousness, and in God everything is the present. As Augustine has said, because time was created by God and God transcends time, God resides in the eternal now. Therefore, in God there is no reflection, there is no memory, there is no hope, and consequently there is no consciousness of a special self. Since everything is the self and apart from the self there is nothing, there is no consciousness of the self. (meaning ? Trinity !!)

Next, even in the freedom of the will there are various meanings, but true freedom must be in the sense of so-called necessary freedom which operates from the internal characteristics of the self. Not only is such a thing as a will wholly without cause indeed irrational, but this kind of a thing is an utterly accidental event in the self too, and the free behavior of the self probably cannot be felt. Since God is the basis of the myriad existences and apart from Him there is not anything which is, and the myriad things all emerge from the internal characteristics of God, He is free, and in this sense God truly is absolute freedom. If we speak in this way, perhaps it seems as if God is restricted by the characteristics of the self and loses his omnipotence, but to operate contrary to the characteristics of the self means the imperfection or the contradiction of the characteristics of the self. I think that the perfection and omniscience of God cannot stand together with His variable free will. Augustine too has stated that the will of God is unchanging and is not such a thing as one wherein at times He desires and at times He does not desire; still less is it one wherein after a previous decision He cancels it. (Conf. XII. 15) Such a thing as a selective will must accompany rather the conscious states of us imperfect men, and it is not something which we attribute to God. For example, in things wherein we have become sufficiently

proficient there is not the slightest space into which the selective will can enter, and the selective will becomes necessary in circumstances of doubt, contradiction, and conflict. Of course, as everyone says, within knowing already the fact of freedom is included; intelligence means precisely potentiality. It is not, however, that this potentiality must necessarily mean variable potentiality. Intelligence must not be used only in the case of reflection, for intuition too is intelligence. Intuition rather is true intelligence. The more intelligence becomes perfect, on the contrary, the more variable potentiality ceases. Since in this kind of God there is no variable will, i.e., voluntariness, the love of God too is not an illiberal love such as one wherein God loves a certain person and hates another person, wherein He causes a certain person to prosper and another to die. With God as the foundation of all reality, His love must be equal and universal; moreover, its self-development itself must be directly infinite love for us. Apart from the development of the myriad things of nature, there is no love of God. Originally love is the emotion which seeks unity, and the demand for self-unity is self-love, and the demand for unity of the self and another is altruism. Since the unifying function of God is directly the unifying function of all things, as Eckhardt has said, God's altruism must be precisely His self-love. Just as we love our own hands and feet so too does God love all things. Eckhardt has also stated that God's loving man is not a voluntary activity but must be that way.

As I have discussed above, even the statement that God is personal cannot be viewed directly as identical with our subjective spirit; rather it must be compared to the state of pure experience wherein there is no separation between subject and object and there is no distinction between the thing and the self. This state is truly the beginning and the end of our spirit and at the same time it is also the true aspect of reality. Even as Christ has said that the

pure in heart shall see God, and also that he who is as a little child shall enter the kingdom of heaven, at such times our heart is closest to God. Pure experience too does not merely mean perceptive consciousness. At the rear of the reflective consciousness too there is unity, and the reflective consciousness is established according to it, i.e., this too is also a kind of pure experience. At the foundation of our consciousness in every kind of circumstance there is the unity of pure experience, and we cannot jump outside of this. (See Part I.) We can view God in this sense as one great intellectual intuition at the foundation of the universe, and we can view Him as the unifier of pure experience which embraces the universe. In this way we can understand Augustine's statement that God intuitively knows all things with an unchanging intuition and that God, while still, is in motion and while in motion, is still (Storz, *Die Philosophie des Hl. Augustinus*, § 20), and we are also able to perceive the meaning of such words as Eckhardt's "Gottheit" and Boehme's "Stille ohne Wesen." All unity of consciousness transcends change and must be clearly unchanging; and change comes to arise from this, i.e., it is that which moves and does not move. Moreover, the unity of consciousness cannot become the object of knowledge, and transcends all categories; we are unable to give it any fixed form, and all things are established according to it. Thus that which we call the spirit of God, seen from one side, is extremely inscrutable, but seen from another, on the contrary, is infinitely connected with our spirit. In this foundation of the unity of consciousness we are able directly to touch the visage of God. Therefore, Boehme too said that heaven is everywhere, where you stand and where you go are all heaven, and one arrives at God through the deepest internal life. (Morgenröte.)

Certain people may say when I have discussed the matter as I have above that God becomes identical with the essence of matter,

or not comes to be decided according to whether they are rational or not. As I have stated previously, if one considers that reality is spiritual and our spirit is nothing more than a small part of it, then there is not the slightest reason to be astounded that when we break the small consciousness of the self we become aware of one great spirit. Perhaps our clinging fast to the limits of our small consciousness is instead error. I think that in great men, of necessity, there must be, as above, a far deeper spiritual experience than in ordinary men.

Chapter 4 God and the World

If we consider that the facts of pure experience are the only reality and that God is their unity, we can know also the relationship between the characteristics of God and the world from the relationship between the unity of our pure experience, i.e., the characteristics of the unity of consciousness, and its content. First of all, we are unable to see our unity of consciousness, we are unable to hear it, and it is utterly unable to become an object of knowledge. Since everything is established according to it, it is able to transcend everything. When the mind encounters black, even though it manifests black, it is not that the mind is black; when the mind encounters white, even though it manifests white, it is not that the mind is white. It goes without saying that in Buddhism it is so, but even the fact that in medieval philosophy the so-called negative theology of the school of Dionysius employed negatives in discussing God reflects this tendency. Such a man as Nicholas of Cusa stated that God transcends both being and nothingness, and while God is being, He is also nothingness. When we try to reflect deeply on the inner recesses of the consciousness of the self, we both find profound mean-

ing in the terms which Jacob Boehme previously used, such as that God is "quiet without anything," or is "*Ungrund*," or also "will without object" ("*Wille ohne Gegenstand*"), and we also are struck by a feeling of a kind of sublime inscrutability. In addition, such things as God's eternity, omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence, all must be interpreted from the characteristics of the unity of consciousness. Since time and space are established according to the unity of consciousness, God transcends time and space, is eternal and indestructible, and there is no place where He is not. Since everything is born from the unity of consciousness, God is omniscient and omnipotent, there is nothing He does not know, and there is nothing He cannot do, and in God knowledge and ability are identical.

If this be so, what kind of a thing is the relationship of the above kind of absolute and infinite God with this world? Nothingness separated from being is not true nothingness; the one separated from the all is not the true one; equality separated from distinction is not true equality. In the same way that if there is no God there is no world, if there is no world there is no God. Of course, when I here say the world, I do not mean only this world of ours. Since, as Spinoza has said, the "attributes" of God are infinite, God must include infinite worlds. However, the universal expressions are things which must belong to the essence of God and are certainly not accidental functions; and it is not that God previously created the world once but that He is its eternal creator. (Hegel.) In short, the relationship between God and the world is the relationship between the unity of consciousness and its content. The content of consciousness is established according to unity, but also apart from the content of consciousness there is not anything which is unity. It is not that the content of consciousness and its unity are two things, that which is unified and that which unifies, but that they are nothing more than two sides of the same reality. All phenomena

of consciousness in their state of direct experience are only one activity, but by reflecting on them as objects of knowledge, their content is variously analyzed and distinguished. If we speak from the process of its development, first of all, the content of the whole, that which has appeared impulsively as one activity, by contradiction and conflict is reflected upon and discerned. At this point I am unable not to recall the words of Boehme; he stated that by means of God's reflecting on Himself, i.e., making a mirror of Himself prior to the revelation which we must call the will without an object, subjectivity and objectivity are separated, and from this, God and the world develop.

Originally the differentiation of reality and its unity were one and not that which must be two. It meant on the one hand unity and on the other differentiation. For example, in a tree a blossom's perfect "blossom-ness" and a leaf's perfect "leaf-ness" express the essence of a tree. The above distinction is merely in the realm of our thought and is not one of direct actuality. Just as Goethe has stated that nature possesses neither kernel nor shell and that all is simultaneously kernel and shell ("*Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale, alles ist sie mit einemale*"), in the facts of concrete reality, i.e., direct experience, differentiation and unity are a single activity. For example, in one painting or in the notes of one musical piece, in all the brush strokes and all the sounds, there is not one which does not express directly the spirit of the whole, and in the painter or musician that which is one feeling, immediately overflowing, becomes a landscape of a thousand changes and ten thousand transformations, or becomes a complicated musical piece. In this kind of situation God is precisely the world and the world is precisely God. As Goethe has said in his poem entitled "How Great is Diana of the Ephesians," we can say that rather than those who became excited over an abstract God in the brain of man, it was instead the

silversmiths who, while with all their hearts they were making silver images of Diana and did not consider the teaching of Paul, in a certain sense were in contact with the true God. As Eckhardt has stated, at the place where we have lost even God do we see the true God. In the above situation heaven and earth are merely one finger, and the myriad things are one body with the self, but as I have stated before, seen from one side, by the conflicts of the system of reality, and seen from another, as the necessary process of its development, there comes about the disintegration of this system of reality, i.e., that which is so-called reflection must arise. By means of this, that which was actuality becomes conceptual, that which was concrete becomes abstract, and that which was one becomes many. Herein, if on the one hand there is God, on the other there is the world, and if on the one hand there is the self, on the other there is the thing, and it comes about that each is relative to the other and that one thing goes against the other. Even the story that our ancestors, having eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, were expelled from God's paradise probably elucidates this truth. The fall of man occurred not only in the distant past of Adam and Eve but occurs, moment by moment, within our hearts. But if we try to think differently, it is not that there are separately such functions as disintegration and reflection, for each is nothing more than the development of a one-sided differentiation function of this unity. Behind disintegration and reflection is included the possibility of an even more profound unity, and reflection is the road to attaining a profound unity. (There is the expression, "A good man will still die; what then shall one say of an evil one?") God in expressing His deepest unity must first be greatly disintegrated. Man, if seen from one side, is directly the self-awareness of God. If we employ the terms of the legends of Christianity, precisely because there was the fall of Adam, is there the salvation of Christ, and consequently

the infinite love of God has become manifest.

Now, from considering in the above way the relationship of the world and God, how must we explain our individuality? If we consider all things as an expression of God, and only God is the true reality, must we think that such a thing as our individuality is a sham appearance and a thing wholly without significance like a bubble? I think we do not necessarily have to think in this way. Of course, there is probably not a thing such as individuality independent and separate from God. Because of this, however, our individuality is not something which must be considered as an utter phantasm, and on the contrary we are able to consider it as a part of the development of God, i.e., we are able to view it as one of His differentiating functions. Just as all men were born with a mission given to each by God, so too our individuality is something which differentiates divinity, and the development of each thus perfects the development of God. In this sense we are able to say that our individuality possesses eternal life and performs eternal development. (See Royce's discussion of the indestructibility of the soul.) The relationship between God and our individual consciousness is the relationship between the entirety of consciousness and a part of it. While in all spiritual phenomena each part stands under the unity of the whole, each must be an independent consciousness. (In spiritual phenomena each part is an "end in itself.") To say that all things are an expression of a single God does not necessarily negate the self-conscious independence of each man. For example, while our moment-by-moment consciousness lies under individual unity, when each one can also be used as an independent consciousness, it is general. Illingworth has stated that one personality of necessity seeks another personality, for in another personality the self acquires the satisfaction of the complete personality, i.e., love is the distinctive feature which must not be lacking in personality. (Illingworth,

Personality Human and Divine.) To recognize another personality is precisely to recognize the personality of the self; in this way the relationship whereby everyone mutually recognizes personality is precisely love, and, seen from one aspect, it is the union of two personalities. While in love two personalities respect each other, and are mutually independent, they are also joined, constituting one personality. If we think in this way, we are able to say that since God is infinite love, while He includes all personalities, He recognizes the independence of all personalities.

Next the criticism against such a pantheistic idea as the one that all things are an expression of God lies in how one is able to explain the origin of evil. My system of thought leads me to say that originally there was nothing which we must call absolutely evil, that all things in their origin are good, and that reality is precisely good. Although religious leaders exhaust themselves in expounding the evils of the flesh, fleshly desires are certainly not absolute evil but merely become evil in that they hinder spiritual betterment. Moreover, as the ethicists of the theory of evolution contend, that which today we denominate sin, in certain eras was morality. In other words, we can say that it is a legacy of the morality of the past and becomes evil merely because it is not suited to the present era. If this be so, it is not that there is originally something which is evil in the thing itself, but that evil arises from the contradictions and conflicts of the system of reality. And if we ask from what arises this thing which is conflict, we can say that it is something which is based in the differentiating function of reality, and is one necessary condition of the development of reality, and that reality develops according to contradiction and conflict. Just as Mephistopheles, while always seeking evil, said he was a part of the force which always creates good, it is correct to say that evil is one element which constructs the universe. Of course it is obvious that since evil is not

pression that the gods too are unable to change the past. But Christ showed how even the most ordinary sinner is easily able to do this. When the prodigal son of the parable knelt and wept, Wilde states that Christ said that he, the young man, made the sins and sufferings of his past into the most beautiful and divine events of his life. Wilde was a man of sin; thus, he well knew the essence of sin.

Chapter 5 Intelligence and Love

This one chapter is not written as a continuation of this work. However, since I feel that it is related to the thought of this work, I have decided to append it here.

Intelligence and love are usually thought of as utterly different spiritual functions. I think, however, that they are certainly not things of different kinds but originally are the identical spiritual function. If this be so, and if we ask what kind of spiritual function it is, in a word it is that of the union of subject and object. It is the function wherein the self merges with the thing. Why is intelligence the union of subject and object? Our knowing the true aspect of things is first possible when, having utterly extinguished the fantasies and speculations of the self, i.e., the so-called subjective things, we have merged with the true aspect of things, that is, when we have merged with pure objectivity. For example, to say that the gray places in the bright moon are a rabbit pounding rice cakes or that an earthquake is a large catfish moving under the earth is subjective fancy. However, when in the studies of astronomy and geology we investigate the problems, casting aside utterly this kind of subjective fancy and following purely objective natural laws, thereby we are first able to arrive at the true aspect of these phenomena. The more we become objective, the more we are able to

know the true aspect of things. The history of the advance of learning over these past several thousand years indicates the road whereby we human beings, casting aside subjectivity, have come to follow objectivity. Next, I should like to speak about why love is the union of subject and object. Our loving a thing means our casting aside the self and merging with the other. When the self and the other are united and there is not the slightest space between them, for the first time true love arises. Our loving a flower is the self's uniting with the flower. Our loving the moon is our uniting with the moon. When a parent merges with his child and a child merges with his parent, here for the first time the love of parent and child arises. Since the parent has merged with the child, each advantage and disadvantage of the child is felt as if it were the advantage and disadvantage of the self, and since the child has merged with the parent, each joy and sadness of the parent is felt as if it were the joy and sadness of the self. The more we cast aside the selfishness of the self and become purely objective, i.e., unselfish, the greater and deeper does love become. From the love of parent and child, and husband and wife, one advances to the love of friends, and from the love of friends one advances to the love of mankind. The love of the Buddha extended even to birds and beasts, grasses and trees.

In this way, intelligence and love are the identical spiritual function. Thus, in knowing a thing, we must love it, and in loving a thing, we must know it. Since mathematicians, casting away the self, love mathematical principles and become one with the mathematical principles themselves, they are easily able to clarify them. Artists love nature, become one with nature, and by submerging the self within nature, they are first able to penetrate its truth. Moreover, if we try to think from another aspect, since we know our friend, we love him. The more our circumstances are the same, the

more our thoughts and tastes are the same, and the deeper we understand each other, the richer our sympathy becomes. If we think, separating these two functions, however, that love is the result of intelligence and intelligence is the result of love, we have not yet acquired the true aspect of love and intelligence. Intelligence is love and love is intelligence. For example, when we are absorbed in that which the self likes, we are almost unconscious. Forgetting the self, only an inscrutable power above the self operates loftily alone. At this time there is neither subject nor object but rather a true union of subject and object. At this time intelligence equals love and love equals intelligence. When the heart is captured by the sublimity of mathematical principles, and forgetting sleeping and eating, one is immersed in them, while the self knows mathematical principles, it is loving them. Again when with regard to the joys and sorrows of another person, there is absolutely no distinction between the self and the other and we feel in the self directly what the other person feels, laughing together and weeping together, at this time we are loving the other person and we also are knowing him. Love is to intuit the emotions of the other person. When one saves a child who is about to fall into a pond, even the thought that he is adorable does not have the space to arise.

Usually we say that love is emotion and must be distinguished from pure intelligence. Among spiritual phenomena in actuality, however, there is neither pure intelligence nor pure emotion. This kind of distinction is nothing more than an abstract concept which psychologists have created for academic convenience. Even as theoretical research must be maintained by means of a kind of emotion, in loving another a kind of intuition must become its foundation. In my view, ordinary intelligence is knowledge of an impersonal object. Even if the object be personal, it is knowledge of the time when one views it as impersonal. In contradistinction

to this, love is knowledge of a personal object; even if the object be impersonal, it is knowledge of the time when one views it as personal. It is correct to say that the difference between the two lies not in the spiritual functions themselves but rather is based on the kind of object. And if, as in the past many scholars and philosophers have said, the basic substance of the reality of the universe is something personal, love is the power to seize the basic substance of reality. It is the deepest knowledge of a thing. The knowledge of analysis and reasoning is superficial knowledge of a thing and cannot seize reality itself. We are only able to attain it according to love. Love is the zenith of intelligence.

Having discoursed briefly above on the relationship between intelligence and love, I now should like to think about this relationship in connection with the facts of religion. Subjectivity is *jiriki* (self-power), objectivity is *tariki* (other-power). Our knowing a thing and loving a thing mean casting away *jiriki* and entering into the faith of *tariki*. If we consider that the work of a man's whole life is nothing other than intelligence and love, we are daily working in the realm of *tariki* faith. Both learning and morality are all the glory of the Buddha, and that which we call religion is the consummation of these functions. Learning and morality in their individual, distinctive phenomena are bathed in this *tariki* glory, but religion in the realm of the entire universe touches the absolute, infinite Buddha himself. Such expressions as, "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt," and, "Calling the Buddha's name is truly not a means of being born in paradise, nor is it a way of not falling into hell; rather in everything it is that we do not know," are the secret of religion. And to know this absolute, infinite Buddha or God is only possible by loving Him, and to love Him is precisely to know Him. The teachings of the Vedas of India, the Neo-Platonic school,

and the Holy Gateway of Buddhism speak of knowing Him, while Christianity and the Pure Land Sect speak of loving Him and relying on Him. It is not that each does not have its special features, but in their essence they are identical. God is not someone who must be known according to analysis and reasoning. If we consider that the essence of reality is a personal thing, God is that which is most personal. Our knowing God is possible only through the intuition of love or faith. Therefore, we who say we do not know God but who only love Him and believe in Him are the ones who are most able to know God.

made identical. In *A Study of Good* there is a naïveté wherein this critical reflection is still lacking. In short *A Study of Good* is nothing other than a psychology of pure experience which still stops at the position of direct *experience* where subject and object are united. This is the limit of *A Study of Good*. Such a unity of things which are basically distinguished is not mere *direct* unity but rather a unity through *negation*. Such an identification through negation or an identity of the distinctions cannot be founded by a mere psychology of pure experience. The basic principle of the *distinction* and *development* of the *various aspects* of pure experience is insufficient in mere pure experience. For that, the *logic* of pure experience, and not the psychology of pure experience, is necessary. In short, the subject-matter of *A Study of Good* could not be fully contained within the concept of pure experience. For this reason Nishida's main problem thereafter lay in the development of a logic which would provide the foundation for the basic distinction between the identity of subject and object which are *not yet* divided on the one hand and the identity of subject and object which are *no longer* divided on the other, and the self-identity of both these through that very distinction. As is already clear, a dialectical logic is here anticipated.

Nishida gradually became aware of this question through the purification, deepening, and effectivation of the basic concepts of *A Study of Good*.

The previously-mentioned psychologism in *A Study of Good*, however, was also the general intellectual current in philosophy at that time. After this work Nishida encountered Bergson's idea of pure duration, felt like-minded, and by means of it he refined his own concept of pure experience; at the same time, through his encounter with the newly-founded neo-Kantian school (H. Cohen, Windelband, and Rickert) and its critical-logical method he found the opportunity

philosophical thinking from the very beginning until the very end, but he treated it as a major theme in his last work. However, that which particularly constituted the foundation of his entire thought and his basic motive was *Zen* intuition—or the Eastern way of thinking which is idealized through it. As stated before, however, he endeavored to develop this method of thought logically as a philosophy linked with Western tradition. In order to achieve this goal he had to develop new categories which transcended all of the traditional categories of Western philosophy, and also a new logic. Pure experience as well, which is the basic concept of *A Study of Good*, as stated above, was already a thing possessing a character which in its foundation was originally linked with *Zen* intuition. To deepen and extend his grasp according to this Eastern intuition, to add reflection upon the logical reflection which had Western philosophy as its intermediary, and to develop all of this logically was the goal of his entire thought. Accordingly, he tried to include in philosophy also what in the West, perhaps as mysticism and as the limit of philosophical thought, philosophy stops short of; the organization of a vast system, wherein Western science and philosophy too were able to maintain their own positions, i.e., the development of a philosophy which included religious and mystical elements and at the same time rational science—such was the ultimate design of Nishida's philosophy. Because of this, Nishida's intellectual development indeed possesses varied stages and aspects, the problems are divergent and varied, and his vigorous and indefatigable thought which piled investigation on investigation was indeed colossal. Therefore his thought after *A Study of Good* not only was extremely difficult but had to be difficult. Probably it is more difficult than the thought of any Western philosopher, even that of Plotinus and Hegel. And yet because of those elements wherein Nishida's philosophy has attempted to make a new contribution from the East to the philosophy

of the world, we hope for the patience of the Western reader. In *A Study of Good*, however, the reader will probably be able to understand the general character and intention of Nishida's philosophy and its problems and methods. As we have repeatedly said, however, this is a work of his first period, and it must be remembered rather that his thought, with this as a starting-point, continued its development unceasingly for forty years thereafter until his death, and he overcame, by himself, the naïveté which exists in this work.

IV

Since Nishida's works after *A Study of Good* were all essays or studies and since with each work he continued the development and deepening of his thought, it is impossible to summarize them briefly. Nishida compared himself to a miner. The grading, scouring, and ordering of the excavated matter he entrusted to his successors. Thus, to organize his later thought thoroughly is extremely difficult. We shall here have to content ourselves with merely sketching some aspects of this thought development in a very simplified form.

It may be said in passing that the form of these later works is quite unique. Nishida always thought by writing. His essays indeed constitute a journal of his meditation. They are, as it were, his monologues or dialogues with himself. Like a musical theme, the basic theme is repeated and emphasized many times over, and while executing variations and performing spiral rotations continues to ascend. Happily, two representative articles, and an essay, concerning Goethe, of Nishida's later period have recently been translated into English by Dr. Robert Schinzinger, Professor at Gakushūin University; a superb introduction is attached to it. We hope the reader will refer to it.*

* Nishida Kitarō, *Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness*, translated and introduced by Robert Schinzinger, 1958, Maruzen Co. Ltd., Tokyo.

In Nishida's second systematic work, *Intuition and Reflection in the Consciousness of the Self* (1917), the "pure experience" of *A Study of Good* has been expanded and deepened into "self-awareness" (consciousness of the self). Nishida's self-awareness is the consciousness wherein that which knows and that which is known are together identical as the self. This work attempts to explain such self-awareness as a truly concrete and ultimate thing and all things as various aspects and developments of it. With such an idea as a basis, he tried to clarify, by means of the form of self-awareness, the development from pure logic to that of mathematics, and further to experience; moreover, he advanced through this research to epistemological problems concerning such relationships as that of thought and existence, meaning and fact, and consciousness and object, and further to metaphysical problems concerning such relationships as that between matter and life, and body and mind, and tried to understand all of these as aspects of the development of the system of self-awareness. Nishida, at the end of this work, recognized the ultimate character of self-awareness as "absolute free will." That is to say, he considered "the consciousness of the self" (jikaku) as a more basic and ultimate thing than subject and object and their opposition, but he considered the basic substance of that "self" as absolute free will. True will is no longer able to be reflected upon; for will transcends reflection and is that which causes reflection. This kind of will is the true self. That by the function of remembrance we are able to make the entire past the present, and similarly that by the process of imagination we are also able to make the future the present mean that we are able to transcend time: this is solely dependent upon free will. The center of the will, i.e., the self, is always the present. It is "the eternal now." In the will all experiential content is unified in an active state. It is straightforwardly active. The will is creative,

but it does not only advance ahead, for at the same time it also turns backward. Bergson thought that in the "pure duration" of consciousness one cannot return to a moment of the past, but according to Nishida, this is not a *living* pure duration. Living duration is unrestricted expansion and contraction, and must be something which is able to turn in any direction. In Nishida absolute free will is of this kind, and while on the one hand it is unlimited development, on the other it is "the eternal now." The will is that which *determines* every thing, and there is not anything which determines the will. If the will is determined, it already is not a living will. The will is not controlled by cause and effect, for since it is that which composes cause and effect it is absolutely free. "The will came from creative nothingness and returns to creative nothingness." Dionysius the Areopagite's statement, "While God is everything, He is not anything," is directly applicable to the will. In the true creative action, where there is no discursive thought whatsoever included but all is absolutely immediate, there is absolute free will, there there is unlimited reality, there one is in contact with the will of God. "Only abundant and profound reality can fall into error and evil. *Unde ardet, inde lucet.*" The book concludes with these words.

From this standpoint of absolute free will, Nishida further wrote *The Problem of Consciousness* (1920) and *Art and Morality* (1923).

We must note here that both Nishida's "self-awareness" and his "absolute free will," like his "pure experience," are not of merely psychological and epistemological meaning, but of metaphysical, existential, and even methodological meaning also. It is not that he confused these various meanings but rather that he intended to unify all these components.

Since Nishida's thought does not consider either subject or

object, or even their opposition, as basic things, but seeks for something more basic and more concrete, and from this attempts to comprehend subject, object, and their opposition too, both "pure experience" and "self-consciousness," which is its expansion and deepening, and furthermore even "absolute free will" too have still not wholly emerged from a psychological, subjective character. Thus Nishida further made every effort to extricate himself from this subjective bias. Of course this did not mean that he turned to an objective position, but rather, without leaning towards either subjectivity or objectivity, that he aimed for a position which transcends both.

Nishida finally arrived at the idea of "place" (*basho*) as a solution. This concept had been suggested by Aristotle's "*Hypo-keimenon*," but the *idea* of "place" itself, however, is nothing other than the result of the thoroughness of Nishida's own thought up until that time. It was developed during the creation of his epoch-making work, *From the Acting to the Seeing* (1927). Since "absolute free will" is will of the kind that "comes from creative nothingness and returns to creative nothingness," it itself should possess the character of "nothingness." If not, one cannot yet establish it as truly absolute free will. Therefore, absolute will itself must further be taken as being in its foundation "a certain *place wherein*" everything else exists. Nishida caused this to transcend subjectivity completely and named it "the place of nothingness." By means of this, the absolute will, or the "self," which until then had been considered as ultimate, becomes "place" possessing the character of "nothingness." All things are things *therein*, or, contrariwise, all things are the self-determination of "place." (*selbst bestimmen*) Radically speaking, absolute free will too exists in it, or rather therein it first is able to be absolutely free will and is able to be absolutely free. Nishida previously stated that Western

philosophers only treat the passive consciousness ("Bewusstes") and overlook the active consciousness. In this idea of "place" an Eastern character is plainly expressed. "In contradistinction to Western culture which considers form as existence and formation as good, the urge to see the form of the formless, and hear the sound of the soundless lies at the foundation of Eastern culture. I wish to give a philosophical basis to this kind of urge." Nishida stated the above in the preface to this book.

However, we particularly wish to note here that this idea of "place" is not dogmatically Eastern, but it was developed *through* Kant's epistemology—indeed through a critique of Kant's already extremely critical epistemology itself—and was rather established as an effectivation of it. Kant conceived of "transcendental apperception" or "*Bewusstsein überhaupt*" as the basis which makes possible objective natural cognition, but this, however, is nothing more than the subject which makes merely objective knowledge possible. And yet we are actually conscious of emotion and the will which are *subjective* in their *essence*; the basis which makes this possible can no longer be "*Bewusstsein überhaupt*." Much less then is it able to be the basis which makes possible the historical world wherein the self itself is an actor and *cannot* be merely an observer, and the religious world which is the place of our own life and death. And these are all *events* which we actually experience; that which makes these events possible is no longer mere subject such as "*Bewusstsein überhaupt*" in opposition to object. That which is able to be conceived of as that *wherein* both subject and object do exist, and *therein* consciousness itself as well is established, and thus both subjectivity and objectivity are transcended, is precisely "place." "Place" is neither objective existence nor subjective existence; since it is that *wherein* both worlds "are placed," and since it is that *wherein* all existences—of course objective existence, but even subjective ex-

istence which can never be objectified—"are placed," then "place" is not existence, it is nothingness. This, however, is not nothingness in opposition to existence, i.e. *relative* nothingness, for since it is that *wherein all* existences appear as determinations (*Bestimmen*) of it, it is *absolute nothingness*. All existences become self-determination of this kind of absolute nothingness. Herein Nishida freed himself completely from subjectivism, and attained the most basic ultimate principle which combines perfectly that which is subjective with that which is objective.

Hereby Nishida grasped in "place" the systematic principle which includes all existences and cognition, this principle of a system which includes also that which usually is called mysticism. Nishida named his own philosophical system "the self-conscious system of absolute nothingness." It was that which attempts to understand all things as the self-determination of "place" or of absolute nothingness. To consider nothingness as the base of existence is a traditional idea unique to the East, and even though it is considered as mystical as far as Western thought is concerned, for Eastern thought rather it has even become a commonplace way of thinking. Nishida attempted to construct this "mysticism" as philosophy. To do this he had to be able to fix this mysticism conceptually and logically. By means of the idea of "place" Nishida found the clue towards laying the foundation for this position logically.

Already the pure experience of *A Study of Good* was the foundation of both subjectivity and objectivity, and since the two were interpreted as its differentiation, pure experience included the two, and there had been indicated "a certain universal entity" which determines them. We can recognize this kind of character in "self-awareness" and "absolute free will" as well. The final "place" most straightforwardly expresses the character of this all-inclusive universality. Aristotle, taking the structure of connotative judg-

ment as the clue, defined substance as that which becomes subject and does not become predicate. If this be so, true substance is nothing other than the *individuum* as limit, which has utterly determined generality. The *individuum* is not wholly determined by any generality whatsoever, for to the extent that it is determined by a generality it is a *specific*, and is not yet an *individuum*. Instead the *individuum* must positively be thought of as that which *cannot* be determined by generality, but rather as that which conversely determines generality, as that which rather cannot be determined by anything, but as that which determines itself. The *individuum* as the indeterminable is essentially *irrational*. The freedom as the nature of the *individuum* can be herein established. Freedom is truly freedom only when it is *free to* the good as well as *free to* evil. Nishida said: "An *individuum* is first an *individuum* only when it is in opposition to an *individuum*." I am I in opposition to you, just as you are first you in opposition to me. In order to lay the logical foundation for the thought that truly makes the *individuum* possible, Nishida, contrary to Aristotle, sought that which becomes only the predicate of connotative judgment and never becomes subject. The final transcendental generality which has been pushed forward unlimitedly in this direction of the predicate is utterly undetermined, absolute nothingness as that which can no longer be determined by any predicate whatsoever. This is Nishida's so-called "place of absolute nothingness."

This "place of absolute nothingness," however, is the most abundant thing as the final predicate including within itself all content. It is the so-called "dazzling obscurity." This kind of place of absolute nothingness is first able to determine the individual. Nishida called such generality "dialectical generality." The self-determination of the individual is namely the self-determination of the dialectical generality as absolute nothingness. This is the logic

of the ancient Eastern expression, "to see the form of the formless and to hear the sound of the soundless." Thus Nishida's philosophy was formulized as "the system of the self-consciousness of absolute nothingness," and the logic which took "the self-identity of absolute contradictions" as its basic principle was developed. Herein the dialectical method which had always been anticipated at the foundation of Nishida's thought appeared completely at the forefront.

The dialectical method, as Hegel has made clear, at the same time that it is the law of thought is also the law of existence. Yet Nishida's dialectical method is even more dialectical than that of Hegel. Tanabe Hajime (Professor Emeritus of Kyoto University) has developed it more critically in his own way.

In the last stage of Nishida's philosophy the "pure experience" of *A Study of Good* becomes "the historical world." "World" is the concrete expression of "place." The self is the self in the world, it is born *from* the world and dies *into* the world. Both the thought and activity of the self are all determined by the world, and yet the self is the self only when it is not determined by another. Thus, that the self is determined by the world is at the same time the fact that the self determined itself. That the self is determined by the world is at the same time the fact that the self itself determines the world. It is the self-identity of absolute contradictions. At the same time that historical events in the historical world are events in our spontaneousness, they are nothing other than events wherein the world determines itself. Our thought and activity are things which arise from ourselves, and yet the fact that they are evoked by the world and that the self determines them is simultaneously that they *are determined*. Things which are absolutely contradictory are identical. *At the same time that* the world is transcendent of everything it is the thing in which all things are founded by it. This is the fact of things which are absolutely mutually opposed

being identical. Nishida interprets the world of reality, i.e., the historical world, as the self-determination of this kind of absolute nothingness. The natural world as well is included within the historical world as its abstract aspect. Nishida, from this standpoint, developed a final system which includes the basic problems of philosophy, science, morality, art, and religion.

As has here been made clear, while Nishida's philosophy is a theory of epistemology, it is equal to the task of being a philosophy of religion. The logic of "place" in its final stage is a logic of religion. We can even say rather that Nishida's self-identity of absolute contradictions has its prototype in the religious self-awareness of the self. The problems of religion lie in the problems of the self. The problems of the self in religion, however, do not reside in anticipating the existence of the self as an established fact and in clarifying the ethics of how this self must act and how it must be, but rather in considering as problems the very existence and essence of this self itself and in considering as a problem the foundation of the self's existence itself. The self's existence is an existence towards death—it is an absolute contradictory existence. The work of man's life is work towards death; the satisfaction of desire is the extinction of desire, and the will makes the extinction of the will its object. Man's existence is full of contradiction. In our knowing this fact we become aware of the nothingness of desire and life. In this awareness we first come in contact with that which is eternal and absolute. Herein is religion established. In the awareness that the absolute contradictoriness and nothingness of the self's existence themselves are the reasons for the existence of the self—in the eternal death of the self—we first, on the contrary, touch the absolute and touch God. In Nishida's philosophy the relationship between God and man is not one of correspondence but of *counter-correspondence*. The religious awareness that the *raison d'être* of the self lies in the absolute contradictoriness of the self is that which is ultimate

in the self. The logic of the self-identity of absolute contradictions of Nishida's philosophy is indeed this logic of religion. Moreover, in this religious awareness there is true or absolute freedom. This freedom resides in that of the kind described by Rinzai: "Everywhere I become the Lord; wherever I stand is all the truth." In this way, the ultimate standpoint of religion is the standpoint of everyday life. It is *eschatological* everyday life.

The above statement constitutes literally only *some* aspects of Nishida's philosophy, and we regret that we have been unable to touch upon many important ideas and concepts. Particularly in such concepts as "acting intuition," "poiesis," and "historical body," and in the ideas concerning art and morality there are elements which are extremely creative and rich in insight.

The idea of absolute nothingness is probably the most difficult one for the Western reader to understand. In the East, however, it is rather a common way of thought. In Western religion God is the highest *existence*, and in general the base of existence is existence. In Mahāyāna Buddhism of the East, however, to adhere to existence is *ignorance*. Christ is resurrected, but the Buddha is not. In the West, that which has transcended life is eternal *life*—as before. In the East, the transcendence of life is the transcendence of *life* and death, and it is not merely eternal *life*. In Western philosophy idealism and materialism are opposed, but in the East there is the tradition of *insentience* (*no-mind*) which makes of matter, naturally, and of even spirit itself nothingness. In art too Eastern paintings do not aim at the expression of the real form of things; and even if they do portray the form of things, they do not portray the things themselves; by means of them they express the soul, but this soul is nothing other than the formless world. On the surface of the canvas the blank spaces dominate. These blank spaces are wholly different things from the *backgrounds* of Western paintings. Instead, the blank spaces are expressed by the form of

the things portrayed. If we speak more plainly, the form of things expresses the blank spaces. In the famous Eastern poem there is the line: "One bird gives a cry and the mountains become more quiet." In this situation the sound is negation of sound and rather expresses silence; sound expresses no-sound. Even though we say we express our spirit, that spirit is not one *opposed* to matter or nature. In the East nature is not *objectivity*. In Japan's traditional verse form of the *haiku* the "season" (*ki*) is an element which must not be lacking. This suggests that we sing of the spirit which has become one body with nature. In Japanese poetry spirit itself which is independent of, or in opposition to, nature, has never been expressed crudely and directly. This way of feeling, this way of thinking, and this way of life are the *everyday experiences* of Easterners. The Eastern concept of "spirit" is indeed unique. Nishida's philosophy is motivated by this Eastern experience. Even that which in the West is said to be mystical in the East is often commonplace.

It was always in Nishida's thought to make his philosophy philosophy in universality. Because of this, the philosophical efforts of his entire life were directed towards the development of the logic of this Eastern experience. Almost all the technical terms of his later thought evolved from this logical motivation. And yet the proper function of Nishida's philosophy does not consist merely in a regional Eastern peculiarity, but in the philosophical development of Eastern wisdom in universality. Of course philosophy becomes philosophy only in universality. And just as previously Christian ideas newly contributed, within the historical tradition of philosophy which began in Greece, elements which had not existed in Greek philosophy, we hope that Nishida's philosophy contributes from the East something which exists neither in Greek nor Christian philosophy. Absolute nothingness is doubtless one of the most important of these ideas.



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